
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
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
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
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
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Karen Bettez Halnon

Poor Chic: The Rational Consumption of Poverty

Introduction

Poor Chic refers to an array of fads and fashions in popular culture that make recreational or stylish – and often expensive – 'fun' of poverty, or of traditional symbols of working class and underclass statuses. Earlier historical examples of Poor Chic are 1920s Harlem 'white slumming parties', 1960s Levi blue jeans, Parisian costume balls where the rich adorned themselves in expensive rags, and Marie Antoinette's 15-cottage ornamented *Hameau* farm. Poor Chic can be compared with practices such as playing Indian, black face minstrelsy, and drag that involve privileged members of society impersonating down the social ladder of stratification. However, what is distinctive about Poor Chic today is that 'lower class' masquerade is now center stage in the historical theatre of downward impersonation, and is a phenomenon that takes place in the contexts of the increasing and extreme polarization of classes (Bauman, 2000, 2001); consumer society (Baudrillard, 1998; Lee, 2000; Ritzer, 1996); class-stratified consumer cultures (Bourdieu, 1984; Featherstone, 2000; Gottdiener, 2000); a zeitgeist of fluid, mutable, or unbounded self-stylization with a subject (Dunn, 2000; Giddens, 1991) and without (Gergen, 1991; Baudrillard, 1996); travel and vacationing as standard staples of social life and measures of social worth (Bauman, 2000; Urry, 1990); and more generally, in a society organized, in large part, on a highly rational fast-food model, McDonald's being a prototype (Ritzer, 1996; Ritzer, 1998).

Below I begin by demonstrating the pervasiveness of Poor Chic in popular culture in the United States and internationally, emphasizing multiple poverty symbols across numerous fads and fashions, and by explaining how poverty symbols, while stereotypical, are representative of lower class status and have referents in the material realities of poverty. Poor Chic is further explained as an objectification of poverty that obscures itself through the fragmentation of a 'class script' over multiple fads and fashions.

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Next, drawing on Thorstein Veblen's work, I explain how 'conspicuous consumption' (or wasteful spending) and work abstention are no longer regarded as reliable indicators of upper class status in contemporary society, and how some theorists claim that 'lifestyle' consumption has displaced consumption as a means of displaying class status. Challenging the reductionism of 'lifestyle' theorists, I explain and extend Zygmunt Bauman's distinction between postmodern 'tourists and vagabonds', arguing that consuming the 'vagabond', or what Bauman describes as the fearful 'alter ego' of the tourist, is not only a method of addressing fears of descending into vagabondage, but also a new means of class-distinguishing wasteful consumption. Using George Ritzer's conceptualization of McTourism as guide, I delineate how Poor Chic protects against sliding into poverty through the rational (controlled, efficient, predictable, and calculable) consumption of it.

Poor Chic

Poor Chic pervades contemporary popular culture. It is found in Rachel Ashwell's Shabby Chic house furnishing style based on refurbishing flea market purchases (Ashwell with Costin, 1996), in *Better Homes and Gardens Flea Market Decorating* (Ingham, 2000), and in Melbourne's trendy 'op shop' 'trash-and-treasure jumble sale(s)' and its Salvation Army store shopping up by $10 million in just the last year (Heinrich, 2002). Vintage clothes by west London 'secondhand stylist' Jeff Ihenacho are popular with his celebrity customers such as Kate Moss, Naomi Campbell, Bette Midler, and Winona Ryder (Gunn, 2002).

Since the mid-1990s Poor Chic is featured in high fashion, such as Calvin Klein's, 1996–1997 'heroin chic' advertising campaign where supermodels posed as emaciated, strung-out junkies and House of Dior's 2000 lines of 'hobo chic' and 'asylum attire' (de Quetteville, 2000; Dowd, 2000). London and Paris 2002 fashion trends 'Gangsta' and 'Rough Stuff'; Christian Dior's 2001 $35 'laddered' (i.e. torn-up) hosiery (Murphy, 2001); Yves Saint Laurent's Rive Gauche 2001 collection of 'gipsy meets peasant luxe look' (Alexander, 2001); Xuly Bet's 'street-person chic' and the designer clothes of Rei Kawakubo of Comme des Garçons ('who does a poor-girl look that only a rich one could afford') (Donnally, 1993) serve as additional examples.

Poor Chic is found in a variety of other forms. It is found in the mainstreaming of tattooing as 'body art' since the 1980s (Camphausen, 1997; Hewitt, 1997; Sanders, 1989) and in Rich Urban Biking, or when white-collar professionals take 'wild' weekend excursions on their loaded BMW, Harley, and Indian motorcycles (Harrington, 1993; McCabe, 1996). It is found in Emo style, ally to punk music heavy with emotion. The poverty props for this act include wearing gas station jackets, short undersized pants, 'thin, too

small polyester button-ups', 'too small cardigans and v-neck sweaters', and 'anorexic thinness' aided by veganism (http://www.pcweb.net/fourfa/fashion.htm). Poor Chic is also found in the enormous popularity of WWF (World Wrestling Federation) over the past four years, and in the fact that wrestling now constitutes the single most popular spectator sport among American youth today (PBS, 2001). It is also found amidst 13 million body builders working out in 5000 health clubs in the United States since the early 1980s (Reed, 1981). The wide popularity of Kenneth Cole, Steve Madden, and House of Prada designer bowling shoes that range between $94 and $330 (Biuso, 2001; Wilkins, 2000) and pink flamingos (see, for example, http://collector-connection.site.yahoo.net/flamingos.html) serve as more specific examples.

We find Poor Chic in numerous slum and underclass fads and fashions, such as Rio's 'shantytown chic' funk balls and on the catwalks of São Paulo where 'leggy models parade favela fashions, including skintight "Gang Jeans" selling for $200 a pop. Local companies even offer popular favela tours.' Catching on beyond Brazil, 'In Paris, a nightclub called Favela Chic celebrates the rhythms and cuisine of Brazil's slums' (Faiola, 2001). A continent away, wealthy white 'gutter punks', amidst real homelessness (and real 'gutter punks'), beg for money, sleep in parks, and otherwise 'act poor' at the fringes of New Orleans' Bourbon Street area (Field notes, 20 October 2000). A few years earlier, white middle class suburban girls in California were choosing identities as 'cholita' or Mexican 'gangsta girl' (Bernstein, 1995). Today in the United States millions of white suburban teens adopt Hip-Hop culture, which originates in the black urban underclass, by wearing expensive designer baggy pants, hoodies, Fubu jackets, gold chain jewelry, and Timberland boots.

We find Poor Chic perhaps most extremely but certainly not exhaustively in the shocking, angry, alienated, and delinquent styles of heavily tattooed, white musicians such as Kid Rock (whose inaugural tour was promoted as 'White Trash on Dope' and whose 'trailer' origins and pimping aspirations are proudly declared in the song 'Cowboy' on the *Devil Without a Cause* CD). Similar thematic content is found in the music of Eminem, Limp Bizkit, Insane Clown Posse (ICP), GWAR (thrash-metal Virginia Commonwealth University students doing a marketing experiment), and Rage Against the Machine (with dread-locked, rap-core Harvard University graduate, guitarist Tom Morello).

Poor Chic was conceptualized by collecting and analyzing multiple symbols traditionally associated with working class and underclass life – or those in our common 'stock of knowledge' (Schutz and Luckmann, 1989) that represent lower class status – among numerous fads and fashions since the 1980s. Poor Chic symbols include (so far): mental illness, homelessness, starvation, drug addiction, bowling, pink plastic flamingos, trailer park and 'white trash' status, tattooing, pumping iron, pimping, motorcycling,

wrestling, polyester clothes, belt-less prisoner baggy pants, work boots, gas station jackets, thrift store and flea market purchases, secondhand clothes, slum and gang lifestyle, and more abstractly yet importantly, a 'code of the street' (Anderson, 1999) turned 'code of consumption' marked by anger, alienation, and delinquency.

While these class symbols (that some times intersect with race and ethnicity) are obviously stereotypical, many of them are rooted in material realities. For example, sociologists have long recognized and documented strong correlations between poverty and homelessness, starvation, drug addiction, ghettoization, juvenile delinquency, anger, and alienation. These are material realities experienced by the poor (often as symptoms of poverty or as protests against it) in daily life regardless of whether they are transformed into saleable commodities. And that these symbols are stereotypes or even possible as stereotypes is because they are distortions of *realities* that lurk behind them. To convey the point as plainly as possible, just because one 'acts poor' or does a poor imitation does not erase real poverty or poor people; but it does have the effect of obscuring those realities. In other words, just because a white suburban teenager acts like a Mexican 'gangsta girl' or cholita by eating at Taco Bell, wearing dark purple lipstick, and affecting a Spanish accent does not mean that real delinquent Chicanas are nowhere to be found. One bewildered father-to-cholita recognized the less exotic reality behind his daughter's safely distanced impersonation when he teased: 'Hey, cholita . . . Get a suntan. We'll put you in a barrio and see how much you like it' (Bernstein, 1995: 87). This is not to make the claim, however, that all 'images' generated by the fashion industry, media corporations, and other producers of popular culture have a 'truth' behind them. For example, the 'Mook' (prototype Howard Stern) and the 'Midriff' (prototype Britney Spears) are artistic creations based less in representations of truth than in what Baudrillard (1983) would call 'simulation' (there is nothing behind the media-generated image but the image itself). As explained in the documentary *The Merchants of Cool* (PBS, 2001), when teens subsequently mimic Mooks and Midriffs, the images do not represent them. They represent images that have no referents outside the media-machine.

A related introductory point is that Poor Chic is often obscured as a specifically *class* impersonation because of its objectifying character. Objectification, as feminist scholars (Bartky, 1990; Dworkin, 1989) have explained, entails reducing a complex and multi-faceted human being to a single part or function. In pornography, the prototype of objectification, subjects are cut up, split up, or fragmented. Feminists have argued that pornography not only reductively objectifies the individuals depicted (e.g., the narrowly depicted woman in the centerfold) but also objectifies women as a gender *class*. Poor Chic is like pornographic media and individualizing claims about it ('It is only *a* self-deciding women in the centerfold') in that it fragments or divides

up the large script of 'lower class' symbols across numerous fads and fashions and because it is often defended with individualizing (and reifying) claims to the ring of 'it's just a style' or 'it's just a form of self-stylization'. However, inductively reconstituting lower class status by cataloguing multiple poverty symbols otherwise dispersed among numerous Poor Chic fads and fashions (as I have done), aims to show that it is not simply *a* characteristic of poverty or non-referential 'lifestyle' involved, but a class script (even while obviously incomplete). This theoretical explanation is like sermonizing to the choir to some critics of Poor Chic, such as a *Washington Post* writer who explained with equal generality (and much more concreteness) about class status, while using Poor Chic clothes as a single example:

> The height of chic is to look downtrodden, poor, disadvantaged . . . The rich – or those willing to hike up their credit card debt – are distinguishing themselves with clothes that stand out because they are so off-kilter, so mockingly lower-class. (Givhan, 1996)

Vacationing in Vagabondage

In *The Theory of the Leisure Class* Thorstein Veblen (1925, c1899) explained how the upper class displayed its greater social worth through the acquisition of property. At the time of Veblen's writing, the American upper class, lacking an aristocracy, also distinguished itself from the lower classes through work abstention and 'conspicuous consumption', or wasteful spending. In the postmodern period where consumption has displaced production as the prominent feature of capitalism, where 'conspicuous consumption' pervades in its practice throughout the social classes, and where the upper classes are integrated into the occupational structure (even Bill Gates, who is worth $43 billion or so, goes to work), it is becoming increasingly difficult to use work abstention and conspicuous consumption as a means of distinguishing upper class status (Gottdiener, 2000).

These changes, and other features of postmodern living, have led some scholars to question whether 'lifestyle' consumption, an individualistic, self-expressive, and self-stylizing consumption, has displaced consumption as a means of constructing conventional social statuses. Featherstone (2000: 93) clearly poses the pertinent questions:

> Are consumer goods used as cultural signs in a free-association manner by individuals to produce an expressive effect within a social field in which the old co-coordinates are rapidly disappearing, or can taste still be adequately 'read', socially recognized and mapped onto class structure? Does taste still 'classify the classifier'?

Featherstone (2000: 93), who attempts 'to develop a perspective which goes beyond the view that lifestyle and consumption are totally manipulated

products of mass society, and the opposite position which seeks to preserve the field of lifestyles and consumption', proposes that:

> . . . the 'no rules by choice' view (celebrated by some as a significant movement towards the break-up of old hierarchies of fashion, style and taste in favour of an egalitarian and tolerant acceptance of differences, and the acknowledgement of the right of individuals to enjoy whatever popular pleasures they desire without encountering prudery or moral censure) does not signify anything as dramatic as the implosion of the social space but should be regarded as merely *a new move within it*. (Italics added)

Featherstone (2000: 100–1) explains the continued significance of class status through his discussion of the 'new petit bourgeoisie' who serve as 'cultural intermediaries', intellectuals who apply serious analysis in new areas of expertise such as popular culture and in doing so cater for and promote 'a general interest in style itself' (e.g. the unavoidable contradictions of the paper you are reading). Featherstone (2000: 100) is scathingly, yet implicitly, self-reflexive: 'In effect the new ethic espoused by the vanguard of the new bourgeoisie (the producers of consumer commodities) and the new petite bourgeoisie may well be in the process of creating the *perfect consumer*.'

In this paper I wish to show, in the spirit of Bourdieu's (1984) work, how socioeconomic status is distinguished through distinct consumption processes of dominant members of society to reproduce inequality. To do so is to challenge the reductionism of 'lifestyle' theorists who propose the 'waning of class', along with other conventional social statuses. For example, Dunn (2000: 116), who provides a 'weaker' version of the postmodern subject/object of consumption than that of Jean Baudrillard, Mark Poster, or Frederick Jameson, still proposes that 'socially delineated statuses' have been replaced by 'a loose aggregate of personality traits' gleaned through 'lifestyle consumption'. He says at greater length:

> (T)he collective identities of class, gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity, along with conventionalized institutional social roles, are weakened or replaced by more 'individualized' and fluid 'lifestyle' identities constructed in relation both to consumer goods and media images . . .To the extent this occurs, the moorings of the self in socially delineated statuses, roles, and relationships are weakened, and processes of self-definition come to depend increasingly on an appropriation of the attributes of commodities. An integrated social conception of the self is thereby replaced by a loose aggregate of personality traits assembled through the consumption of goods and images. (Dunn, 2000: 116)

I do not challenge this 'weaker' version of the postmodern subject overall, but aim to show how in Poor Chic (at least) class status is distinguished through work abstention (i.e. travel and vacationing) and conspicuous (wasteful) consumption, although with somewhat different applications of those traditional class-distinguishing activities.

One of the ways to display social worth in the role of consumer in

consumer society is by traveling in a world of increasing and extreme polarization between wealth and poverty. Bauman (2000: 18) tells us that in 1996 'the total wealth of the top 358 "global billionaires" equaled the combined incomes of the 2.3 billion poorest people (45 percent of the world's population)', and in 1991 'the top fifth of the world population enjoyed 84.7 percent of the world's gross product', while the bottom fifth made do with 1.4 percent. Bauman explains further that in this polarized world where we are expected to be always on the move, travelers are stratified 'high up' and 'low down'. The 'high up' people, judged to excel in their willingness and ability to move, are globetrotting 'tourists'. Contrasted with tourists are 'vagabonds'. Their experience is 'localization', space restriction, and a slow, shallow, and morally unworthy use of time. In a travel society, 'The vagabond is a flawed consumer':

> Vagabonds are not really able to afford the kind of sophisticated choice in which consumers are expected to excel. Their limited resources severely limit their potential for consumption. This fault makes their position in society precarious. They breach the norm and sap the order. (Bauman, 2000: 24)

Bauman's account of the psychological relation between tourist and vagabond is intriguing and provokes elaboration. He says:

> (I)n a society of travelers, in the traveling society, tourism and vagrancy are two sides of the same coin. The vagabond, let me repeat, is the alter ego of the tourist. The line that divides them is tenuous and not always clearly drawn. One can easily step over it without noticing. There is an abominable likeness. (Bauman, 2000: 24)

The dilemma for the tourist is to 'exorcise' the 'nightmarish' fear of that 'demon', the ever-present possibility of declining into 'vagabondage'. 'In forcing the vagabond off the street, confining him to a far-away and "no-go" ghetto, demanding his exile or incarceration, the tourist desperately seeks the deportation of his own fears.' The utopia of the tourist is 'a world without vagabonds' where 'the tourist need never wake up a vagabond' (Bauman, 2000: 25).

In a less than utopian world, tourists and those who aspire to tourist status have found a new kind of tourism in a travel society that helps sooth the fear of downward flight into vagabondage. Convenient that vagabonds are localized, fixed; that way you know who and where they are. That is especially necessary when they themselves might become the tourist site. The tourist defends against its alter ego after Bauman's work: in a society unlikely to be rid of vagabonds, and in a society always inventing more and more wasteful things to consume, why not take a vacation in poverty? Why not baptize that social waste with the fluidity of the tourist? Why not control the vagabond by consuming him?

The Rational Consumption of Poverty

Control

Vacationing in poverty, like other forms of McTourism in consumer society, is carried out rationally. Control is most important in that efficiency, predictability, and calculability are integral to this 'scientific' process. Yet control is far from objective (an alleged feature of rational science) in its application to Poor Chic. In Poor Chic, control involves becoming what elicits fear, what haunts, but in its opposite: poverty becomes wealth, despair becomes fun, localization is transformed into travel. The tourist controls by obscuring the reality of vagabondage, in 'self-stylizing' word and in deed. The Poor Chic tourist is fluid and mobile, on a temporary, affordable, comfortable, and recreational voyage, venturing always, like other vacationers, toward the safe haven of home.

By becoming the tourist-as-vagabond, one can take charge, dominate the alter ego by displaying discretionary power to occupy and vacate poverty. Tourist masquerading as vagabond, Poor Chic, controls the possibility of becoming one by dehumanizing it, by reducing it to a commodity. Envelop it, consume it, before it consumes you. The 'It' status of fearfully real persons is especially important for the highly ontologically uncertain. 'It' quells the fear of being swallowed up (Laing, 1969: 47). And Karl Marx (quoted in Gottdiener, 2000), in a different context but not inconsistent way, said: 'the commodity form possesses the peculiar capacity of concealing its own essence and origin from the human beings who live with and by it.' The commodity fetishizes: it conceals its essence, and replaces it with desires purchased for a price. The tourist (conveniently in this case) is estranged from what really lies behind the commodity: the haunting humanity of the poor and the fearful reality of poverty.

Efficiency

> Accustomed to efficiency in their everyday lives, many people tend to have little tolerance for inefficient vacations. They want the most vacation for the money . . . and to see and do as much as possible in the time allotted. (Ritzer, 1998: 38)

Imitators of the poor pose, for example, as junkie, delinquent, (hungry) gas station attendant, slum-dweller, homeless person, or patron of flea markets. These stereotypical roles serve as time- and work-saving devices. Instant identities, with minimal and pre-packaged ingredients, replace the otherwise costly process of mastering a role from scratch. For example, a *Boston Globe* reporter (Hayes, 1996) says that the children and adults he interviewed about temporary tattoos 'agreed that their biggest selling point is their temporary nature . . . It's kind of harmless fun. You get a chance to be that motorcycle guy without having to undergo laser surgery.' A *Houston Post* writer

(Roberts, 1992) reports similarly: 'Like artificial sweeteners and near beer, temporary tattoos give you the thrill of the real thing, but without the morning-after guilt and regrets.' 'America's yuppie outlaws', or Rich Urban Bikers, can also 'climb aboard their growling Harleys on weekends and slip quietly back behind their neat desks on Monday mornings' (Cobb, 1999: 3). An Internet description (http://www.metroactive.com/papers/cruz07.03.96/bikers-9627.html) commented further about such efficiently superficial and temporary identities:

> ... for some new riders it has now become a ready-made, weekend identity. Expensive black-leather jackets hang in closets alongside Giorgio Armani suits. And RUBies – rich urban bikers – own $20,000 motorcycles that share garages with high-priced BMW and Mercedes-Benz automobiles. They've become *The Wild One* for the brunch bunch.

Poor Chic is not only efficient because it minimizes work and time investments, but also because of other more sociologically evident benefits of employing stereotypes. Stereotypes are vehicles through which socially devalued identities are made 'open' or de-privatized. And the extent to which an identity is open and accessible is a sociological gauge of its devaluation (Goffman, 1963). Therefore, to use stereotypes as recreational domains is to exploit inequality, (and, quite literally, to make fun of it).

Goffman's (1959: 59–60) discussion of the differential social costs of 'upward' and 'downward' impersonation points to the further social efficiency of Poor Chic:

> ... while it is felt to be an inexcusable crime against communication to impersonate someone like a doctor or a priest, we are often less concerned when someone impersonates a member of a disesteemed, non-crucial, profane status, such as that of a hobo or unskilled worker.

However, in Poor Chic there is no 'heroic' discovery that a low status individual actually has a high one, as in Goffman's account. The social costs of impersonation, measured in the application of negative social sanctions, are at a minimum when there is an explicit downward impersonation from the very beginning. Poor Chic is distinctively the superficial pretense of poverty.

Poor Chic is also efficient (quick, non-committal, fluid) because of the very faddishness of the phenomenon. For example, Harold (1999) observed of Heroin Chic: 'As fashion trends inevitably do, heroin chic passed from the cultural spotlight almost as quickly as it had arrived.' The trend began in September 1996 with an advertising campaign for cK Be cologne and was over directly after leading heroin chic photographer Davide Sorrenti's lethal heroin overdose in February 1997. As one magazine article read: 'Out with wasted looking models in scuzzy settings and in with full-figured beauties gleaming with health' (Kaplan, 1998). Once the impersonation revealed the harsh reality behind it, fashion moved in another direction. While Calvin

Klein may have 'kicked the habit' of heroin chic, the fashion world has since offered a number of trendy equivalents such as House of Dior's self-starved models donning 'homeless chic' and 'asylum attire':

> They came down the runway raggedy and baggy, some swathed in newspapers, with torn linings and inside-out labels, accessorized with empty little green J&B whiskey bottles, tin cups dangling from the derriere, bottle caps, plastic clothes-pins and safety pins. Some posed as lunatic ballerinas in frayed tulle, others in straitjackets and white madhouse makeup. (Dowd, 2000)

Predictability

> . . . the McDonaldization thesis leads to a view that people often travel to other locales in order to experience much of what they experience in their day-to-day lives . . . many [tourists] want few, if any, surprises. (Ritzer, 1998: 137–8)

The mother of flea market 'art', Rachel Ashwell, instructs that one must learn to discern potential 'treasures amidst the trash' (Ashwell with Costin, 1996). And while Ashwell says that she is 'attracted' to 'the quirky appeal of chips, stains, cracks, dents, and irregularities that assert character and reveal the charm of history', and that she 'gravitate(s) toward the crumbling, the disheveled, the tattered, and the battered', to 'do' Shabby Chic is to adopt 'a style that is appreciative of the beauty of process and *evolution*'.

What is distinctive about Shabby Chic is how it is actually not-so-shabby chic. Shabby chic does not involve the simple purchase of and decoration with flea market items. It involves cleaning, polishing, staining, repainting, and covering up (most aptly, Ashwell says her style was first inspired by the use of slipcovers). Refurbishment requires a lot more cash than the pocket full of it Ashwell recommends for the initial purchase of items. It also requires a strategic or thematic style, marked by functionality, individuality, integration, and a particular pallet of pale colors. While Ashwell is clear on the latter point, her examples (in her books and on her show) are just as clear in the further requirement of placing flea market items in clean, well-kept, and well-structured homes. Her examples range from small one-bedroom condominiums for young professional bachelors to Paul Mitchell's pricey estate. Pieces of trash-transformed-into-treasure are used to decorate not the subsidized apartments of welfare recipients or the dingy trailers of the poor, but the homes of wealthier classes. And the poor who rely more heavily on flea market purchases for essential items do not have equal access to additional disposable income to transform items from shabby to Shabby Chic. What is necessity for the economically disenfranchised is a leisurely and discretionary choice for the economically privileged. Finally, while Shabby Chic is democratized in that everyone (who can afford cable) has access to the Style channel and can learn to do Shabby Chic, a hierarchy of Shabby Chic styles is inevitable when materials used in the process of refurbishment

will be purchased, depending upon one's income, from a range of class-stratified businesses such as Target to Bloomingdale's.

The predictability characteristic of Poor Chic can be further exemplified by the 'cultural upgrading' of tattooing into 'body art', as Sanders (1989: 34–5) explains:

> Galleries and museums are now exhibiting both photographic reproductions and living samples of exemplary tattoo art. Mainstream publishers are marketing expensive 'coffee-table' books containing full-color photos and learned discussions by accepted art critics that situate tattooing within the larger context of western art history . . . High culture periodicals now present articles on tattoo art . . . while academicians meet to read papers about tattooing and publish proceedings . . . that further help to identify the practice as a legitimate artistic endeavor. In short, a significant segment of tattoo production is proceeding along the traditional route by which a variety of other 'inferior' media have come to be sanctioned as art.

Similar transformations from 'low class' symbolism into artistic enterprises and transportations to the safer milieu of the upper classes can be seen at elite institutions such as Carnegie Hall, the Guggenheim Museum, the Detroit Institute of the Arts, and the American Museum of Natural History that sponsor not only 'body art' exhibits, but also those on 'the art of motorcycling' and Hip-Hop culture. In the latter case, rather than going to the ghetto, Hip-Hop is brought into the safely predictable institutions of the wealthy classes. Further easing the superficial voyage to vagabondage or providing an avenue away from anything too far removed from upper class sensibilities, Hip-Hop exhibits, such as The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame & Museum of Cleveland's 'Rhymes and Rage: The Hip-Hop Story', include explicit warnings for patrons entering areas with 'obscenity' content, a standard staple of much rap music. The Harley-Davidson Museum is scheduled to open next year in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, marking the company's 100th anniversary.

The transformation of pumping iron into weight-lifting serves as a final example of safe and predictable class travels. Bourdieu (1991: 369) explains the traditional class symbolism in weight-lifting:

> (W)eight-lifting, which is supposed to develop muscles, was for many years, especially in France, the favourite working-class sport; nor is it an accident that the Olympic authorities took so long to grant official recognition to weight-lifting, which, in the eyes of the aristocratic founders of modern sport, was symbolized by mere strength, brutality and intellectual poverty, in short the working classes.

A *Time* reporter (Reed, 1981: 94) explains how this traditional working class sport is now culturally upgraded and socially insulated as an activity of the corporate class. Describing the daily fitness ritual of an information systems manager at the Xerox Corporate Fitness Center in Stamford,

Connecticut, he describes the epitome of removal from working class pumping iron:

> On his daily jog, White is surrounded by a $61,000 mechanical sculpture garden of chrome, leather and cable; stationary bicycles, cross-country skiing simulators, rowing machines, Nautilus weight stations and racks of dumbbells positioned around the spacious, brown-carpeted gym. Down a hallway hung with modern paintings are whirlpool baths and a sun-tanning room studded with ultraviolet and infra-red lamps. Near by: offices for a physician and full-time exercise physiologist.

This says little about what might be said concerning the class upgrading of a strong, toiling, (perhaps also smoking and dirty) *working* class *body* to an economically *invested body*: an expensive, recreational, healthy, and sculpted artistic creation. A more detailed analysis of the 'gentrification of poverty in popular culture' is provided in Halnon (2002). There I describe a four-part process involving: (1) a social and economic investment in low-cost 'slum identities;' (2) refurbishing the form and content of identity symbols so that they no longer represent them; (3) aligning refurbished poverty symbols with central cultural and economic institutions; and (4) pricing out and pushing out the poor from the refurbished and upgraded symbols of them.

Calculability

> Many people want to know in advance how much a vacation is going to cost, and they abhor cost overruns. They also want itineraries that define precisely where they will be at a given time and for how long. (Ritzer, 1998: 138)

Consumers of poverty can determine how much they want to spend on a variety of commodities. A couture Hobo Chic dress; a pair of Kenneth Cole bowling shoes or Christian Dior 'laddered' hosiery; a favela funk ball admission ticket or meal at Favela Chic; an authentic (Emo-coveted) second-hand gas station jacket with a real working class guy's name embroidered on the front; or pink flamingo jewelry, all come with explicit price tags.

For particular poverty commodities there is a range of investment choices. For example, a cheap tattoo costs anywhere from one to three dollars and can be applied in a minute and easily removed with soap and water. Henna or mehndi tattoos, 'packaged in ready-made mixes', take about two hours to apply, cost anywhere from 25 to 75 dollars per hand, and 'the color fades after a few weeks' (Parekh, 1997). A permanent tattoo will cost, depending upon style, size, and tattoo artist, anywhere from 25 to several hundred dollars. The amount of pain spent can also be calculated in advance given the widely publicized procedure and costs for removal. Removal of permanent tattoos is now less painful, leaves less scarring than previous abrasion removal methods, and several laser treatments over the course of several months will cost a few thousand dollars. Finally, 'typpies' (yuppies with tattoos) can bank

on the dramatic reduction of negative social sanctions traditionally associated with tattooing. This is due in part to so many celebrities sporting tattoos, but more generally to the 'upgrading' of tattooing to an expensive, more discreet, and qualitatively different kind of class-distinguishing 'body art'.

While changes in the form and content of traditional poverty symbols in Poor Chic are a major exception, Ritzer (1996) tells us that calculability involves a general shift in emphasis from quality to quantity. He exemplifies this change with the ever-bigger, culinary-displeasing McDonald's hamburger and fries. Extending this process to Poor Chic, the rational consumption of poverty involves, as detailed above, a switch in emphasis *from quality*, or the reality of poverty with its constraining 'localization' and constrained consumption, *to quantification*, or to an ever-bigger collection of poverty symbols fluidly consumed by postmodern tourists as superfluous, discretionary, and disposable commodities. And to borrow a phrase, the 'Cathedrals of Consumption' (Ritzer, 1998) for Poor Chic today include the Salvation Army's Terrytown (New Orleans) Superstore that is 'looking more like a Kirshman's than a penny pincher's paradise' and the May 2001 opening of Phoenix, Arizona's largest Goodwill Store in North America',92,000 square feet, complete with coffee shop and snack bar' (Montoya, 2001).

Conclusion

In this article Poor Chic was explained as a set of fads and fashions that make stylish or recreational 'fun' of poverty. Using examples from Shabby Chic and slum and underclass fashions to 'artistic' tattooing and Rich Urban Biking, it was argued that Poor Chic is not an instance of 'lifestyle' consumption, or consumption divorced from the display of class status. Rather, Poor Chic was explained as a rationally organized type of class vacationing. Toward *controlling* against the fear of downward mobility in the context of an increasing and extreme economically polarized consumer society, the Poor Chic tourist demonstrates social worth through wasteful or 'conspicuous' consumption, or by vacationing in poverty. Treated as a tourist site, poverty is symbolically consumed as so many safely objectified and dehumanized commodities. Travels to vagabondage were further explained as safe and *predictable* class travels through refurbishing and culturally upgrading poverty symbols (as in the cases of Shabby Chic and Body Art), and through institutional and environmental insularity (as in the cases of museum motorcycling exhibits and corporate weight-lifting). Travels to poverty were also explained as *efficient* in that Poor Chic involves adopting superficial and temporary identities, employing time- and work-saving stereotypes, taking advantage of low social cost downward impersonation, and the very faddishness (brevity, quick-shifting) character of Poor Chic itself. Finally, Poor

Chic was explained as *calculable* in that Poor Chic consumers can choose from a range of costs and investment choices among Poor Chic commodities, and in the seemingly ever-increasing growth of Poor Chic fads and fashions. Thus, this article has shown that the *rational consumption of poverty* is a class-distinguishing activity that controls against fears of declining into vagabondage by consuming it as a short, safe, socially-distanced and sanitized experience with commodified poverty. Accounting for additional motivations and processes embedded in the superficial pretense of poverty and related safe adventures in popular culture today are subjects of works in progress.

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
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Mark Herkenrath

Quantitative Cross-National Analysis as a Research Tool in the Sociology of Developing Countries: A Critical Examination

Introduction

Research validity and rigor are commonly accepted as being critical to the construction of sociological knowledge. It should be noted, however, that in the case of research on developing countries, issues of research rigor take on both scholarly and political importance. Measures based on faulty diagnoses would not only be scholarly unsound, but potentially devastating in application. As Dixon and Boswell (1996) in their study of the consequences of foreign investment so aptly put it, empirical sociology on developing nations

> ... is about the ability ... to sustain the lives of billions of people. It is about why so many countries remain so deeply mired in poverty. It is about why the developing world has failed to catch up to the industrialized core or to achieve even minimally acceptable living standards. And it is about how these economies can be made to grow in a manner that distributes economic and social benefits more equitably. Even small contributions to these issues carry heavy importance. (Dixon and Boswell, 1996: 583)

The sociologist who intends to work in this field is faced with a number of crucial issues, including the determinants of political democracy, the effects of income inequality, and the causes of homicide and political violence. Clearly, researchers dealing with such vital questions must provide thoughtful and 'correct' answers, particularly when they can reasonably assume that their findings will have some impact on political practice. However, when looking for 'true' answers, researchers will invariably face one of the main paradoxes of the social sciences: for each question examined, one finds at least two contradicting theoretical views of almost equal plausibility.

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This paradox becomes particularly obvious with regard to the consequences of high income concentration. 'Many nice theories exist for assessing the effects of inequality on investment and economic growth. The problem is that these theories tend to have offsetting effects, and the net effects of inequality on investment and growth are ambiguous' (Barro, 1999: 6–7). What development strategy may we as scholars then recommend? 'Growth first – redistribution later', 'growth *with* redistribution', or possibly a third approach? Theoretical reasoning does not give a clear indication of the right decision.

Unfortunately, not only research on income inequality suffers from theoretical ambiguity. The same problem can be seen when considering many other issues within the framework of economic 'progress' in developing nations. For instance, scholars also disagree on the sum effect – positive or negative – of introducing transnational corporations (TNCs) into a developing economy. Many researchers support the hypothesis that TNC affiliates actually distort the economic development of peripheral host countries by crowding out domestic investment and repatriating most profits (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985; Hymer, 1980; Akinsanya, 1984). At the same time, however, one can reasonably conceive of channels (such as technology transfer, access to foreign markets, etc.) through which foreign investors might spur local investment and growth (Osterfeld, 1994; UNCTAD, 1999).[1]

How, then, can we decide on controversial theoretical claims? What practical measures should be taken? This article will assess the uses of quantitative cross-national analysis (CNA) in testing the validity of theoretical claims related to the sociology of developing countries. Following Hopkins and Wallerstein (1967), cross-national research is defined here as the analysis of statistical relations among country 'properties' or national-level aggregates (such as 'degree of political repression', 'ethnic fractionalization', 'income per capita', or 'average life expectancy').[2]

CNA is one of the most frequently used methods in empirical sociology, and has, for instance, served for studying all the topics mentioned above.[3] Bollen et al. (1993: 322) count more than 80 cross-national research articles in the *American Journal of Sociology*, the *American Sociological Review* and *Social Forces* between 1985 and 1990 alone.[4] Its frequent application gives the impression that CNA is a very reliable and powerful research tool for sociologists. There are, however, numerous critics who point out the problems and difficulties with this method. Some of them call into question the legitimacy of the CNA methodology altogether.

Some of the most important criticisms raised by the opponents of quantitative CNA will be presented and discussed in this article in order to explore the strengths and limitations of this popular method. The article is structured as follows. The section after this introduction highlights two of the greatest advantages of CNA, namely its efficiency and the low costs involved. In the

subsequent sections, three problematic issues are discussed: comparability of national societies, case independence, and accuracy of data provided by national statistical offices. The conclusion summarizes the main points.

The article will demonstrate that CNA is indeed a useful research tool, and will provide information about potential difficulties and shortcomings in application to help prevent the misuse of this method. The principal aim is to help readers achieve a critical understanding and responsible use of CNA.

CNA as a Low-Cost Method

For individual researchers and even for medium-sized research institutes, it is almost impossible to collect primary data for cross-national research. Projects of this scope usually exceed their financial resources (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1967: 41). Quantitative cross-national researchers can, however, draw on an immense and ever-increasing amount of data for *secondary* analysis. Such data are collected by international governmental organizations or transnational research collaborations, and are made available in statistical yearbooks or on CD. As all the variables in these data files relate to the same research units (i.e. the approximately 190 contemporary nation-states officially recognized by the UN as independent territories), it is even possible to combine variables from different sources.[5]

Thus, as regards secondary data analyses, CNA is a relatively low-cost and time-saving research instrument. Expensive surveys, time-consuming participant observation, and labor-intensive transcriptions of interviews are substituted by the simple copying of variables from statistical compilations. In recent years, the Internet has made things even easier. With ever-increasing frequency, manual copying can be avoided by quickly downloading entire data files from the WWW.

The great availability of national-level data surely contributes to the striking popularity of quantitative CNA in sociology and other social sciences. CNA enables the researcher to write a traditional quantitative research article in a relatively short period of time, and makes the search for additional funds and collaborators unnecessary. In other words, the method fits well with contemporary expectations of scholarly production (yet it also reinforces the already remarkable time-pressure in academia).

On the other hand, the almost unproblematic access to abundant cross-national data material poses some risks, for it allows several abuses of the CNA method. For instance, it is becoming more attractive to researchers to follow the empiricist approach, rather than tying in statistical findings to an underlying theoretical framework. This mistaken procedure is no longer the province of the undergraduate churning out a 'methods paper'. According to

Chase-Dunn (1982: 118), 'Much or even most of what passes for sophisticated quantitative research is meaningless "number crunching".'

Nor are problems limited to theoretical concerns. As the stock of cross-national data material grows, there is an increasing tendency to empirically test theories on individual-level properties or behavior by means of data measured on an aggregate (national) level. Although 'translations' from the individual to the aggregate level might be legitimate when carrying out preliminary tests, CNA must not replace survey research altogether. Inferences about individual-level relations based on aggregate data often turn out to be ecological fallacies.[6]

In all, the very advantages of quantitative cross-national research – i.e. its efficiency and its relatively modest costs – also present nice opportunities for misusing the method. However, since misuses can easily be avoided, opponents of CNA usually neglect them. Their criticisms, presented in the next sections, are much more fundamental and are claimed to be valid even when the method is used correctly.

The Historical-Singularizing Criticism of CNA

The most challenging criticism of cross-national research draws upon a methodological perspective that is termed the historical-singularizing paradigm. According to this paradigm, countries are unique and, thus, cannot be meaningfully compared or used for the purposes of statistical analysis which necessarily leads to general statements. Adherents to the historical-singularizing approach include such famous authors as Fernando E. Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, and Richard Bach.

Cardoso (1977), Faletto (Cardoso and Faletto, 1976), and Bach (1977) particularly criticize the use of CNA for testing theoretical claims proposed by the 'Dependencia' school. All three authors find fault with the cross-national researchers' premise that a general, abstract form of dependency exists with the same consequences in all the cases studied. According to the critics, this assumption is ridiculous (Cardoso and Faletto, 1976: 213). Rather, it is argued, the expansion of the capitalist system and the activities of trans-national corporations have their own specific history and effects in each country. Each case presents totally different initial conditions (natural resources, material well-being, social structures, etc.) and, accordingly, there are very different reactions to exogenous forces penetrating the country (p. 219).

Put more generally, the historical-singularizing paradigm consists of three characteristic ideas. First, countries are different with respect to historical, cultural and structural properties. Second, social phenomena (e.g. the expansion of capitalist production, the activities of TNCs, democratization, and

social inequality) do not develop independently of these properties; they interact with the initial conditions, thereby adopting a different dynamic in each case. Third, as a consequence of this interaction, the phenomena change their initial shape: '*the same* thing is transformed into *the other*' (Cardoso, 1977: 15).

Drawing on these basic ideas, the proponents of the historical-singularizing perspective claim that CNA has no proper utility. It is argued that one can understand social processes and their varying shapes only when studying single nations in detailed case studies. According to Bach (1977: 813), the uniqueness of national experiences 'cannot be justly served by an analysis which lumps widely different countries together in an averaging type of analytical procedure . . . This averaging technique leads to broad generalizations, which offer little explanatory power or practical application.'

How, then, may the quantitative researcher compare data across nations? It is obviously true that countries vary in many respects. And it is equally reasonable to assume that most social phenomena differ from one country to another, adopting a unique 'form' and producing different effects each time. This, however, should not prevent the researcher from carrying out cross-national comparisons.

In fact, historical-singularizing critiques of cross-national research reflect a misunderstanding of the goals and hypotheses of such empirical work. In conducting CNA, the researcher does not imply that a property x has *identical* consequences in all the countries that constitute the sample under study. This is not even assumed when applying the usual linear and additive regression model. CNA simply claims the existence of *general tendencies* and *similarities* among national societies (and it also tests this claim empirically); no deterministic relations are assumed. Accordingly, Chase-Dunn (1982: 121) writes:

> When we assert that there is a causal relationship between dependence on foreign investment and economic growth, we do not deny the interactive and reactive nature of the relationship between multinational corporations, peripheral states and peripheral workers. What we are asserting is that, on the whole, over many cases, in the long run, ceteris paribus, the more dependent a country is on foreign capital, the slower it will develop economically. The fact that there may be exceptions, or that some country may be able successfully to combine foreign investment with a certain kind of growth, does not disprove the overall contention.

Bach's statement that such generalizations are too broad to be of any interest is clearly mistaken. That the results provided by cross-national regressions are less 'juicy' or 'colorful' than the observations narrated in case studies does not make them less significant or less salient. For example, the fact that most of the contemporary CNA studies find a strong negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth *is* indeed a very important

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finding that can, or should, guide the actions of scholars, politicians, and social agencies (Temple, 1999: 146).

However, the historical-singularizing critique should not be completely dismissed, since it reminds us of the existence of conditional relations. In fact, cultural, geographical, political, or economic traits of countries may influence the relationship between some variables *in a systematic way*, thereby rendering statistical coefficients unstable and inappropriate. For example, it seems plausible to assume that European Union membership has had a very different effect on the economic performance of poor countries as opposed to highly developed countries (Bornschier et al., 2001). Hence, we should be careful with the interpretation of 'null findings': the absence of a statistically significant relationship between two variables in an additive model does not necessarily mean that x has no effect on y at all. In some cases, the effect is more complex than implied by the model. The existence of conditional relationships, however, does not constitute a valid argument against using quantitative CNA, since they can easily be captured by the inclusion of appropriate interaction terms.

Case Independence: the 'Galton Problem'

The second critique addressed here highlights quite a different problem. Its proponents do not postulate that countries are unique, and thus, incomparable. Rather, they point to the fact that national societies are interwoven in many ways, and that social phenomena are able to spread across national borders, thereby eventually undermining the independence of observations in cross-national research.

The issue is by no means new, as it was first brought up by Sir Francis Galton in 1889.[7] However, many contemporary authors point out that 'the Galton problem could [and should] be regarded as potentially more damaging at the present time than ever before' (Goldthorpe, 1997a: 9). They argue that the political, economic, and informational ties that transgress national societies are increasing in number and density, thereby enabling social phenomena to spill over from one country to another more easily. Based on this observation, it is concluded that cross-national analysis is becoming an inappropriate research tool. Charles Tilly (1997: 46–7), for example, states: 'Continuation of these trends . . . will eventually destroy the plausibility and interest of comparisons among state-defined societies.'

While these objections, like the historical-singularizing critique, bear interesting implications, they do not serve to build a solid case against cross-national research. Here again, the appropriate stance must include context of application, rather than an all-or-nothing judgment of the method itself. The premises of the criticism are correct, but the conclusions are problematic.

There has indeed been a substantial rise in the amount of interconnections among national societies, leading to a situation where regional or even global spillovers of social phenomena are probably more frequent than ever. Hence,

> ... it could be hardly denied that, by the late twentieth century, the independence of 'national' observations is likely to be compromised, and not merely by the acceleration and intensification of cultural diffusion but further through the quite purposive actions of a whole range of international or multinational political and economic organizations. (Goldthorpe, 1997a: 9)[8]

It is also true that the existence of regional dynamics and the cross-border diffusion of social phenomena pose special problems in statistical analyses, for they constitute exogenous forces that affect only one part of the cross-national sample. Provided they are not included in the equation, such forces function as non-randomly distributed disturbances, and thus can lead to a situation of spatial auto-correlation (Temple, 1999: 130). In cross-sectional regressions, the coefficients remain unaffected, but their standard errors (and, hence, the results of the usual tests for significance) are biased (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998: 159 ff.; Garson [NN]: 'Regression Analysis'). Tilly and other critics of formal cross-national research in the 'globalization era' may have a point.

Yet, having said this, Tilly's verdict that quantitative cross-national research is about to lose its plausibility altogether must be regarded with skepticism. There are at least two compelling arguments for continuing use of this methodology. First, there are several research areas where spillover effects that could constitute unobserved disturbances play a rather subordinated role (Goldthorpe, 1997a). Second, and more important, the interconnections among countries and the resulting transnational dynamics of social phenomena are only problematic if they remain unobserved. These phenomena can be included in CNA designs without any substantial difficulties, making the problem of spillover one of research design rather than methodological flaw. Therefore,

> ... it should be understood that, even when clearly present, the Galton problem does not preclude comparative analysis of a systematic kind. If, in a comparative study, national observations are known not to be independent, for whatever reason, it may still be possible to proceed by incorporating the process that creates this situation as an element in the analysis. That is, in the language of the variable-oriented [i.e. quantitative] approach, one can seek to 'model' interdependence itself. (Goldthorpe, 1997a: 11)

In cross-sectional growth regressions, for example, one can include gross domestic product per capita growth of a country's three most important trading partners (weighted, for example, by the share of these three partners in total trade) as an additional predictor variable, thereby capturing the transnational character of fluctuations in the level of economic activity. When

studying the determinants of democratization processes, the inclusion of the average level of democracy in the neighboring countries in the test model would probably yield good results.

Data Quality and Comparability

Another problem often referenced by critics of the CNA methodology concerns data quality. Scheuch (1966), for instance, points out that 'official' data published by national statistical offices sometimes reflects the wishful thinking and creativity of politicians and bureaucrats rather than true conditions. Statistical reports are conceived by governments as 'neither socially nor politically neutral' (p. 144) and, accordingly, bear some risk of being manipulated. Thus, 'whenever a polity defines a statistic as relevant to its domestic or international politics, data need be interpreted with some caution' (p. 144). Welfare indicators, data on the distribution of economic chances, and information on military expenditures, probably constitute particularly 'delicate' fields. As regards the latter, Scheuch states: 'Items for defense spending are often ingeniously buried among other budget categories, and not merely for security reasons' (p. 144).

Unfortunately, difficulties are not restricted to deliberate manipulation. Even provided that the data were not manipulated on purpose, there remains the problem that indicators in cross-national tables are often based on incongruent concepts and measurement practices:

> Whether the statistics concern income, education, occupation, labor force participation, migration, rural–urban distinction, marriage, family structure, desertion, divorce, crime, or a host of other frequently counted dimensions, the use of similar classificatory terms is no guarantee for the presence or ordering of similar phenomena. What is a crime in one nation (e.g. selling or using marijuana) may not be in another – if indeed it is recorded at all. 'Completed high school' may refer to different numbers of years in school, to say nothing of different contents of educational experience. What is labeled a town in one nation may be labeled a village in another. The criteria for 'active participation in the labor force' may vary from nation to nation. (Elder, 1976: 219–20)

Far too often, researchers pay insufficient attention to the issue of comparability. Goldthorpe (1997b: 122), who is a fervent advocate of quantitative research, criticizes this sloppy behavior: 'quantitative researchers are often far too casual about problems of data quality'. A possible cause for the frequent neglect of such problems could lie in the popular assumption that measurement errors tend to bias the results of analytical procedures in favor of the null hypothesis. However, according to Temple (1999: 130), this assumption is wrong: 'When there are several badly measured variables, or the errors depart from classical assumptions, then biases may go in either direction.'

Nevertheless, while problems concerning the quality and comparability of cross-national data must not be underestimated, neither should they be overvalued. Many sociologists conceive of measurement errors as fatal for quantitative CNA, yet 'to hold this view is surely to go too far' (Temple, 1999: 130). First of all, one can hope that in the near future internationally standardized definitions and measurement practices will be developed and pursued more strictly. Second, there are many instances where data problems do not have any serious consequences. For example, measurement errors cancel each other out when one is constructing growth rates instead of analyzing absolute values. Thus, 'even faulty measurements may permit statements about change, provided the "faultiness" remains constant' (Scheuch, 1966: 141).

Third, there are many possibilities to correct measurement errors or 'neutralize' the effects of conceptual differences. Scheuch recommends that measurement errors should be accounted for by re-grouping 'faulty' data in categories greater than the presumed measurement error (Scheuch, 1966 140).[9] In addition, one can build subsamples of countries with similar measurement errors in order to minimize their effect in comparisons. 'To account for the types of inaccuracy and yet prevent the bypassing of comparable information, we suggest stratifying the universe of polities into groups with presumably the same sources of error' (p. 141). The only problem with this procedure is that the resulting subsamples are rather small, aggravating the so-called small-N problem (Goldthorpe, 1997a: 5 ff.).

The construction of alternative variables may also help diminish problems of poor match in instrument design. For example, Barro (1999: 25–6) reports an interesting attempt to control measurement differences in indicators of income distribution. Instead of building subsamples of countries with similar measurement practices, he creates dummy variables that indicate which sort of income data the inequality measures are based upon (household versus individual income, net versus gross values, etc.). Used as additional predictors for income inequality in Barro's model, these dummies neutralize measurement differences. Weighting is a similarly elegant solution to this problem. For example, it is known that some countries under-report the stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI), as their definition of FDI does not encompass reinvested earnings of foreign-owned firms. Yet, drawing upon information provided by other countries, it is possible to calculate the average ratio of reinvested earnings to the other components of FDI stocks. This ratio could then be used to re-estimate the under-reported values.

Conclusion

In all, the method of cross-national analysis is indeed an important and useful tool for macro-sociological research, particularly in the sociology of

developing countries. It helps to assess validity of hypotheses (which may be derived from evidence found in single-case studies), and to decide on concurring theoretical views. Its results provide the scientific community, the activists of social movements, and policy makers with important information that can serve as a trustworthy guideline for future actions.

Yet there are several problems and practical difficulties one should be aware of when conducting and interpreting cross-national analysis. In many instances it is conceivable, or even probable, that the effect of a variable is shaped systematically by the different initial conditions of the countries studied. Thus, when no significant and robust coefficient can be found in the usual linear and additive cross-national regression model, one must not put too much emphasis on this; there could be a strong, yet conditional, effect that does not become apparent until an appropriate interaction term is included in the equation.

In addition, the existence of border-crossing interconnections that enable the occurrence of transnational spillovers and demonstration effects should be taken into account. It is also critical that the researcher take note of measurement errors and conceptual differences in cross-national data. These errors and differences tend to be quite considerable. Careful reading of the numerous footnotes and remarks pertaining to cross-national data tables is a must for producing trustworthy results.

Nonetheless, the difficulties mentioned so far are by no means fatal for the whole exercise and should not preclude sociologists from doing cross-national research. Instead of bringing about resignation, the existence of conditional effects, spillovers and data problems should, rather, stimulate the imagination of the researcher and lead to creative solutions.

Notes

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1 Of course, these competing vantage points suggest a number of questions: how should analysts of the modern world-system then theorize the role of the World Bank and the IMF, which force developing countries to liberalize foreign investment policies by their practice of conditional lending? Shall we conceptualize these organizations as driving forces in the reproduction of worldwide inequalities, or do they reflect the progressive potential of international collaboration?

2 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1967) reserve the term 'cross-national' to research that

treats nations as *units* of study. It should be noted, however, that there exists a broader definition of cross-national research, which also includes comparisons of nations as *contexts of social relations* (Kohn, 1987). Using the broader concept, a comparative analysis of the determinants of personal income found in a US survey and a Swiss survey would be considered cross-national research as well.

3 It should be noted, however, that this number also includes small-N comparisons, i.e. qualitative cross-national studies.

4 Lipset (1959), Muller (1995), Przeworski et al. (1996) and many others study the determinants of democracy in a quantitative cross-national manner. The numerous cross-national studies on the effects of democracy on economic growth and income distribution are reviewed by Sirowy and Inkeles (1990). Messner (1989), as well as Alesina and Perotti (1996), examines the impact of inequality on violence and protest. Cross-national research on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) is summarized in Singh and Jun (1995); and the broad CNA literature on the effects of FDI on economic growth encompasses, among many others, Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), Dixon and Boswell (1996), and de Soysa and Oneal (1999).

5 In a recent study of the long-term effects of foreign investment inflows on income distribution (Alderson and Nielsen, 1999), data on income inequality are taken from Deininger and Squire (1996), estimates of accumulated foreign investment stocks are from Ballmer-Cao and Scheidegger (1979), UNCTC (1985), and UNCTAD (1995), while most of the the control variables are from World Bank (1997). In analyzing their multi-sourced data set, the authors find support for one of the central hypotheses of 'Dependencia' theory, namely that countries with high degrees of dependence on foreign capital exhibit – *ceteris paribus* – more income inequality than others.

6 Contemporary discussions on right-wing extremism in Germany greatly illustrate the problem of the 'ecological fallacy'. Politicians and other observers keep on pointing out that extremist activities are most frequent in those states of Germany with the highest unemployment rates. While this striking regularity calls for an explanation, the hypothesis that unemployed people are themselves responsible for the recent surge of right-wing extremism is mistaken. Individual-level data (as discussed in Hopf et al., 1995: 12–13) show that unemployed people participate less frequently in extremist groups than employees and students.

7 In 1889, at a meeting of the Royal Anthropological Society, Galton criticized a paper presented by E. B. Tyler. Tyler had carefully examined the effects of intra-societal factors on the emergence and further development of laws of marriage and descent by means of a cross-national research design. Galton, however, was skeptical as to whether the societies under study could actually be treated as independent units. According to Galton, the societies under study were mere reflections of one general societal pattern and had 'borrowed' their institutions from each other, thereby rendering a strictly comparative research design useless (Elder, 1976: 217–18; Goldthorpe, 1997a: 9 ff.).

8 The existence of transnational spillovers and regional dynamics is most evident in the economic field. The financial crisis in Asia, which had effects far beyond the Asian continent, serves as an impressive illustration. Yet one can think of numerous other instances of social phenomena that are subject to cross-border

diffusion. It could be hypothesized, for example, that successful democratization in one country exerts a strong impact on neighboring countries, leading to a process of democratization in those nations as well. (Goldthorpe [1997a: 9] proposes a similar point regarding the spread of the welfare state.) One might also argue that agglomeration effects play an important role in the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI). Proximity to growing markets probably helps some groups of countries to achieve more FDI than could be expected with regard to their internal conditions, as these countries may serve as low-cost production sites for products that are then re-exported to the foreign investor's nearby home country. Furthermore, many studies demonstrate that successful mobilization of social movements can indirectly (via 'learning effects') or directly (via conscious actions of the movement's adherents) lead to mobilizations in other countries (Smith et al., 1997).

9 In some cases, this procedure, which basically consists of translating a variable into a lower scale, may force the researcher to refrain from his/her preferred statistical technique, since many procedures (including the multiple regression technique) require ratio-scaled variables.

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
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Kwame Boadu

Social Class and Health Status in Ghana

Introduction

Social class is a powerful determinant of a multitude of factors that affect health status: access to resources, such as medical care and adequate housing; the nature of the physical and urban environment; and individual resources, such as income and education, that reflect differential opportunities. It can also be argued that social class is the primary determinant of exposure to adverse factors; however, the mechanisms by which class might influence health status vary across different cultures and populations as a whole. It is noted, for instance, that large gradients in life expectancy by income level, educational attainment, social class, ethnic background, place of residence, etc. have been repeatedly discovered in populations during the 20th century. The association between lower social class status and adverse physical and mental health (Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958; Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1969) has been reported in the United States (Haan et al., 1987; Williams, 1990; King and Williams, 1992), in Great Britain (Marmot et al., 1984, 1987, 1991; Marmot and Theorell, 1988; Carr-Hill, 1989) and in Scandinavia (Vagero and Lundberg, 1989; Vagero, 1991). Inversely, higher socioeconomic status is consistently associated with longer life.

It is noted also that socioeconomic factors, broadly defined, have a major effect not only on the relative health status of groups within a population, but on the health status of the same population at different points in time. For populations over time, as for population groups at a point in time, these other factors do not reflect simply the presence or absence of poverty and deprivation. They point to the tight linkage between health status and the social environment, including the levels and distribution of prosperity in a society, as well as other sociodemographic factors. It is in light of the above

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that this study proceeds to investigate how social class differences affect health status in Ghana.

Health Status

It is interesting to note that studies that have attempted an investigation of this nature have employed different measurement criteria of health status. The two most common measures that have been used in developing country studies are the nutritional status of children and, correspondingly, the body mass index (BMI) of adults. However, the former, involving mainly anthropometric methods, is the most frequently used indicator in studies on Ghana.

Asenso-Okyere et al. (1997) suggest in their study that 'the interconnection between the health and nutrition of a household is better understood by considering children in the early stages of their life'. The reason, according to the authors, is that the nutrition and health status of a child may be linked to the poverty level of the household. Reutlinger and Selowsky (1978) also point out in their study that the nutritional status of an infant is the most important policy-induced determinant of the individual's physical condition. A study by Ewusi (1978) on the nutritional status of children used anthropometric measurements based on changes in the upper arm circumference, as did the study by Orraca-Tetteh and Watson (1977).

Still more studies have used nutritional status of children and the same anthropometric methods to examine health status: the nation-wide nutrition survey conducted jointly by the Nutrition Department of the Ghana Ministry of Health and UNICEF in 1986; the 1988 Demographic and Health Survey (Ghana Statistical Service, 1989) of Ghana report on the levels of malnutrition among 1841 children between the ages of 3 and 36 months; the study by Alderman (1990) based on the first round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 1) data; and the data collected by the Catholic Relief Services (1987) of Ghana on the nutritional levels of children reporting to maternal child health centres.

In the case of adults, the measure that has mainly been used is the BMI, defined as a person's weight in kilograms divided by the square height in metres. It must be emphasized that BMI provides direct nutritional information. But one can argue that while nutritional status and BMI may reflect the health status or general well-being of children and adults respectively, these measurements tend to ignore the important role that socioeconomic factors play in their manifestation. While pointing out the complex relationships between health and nutrition, these studies fail to account for the fact that nutritional status in general is a direct consequence of socioeconomic conditions or circumstances. This study is therefore an attempt to fill the void. Most important, the use of malaria as a proxy measure of health status

is of significant relevance to the particular circumstances of Ghana and other developing countries. This is because of the pervasive influence of malaria as the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Ghana, as well as its linkage to socioeconomic and environmental conditions, factors that invariably determine social groupings. This relationship has been extensively investigated (see, for example, Luckner et al., 1998 and Banguero, 1984). In fact, Banguero observes that the epidemiological, biological and curative aspects of malaria have been well analyzed from the theoretical and methodological points of view (Yetukiel, 1965; Molineaux and Granicia, 1980), but the social and economic aspects of the problem have received very little attention from researchers.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework guiding this study incorporates three factors that are perceived to influence health status in general They are not directly specific to the prevalence of malaria, although a link is implied. These are socioeconomic factors, personal health practices or personal hygiene, and social support. Despite general improvements in health status, broad-based social and economic change, and advances in health care technology and the delivery of medical services, socioeconomic status (SES) remains a powerful predictor of health throughout the industrialized world and in poorer developing countries (Marmot et al., 1987; Williams, 1990). Also, studies have established that the link between health status and socioeconomic status is strong (Syme, 1994), not only within the community, but also in the work place (Frank and Mustard, 1994; Wilkinson, 1994; Renaud, 1995). Rank in the social hierarchy appears to have important implications for health behaviour, with those higher up feeling more in control of life and unhealthy habits (Renaud, 1995). The significant association between unemployment and illness (Jin et al., 1995) presents a strong argument that the provision of gainful employment opportunities acts to safeguard the health of individuals.

It has also been established that the health of individuals is strongly linked to one's coping skills and to the choices one makes about health behaviours. Being able to communicate with others, to cope with stress, and having a sense of control over one's life circumstances are all important in helping resist disease (see for example, Turner and Roszell, 1994; Kessler et al., 1988; Mirowsky and Ross, 1990; Rosenfield, 1989). Also, the choices individuals make about smoking, alcohol consumption, drug use, physical exercise, sexual behaviour, diet, personal hygiene, etc. have a major impact on one's health and well-being.

Social support is also linked to a diverse array of positive outcomes, including stress reduction (Haines and Hurbert, 1992; House et al., 1988),

decreased likelihood of everything from cancer and cardiological problems to infections (Adams and Blieszner, 1995; Evans and Stoddart, 1994; Syme, 1994), decreased mortality and suicide (Cornell, 1992; Pescosolido, 1990), career mobility (Ibarra, 1992), church membership (Bainbridge, 1990), and life satisfaction (Stevens, 1992). The healing support of friends and family is not a new insight. Studies have shown that marital relationship is one of the most consistent categories of social contact in predicting mortality. Age-adjusted mortality rates are consistently higher for the unmarried than for the married (Trovato, 1992; Blazer, 1982; House, Robbins and Metzner, 1982; Berkman and Syme, 1979). However, it is also observed that too many people in one's social network can be as daunting and stressful as social isolation (McDaniel, 1995, 1993).

The foregoing discussion represents the conceptual framework of the study depicted in Figure 1. It is posited that social class affects health status (malaria) through marital status and personal health practices. The hypothesis to be tested is thus stated: upper class status is negatively related to the prevalence of malaria, while lower class status is positively related to the prevalence of malaria.

Data and Method

The study utilizes data from the 1997 Ghana Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) study. In all, 14,514 household heads were successfully interviewed, of which 9162 were rural household heads and 5352 urban household heads. Six variables were selected for the construction of a




Figure 1 Model of Social Class and the Prevalence of Malaria in Ghana

composite social class index. These are highest grade of education completed, dwelling ownership, heads of cattle owned, modern household items, main source of cooking fuel and type of toilet facility. Education was selected because its underlying clusters and dimensions subsume a larger number of intercorrelated variables such as occupation, an important indicator of class status. Dwelling ownership is selected because of its ability to predict, to some degree, other dwelling-related variables (material of walls of house and number of separate rooms) and, perhaps, land ownership in Ghana which are all perceived as very useful indicators of social class in Ghana. The choice of heads of cattle was due to the fact that it is without question an important item of wealth and prestige in Ghana, especially in the rural areas. Modern household items, main source of cooking fuel, and type of toilet facility are perceived more as symbols of prestige and class status in the context of Ghanaian society than mere basic necessities as in western countries, hence their inclusion..

Measurement of Indicators

Generally, indicators used in the construction of an index must be measured on an interval scale; however, the indicators selected in this study are measured on different scales. Education and heads of cattle are both measured as continuous variables and hence have interval scales of measurement. Main source of cooking fuel, dwelling ownership and type of toilet facility are nominal variables comprised of different categories. These were transformed into ordinal variables and treated as interval level scales. The different categories were re-classified and arranged in order of importance from the least to the most. The requirement of having interval level measurement in index construction can be relaxed in the case of ordinal variables on the assumption that there exist equal intervals between the order of the categories. Modern household items was measured as a dichotomy of six items (refrigerator, television, video deck, stereo system, modern stove and car or truck). This indicator too was transformed into an index. This was accomplished simply by re-coding and designating car or truck as the highest order item, possession of any of the other modern household items the second highest, and non-possession of any item at all the lowest in the rank order, thus making it a continuous variable.

Bivariate Analysis

Table 1 presents the zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationship among the indicators according to rural and urban. Overall, the correlations are not very strong, ranging from very weak or insignificant to moderately strong. The urban sample exhibits relatively stronger and significant associations overall than the rural sample. The strongest correlation is found in the urban sample where main source of cooking fuel registers a significantly

Table 1 Correlation Matrices of Indicators

Rural (n = 9162)

Variables	Education	Cooking fuel	Toilet facility	Household items	Dwelling ownership	Heads of cattle
Education	1.000	.236**	.151**	.271**	−.050**	−.051**
Main source of cooking fuel		1.000	.307**	.292**	−.084**	−.064**
Type of toilet facility			1.000	.187**	−.096**	−.087**
Modern household items				1.000	−.011	−.014
Dwelling ownership					1.000	.151**
Heads of cattle						1.000

Urban (n = 5352)

Variables	Education	Cooking fuel	Toilet facility	Household items	Dwelling ownership	Heads of cattle
Education	1.000	.342**	.264**	.305**	−.003	−.010
Main source of cooking fuel		1.000	.366**	.412**	−.040**	−.033
Type of toilet facility			1.000	.278**	−.016	.002
Modern household items				1.000	.114**	.035
Dwelling ownership					1.000	.097**
Heads of cattle						1.000

** significant at $p = 0.01$

positive association (.412) with modern household items. In the rural sample on the other hand, the association is of moderate strength (.292) and significant. This is followed by a moderately strong positive and significant association between main source of cooking fuel and toilet facility with magnitudes .366 and .307 in the urban and rural samples respectively. In the latter case, this represents the strongest correlation overall in the rural sample.

Education registers the third significant and moderately strong .342 positive association with main source of cooking fuel in the urban sample, whilst it is a modest .236 in the rural sample. In the urban sample, the next significant and moderately strong positive association of .305 is between education and modern household items, as against .271 in the rural sample. Other significant and positive associations are found between toilet facility and modern household items, posting .278 in the urban sample and .187 in the

rural sample, while education also registers a positive association with toilet facility with magnitudes of .264 for urban and .151 for rural.

All of the above associations are as predicted and consistent with the reality of Ghanaian society. For example, the ownership and/or use of any modern household item is dependent on electricity and gas as represented in main source of cooking fuel. These facilities, in turn, go hand in hand with modern toilet facilities. Then overall, those likely and able to afford these facilities or items are mostly the highly educated, and this group of people would usually be located in urban centres, hence the relatively stronger correlations found in the urban sample. Also, it is reasonable to anticipate that most homeowners could afford these modern household items as depicted by the moderately positive association (.114) in the urban sample. The opposite is the case in the rural sample where the association is negative, albeit a weak and non-significant one (–.011).

The positively significant but weak association between heads of cattle and dwelling ownership is consistent with what has been mentioned elsewhere: people who own cattle are among the wealthy in Ghanaian society. The fact that most cattle owners would most likely be located in the rural area explains the relatively stronger association (.151) in the rural sample compared to the urban sample (.097). Likewise, the negative correlation between heads of cattle on the one hand, and education, main source of cooking fuel, type of toilet facility and modern household items on the other are not out of order. Cattle owners would most likely not be highly educated, in addition to the fact that basic social amenities are lacking in most rural areas where they are located. But those who are resident in urban areas may have access to, and could afford some of these facilities as depicted in the positive but non-significant correlation.

Principal Component Analysis

Component analysis provided the study with a formula for obtaining the composite index scores of social class. This was accomplished by using the generated factor loadings as weights, the reason being that these loadings are assumed to indicate the correlation between the hypothesized factor (social class) and the indicators. For the purpose of this study, the factor loadings of the first component (unrotated) matrix are used (see Table 2). Modern household items and main source of cooking fuel register the highest positive factor loading in rural and urban respectively. In the rural sample, education has the second highest positive factor loading, followed by main source of cooking fuel. Dwelling ownership and type of toilet facility register very low positive factor loadings. Heads of cattle posts the only negative factor loading in the rural sample. For the urban sample, modern household items produces the second highest positive factor loading, followed by education and heads of cattle. Two indicators, type of toilet facility and dwelling ownership, produce

Table 2 Factor Loadings in Component Matrix

	Rural		*Urban*	
Indicators	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*
Highest education completed	.696	−.079	.695	.197
Main source of cooking fuel	.665	−.113	.754	.174
Type of toilet facility	.179	.644	−.441	.078
Modern household items	.710	−.187	.727	−.121
Dwelling ownership	.212	.627	−.108	.751
Heads of cattle	−.029	−.503	.099	−.654

negative factor loadings. The magnitude of the loadings and the respective indicators would tend to suggest that the definition of social class in this study incorporates a combination of economic as well as social prestige factors.

The next step in the index construction applied the factor loadings to expected ideal type characteristics (Table 3) envisaged for the three groups postulated in this study; upper, middle and lower class. Respondents falling in the upper class are expected to have completed post-secondary education and to be living in their own dwelling. It is also expected that their main source of cooking fuel would be electricity or gas and their toilet facility, a

Table 3 Expected Ideal Type Characteristics of Social Class in Ghana

Indicators	*Upper class*	*Middle class*	*Lower class*
Highest grade of education completed	Post-secondary	Senior sec., vocational, commercial, teacher and nursing training	No school, pre-primary, primary, middle and junior secondary school
Main source of cooking fuel	4 or more	2 or 3	1 or none
Type of toilet facility	Flush toilet (WC)	Pan/bucket, KVIP	None (bush), covered/uncovered pit latrine, other
Modern household items owned	Car or truck	Fridge, television, video deck, stereo system and electric/gas stove	Owns none
Dwelling ownership	Owns dwelling	Rents dwelling	Rent-free
Heads of cattle	10 or more	Less than 10	None

water closet. They are expected to own a car or truck in addition to 10 or more heads of cattle. People of middle class status are expected to have completed some senior secondary, vocational or commercial education, teacher or nursing training and to be living in rented dwellings. Unlike those of upper class status, the main source of cooking fuel used by people of middle class status is expected to be charcoal and kerosene. Their toilet facility is also expected to be the Kumasi ventilated improved pit latrine (KVIP) or pan latrine. Lastly, it is expected that this group of people would possess some modern household items such as a fridge, television, video deck, stereo system, or modern stove, in addition to owning less than ten heads of cattle.

For respondents in the lower class, it is expected that they would have completed some pre-primary, primary, middle or junior secondary school, or not had any education at all. Also, it is expected that they will have free accommodation. People of lower class are expected to use firewood as their main source of cooking fuel, as well as to use the pit latrine as their toilet facility. Lastly, they are not expected to own any modern household items or heads of cattle. Based on the above, the distributions of the three social groups envisaged were obtained. The assumed weights were then multiplied by the score obtained by a respondent on each one of the indicators and the sum of the weighted product was taken to represent the total index score of social class. Thus, the index score was obtained by combining the raw variables with weights that were proportional to their component factor loadings (Kim and Mueller, 1978), that is, the proportion of their contribution to the index. This can be expressed as follows:

$$TISSC = \Sigma R_i W_i$$

where TISSC = total index score of social class
R_i = score by each indicator
W_i = weight of indicator

Respondents were then classified into groups depending on how they were placed on the index scale. Thereafter, the cumulative frequency rule was applied to delineate the cut-off points for the three groups envisaged. The distribution of the classes obtained by this procedure is presented in Table 4 below.

Table 4 shows 50.0% and 48.4% of rural and urban residents respectively are of lower class status. The proportion for middle class is 39.4% and 33.8% respectively. The upper class has the lowest proportions of 10.6% in rural and 17.9% in urban. Overall, the distributions would seem to be fairly consistent with the reality of Ghanaian society, where approximately half or more of the population is classified as poor, and at the other extreme is a minority wealthy class.

Table 4 Distribution Based on Derived Index Scores of Social Class

	Rural		*Urban*	
Social class	*Frequency*	%	*Frequency*	%
Lower class	4578	50.0	2588	48.4
Middle class	3613	39.4	1807	33.8
Upper class	971	10.6	957	17.9
Total	9162	100.0	5352	100.0

The Regression Model

On the basis of the specified model, marital status and personal health practices were introduced as intervening variables that mediate the effect of social class on health status (malaria). The influence of social class on the prevalence of malaria is premised on the observation that 'widespread poverty . . . contributes directly to the high death toll from infectious and parasitic diseases' (Olshansky et al., 1997). Alnwick (2000) also notes that malaria afflicts primarily the poor, who tend to live in dwellings that offer little or no protection against mosquitoes. Hence the incidence of poverty could here be seen as a culmination of the different dimensions of the socioeconomic environment that facilitate the creation of subgroups within the population, which factor, in turn, indirectly influences the prevalence of malaria.

The model predictions for the expected probability of malaria as discussed above are therefore summarized in the following regression functions (Equations 1, 2 and 3):

$$\text{ipd} = f(\text{constant} + \text{soclass}) \quad (1)$$

$$\text{ipd} = f(\text{constant} + \text{soclass} + b6 + \text{urbrur} + \text{region}) \quad (2)$$

$$\text{ipd} = f(\text{constant} + \text{soclass} + b7 + \text{php} + b1 + b6 + \text{urbrur} + \text{region}) \quad (3)$$

where ipd = malaria
soclass = social class
b7 = marital status
php = personal health practices
b1 = sex
b6 = age
urbrur = urban/rural residence
region = ecological zone

Equation 1 examines the direct effect of social class on malaria, while Equation 2 examines the impact of the predictor variables. Equation 3 examines the

total effect with the inclusion of the control variables. These relationships are first examined through simple cross-classification of the predictor variables in Tables 5 to 7.

Cross-Classification of Model Variables

It is observed in Table 5 that the highest proportion of non-observers of personal hygiene in the rural area are of lower class (52.8%), while the upper class has the lowest proportion (7.9%). The same trend is observed in the urban area. Similarly, Table 6 shows that in both rural and urban areas, the highest proportion of unmarried people are of lower class status while people of upper class represent the highest proportion of the married. Table 7 indicates that in both rural and urban areas, the proportion of people observing personal hygiene is slightly greater for the married than for the unmarried.

Finally, Table 8 shows that in both urban and rural areas, the unmarried have a higher proportion of malaria than the married. In the case of personal hygiene, it is shown that the proportion of malaria is higher in non-observers of personal hygiene than in the group of people who observe personal hygiene in both rural and urban areas. For social class, the upper class in the

Table 5 Distribution of Social Class by Personal Hygiene and Place of Residence

	Rural				*Urban*			
	Lower class	*Middle class*	*Upper class*	*Total*	*Lower class*	*Middle class*	*Upper class*	*Total*
No personal hygiene	4424 (52.8%)	3289 (39.3%)	662 (7.9%)	8375 (100%)	2116 (59.4%)	1151 (32.3%)	298 (8.4%)	3565 (100%)
Observes personal hygiene	154 (19.6%)	324 (41.2%)	309 (39.3%)	787 (100%)	472 (26.4%)	656 (36.7%)	659 (36.9%)	1787 (100%)

Table 6 Distribution of Social Class by Marital Status and Place of Residence

	Rural				*Urban*			
	Lower class	*Middle class*	*Upper class*	*Total*	*Lower class*	*Middle class*	*Upper class*	*Total*
Not married	1335 (47.1%)	1274 (44.9%)	228 (8.0%)	2837 (100%)	1168 (55.1%)	675 (31.8%)	277 (13.1%)	2120 (100%)
Married	3243 (51.3%)	2339 (37.0%)	743 (11.7%)	6325 (100%)	1420 (43.9%)	1132 (35.0%)	680 (21.0%)	3232 (100%)
Total	4578 (50.0%)	3613 (39.4%)	971 (10.6%)	9162 (100%)	2588 (48.4%)	1807 (33.8%)	957 (17.9%)	5352 (100%)

Table 7 Distribution of Marital Status by Personal Hygiene and Place of Residence

	Rural			*Urban*		
	No personal hygiene	*Observes personal hygiene*	*Total*	*No personal hygiene*	*Observes personal hygiene*	*Total*
Not married	2637 (93.0%)	200 (7.0%)	2837 (100.0%)	1488 (70.2%)	632 (29.8%)	2120 (100.0%)
Married	5738 (90.7%)	587 (9.3%)	6325 (100.0%)	2077 (64.3%)	1155 (35.7%)	3232 (100.0%)
Total	8375 (91.4%)	787 (8.6%)	9162 (100.0%)	3565 (66.6%)	1787 (33.4%)	5352 (100.0%)

rural area has the highest proportion of malaria (12.0%) while the lower class registers the lowest proportion (10.7%). The reverse is seen in the urban area where the upper class records the lowest proportion of malaria (9.9%) and the lower class the highest (13.6%).

Logistic Regression Analysis

Measurement of Variables

Dependent Variable Malaria is measured as a dichotomous variable; respondents who have no malaria are coded 0 while those who have malaria are coded 1.

Predictor Variables The predictor variables are social class, marital status and personal health practices. Social class is comprised of three categories, namely, lower, middle and upper class, coded as 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Marital status is used in this study as a proxy for social support and measured as a dichotomous variable comprising 'not married' (1) and 'married' (0). 'Personal health practices' or personal hygiene is a combination of three hygiene-related items: use of toilet paper rolls, toothbrush/toothpaste and package soap. This is measured as a dichotomous variable of respondents who use none (coded 1) against those who use all three items (coded 0).

Control Variables The intervening or control variables are sex, age, place of residence and ecological zone. Sex is coded 0 for female and 1 for male. Age is comprised of three subgroups, namely, 15–44, 45–64 and 65 years or more,

Table 8 Prevalence of Malaria by Marital Status, Personal Hygiene and Social Class

	Rural				*Urban*			
Marital status	*Not married*	*Married*	*Total*		*Not married*	*Married*	*Total*	
Proportion of malaria	434 (15.3%)	595 (9.4%)	1029 (11.2%)		329 (15.5%)	330 (10.2%)	1029 (11.2%)	
95% CI	13.9; 16.6	8.7; 10.1	10.6; 11.9		14.0; 17.1	9.2; 11.3	11.4; 13.2	
Personal hygiene	*No hygiene*	*Observes hygiene*	*Total*		*No hygiene*	*Observes hygiene*	*Total*	
Proportion of malaria	945 (11.3%)	84 (10.7%)	1029 (11.2%)		471 (13.2%)	188 (10.5%)	659 (12.3%)	
95% CI	10.6; 12.0	8.5; 12.8	10.6; 11.9		12.1; 14.3;	9.1; 11.9	11.4; 13.2	
Social class	*Lower class*	*Middle class*	*Upper class*	*Total*	*Lower class*	*Middle class*	*Upper class*	*Total*
Proportion of malaria	491 (10.7%)	421 (11.7%)	117 (12.0%)	1029 (11.2%)	352 (13.6%)	212 (11.7%)	95 (9.9%)	659 (12.3%)
95% CI	9.8; 11.6	10.6; 12.7	10.0; 14.1	10.6; 11.9	12.3; 14.9	10.3; 13.2	8.0; 11.8	11.4; 13.2

coded as 1, 2 and 3 respectively. These classifications are intended to test for possible sex- or age-specific effects. Place of residence is coded 0 for rural and 1 for urban as control for rural- or urban-specific differences. The data set was partitioned into two subsets according to rural and urban prior to executing all of the analyses. Ecological zone is also comprised of three subgroups: Savannah (Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions), Forest (Ashanti, Eastern and Brong-Ahafo regions) and Coastal (Greater Accra, Western, Central and Volta regions). These zones are coded as 1, 2 and 3 respectively, with Coastal as the reference category.

The logistic analysis is executed using the indicator-variable coding scheme. As would be observed from above discussion, the binary variables are sex, marital status and personal health practices. Age, ecological zone and social class are the categorical variables entered in the model. Treating the respective variables as dichotomous or categorical facilitates their analysis and interpretation.

Discussion of Results

The $Exp(B_k)$ is the estimated odds ratio for those who are a unit apart on X_k, net of other predictors in the model. For the coefficients of binary predictors, a unit difference in X_k is the difference between membership in category X_k and membership in the omitted category. In this case, $Exp(B_k)$ is the odds ratio for those in the membership category versus those in the omitted category.

The logistic regression results are presented in Tables 9, 10 and 11. The model chi-square for Equation 1 is 2.466 and 9.796 for rural and urban respectively, with two degrees of freedom (Table 9). The results indicate that the odds of having malaria in the rural area are about .88 and .96 times less for the lower class and middle class respectively as they are for the upper

Table 9 Logistic Regression: Direct Effect of Social Class on Malaria

	Rural			*Urban*		
	B	*Sig.*	*Exp(B)*	*B*	*Sig.*	*Exp(B)*
Lower class	−.131	.230	.877	.357	.004	1.428
Middle class	−.038	.733	.963	.187	.151	1.206
(Upper class)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Model chi-square		2.466			9.796	
df		2			2	
sig.		.291			.007	

class. This suggests that each of these groups has better health status than the upper class. The reverse is the case in the urban area where the odds of having malaria are about 1.43 and 1.21 times as large respectively for the lower and middle classes as they are for the upper class.

A possible reason for the rather intriguing finding in the rural area is that people of upper class who would usually be highly educated and more knowledgeable about malaria may be reporting it and seeking medical assistance more than the less educated people who would normally be of lower class. Interestingly, however, these results are in conformity with the distributions obtained by cross-classification, but they are not statistically significant, an indication that social class does not directly influence health status in either rural or urban Ghana.

It is important to note that this outcome is consistent with various studies that have sought to investigate the effect of socioeconomic or social class factors on the prevalence of malaria. Koram et al. (1995) investigated the possible importance of socioeconomic variables on the severity of malaria in Gambian children and found that socioeconomic and behavioural factors are not major determinants of severe malaria in African children. Similarly, Luckner et al. (1998) found that socioeconomic factors are not major determinants of severe malarial anaemia in children in Gabon. But in the Democratic Republic of Congo, low socioeconomic status was significantly associated with severe disease in a cross-sectional study comparing 84 children with cerebral malaria and 600 controls (Carme et al., 1994).

Furthermore, socioeconomic and environmental factors such as poor housing, crowding, lack of knowledge of the causes of malaria, and educational level have been shown to predispose populations to malaria in parts of Asia and Latin America (Banguero, 1984; Buttraporn et al., 1986). And in a cross-sectional study of the association between nutritional, environmental and socio-demographic factors and malaria occurrence among children under 5 years in a Sudanese rural community, El Samani et al. (1987) found an inverse relationship between ownership of a refrigerator, which is an indicator of socioeconomic status, and the prevalence of malaria. The attack rate of malaria was significantly lower among children in households with a refrigerator (20%) than those without (33%). The study revealed further that children from homes with two rooms or less had a significantly higher occurrence of malaria (31%) than those from homes with three or more rooms (23%).

The results in Table 10 explain to what extent the prevalence of malaria is mediated by marital status and personal health practices. The study first examines whether the addition of these variables makes a significant contribution to the prediction of malaria. This is represented by the difference in model chi-squares between the first and second regression equations (rural = 67.941–2.466; urban = 41.767–9.796) which are 65.475 and 31.971 respectively

Table 10 Logistic Regression: Effect of Intervening Variables

	Rural			*Urban*		
	B	*Sig.*	*Exp(B)*	*B*	*Sig.*	*Exp(B)*
Not married	.554	.000	1.740	.452	.000	1.572
(Married)	–	–	–	–	–	–
No personal hygiene	.087	.493	1.091	.170	.085	1.186
(Personal hygiene)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lower class	−.191	.098	.827	.197	.138	1.218
Middle class	−.128	.267	.880	.093	.490	1.098
Upper class	–	–	–	–	–	–
Model chi-square		67.941			41.767	
df		4			4	
sig.		.000			.000	

for rural and urban. With four degrees of freedom, the result is highly significant ($p < .001$), suggesting that at least one of the additional terms is important.

The coefficients reveal that the significance of the set of added predictors is due primarily to the strong impact of marital status. In the rural area, being married reduces the odds of having malaria by a factor of 1.74, while in the urban area, it reduces the odds by a factor of 1.57. Put differently, the odds of having malaria are about 1.74 times as great for the unmarried as they are for the married in the rural area. For the urban area, the corresponding odds are 1.57 times. This finding affirms the hypothesis of marriage as a support mechanism that contributes positively to better health, as several studies have demonstrated.

It is also observed that the odds of having malaria in both rural and urban areas are respectively 1.09 and 1.19 times as large for those who do not observe any personal hygiene as they are for those who do. This outcome is consistent with what would be obtained in any modern society or population anywhere in the world where normal hygiene practices are observed. Furthermore, all of the above results are consistent with the distributions obtained by cross-classification. But whereas marital status is statistically significant, personal hygiene is non-significant. It can therefore be inferred that between the two intervening variables, marital status is the one predictor that mediates the influence of social class on malaria.

With respect to the effect of control variables presented in Table 11, the difference in model chi-square of 31.816 (99.757–67.941) and 28.585 (70.352–41.767) for rural and urban respectively, represents the magnitude of

Table 11 Logistic Regression (Social Class + Effect of Intervening + Control Variables)

	Rural			*Urban*		
	B	*Sig.*	*Exp(B)*	*B*	*Sig.*	*Exp(B)*
Male	−.204	.010	.815	−.388	.000	.678
(Female)	–	–	–	–	–	–
15–44	.003	.977	1.003	.086	.512	1.089
45–64	−.102	.308	.903	.057	.681	1.058
(65+)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Savannah zone	−.432	.000	.649	.296	.097	1.344
Forest zone	.084	.237	1.088	.282	.002	1.325
(Coastal zone)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Not married	.426	.000	1.531	.311	.001	1.365
(Married)	–	–	–	–	–	–
No personal hygiene	.118	.351	1.125	.132	.193	1.141
(Personal hygiene)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lower class	−.095	.420	.909	.079	.557	1.083
Middle class	−.168	.148	.845	.031	.817	1.032
Upper class	–	–	–	–	–	–
Model chi-square		99.757			70.352	
df		9			9	
sig.		.000			.000	

their effects. These results are highly significant with nine degrees of freedom ($p<.001$) and show ecological zone as the most important of the control variables. Indeed, Kleinschmidt et al. (2001) observed in their study that even small differences in climate can have very marked effects on the intensity of malaria transmission, thus lending credence to the above finding. Specifically, the odds of having malaria are about 1.09 times as high in the forest zone as they are for the coastal zone in the rural area, while in the urban area, the odds are about 1.33 times as great. It is worth noting, however, that while the outcome of the urban area is significant, that of the rural area is non significant.

This notwithstanding, the trend observed is corroborated by Ahmed (1989) who reported that the distribution of malaria in Ghana follows distinct ecological zones and climatic conditions, especially the seasonal rainfall pattern. He notes that the normally humid climate of the forest zone and the attendant heavy and double rainfall pattern, coupled with the farming practices employed, create more breeding sites and favourable conditions for malaria transmission, so the forest region reports the highest rate of malaria

infection throughout the year. On the other hand, he notes that malaria transmission is lower in the coastal zone where there is low rainfall accompanied by a relatively long period of dry weather.

For the northern savannah zone, Ahmed observes that because of the longer period of dry weather, infection rates are lower throughout the year except in the rainy season. This is also true of the rural area in this study where the odds of having malaria in the savannah zone are .65 less than in the coastal zone, and statistically significant, while in the urban area, the odds are about 1.34 times as great as they are for the coastal zone but not statistically significant.

The results also indicate that the odds of having malaria are about .82 times less for males in the rural area and .68 times less for males in the urban area as they are for females. This finding is statistically significant, underscoring the sex-specificity of malaria infection. By inference, males have better health than females. There is no definitive explanation for this difference; however, possible reasons could include (1) increased risk of exposure to vector mosquitoes because of differential behaviour, (2) medical care being sought more often or earlier by females; and (3) the presence of higher parasite loads in females as reported by Brabin and Brabin (1992) which, under stress of the disproportionate burden of domestic chores and other related activities, results in clinical illness.

In the case of age, it is observed that the odds of having malaria are about 1.00 and 1.09 times as large in rural and urban areas respectively for the age-group 15–44 as they are for the age-group 65 and over. A possible reason for this finding may be that the younger age-group is more engaged in economic activities, such as agriculture, that lead to greater exposure. For the age-group 45–64 on the other hand, the odds are .90 times less in the rural area but 1.06 times greater in the urban area than they are for the 65 or more age-group. The direction of effects is similar with the introduction of the intervening variables in the second equation. These findings are also not statistically significant. Not unexpectedly, differing outcomes have been arrived at in studies that examine sex–age variation in health status.

In a study of a peri-urban area near Accra, Ghana, Landgraf et al. (1994) examined 1048 schoolchildren between the ages of 5 and 17 in order to determine the prevalence of malaria. When standardized for age, the study revealed that the overall parasite rates were 53.7% in females and 57.4% in males even though the difference was not statistically significant. Also, Aramburu et al. (1999), in an overview of the malaria epidemic in the Peruvian Amazon, reported that age-specific attack rates were highest in adults, particularly males, and suggested that occupation might be an important risk factor, even though they found no associations between malaria incidence and specific occupations. Furthermore, Mendis et al. (2001) note that for occupational reasons, the risk of malaria can be expected to be several times greater in men

than in women, except during pregnancy. Fungladda et al. (1987) also examined sociodemographic and behavioural factors associated with hospital malaria patients in Kanchanaburi, Thailand and found that malaria cases were predominantly male, under the age of 30 and single.

Contrary to these observations, Bawden et al. (1995) found that among displaced Haitians in temporary camps at the US Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, the incidence of clinical malaria for females under 16 years of age was 491 per 10,000 compared to 278 per 10,000 for males of the same age. Giha et al (2000) also found the malaria risk to be significantly lower in individuals aged 20–88 years than in the 5–19 years age-group. Also, the incidence of malaria was lower in males than in females in one year and reversed two years later. And Laserson et al. (1999) surveyed malaria infection and disease among 1311 Yanomami in three communities in the Venezuelan Amazon, and the authors found that the rate of infection in males did not differ from those of females. It was also revealed that clinical disease was most evident among children under 5 years of age.

Conclusion

This study set out to investigate the influence of social class on health status, using malaria as a proxy measure of health status. Marital status and personal hygiene were introduced as intervening variables. The control variables were sex, age, and ecological zone. While some studies are of the view that widespread poverty contributes to high mortality from infectious and parasitic diseases (Alnwick, 2000; Olshansky, 1997), others argue that the high levels of malaria in poor countries are not due to poverty. What cannot be disputed, however, is the fact that no study has attempted to aggregate different socioeconomic indicators into a single composite index of social class and on the basis of that, examine the health status of a population using the prevalence of malaria as a proxy measure, as has been undertaken in this study. In fact, the indicators used in the construction of the social class index, namely, education, dwelling ownership, heads of cattle, modern household items, main source of cooking fuel and type of toilet facility not only affect exposure to the risk of malaria, but each is also by itself an indicator of socioeconomic status or social class. Therefore, the advantage gained by this procedure is that the index incorporates as many as possible of the competing factors that go into defining the socioeconomic environment.

The study revealed that social class does not have a direct influence on the prevalence of malaria in Ghana. However, marital status is found to mediate the influence of social class on the prevalence of malaria. The findings in this study should be interpreted with caution. Most important, the results cannot be generalized for the entire population of Ghana given that only

household heads were interviewed. Another major limitation relates to the measurement of malaria, since it is not possible to discern from the question whether the information sought was about the rate of prevalence or incidence.

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
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Yandong Zhao

Measuring the Social Capital of Laid-off Chinese Workers

Over recent years there has been a rapid development in the concept of social capital in various areas of social science. Introduced to sociological literature by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, this concept has drawn the interest of researchers from different academic backgrounds and has become one of sociological theory's most popular exports into everyday language (Portes, 1998; Woolcock, 1997). However, definitions of social capital have been various and confusing. Generally speaking, sociologists tend to regard social capital as an asset possessed by individuals. In this view, social capital refers to the accessible resources embedded in the social structure or social networks that will bring benefits to their owners (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Lin, 1999). Contrary to this individual-level conceptualization, however, economists and politic scientists consider that social capital can be a collective asset of a group, an organization, or even a whole society, upon which the basis of civic society and economic development is constructed (Putnam, 1993, 1995; Fukuyama, 1995).

The confusion in the concept of social capital brings about another problem: how to measure social capital in empirical studies. In the large number of relevant empirical studies we have seen various methods of measuring social capital, ranging from simply one indicator to complicated groups of indexes. The debate over the measurement of social capital, like the argument about the concept, may never come to a conclusion.

As shown above, the concept of social capital was originally constructed and studied in the context of western societies. In recent years, however, it has drawn the attention of researchers from different cultural backgrounds. Chinese society has a tradition of emphasizing the importance of interpersonal relationships and personal networks (Fei [1949]1992; Walder, 1986). Meanwhile, it is now undergoing a great social transition, in which informal social institutions are playing very important roles in social life (Li, 1995;

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Kolankiewicz, 1996). Therefore, it is of great theoretical significance to study social capital in current Chinese society, and some research has already been conducted in this area (Li, 1995; Bian, 1997; Lin, 1999; Bian and Li 2001). However, the methods of measurement in these studies are still so various that the question needs further exploration.

Based on questionnaire survey data of 621 laid-off workers in Wuhan, China, my study set out to investigate the role and effect of social capital in the re-employment of laid-off Chinese laid-off workers.[1] The focus of my study is individual-level social capital. In measuring this, I specifically distinguish two forms: possessed social capital, and the social capital actually used in re-employment. The former refers to the accessible resources embedded in the workers' personal social networks, while the latter refers to the social capital that they actually mobilized while searching for new employment. Although most empirical studies on job seeking have hitherto focused solely on the social capital actually used, some researchers have argued that the role of possessed social capital should not be ignored (Montgomery, 1991, 1992; Reingold, 1999; Lin, 1999). Until now, few researchers have clearly distinguished these two types of social capital, let alone measured them simultaneously in one study. Therefore, it will be very interesting to have a close look at these two types of social capital in re-employment of laid-off Chinese workers.

Measuring Possessed Social Capital

Position Generator and Spring Festival Contacts Network

As possessed social capital refers to embedded network resources, studying the laid-off workers' personal networks was indispensable in measuring their possessed social capital. As a powerful new approach to the study of social structure, social network analysis has achieved a high degree of technical sophistication and has built up a set of mature research methods (Scott, 1991). The most frequently used method of studying egocentric social network is by 'name-generators'.[2] However, when adapted to measure social capital in the network, this method ran into problems such as the lack of sampling frames for naming items, and contingency on the generating questions. Moreover, a fatal shortcoming in 'name-generator' is that it is more likely to involve strong rather than weak ties, which leads to a bias in sampling the network members (Lin, 1999).

For these reasons I have abandoned 'name generator' and adopted a recently developed method, 'position generator', to ascertain the possessed social capital of laid-off workers in my study. Proposed by Lin and Dumin (1986), the position generator is an assessment tool specifically aimed at measuring social capital embedded in personal networks. Its basic hypothesis

is that certain structural positions in a society represent corresponding social resources. Therefore, by counting the structural positions, instead of people, existing in the personal network, the researchers are able to assess the social capital embedded in that network.

In their studies of Chinese society, Bian and others assert that since 'spring festival' is the most important traditional festival in China, to contact one's core network members at this time is an obligation for Chinese people (in China it is called *bainian* or 'paying a new year's call'). Therefore, the spring festival contacts network is an appropriate position generator for measuring the core network capital of Chinese people (Bian and Li, 2001). In my study, the respondents were first asked to recall on how many relatives, friends and acquaintances they 'paid a new year's call'[3] in the spring festival (the first five days in the lunar year) of 2000. Then they were asked the generating question: 'Among the people you mentioned above, are there any who have the jobs listed below or are working in the work units listed below?' In the questionnaire (see Appendix) there are two tables, one consisting of 19 representative occupations and the other of 11 work units. The prestige scores of these occupations and work units were calculated on the basis of previous studies (see Bian and Li, 2001). To obtain information about the network structure, the contacts were also divided in the table into three role-relation categories: relatives, friends, and acquaintances. By this method, data on the laid-off workers' core social networks were collected and could be used in further analysis of their possessed social capital.

Indicators of Possessed Social Capital

Since the target of measurement in my study is social capital rather than the social network itself, it is necessary to decide which network indicators are best suited to represent social capital. Bourdieu asserts that one's possession of social capital could be quantified by aggregating (1) the size of the network and (2) the volume of capital, be it economic, social, or symbolic, possessed by network members (Bourdieu, 1986: 248). Following this classification, some researchers insist that it was the embedded network resource that represented social capital (Lin, 1999), while others believe that indicators of network structure, such as size, composition, and density, are also indispensable indicators of social capital (Burt, 1992; Montgomery, 1991, 1992; Bian and Li, 2001). Both of these ideas are adopted in my study, and three indicators are used to represent the social capital possessed by the laid-off workers: network size, network density, and embedded network resources.

Network Structure: Size and Density

The size and density of a network are two basic indicators of network structure (Scott, 1991). Network size refers to the number of network members.

By aggregating all the relatives, friends and acquaintances to whom the respondents 'paid a new year's call' in the spring festival, we got the size of the workers' core networks. As Bourdieu (1986) asserts, the bigger the network size, the more social capital can be mobilized.

Network density describes the general level of linkages among the network members (Scott, 1991). Therefore, in past studies on egocentric networks, the respondents were asked to describe the relationship with the contacts they generated so that density of network could be measured. However, since the data generated by the position generator cannot show relationships among the network members, alternative indicators for density have to be found. Past studies on Chinese society show that the type of role relation has a very strong correlation with network density (Bian, 1997; Ruan, 1998). As Bian and Li suggest, 'relatives' usually build very strong relationships among themselves, while the relationships between 'friends' and 'acquaintances' are usually weak (Bian and Li, 2001). Therefore, I counted the proportion of 'relatives' in the respondents' network and used it as an indicator of network density. According to Granovetter's 'strength of weak ties' hypothesis, the lower-density network may provide better social capital (Granovetter, 1973).

Network Resources: Scores of Embedded Resources

Measurement of embedded network resources is one of the advantages of the 'position generator' method (Lin, 1999). After the respondents answered all the questions about their spring festival contacts, each type of occupation listed in the table was checked and coded. If none of the contacts was engaged in any of these occupations, this occupation type was coded as 0. If there was at least one contact engaged in this type of occupation, it was coded as 1. Notice here that if more than one contact was engaged in one occupation, this occupation type was still coded as 1, since it was occupation types, rather than the number of contacts, that represent the resources embedded in the networks. By aggregating all the occupation types coded 1, we arrived at variable I, 'number of occupation types in spring festival network'. Then the prestige scores of these occupations[4] were added up to get variable II, 'sum of occupational prestige scores in spring festival network'. Following a similar procedure, we obtained variable III, 'number of work unit types' and IV, 'sum of work unit prestige scores' in the spring festival networks.

As Bian and Li (2001) suggest, since these four variables are highly correlated yet cannot be aggregated together, it is appropriate here to simplify the data by factor analysis (see Table 1). One factor was extracted though the principal component method with a variance of 84.8%, demonstrating that the factor analysis was quite successful. Finally, the factor scores were calculated and used as the variable representing the embedded network resources of the laid-off workers.

Table 1 Principal Component Factor Analysis for Embedded Network Resource

		Loadings	*Communalities*
I	Number of occupation types	.930	.865
II	Sum of occupational prestige scores	.915	.837
III	Number of work unit types	.924	.854
IV	Sum of work unit prestige scores	.916	.839
Eigenvalues		3.39	
Variance		84.83%	

Note One factor was extracted.

Measuring Used Social Capital in Job Searches

The social capital actually used in the process of job-seeking has, for a long time, been the main focus of studies in this area. The methods to measure used social capital in these studies are also various (Granovetter, 1974; Lin et al., 1981; Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988; Bian, 1997). In my study, the used social capital in re-employment of the laid-off workers was operationalized into three groups of indicators. First, the respondents were asked by which method they collected information or found opportunities for re-employment. Then those who mobilized social capital in job-seeking were asked what kinds of resources they got from the network. Finally, the respondents who got their jobs through informal channels were asked to describe the characteristic of 'the most important contact'.

Methods of Getting Re-employment

When measuring social capital used in re-employment, a very important indicator is the method the workers used to get information or other help in job searches. In my study, the classification of 'formal' and 'informal' methods in finding new jobs was adopted. As Granovetter (1973) suggests, the 'formal method' of getting information and opportunities for re-employment involves using government or non-government employment services, visiting enterprises, checking advertisements, etc. Beyond these 'market methods', the formal method of re-employment in China also includes getting jobs by government allocation, which is an inheritance of the previous planned economy. On the other hand, the 'informal method' refers to getting jobs through personal contacts, or, in other words, by using social capital.

According to this classification, in my study the workers are divided into two groups. One includes all the workers who used informal methods in finding their first jobs after being laid off. The other includes those who did

not use informal methods in finding first jobs. The former group is considered as having used social capital in job searches.

Resources from Networks

Granovetter (1973, 1995) distinguished between two types of resources flowing through the network during job-seeking. The first category deals with relevant *information* about new jobs that can be channelled through the social network. The second deals with the *influence* that the respondent mobilizes from his/her network members. In his studies in China, Bian (1997) assumed that these resources are related to tie strength. While weak ties are more likely to provide useful information, the strong ties of trust and obligation are more advantageous for providing influence. Since the institutional background of laid-off workers' re-employment is the social transition in China, it is valuable to examine the different mechanisms of information and influence flowing through social networks.

In my questionnaire, the laid-off workers were asked what types of resources they got from their personal network, if they got any. These resources were classified into three types. The first was 'information' about new job opportunities. The second was 'substantial help' in job-seeking, including 'direct job allocation', 'making recommendations', 'arranging application materials', etc., and the third was a combination of 'information and substantial help'.

Characteristics of Contact

The characteristics of contact have always been the most important aspect of studies on social capital and job search (Granovetter, 1974; Lin et al., 1981; Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988; Bian, 1997). 'Contact' refers to the person who provided information, influence and other resources to the respondents in their job searches. In my study, the contact was defined as the person who, according to the respondent, played 'the most important role' in the respondent's attainment of their first job after becoming redundant.

Strength of Ties

The strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis, proposed by Granovetter, has become a classical proposition in sociology and has attracted the interest of a group of researchers (Granovetter, 1995). In these studies, one of the most crucial issues is how to determine the 'strength of ties'.

Though Granovetter clearly states that the strength of ties is shown by a group of multidimensional indicators (Granovetter, 1973), most researchers, including Granovetter himself, do not actually put the idea into practice. Instead, they simply operationalize tie strength into one or two single indicators. Take Granovetter again as an example. He uses 'frequencies of

interaction' and 'role relation', respectively, as indicators of tie-strength respectively in different research projects (Granovetter, 1973, 1974). In later studies, the 'role relation' indicator is most frequently used. The consensus is that 'relatives' and 'friends' represent 'strong' ties, while 'acquaintances', 'neighbours' and 'peer workers' represent 'weak' ties (Lin et al., 1981; Lin and Dumin, 1986; Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988; Bian, 1997).

The defect of the 'role relation' indicator, however, is prominent. 'One problem with this procedure', said Wegner, 'is that social relations with relatives or friends are not always close or warm, nor are relations with acquaintances or colleagues always distant' (Wegner, 1991: 63). In his research, Wegner endeavoured to re-emphasize Granovetter's idea of multi-dimensional indicators of tie strength and put it into practice. He used multiple indicators, including role relation, social distance, duration of relationship, frequency of contact, and activities together, to measure tie strength and extracted several representative variables by the factor analysis method (Wegner, 1991). Though a valuable attempt to construct a multi-dimensional indicator of tie strength, Wegner's measurement seems rather complex and difficult to operationalize.

In my study, a somewhat easier and clearer multidimensional indicator was used to measure tie strength. In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to describe the following features of 'the most important contact' in the attainment of their first job:

1. the type of relationship they had with the respondent. The questionnaire provided 14 items including family member, relative, friend, schoolmate, neighbour, etc.;
2. the length of time the contact and the respondent had known each other;
3. the frequency of contact the two parties had during the respondents' job searches, which could be 'contact each other very frequently', 'contact each other sometimes', or 'almost no contact';
4. a five-point scale of the degree of familiarity, intimacy and mutual trust between the respondent and the contact, ranging from 'very familiar/ intimate/trustworthy' to 'not at all'.

After the data were collected, the five variables of items 2 to 4 were subjected to a factor analysis, as shown in Table 2, which finally extracted one factor by principal component analysis. Then the factor scores were calculated to produce the variable that represented multidimensional tie strength. Since the factor score was a standard score variable with a standard deviation of 1 and an average of 0, I transferred it into a variable with the highest score of 100 and the lowest score of 0 so that it is easier to understand.

Social Status of Contact According to Lin's social resource theory, the contact's ability to provide help and other resources depends directly on their

Table 2 Principal Component Factor Analysis for Tie Strength

	Loadings	*Communalities*
Duration of relationship	.554	.307
Frequency of contact	.731	.535
Familiarity	.886	.785
Intimacy	.930	.866
Trust	.907	.824
Eigenvalues	3.31	
Variance	66.32%	

Note: One factor was extracted.

social status (Lin, 1982). The higher the status, the better the ability. Therefore, it is necessary to measure the social status of the contacts. In my study, two indicators were used to represent the status of contacts. The first was occupational prestige of the contact. As sociologists have pointed out, in modern industrial society, occupational prestige is the most important indicator of social status (Blau and Duncan, 1967). In my study, I asked what job the most important contact had, and calculated the prestige score according to the prestige scores table in China (Li, 2000). Second was the post and rank of the contact.

The occupational prestige score reflected a general evaluation of occupations in society. However, in job searches, especially in re-employment of Chinese laid-off workers, the power of the contacts is even more important. In China, the post and rank of a person basically reflects the power he or she wields. To simplify the analysis, the post and rank of the contacts were divided into three categories: 'cadre in government and party organization/state institution/state-owned enterprise', 'manager of non state-owned enterprises', and 'no post or rank at all'.

Results and Findings

Possessed Social Capital of Laid-off Chinese Workers

Through the method described above, three indicators representing the possessed social capital of laid-off workers were measured in my study. To have a clearer understanding of the laid-off workers' possession of social capital in Wuhan, the results of my study are compared with those in a similar study on social capital of Chinese citizens by Bian and Li (2001). As shown in Table 3, the laid-off workers have an average network size of 21 persons, much less than that of citizens in general. The workers' network density is

Table 3 Possessed Social Capital of Laid-off Workers in Wuhan and Citizens in Four Chinese Cities: Averages and Standard Deviations

Indicators of possessed social capital	*Laid-off workers in Wuhan*	*Citizens in four Chinese cities*
Network size (person)	20.97	35.30
	(24.37)	(31.67)
Network density (%)	49.44	28.36
	(27.76)	(20.54)
Score of embedded network resource	24.47	27.90
	(17.06)	17.43

Note: Data for citizens in four Chinese cities are taken from Bian and Li (2001).

49.44%, which means that nearly half of their network members are their relatives. This figure is much higher than that of citizens in general. Finally, the laid-off workers have a rather low network resource score, which is also lower than that of the citizens in general. As mentioned above, a network characterized by small size, high density and low embedded resources will not provide a high amount of social capital. It is clear that the laid-off Chinese workers' possession of social capital is rather poor; other studies also show that these workers belong to the social group with very poor social resources (Wang and Zhao, forthcoming; Drury and Arneberg, 2001).

Social Capital Used in Re-employment

Most of the laid-off workers in my study depended on informal methods to get information and opportunities for re-employment. Of those 529 'successful' workers who had the experience of re-employment, 61.5% used social capital in finding their first job. The reasons why so many workers choose informal methods are various. It may be because of the slow development of the labour market in China. Since the construction of a labour market in the early 1990s, the institutional development has been far from perfect, so that it is too costly for the workers to use formal institutions (Wang and Zhao, forthcoming). Moreover, as Granovetter (1973, 1995) insists, economic actions are embedded in social life and social networks. Thus the workers could easily get relevant information and other help by using their social capital.

What type of resource did these workers get from their networks? In my study I found that 33.6% of the workers got 'substantial help' from their network, 36% of them got a combination of 'substantial help and information', and 30.4% of them got 'information only' from their network. The conclusion here is that, in current Chinese society, people tend to get 'influence' or 'substantial help' instead of 'information' through their social

network. In a period of social transition, the role of information seems to be less prominent than in a mature market society.

The average score of tie strength between contacts and respondents is 62.2. Since possible tie-strength score ranges from 0 to 100, we may conclude that these laid-off workers tend to use 'strong ties' in finding new jobs. As Granovetter (1995) and Bian (1997) state, the low status of laid-off workers and the structure of current Chinese society have enhanced the effect of strong ties as a valuable social capital in job-seeking. Moreover, a deeper understanding of the relationship between 'tie strength' and 'role relation' could be obtained by studying the association of these two variables in my study. Table 4 illustrates that ties with 'family member' and 'relative' were the strongest, with 'strength scores' significantly higher than other role-relation types. The second strongest tie group consists of 'schoolmate', 'friend', 'colleague', 'neighbour' and 'comrade-in-arms', while 'fellow provincials or townsfolk', 'acquaintance', 'teacher/master and student/apprentice', and 'indirect ties' are the weakest. In previous studies, 'colleague' has usually been considered a 'weak' tie in western societies. However, Watanabe (1987) proposed that in eastern societies 'colleague' is a strong tie, which is demonstrated again in my study. 'Neighbour' has also been considered as a 'weak' tie in previous studies. Its higher tie-strength score in my study is partly due to my sampling. In China, since workers in the same work unit usually live together in houses provided by the unit, many 'neighbours' are friends and colleagues at the same time. Therefore, it is not surprising that 'neighbour' is a strong tie in my study.

The 'most important contacts' mentioned by respondents in my study have an average occupational score of 58.02. Two-thirds have 'no post or rank

Table 4 Mean Tie-Strength Scores by the Role Relation Type of Contacts

Role relation	*Average score of tie strength*	*N*
Family members	86.71	30
Relatives	74.14	83
Schoolmates	66.52	27
Friends	63.49	104
Colleagues	63.29	40
Neighbours	61.72	34
Comrades-in-arms	60.64	5
Fellow provincials or townsfolk	47.67	1
Acquaintances	41.80	21
Teacher/master & student/apprentice	36.12	1
Indirect ties	14.68	28

at all', while 19.7% are 'cadres in government and party organizations/state institutions/state owned enterprises'; and 13.6% are 'managers of non state-owned enterprises'. The proportion of contacts with post and rank is much lower than in other studies in China (Bian, 1997). The low social status and the narrow scope of their social network may prevent these workers from using a better quality of social capital in general.

Relationship Between Possessed Social Capital and Used Social Capital

Since possessed social capital and used social capital measure different aspects of an individual's social capital, the relationship between them becomes a question that needs further exploration. For example, will the workers with higher amounts of social capital be more likely to use this capital in job searches? Or will they use a better quality of social capital than others? As these two types of social capital are measured simultaneously in my study, it is possible to test these hypotheses empirically.

At first glance, there is no significant association between possessed social capital and the use of social capital in job searches. From the results shown in Table 5 we can see that the amount of social capital possessed by the group of workers who used informal methods in their job searches is not significantly higher than that of the workers who never used informal methods in re-employment.

This conclusion, however, may be misleading. When we divided the respondents into three groups according to the score of network resources, the association between use of informal methods and score of network resources became significant (chi-square test is significant at the 0.001 level). In Table 6 we see that in the groups with very low and very high social resource scores, there is no strong tendency to use social capital. However, the proportion of people who use social capital rises to 70.9% in the group

Table 5 Averages and Standard Deviations of Possessed Social Capital by Method of Finding the First Job

	Indicators of possessed social capital		
Use of informal methods in job searches	*Network size*	*Network density*	*Score of network resource*
Yes	22.17	48.85	25.96
	(28.00)	(28.29)	(20.39)
No	21.07	48.71	24.57
	(23.36)	(25.69)	(15.35)
F	.371	.281	.003

Table 6 Groups of Embedded Network Resources by the Use of Informal Methods

	Groups of embedded network resource scores		
Use of informal methods in job searches?	*Low (0–10)*	*Medium (11–30)*	*High (31–100)*
Yes	46.5%	70.9%	55.6%
No	53.5%	29.1%	44.4%
(*N*)	(86)	(265)	(153)

Chi-square = 20.469, $p < 0.001$.

with a medium resource score. Those workers with poor possession of social capital have limited capability of using it, even if they are willing to do so. However, it is odd that the workers with a high amount of social capital do not tend to use it. My explanation is that, as Bourdieu (1986) and Lin (1999) assert, social capital is positively correlated to human capital and other forms of capital. Thus the workers with most social capital can easily make use of formal methods in getting jobs. Therefore, they do not have to depend on informal methods such as social capital.

Meanwhile, we can see some positive relationships between the possessed social capital and the characteristics of contacts. From correlation analysis, as shown in Table 7, we see that there is a significant positive correlation between 'score of network resources' and 'prestige score of contact'. Moreover, when a worker gets re-employment with the help of a contact in the category 'cadre in government and party organizations/state institutions/state-owned enterprises', this worker is likely to possess more embedded network resources than others (see Table 8). All these results suggest that the the higher amount of social capital one possesses, the better quality of social capital one will use in job-seeking.

Table 7 Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Possessed Social Capital and Characteristics of Contact

	Network size	*Network density*	*Score of network resource*
Score of tie strength	.11	−.03	.04
Occupational prestige score of contact	.01	.01	.12*

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 8 Averages and Deviations of Indicators of Possessed Capital by Post and Rank of Contact

	Indicators of possessed social capital		
Post and rank of contact	*Network size*	*Network density*	*Score of network resource*
No post or rank	23.79	43.52	30.28
	(26.09)	(22.62)	(17.12)
Manager of non state-owned enterprise	16.84	51.80	22.65
	(16.17)	(25.44)	(11.76)
Cadre in government and party organization/state institution/ state-owned enterprise	20.63	49.52	24.12
	(20.26)	(26.02)	(15.82)
F	1.53	1.97	4.98**

** $p < 0.01$.

Summary

Social capital has been widely used in many studies regardless of its content and the methodology to measure it. Therefore, both the clarification of the concept and the standardization of the measurement are necessary in relevant empirical studies. In my study I measure individual-level social capital in two ways: possessed social capital and used social capital.

When measuring possessed social capital, I adopt the 'position generator' method to study the 'spring festival contact' network of the respondents. Three indicators are used to represent the accessible resources embedded in the respondents' personal social networks, i.e., network size, network density, and the score of embedded resources. The result of my study indicates that, generally speaking, laid-off workers have a smaller amount of possessed social capital than the population in general.

Social capital actually used in looking for re-employment is also measured in my study. First, the respondents' methods of getting information and opportunities of re-employment are investigated. Second, the respondents are asked what types of resources they got from their personal networks in looking for work. Finally, the respondents are asked to describe the characteristics of one contact who they considered 'played the most important role' in their job attainment. According to my study, most of the laid-off workers in Wuhan depend on informal methods to get re-employment. Rather than getting 'information' from the network, they tend to get 'substantial help' in job searches. Most of their contacts are strongly related to these workers.

Further analysis on the relationship between possessed and used social capital shows that they are positively related. Although workers with extremely high or low amounts of social capital do not prefer informal methods in job searches, those workers with a medium amount of social capital are more likely to choose informal job-searching methods. Meanwhile, if a worker possesses higher amount of social capital than others, the social capital he/she uses in job searches is probably of higher quality than others.

China's cultural tradition and its current social structure have provided an ideal background to study the effect of social capital in social life. In the future we can expect to see the ongoing development of more improved and precise methodological and theoretical tools for assessing social capital in China.

Appendix Position-Generating Questions, Types of Occupation and Work Unit in Questionnaire

1. Please recall the spring festival of 2000 (the first five days of the lunar year); on how many relatives, friends and acquaintances did you pay a new years call?

Relatives:_____; Friends:_____; Acquaintances:_____

2. Among the people you mentioned above, are there any who have the jobs listed below?

Type of occupation	*Relatives*	*Friends*	*Acquaintances*
Scientific researcher			
University teacher			
Technicians and associated professionals			
Law professional			
Doctor			
Responsible cadre in government organization			
Teacher in primary/middle school			
Responsible cadre in party organization			
Leader of enterprise or institution			
Economic professional			
Accountant			
Administration clerk			
Policeman			
Nurse			
Driver			
Cook			
Industrial worker			
Waiter/waitress			
Housemaid or cleaning worker			

3. Among the people you mentioned above, are there any who are working in the work units listed below?

Type of work unit	*Relatives*	*Friends*	*Acquaintances*
Party and government organizations			
State institution			
Foreign enterprise			
Joint venture			
Stock company			
Private institution			
State enterprise			
Private enterprise			
United enterprise			
Self employment			
Collective enterprise			

Notes

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1 The survey is a joint research project conducted in Wuhan, China by the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Science and the Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. A total of 630 sample workers were drawn by random sampling and snowball sampling. The survey was conducted in October 2000 with 621 questionnaires completed. The response rate was 98%.

2 'Name-generator' generated a list of contacts, or network members, by posing one or more questions about the subject's contacts (names) in certain social situations. The researchers were able to study the structure and content of the respondents' egocentric network on the base of the data generated (Scott, 1991; Lin, 1999).

3 Dropping in, making telephone calls or sending cards/emails.

4 See Bian and Li (2001) for the method of calculating prestige scores of occupations and work units.

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
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Michael R. Smith

Income Inequality and Economic Growth in Rich Countries: A Reconsideration of the Evidence

What does sociology have to say about inequality? On the one hand, a good case can be made that the discipline is absolutely obsessed by the subject.[1] On the other hand, in general, one might argue that most of what it has to say with respect to inequality goes little beyond the observation that *there is altogether too much of it about*. This latter is a position that is at once easy and difficult to sustain. It is easy to sustain because one can fairly effortlessly identify inequalities the unwarrantedness of which can be denounced. As a good republican, I am easily persuaded that the relatively high incomes of royal families largely constitute waste. There is a cottage industry of academic writings in which both sociologists and left economists take pleasure in being scandalized by the high earnings of the chief executives of large corporations, either because some high multiple of lower level employees' salary is regarded as immoral in its own right, or because the high earnings have been accompanied by poor corporate performance, or both (Gordon, 1996). But sustaining the position that there is altogether too much inequality about without specifying *how much* would be desirable or acceptable could be seen as a bit of a challenge. It would be hard to find in any literature – including within that produced by sociologists – a case to the effect that exact equality of earnings, income, or wealth, constitutes a suitable policy target.

What, then, *does* sociology say about inequality (other than that there is altogether too much of it about)? Class analysis occupies a large part of the space devoted to inequality in the sociological corpus. I take it that its broad thrust is to say that the inequalities embedded in classes are a product of power rather than of some neutral logic of the market (e.g. Fligstein et al., 1983). However, even if power is involved, this does not necessarily mean

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that the inequalities are unwarranted (although it may often mean that). After all, for example, the market itself rests on the exercise of power. It depends on private property which in turn rests on legal protections including, in the final analysis, the use of force. Thanks to the natural experiment provided by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe hardly anyone contests the idea that economic growth, or at least a kind of growth that responds to consumer preferences, requires *some* form of market and private property. So the fact that inequality rests on power does not get us very far in making judgements about the desirability of any given level of it.

More recently, the issue of employment precariousness has attracted much attention. Esping-Anderson (1999) associates rising inequality with increasing precariousness of employment (see also Carnoy, 2000). Interestingly, he associates both rising inequality and employment precariousness with the increasing share of service sector employment, *and* allows that there is probably a trade-off between rising service sector employment, which is to be desired, and equality (pp. 178–80).

Now, I take it that the most common outcome with respect to which the possibility of a trade-off is allowed is economic growth. Beyond rather casual references to the issue of the sort found in Esping-Andersen there is little of value produced by sociologists on possible trade-offs between inequality and any other valued objectives. More specifically, there is little theory *within sociology* that might be used to specify under what conditions trade-offs might be present, the form of the trade-offs, and the specific evidence that might be brought to bear to evaluate them.[2] Given the relatively underdeveloped state of relevant sociological theory it is not surprising that the discipline has brought little evidence to bear on the issue. This is unfortunate since a case can be made that patterns of change in inequality provide one of the more interesting recent social trends – certainly one that has attracted a great deal of popular attention. In particular, from about the end of the 1970s until the mid 1990s, income inequality in the United States increased considerably. It also increased to a lesser extent in several other OECD countries (Smith, 1999). This rise in inequality poses the very fundamental policy questions: should policies have been adopted to counter the increase? And, if so, *what* policies?

In what follows I: (i) review the relevant theory on growth and inequality, with particular reference to factors that might be used to explain the recent increase in inequality in the US and elsewhere; (ii) outline the evidence that bears on the plausibility of the various factors cited that might be used to explain the increase; (iii) discuss the implications of the evidence for standard sociological concerns. The major source of both theory and evidence is writings by economists. In the absence of a significant body of serious work on the subject by sociologists I think that recourse to the writings of economists is the only prudent course of action. In reviewing

evidence I rely rather heavily on the case of the US. There are two reasons for this. First, the size of the social science establishment in the US means that it accounts for a large proportion of high quality research, for which the US is the main subject. Second, the marked increase in inequality there from the late 1970s to the early or mid 1990s gives the case a particular importance. Nonetheless, I make use of data from other societies where both pertinent and readily available.

Inequality and Growth: Theory

The standard reference on growth and inequality is Kuznets (1955). Kuznets is sometimes used to interpret recent developments in rich countries (e.g. Brinkman and Brinkman, 2001). This is unfortunate. Kuznets postulated that the relationship between inequality and *level* of economic activity (GDP per capita) over human history could be described with an inverted U-shaped curve. The core of his argument was that early urbanization increased economic growth, but that its subsequent spread, and the spread of urban living standards to the rural population, reduced it. This is clearly irrelevant to whatever processes have affected inequality in rich societies in the last 30 or so years because they would be located in the extreme part of the right tail of the curve. Theory on the following *is* relevant, though to varying degrees: (i) family and employment structure; (ii) the role of work and training incentives; (iii) the effect of the displacement of the location of employment often, but not only, associated with globalization; (iv) inequality and capital market imperfections; (v) inequality and production complementarities.[3]

I will consider these in turn, bearing in mind that some of the factors above imply a negative relationship between growth and inequality and some imply a positive relationship. In what follows I am interested in both household income inequality and personal income inequality, which is largely a function of earnings inequality. Note also that I do not attempt to distinguish between effects that might produce a once and for all increase in output and effects that might produce a sustained increase. I am interested in any way in which a shift in income distribution might have something to do with growth.

Family and Employment Structure

One of the most important sources and correlates of growth in rich industrial countries has been increased female labour force participation. At the same time, the probability of divorce has increased. At the very least, the increase in female labour force participation is likely to have influenced the relative income shares of households with two earners. The increase in divorce and the creation of households with children headed by a single adult

(usually a mother) has been associated with increases in poverty – one particular form of inequality.

Work and Training Incentives

The major thrust of economic writings, that has spilled over into much recent sociology, is that earnings are tied to skill – usually operationalized as education and experience, to working conditions through compensating differentials – more dirty or dangerous work is paid more, and to the need to extract effort.[4] In the form of so-called 'tournament theory', this latter attempts to explain very large differentials between executives and subordinates (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981). The underlying idea is that because of difficulties in monitoring employee performance on a regular basis (through supervision or piece work, say) employers establish a system of ranks with more or less steeply graded increases in pay associated with hierarchical level, so that employees have a strong incentive to work very hard indeed, in order to better present themselves in the competition for the large increments that come with senior positions. The assumption here is that while it may be impossible to monitor performance on a day-to-day basis, it is possible to make judgements about it over the longer term. Clearly, economic growth, and the technological change that accompanies it, may change the conditions of work, reducing or increasing the need for compensating differentials. It may increase the difficulty in monitoring performance, for example, through the spread of team work (e.g. Piore, 1994; Osterman, 1994; Scott et al., 1996) which might require larger pay differentials to induce effort. Or it may increase the demand for skill, leading to an increase in the skill premium. There is a very large literature claiming this latter effect.[5]

In terms of income inequality more generally, it is argued that various attempts to reduce it are likely to reduce economic performance, including growth. The standard source on this is Okun (1975). Minimum wages are thought to be likely to reduce both inequality and the growth of average income and employment.[6] It is claimed that the transfers involved in social programmes increase the reservation price of labour and reduce labour force participation and growth;[7] that the increase in taxes required to fund the social programmes leads to the displacement of effort from productive activities to tax avoidance;[8] and that wage compression by unions reduces employer flexibility to adjust wages to skill shortages in ways that disrupt production, and so on.[9]

Note, however, that there is an incentive-related alternative approach to inequality and growth, that makes something like the opposite prediction. A recent paper by Gomez and Meltz (2001) outlines this position. 'Workers', they write, 'are . . . distinct from other organizational inputs because of their intrinsically human requirements for fairness, voice, and job security as preconditions before making maximal contributions to real efficiency' (p. 13).

The idea here is that excessive inequality within workplaces, and perhaps between them, is likely to reduce effort and output. It is an obstacle to growth. This sort of idea inspires much (though not all) of the recent writing on so-called 'high performance workplaces' (e.g. Ichniowski et al., 1996).

The Displacement of the Location of Employment

Globalization fits under this heading. The core of the globalization argument is that international trade and capital mobility lead countries to specialize in production using the factors with which they are most richly endowed.[10] The standard theory would predict that production is greater in each country after such specialization. Globalization is a source of growth. In rich countries, factor specialization implies a concentration in the production of goods requiring more skilled – more educated, that is – labour, and a reduction in the amount of production requiring less skilled labour. Together these two processes would cause an increase in earnings inequality. Since the international economy has been substantially liberalized during the postwar period one might expect to find evidence of these two processes.

Wood (1994) is the most frequently cited source on this issue.[11] He has claimed that the growth of world trade has exposed unskilled workers in the North to competition from their counterparts in the South. This competition from unskilled workers has forced down unskilled worker wages in the North and increased earnings inequality. At the same time, the shift of production to the South implied by this reduces the cost of goods in the North and increases income. To some extent related to this are changes in industrial structure. The share of services as a proportion of total employment has increased, partly because manufacturing – which usually produces tradable goods – has moved offshore. Again, this is an aspect of economic growth, but replaces jobs in manufacturing the compensation of which tends to be concentrated in the middle of the distribution with jobs in services that tend to be polarized between very high and very poorly paid jobs (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982).

Inequality and Imperfect Capital Markets

Suppose that the rate of return to investments tends to fall with the dollar magnitude of an investment. Suppose, further, that for any given investment it is harder for a poor than a rich person to borrow. There are two reasons why this latter might be so. Lenders are reluctant to provide capital because the poor person has no collateral in the case of a default. It has also been theorized that the amount of effort likely to be expended by the poor person in making the investment succeed may be lower than would be the case for a richer person, because the returns to the effort have to be shared with the lender. Such a case of reduced access to credit *for the same or a higher quality investment* would be an example of capital market imperfection.

If the poor do not have access to credit then most investment will be made by the rich. But since, by assumption, the rate of return on large investments is lower than it is on small investments, growth would be higher were some of the cash of the rich to be transferred to the poor. In other words, a greater pre (hypothetical) transfer inequality reduces the return on investment and the rate of growth, relative to what it would be if the transfer took place (e.g. Aghion et al., 1999).

This sort of analysis is commonly applied to third world countries – in particular, farmers who with access to credit could increase agricultural productivity considerably. But the same sort of mechanism might apply, in particular, to investments in human capital in richer countries. Providing the resources to allow young people from low income backgrounds to acquire the basic literacy and numeracy associated (hopefully!) with a secondary school diploma or to learn a trade may yield a higher rate of return than would allowing a young person from a richer background to complete a personal culture-enhancing university education.

Production Complementarities

Standard economic analyses relate output to inputs that can increase either in quantity or in quality. Thus, production might increase because an employer adds employees or because the average quality of employees is raised through investments in human capital, either through the education system or through employer-provided training. To this process, recent writing has added the possibility of substantial output increases through *complementarities* of inputs, particularly labour inputs. For example, within a single plant, the productivity of an engineer and a machinist may depend not only on the individual human capital with which each is endowed but also on the human capital of the other. Thus, the productivity of a design engineer may be increased if the machinists who implement the designs can read plans and instructions rather than requiring detailed instructions in person, combined with close supervision (Benabou, 1996).[12] The same sort of mechanism can just as easily apply across workplaces and firms.

This implies that substantial inequality may reduce productivity and growth. This would be the case *if* earnings inequality is based on the presence in the economy of a large proportion of entirely unskilled workers from whom there can be no productive complementarities with more skilled workers.

Inequality and Growth: Evidence

Household inequality is a function of both household composition (the number of incomes in the household) and of the individual incomes of those

that make up the households. In what follows I first examine the effects on income inequality of changes in household composition and then of changes in earnings and income at the individual level. Note that when I switch to the examination of the relation between inequality of earnings and growth I first look at evidence on theories that predict a positive association between inequality and growth (technology and incentives, globalization, institutional obstacles to market determined differentials like high taxes, the minimum wage, social protections that increase the reservation wage, and wage compression from union bargaining) and then examine evidence on theories that predict a negative association (the effort incentives of high performance work organizations, production complementarities, imperfect capital markets).

Female Employment and Family Structure

Burtless (1999a, 1999b, 2001) presents data that suggest that from 1979 to 1996 increased female labour force participation and family dissolution, alone and in combination, have made a substantial contribution to the increase in *household* earnings inequality in the US. Rising female labour force participation has increased the proportion of households with two earners. These combined earnings are large compared to those of most single earner households. The magnitude of the aggregate earnings in two earner households relative to the distribution of earnings as a whole is increased by *assortative mating*. High earning individuals tend to marry each other.

At the bottom of the distribution there has been an increase in the proportion of households with no earners. The largest component of this category is single mothers. However, the category has been increased over the last couple of decades by a rise in the proportion of males over 50 who have withdrawn from the labour force – presumably because they have been restructured out of employment. They provide an example of the inverse of the assortative mating referred to above: these mainly unskilled males who have withdrawn from the labour have also experienced a disproportionate increase in marital dissolution.

Burtless estimates that these factors explain about a third of the increase in the Gini coefficient for household incomes in the relevant period.[13]

But what does this have to do with economic growth? To start with, increased female labour force participation has been a major source of economic growth. In the US, in particular, a large part of the growth of the last two decades is accounted for by an increase in employment (rather than by an increase in productivity). Moreover, a good case can be made that the rising proportion of households headed by a husband or wife but not both is related to rising income. Burtless (2001: 9) puts the point as follows: 'As Americans' affluence and security grew, they had less reason to put up with the disagreeable habits of an irritating partner.' This suggests that female labour force participation has been a source of increasing household income

inequality in the US, and probably elsewhere. It also suggests that economic growth, in turn, has contributed to the creation of the single member households that have played a significant role in further increasing household earnings inequality.

Inequality and Aggregate Economic Performance

In the 1980s there was a fairly substantial body of literature that purported to show that so-called 'neocorporatist' societies like Scandinavia and Germany had better macroeconomic performance than did so-called 'neoliberal' societies like the UK and the US. This better performance included superior economic growth (Lange and Garrett, 1985; McCallum, 1983; Blais and McCallum, 1986; Wilensky and Turner, 1987; Friedland and Sanders, 1985; Alvarez et al., 1991). Part of the mechanism that was thought to lead to this outcome was lower inequality, and the institutions that produced it. An underlying idea was that employees tended to be more cooperative in pursuit of productivity because centralized bargaining produced outcomes that they regarded as fairer, including lower inequality.

We can be pretty confident that, with respect to growth at least, the data presented did not support this interpretation. There were major methodological problems with the relevant research.[14] Subsequent studies that control more carefully for relevant factors show no relationship between 'neocorporatism' and economic growth ('Neocorporatism ... contributes nothing to growth', Hicks and Kenworthy, 1998: 1655; see also OECD, 1997).

In the mid and late 1990s there was a switch in the focus in the relevant literature. It moved towards examining whether economic growth may have been hampered by policies designed to minimize inequality. The unravelling of the Swedish economy in the early 1990s provided an impetus for this discussion. In fact, the case that the much less unequal Sweden has had poorer growth than the much more unequal US is very strong indeed. Better than average Swedish economic performance in the early postwar period was followed by a marked deterioration after about 1970. After suitable adjustment for purchasing power parity, among 25 OECD countries, Sweden's GDP per capita fell from fourth ranked in 1970, to ninth ranked in 1990, to sixteenth ranked in 1995 (Lindbeck, 1997).[15] It is likely that this substantial decline in performance was related to the Swedish policies that produced lower income inequality. For example, training programmes became devices for propping up the income of the unemployed rather than training (Johannesson, 1995; Blanchflower et al., 1995; Agell et al., 1995), profit rates were lower than those of most competitor nations (Aliber, 1987: 405–6), and generous sick benefits seem to have led to some non-trivial amount of malingering (Lindbeck, 1997: 1299).[16]

At the other end of the inequality scale, after a decade or so of indifferent economic performance, relative economic growth in the US picked up at

the beginning of the 1990s, with marked acceleration in the second half of the decade. Burtless (2001) has presented some data that suggest that, from about 1980 to the mid 1990s, societies that were becoming more unequal had higher rates of growth. Figure 1 is adapted from two of his charts and tends to support this interpretation (though there is a question of the effect of *levels* of inequality versus the *changes* that Burtless uses in his graph).[17]

Still, this can hardly be considered to be conclusive. There are no controls. It is worth considering other sorts of evidence – in particular, evidence that bears directly on the *mechanisms* thought to connect inequality or its relative absence to growth.

Technological Change

The most common claim is that technological change has increased the demand for more skilled workers and in doing so has forced up the pay premium that they can command. The following sorts of evidence are typically presented in support of this interpretation: (i) an increase in earnings inequality took place in a significant number of rich societies at the same time; (ii) in the US, a large part of the increase took the form of an increase in the premium to skill, in particular, an increase in the premium to a college education; (iii) people who use computers or other recent vintage technology tend to get paid more; (iv) there has been a shift in the occupational structure, with an expansion in employment in jobs that require more skills, including computer literacy (basically, professionals, managers and some technicians versus production and most service workers).

It is widely recognized that there is a significant number of findings that are anomalous with respect to this interpretation. The main ones are that: (i) several rich countries have not experienced an increase in earnings inequality; (ii) the increase in earnings inequality *within* skill categories is about as large as the increase *between* them; (iii) while the relative wages of skilled workers have risen, the average wage level has been fairly stagnant, which is surprising *if* the rise in the pay of skilled workers is associated with an augmentation of their productivity by new technology; (iv) related to this, growing earnings inequality has coincided with a period of very slowly increasing productivity, which is odd if technological change has been the driving force behind the distributional changes. The best response to all this is to say that the jury should still be out on the technological change account.

Globalization and the Displacement of Employment

The theory predicting an effect on inequality of globalization makes perfect sense. However, a first cut at the evidence provides little support for it. Were globalization the source of rising inequality one might expect to see relevant occupational change concentrated in industries most subject to international competition. The evidence tends to suggest that occupational and earnings




Figure 1 Growth in Real GDP per Capita and Income Inequality in G7 Countries in the 1980s and 1990s

shifts are more or less common across industries (Berman et al., 1994; Machin, 1996; Borjas et al., 1992). Were production of goods with a low skill component being shifted to the third world where labour is markedly cheaper one might expect to see falling prices, or at least prices that grow more slowly, in industries in rich countries with a large component of unskilled labour. Evidence from both the US and Europe seems to suggest that this has not been the case (Slaughter, 2000; Lawrence, 1996; Neven and Wyplosz, 1999).

But this does not quite settle the issue. It is *possible* that the main form taken by a globalization of production has been through a shift to the offshore production of *intermediate goods.* An example of this might be a shift to Asia of the production of inputs into electronic goods requiring less skill in their manufacture. Outsourcing of this sort 'would increase the relative demand for skilled workers, shifting the within-industry labor demands in all industries that use such inputs, irrespectively of whether they themselves produce traded or untraded goods and of whether they are skill – or unskilled – labor intensive': (Aghion et al., 1999: 1638). This would mean that the effect of trade would produce *within* industry shifts in employment and wages rather than the *between* industry shifts in the standard trade model.

If globalization worked along Heckscher-Ohlin lines it would increase growth while damaging the unskilled in rich countries. So far, however, there is no strong evidence in favour of the theory; though, as outlined above, that may be because of the inadequacy of the bulk of the tests. Again, this is an area where the jury should still be considered to be out.

Moreover, the available evidence tends to contradict the related, de-industrialization, argument – that whatever economic processes led to the replacement of manufacturing by service employment have tended to increase inequality by polarizing jobs. Wolfson and Murphy (1998) present a very careful analysis of data for the US and Canada for the period 1974 to 1995. Their results vary depending on how the data is sliced – that is, whether men and women are analysed separately or combined, and whether analysis is confined to a limited age range. Their most aggregate analyses, however, suggest that polarization in the two countries increased somewhat from 1974 to 1985 but then fell in the subsequent decade.

Institutional Effects on Differentials

At the beginning of the 1980s the minimum wage in the US was frozen in nominal terms. Consequently, its real value fell substantially until the end of the decade. Fortin and Lemieux (1997) provide strong evidence that this fall in the real value of the minimum wage made a substantial contribution to the subsequent increase in earnings inequality. It also seems to have led to the creation of many jobs at or about the minimum wage level. This rise in employment certainly contributed to the economic growth of the period.

With respect to the effects of taxes, the US provides an interesting case. While early in his term of office President Clinton raised them, it remains the case that the US is by international standards a very low tax country. In addition, the Clinton tax increase was combined with a range of efforts at both the federal and state level to compel welfare recipients to seek and, under specific circumstances, accept employment (Glazer, 1995). The effect of this would have been to limit the magnitude of any negative effect of welfare benefits on employment. Preferences not to work of welfare recipients would have been overridden by administrative pressures on them to accept employment, including the threat of loss of benefits. Also relevant to the reservation wage is unemployment insurance. Until the early 1990s, unemployment benefits were significantly less generous in the US than in Canada. This seems to have contributed to the unemployment rate differential between the two countries, possibly through a variant of the conventional reservation wage interpretation (Freeman and Card, 1993).

Overall, while the 1980s were a period of relatively slow growth in the US, a case can be made that these institutional changes and practices contributed to the much better performance from the beginning of the 1990s.

Skill Complementarities and the Requirements of High Performance Workplaces

The presence of significant skill complementarities, of the sort that would argue for less inequality, is easy to postulate but harder to demonstrate.[18] The basic method used to demonstrate an effect of this sort is the inclusion of a measure of *average schooling* in wage equations (e.g. Rauch, 1993). The reasoning here is that pay is a function of productivity; so if, net of everything else including individual human capital, individual pay is raised by the average in the relevant community, that must reflect an increment produced by skill complementarities. But there is a fundamental methodological problem with these estimates: people with higher wages are likely to be able to afford more schooling – that is to say, more human capital. So average schooling may be associated with wages, but the causal direction may run from wages to schooling rather than vice versa. The standard methodological solution is to 'instrument' for average schooling; that is to say, to identify a source of schooling variation that cannot be endogenous with respect to wages and use that source to predict wages. After that procedure, the additional effect of average schooling becomes very small indeed (see Lloyd-Ellis, 2001: 12).

So the skill complementarity argument yields quite precise predictions but is not so far well supported by the evidence. What about the looser argument, found in the industrial relations literature, to the effect that treating employees well, including upgrading their skills and adjusting their pay accordingly, increases productivity and growth? Ichniowski et al.

(1996) notwithstanding, the evidence on the link between high performance work practices (multi-skilling, team working, reduced hierarchical levels, delegation of responsibilities) is mixed (see OECD, 1999: 203–7; Osterman, 2000: 193). Training *does* seem to be more common in workplaces having adopted the practices. On the other hand, there is little evidence that higher pay is associated with the practices – which raises the question: how can skill have *increased* when (on average) there has been no increase in the wage level?

Capital Market Imperfections

In rich countries, credit market imperfections are usually associated with difficulties that the poor might have in borrowing to finance education and training, a problem that might be exacerbated by high degrees of inequality. This would constitute a problem for growth if the rate of return to education decreased with additional years of it. We know that the poor have less years of schooling (Kane, 1994). It is less clear that this is because they do not have access to credit. After controlling for other characteristics and scores on cognitive tests, the effect on years of schooling of parental income – which should be the best gauge of differential access to credit – is small, at least in the US (Cameron and Heckman, 1998).

Clearly, however, this does not mean that family income is unimportant to educational attainment.

> Family income affects the kind of community that children grow up in, the schools they attend and the important complementary inputs to human capital formation such as nutrition, location, books, family holidays, etc. All of these factors in turn affect how well they do early on in the schooling system (and hence their performance on tests), which determines the feasibility and optimality of continuing on to higher levels of education and training. (Lloyd-Ellis, 2001: 14)

So, for a given level of ability, access to credit to finance education may be no more important for a person from a poor background than for one from a rich background. But the possibility of reaching a particular level of ability is likely to be influenced by parental income and the fact that credit markets are inadequate suppliers of the funds required to overcome inadequate parental income. This would reflect the degree of inequality.

It is clear that, within the US (and no doubt elsewhere) production options are constrained by the poor cognitive scores of a good part of the work force (e.g. Murnane and Levy, 1996). There are ways to work around this – for example, by switching larger responsibilities, including supervisory responsibilities, to engineers (Mason and Finegold, 1997). Still, in my view the presence of a very large, effectively uneducated, part of the labour force is in itself pretty good evidence of a pernicious effect of inequality on growth and productivity.

Conclusion

Goldthorpe (2001) has recently turned his attention to the issue of globalization. As I understand it, the main thrust of his position is to argue that globalization does not have the socially homogenizing effects attributed to it; that countries have political choices, including their degree of inequality.[19] In effect, he is arguing that there is still plenty of room for a social democratic alternative. But this seems to me to be an ultimately unsatisfactory position.

In the absence of external compulsion, governments can choose any policy combination that they wish. They can cut their economies off from trade with the rest of the world, as Albania did until the beginning of the 1990s. Or they can make the minimization of unemployment the main gauge of economic performance and do everything possible to keep unemployment low, as Sweden did – stocking the unemployable in training programmes, radically devaluing the currency, and creating institutional obstacles to dismissal. Or, as long as they can hang on to power, they can do almost anything else. But the important thing is, surely: at what cost do such measures come?

One measure of welfare is economic growth. The difficulties with the standard operationalization of economic growth as increases in GDP are well known (e.g. Morgenstern 1963; Hirsch, 1978). Still, not least because we probably have better evidence on trends in it than most other rival concepts of welfare, use of it as a gauge of performance is probably unavoidable. If inequality, either levels or changes, has consequences for growth, it makes sense to judge *in part* interventions designed to increase or decrease inequality in terms of those consequences. In light of this consideration, what do we know about inequality and growth? And, does it warrant the conclusion that the most fundamental property of inequality is that there is altogether too much of it about?

Consider, first, the issue of employment and family structure. Burtless makes a pretty persuasive case that a significant source of increased inequality in the US has been female labour force participation – both because it increased the likelihood of divorce and the creation of single adult families and because it provided a basis for more assortative mating. But increased female labour force participation has been an important source of economic growth. It constitutes, besides, a major source of greater freedom for half of the adult population – something that makes it, pretty much, an unqualified good. It follows, I would have thought, that the part of the increase in inequality that results from it is to be tolerated, though intervention to protect single mothers is unlikely to damage economic growth – perhaps the contrary, and is to be welcomed.

The evidence on the positive and negative effects of personal inequality on growth is mixed. With respect to the negative effects of inequality, there

are undoubtedly some skill complementarities at work. But there is little evidence that they have a quantitatively significant effect. Nor is there much evidence that lack of access to capital prevents the poor from acquiring human capital, though I am inclined to think that it is likely that the social exclusion of some significant part of the population does damage growth. With respect to the positive side, the evidence is also mixed. There are anomalous results with respect to both the technological change and globalization accounts of rising inequality.

Yet we are left with relative US economic performance – in contrast to Sweden, for example. Distinctively unequal, with institutions that support that inequality – weak unions, low taxes, a relatively low minimum wage for long periods, and with modest social benefits – the US has outperformed most other rich countries in the last 10 or so years. It is *possible* that it has achieved a relatively strong performance despite its inequality. But I think that, at the moment, the state of evidence puts the onus of proof on those who tend to think that there is no trade-off between inequality and growth.

Still, one might argue that it is worthwhile forgoing some growth. This might seem to be a defensible policy position. But, take the case of Canada. Canada has much less income inequality than the US. It also has a markedly lower GDP per capita. After making a defensible purchasing power parity adjustment, Wolfson and Murphy (1998: 12) show that in 1995, up to about the 80th or 90th percentile (depending on the purchasing power parity adjustment made), individual earnings were higher in Canada than in the US and family earnings (adjusted for family size) were higher up to about the 60th percentile. Inequality makes a difference. The markedly higher living standards in the US are concentrated in the upper part of the income distribution. So, Wolfson and Murphy suggest, in the mid 1990s it was better to be a middle or low income person in Canada than in the US. Even if it implies a sacrifice in terms of GDP per capita, one might politically choose the more equal Canadian distribution. Presumably, one could argue that this has been Sweden's choice.

However, the current magnitude of the difference in living standards between Canada and the US has been produced by a long period of slower growth in Canada. Since inequality did not continue to increase in the US in the second half of the 1990s and, since the US had faster growth than Canada through most of that period, it is likely that the percentile of the income distribution below which a Canadian has a higher living standard has fallen. At any given point governments can make politically acceptable choices that reduce growth because they favour some fairness criterion. My guess, however, is that over the long haul, governments in democratic societies that make that choice are likely to lose office as the power of compound interest kicks in. But that is a subject for another article.

Notes

An early version of this paper was presented at the Cambridge Seminar on Social Stratification in September 2001. That seminar was held in honour of Bob Blackburn, on the occasion of his retirement from the University of Cambridge. Whether he agrees with its sentiments or not, this paper is very much inspired by Bob's meticulous and empirical approach to the analysis of inequality.

1 I assume that this claim does not require documentation. The centrality of the concept of *class* is, I take it, an adequate indicator.
2 The so-called 'functionalist theory of stratification' did say something about incentives and the need for stratification. Whatever its virtues, however, precision was not among them (e.g. Davis and Moore, 1945).
3 There is also a body of literature connecting inequality to growth – negatively – through voting incentives and disruptive political protests. See Persson and Tabellini (1992, 1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1992, 1994), and Alesina and Perotti (1996). Substantial effects of this sort, however, are probably confined to third world countries.
4 On effort and work see Lazear (1998). On compensating differentials see Smith, Masi, and Came-Lemay (1997).
5 For interesting variants on the standard technological effect argument see Acemoglu (2001) and Aghion and Howitt (2001).
6 Card and Krueger's (1995) challenge to this view is well known. There is no room to consider its limitations here.
7 It is not well known that Keynes largely attributed wage inflexibility to the effect of the 'dole' on the reservation price of labour. See Skidelsky (1992: 201, 347–50).
8 On the high tax case of Sweden, see, for example, Agell and Persson (2000).
9 See Lindbeck and Snower (1997).
10 This intuition is known rather grandly as the 'Heckscher-Ohlin' model. It provides the theoretical inspiration for Wood's (1994) well known treatment of the subject.
11 In a more general form this argument has been widely adopted by sociologists. See Giddens (1994: 74–5), Castells (1998/2000: 354–5), and Beck (2000: 96).
12 An excellent example of this can be found in Whittaker (1990). The training of operators of numerically controlled machines in Japan was less difficult than it was in Britain because higher literacy levels meant that the Japanese operators could be given manuals, and trouble-shoot with more limited assistance from trainers or supervisors.
13 The procedure used to decompose the sources of growth is not entirely clear (see Burtless, 1999a: 861–2). It seems to have involved imputing the 1979 position in the income distribution to the relevant category (e.g. single men over 50) and comparing the degree of inequality that is observed in 1996 with what it would have been, had the average rank of the category remained the same. For present purposes I assume that the procedure is competent.
14 For example, there was marked inconsistency in the classification of countries as corporatist or neoliberal, erraticness in time period analysed, a failure to take into

account the fact that the degree of integration of economies implied that country cases were not really independent (e.g. Canada's economic performance follows that of the US, Austria's that of Germany), a failure to take into account the role of 'catch up' economic growth, and failure to properly control for relevant factors (e.g. the effect of oil on the Norwegian economy, the effect of the loss of preferential access to the UK market for New Zealand's butter and mutton, and the role of central bank autonomy in Germany). There is detailed examination of these difficulties in Smith (1992).

15 This interpretation generated considerable controversy within Sweden, with Korpi as a major protagonist in criticisms of Lindbeck's position. I think that the debate is won by Lindbeck's side. The relevant English-language publications are Korpi (1996), Henrekson (1996), and Lindbeck (1997)

16 The case of the Netherlands provides an even more spectacular example of the effect of generous sick benefits on absences. See Visser and Hemerijk (1997: 136–44).

17 The sources are given in Burtless (2001: 26).

18 The term 'externality' is usually used to describe what I call here complementarities. See Lloyd-Ellis (2001: 7–9).

19 To buttress his argument he cites evidence on the diversity of trends in inequality from, in particular, Atkinson (1999).

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
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Abstracts/Résumés/Resúmenes

Karen Bettez Halnon
Poor Chic: The Rational Consumption of Poverty

A discussion of Poor Chic, or an array of fads and fashions in popular culture that make recreational or stylish 'fun' of poverty, or of traditional symbols of working class and underclass statuses, challenges the reductionism of the view that 'lifestyle' consumption has displaced consumption as a means of expressing social status (e.g. race, class, and gender). It is argued that the multiplicity of symbols involved in Poor Chic collectively represent lower class status and have referents in the material realities of poverty. Using numerous examples of Poor Chic in the United States and internationally since the 1980s, this article shows how the rational (controlled, efficient, predictable, and calculable) consumption of poverty symbols distinguishes class boundaries between the wealthy and the poor. Drawing on works by Ritzer, Bauman, Veblen, and others, Poor Chic is explained as the rational consumption of commodified poverty, involving postmodern 'tourists' who 'conspicuously' vacation in 'vagabondage'.

Keywords: consumption, impersonation, lifestyle, poverty, rationality

Karen Bettez Halnon
La pauvreté chic: consommation rationnelle de la pauvreté

Une discussion de la pauvreté chic, éventail de modes de la culture populaire jouant sur de multiples symboles de la classe ouvrière et de la marginalité, amène à mettre en question le simplisme d'arguments selon lesquels la consommation en 'mode de vie' aurait remplacé la consommation comme moyen d'exprimer un statut social (par exemple, la race, la classe, l'appartenance au genre masculin ou féminin). L'argument est que la multiplicité de symboles impliqués dans la pauvreté chic constitue collectivement un statut de classe,

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avec pour référents les réalités matérielles des 'autres'. A partir de nombreux exemples de pauvreté chic, aux Etats-Unis et dans le monde, depuis les années 1980, l'auteur montre comment la consommation de pauvreté rationnelle (efficace, contrôlée, calculable et prévisible) reconstruit de nouvelles frontières entre les riches et les pauvres. L'article explique en quoi la pauvreté chic est un processus de consommation rationnel et, s'appuyant sur ce qu'ont écrit Marx, Veblen, Weber, Ritzer, Bauman et d'autres, souligne la politique de la force pratiquée par les 'voyageurs' post-modernes qui 'affichent' leurs vacances dans la classe des autres, prudemment distanciée et changée en commodité.

Mots-clés: consommation, mode de vie, pauvreté, personnification, rationalité

Karen Bettez Halnon
Moda pobre: el consumo racional de la pobreza

La discución sobre moda pobre, o un conjunto de modas y nuevas tendencias en la cultura popular que juegan un papel sobre símbolos múltiples en la clase trabajadora y estudiantil, desafía la reducción de argumentos puestos en el 'estilo de vida' de consumo que ha movido a un lado el consumo como medio de expresión de estatus social (por ejemplo, raza, clase, o género). Ha sido argumentado que la multiplicidad de símbolos evueltos en la moda pobre, representa colectivamente clase-estatus y tiene referentes en realidades materiales de otros. Extrayendo de varios ejemplos de moda pobre en los Estados Unidos e internacionalmente desde los años 1980, el autor muestra cómo el consumo (eficiente, controlado, calculable y predecible) racional de pobreza reconstruye nuevos límites entre ricos y pobres. Examinando moda pobre como un proceso racional de consumo, y extrayendo de los trabajos de Marx, Veblen, Weber, Ritzer, Bauman y otros, este escrito destaca el poder que las políticas de 'viajeros' postmodernistas, quienes 'claramente' vacacionen a distancias seguras, comodamente en otras clases.

Palabras claves: consumo, estilo de vida, imitación, pobreza, racionalidad

Mark Herkenrath
Quantitative Cross-National Analysis as a Research Tool in the Sociology of Developing Countries – A Critical Examination

Quantitative cross-national analysis (CNA) is one of the most frequently used research methods in empirical sociology, particularly in research on

developing countries. Its frequent application implies that CNA is a useful instrument that yields trustworthy results. However, numerous criticisms, which call into question the method's legitimacy, can be found in the relevant literature. This article discusses the most important among these criticisms, and explores three particularly problematic issues: comparability of national societies, case independence, and accuracy of 'official' data material. Although these issues represent potential difficulties and shortcomings of quantitative cross-national research, there are elegant solutions. The article provides information about these solutions and demonstrates that CNA is indeed a useful research tool for sociologists.

Keywords: comparative research design, cross-national analysis, developing countries, quantitative methodology

Mark Herkenrath

L'analyse transnationale quantitative comme outil de recherche en sociologie des pays en voie de développement – examen critique

La recherche transnationale quantitative (RTQ) est l'une des méthodes de recherche les plus fréquemment utilisées en sociologie empirique, notamment dans la recherche sur les pays en voie de développement. À en juger par la fréquence de son emploi, la RTQ est un instrument utile qui donne des résultats fiables. Toutefois, il existe dans la documentation propre au sujet de nombreuses critiques mettant en doute le caractère légitime de la méthode. Le présent article évoque les plus importantes des critiques ainsi faites, dont trois problèmes particulièrement épineux: la comparabilité des sociétés nationales, l'indépendance des cas et l'exactitude des données 'officielles'. Ce sont des questions qui constituent effectivement des difficultés potentielles et des inconvénients de la recherche transnationale quantitative, mais auxquelles existent des solutions élégantes. L'auteur offre des renseignements utiles sur les solutions en question, et démontre que la RTQ est bien un outil de recherche utile pour les sociologues.

Mots-clés: analyse transnationale, méthodologie quantitative, modèle de recherche comparative; pays en voie de développement

Mark Herkenrath

Análisis cuantitativo transnacional como herramienta de investigación en la sociología de paises en vías de desarrollo – un examen crítico

Análisis cuantitativo transnacional (ACN) es uno de los métodos de investigación más frecuentemente usados en sociología empírica, particularmente en investigaciones sobre paises en vías de desarrollo. Su frecuente aplicación da a entender que el ACN es un instrumento útil que produce resultados confiables. De cualquier manera, numerosas críticas que cuestionan la legitimidad del método, pueden ser encontradas en la literatura relevante. Este artículo trata de la más importante de estas críticas, y explora tres puntos problemáticos en particular: comparación de sociedades nacionales, independencia de casos, y precisión de información 'oficial'. Si bien estos casos representan posibles dificultades y defectos de investigación cuantitativa transnacional, existen soluciones elegantes. El artículo provee información sobre estas soluciones y demuestra que ACN es realmente una herramienta útil para la investigación en sociología.

Palabras claves: análisis transnacional, diseño de investigación comparativa, metodología cuantitativa, paises en desarrollo

Kwame Boadu

Social Class and Health Status in Ghana

This study investigates differences in social class and their influence on health status in Ghana, using malaria as a proxy measure of health status. Data were obtained from the 1997 Ghana Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) study. A total of 14,514 household heads were interviewed, out of which 9162 were rural and 5352 urban household heads. The research method used in this study involves the construction of a composite index of social class from six indicators: education, dwelling ownership, heads of cattle, modern household items, main source of cooking fuel and type of toilet facility. Social class represents the main predictor variable, and is examined in conjunction with marital status and personal hygiene. Sex, age, place of residence and ecological zone are employed as control variables, while the prevalence of malaria is used as a proxy measure of health status, the dependent variable. The focus on malaria stems from the pervasive influence of the disease as the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Ghana, and its linkage to socioeconomic and environmental conditions. Logistic regression procedure is executed to examine the effect of social class on the prevalence of malaria, while controlling for all other

variables. The study reveals that social class has no direct influence on health status.

Keywords: Ghana, health status, social class

Kwame Boadu
Classe sociale et état de santé au Ghana

La présente étude porte sur les différences en terme de classe sociale et sur leur influence sur l'état de santé au Ghana, en utilisant la malaria comme variable subrogative de l'état de santé. Les données utilisées sont tirées d'un sondage sur les indicateurs majeurs de bien-être, réalisé en 1997 (Ghana Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire). Au total, 14.514 chefs de famille ont été interrogés, dont 9162 en milieu rural et 5352 en milieu urbain. La méthode de recherche utilisée dans la présente étude implique la construction d'un indice composé de la classe sociale, à partir de six indicateurs: instruction, détention de l'habitation en propriété, têtes de bétail, équipement ménager moderne, principale source de combustible pour la cuisine et type d'installations sanitaires. La classe sociale, variable explicative principale, s'examine en conjonction avec la situation de famille et l'hygiène personnelle, comme autres variables explicatives. Le sexe, l'âge, le lieu de résidence et la zone écologique s'emploient comme variables de contrôle; et la prévalence de la malaria, comme variable subrogative de l'état de santé, variable dépendante. L'accent sur la malaria découle de l'influence prépondérante de cette maladie comme cause principale de morbidité et de mortalité au Ghana, d'une part, et de ses liens avec les conditions socioéconomiques et environnementales, d'autre part. Intervient ensuite une analyse de régression logistique, pour examiner l'effet de la classe sociale sur la prévalence de la malaria, une fois toutes les autres variables contrôlées. L'étude révèle que la classe sociale n'a pas d'influence directe sur l'état de santé.

Mots-clés: classe sociale, état de santé, Ghana

Kwame Boadu
Clase social y el estado de salud en Gana

Este estudio investiga diferencias en clases sociales y su influencia en estado de salud en Gana, usando la malaria como medida aproximada con respecto a estado de salud. La información utilizada es obtenida del estudio del Cuestionario Principal de Bienestar de Gana (CPBG) de 1997. Un total de 14,514

cabezas de familia fueron entrevistados de los cuales 9162 fueron cabezas de hogares rurales y 5352 cabezas de hogares urbanos. El método de investigación usado en éste estudio envuelve la construcción de un índice compuesto de clases sociales de seis indicadores nombrados: educación, posesión persistente, cabezas de ganado, artículos para hogares modernos, principales recursos de combustible para cocinar y tipos de facilidades sanitarias. Las clases sociales representan el principal pronosticador de variables, y es examinado en conjunto con estado civíl e higiene personal también como pronosticadores. Sexo, edad, lugar de residencia y zona ecológica son empleados como variables de control, mientras la prevalencia de malaria es utilizada como una aproximada medida de estado de salud, la variable dependiente. El enfoque en la malaria radica en la pervasiva influencia de la enfermedad como causa principal de morbosidad y mortalidad en Gana, y su vínculo con condiciones socio-económicas y ambientales. El procedimiento de regresión logística es ejecutado para exterminar el efecto de clases sociales en la prevalencia de la malaria, mientras controla las otras variables. El estudio revela, que clases sociales no tienen influencia directa en el estado de salud.

Palabras claves: clases sociales, estado de salud, Gana

Yandong Zhao

Measuring the Social Capital of Laid-off Chinese Workers

Confusion over the concept of social capital is reflected in the variety of methodologies used to measure it. In studying the re-employment of laid-off Chinese workers, the author endeavours to measure their individual social capital in two ways. To measure their 'possessed social capital' (i.e. the accessible resources in their social networks), their 'spring festival contacts network' was studied for information about network size, density and embedded resources. The social capital actually used for re-employment was also measured. It was found that Chinese laid-off workers have less social capital than ordinary citizens. While searching for new jobs, they mainly depend on informal methods and substantial help from the network. Strong ties are more frequently used by these workers. However, workers with very low and high amount of possessed social capital tend to avoid using social capital in re-employment.

Keywords: measurement, possessed social capital, re-employment, used social capital

Yandong Zhao

Mesure du capital social d'employés chinois licenciés

Il existe une certaine confusion autour du concept de capital social, mesuré conséquemment par des méthodologies variées. Lors d'une étude du réemploi d'employés chinois licenciés, je m'efforce de mesurer leur capital social de deux façons. Tout d'abord, pour mesurer le capital social à leur disposition (c.-à -d. les ressources accessibles faisant partie prenante du réseau social de chacun), j'ai étudié leur 'réseau de contacts du festival de printemps' et obtenu ainsi des données sur la taille et la densité du réseau, ainsi que sur les ressources qui en faisaient partie intégrante. D'autre part, j'ai également mesuré le capital social effectivement utilisé lors du réemploi d'un employé. J'ai constaté que les employés chinois licenciés avaient un capital social plus réduit que la moyenne des gens. Dans leur recherche d'un nouvel emploi, ils dépendent de méthodes non-structurées et de l'aide substantielle apportée par le réseau. Ils ont plus souvent recours à des liens étroits. Toutefois, ces employés ayant un capital social exceptionnellement riche ou pauvre ont tendance à ne pas y avoir recours lors du réemploi.

Mots-clés: capital social disponible, capital social employé, mesure, réemploi

Yandong Zhao

Midiendo capital social de trabajadores chinos despedidos

Confusión sobre el concepto de capital social conduce a varias metodologías para medir el capital social. Al mismo tiempo en que se estudiaba el re-empleo de trabajadores chinos que habían sido despedidos, yo me puse en la tarea de medir el capital social individual de estos trabajadores de dos maneras. Para hacer posible, la medida del capital social poseido de los trabajadores despedidos (por ejemplo, los recursos accesibles enclavados en la red social de uno), estudié su 'festival en contacto de redes de primavera' para obtener información sobre su tamaño de red y los recursos enclavados en la red. Además, medí el capital social realmente utilizado durante el re-empleo de los trabajadores. En mi estudio encuentro que trabajadores chinos que han sido despedidos poseen menos cantidades de capital social a comparación de otros ciudadanos. Mientras buscaban trabajo, ellos solamente dependen en métodos informales y la substancial ayuda de la red. Lazos fuertes son usados más frecuentemente por estos trabajadores. Sin embargo, los trabajadores con muy baja y alta cantidad de capital social poseido tienden a evitar usar capital social en el proceso de re-empleo.

Palabras claves: capital social empleado, capital social poseido, medida, re-empleo

Michael R. Smith

Income Inequality and Economic Growth in Rich Countries: A Reconsideration of the Evidence

Inequality has been a major focus of sociological interest. This interest seems to be animated by a general disapproval of it. But to transform this disapproval into intelligent commentary on policy it is necessary to assess the sources of changes in the level of inequality and in its association with outcomes that might also be sought. One such outcome is the rate of economic growth. In this article I review theories that associate economic growth to inequality – negatively or positively – and what the available evidence tells us about the plausibility of those theories.

Keywords: economic growth, globalization, income inequality

Michael R. Smith

L'inégalité de revenu et la croissance économique dans les pays riches: un nouvel examen du problème

Les inégalités sont une des préoccupations de la sociologie, une préoccupation qui s'inspire du jugement que les inégalités sont, en général, excessives. Mais il faut que l'on fonde un tel jugement sur une analyse de la relation entre les niveaux d'inégalité et les autres objectifs de la politique. Un de ces objectifs est le taux de croissance économique. Dans ce texte j'examine les théories de l'inégalité et la croissance économique et les preuves pertinentes.

Mots-clés: croissance économique, globalisation, inégalité de revenu

Michael R. Smith

La desigualdad en el ingreso y crecimiento económico de países ricos: una reconsideración de la evidencia

La desigualdad ha sido siempre de mucho interés sociológico. Al parecer, este interés se ha visto estimulado por un desacuerdo general hacia lo que significa la desigualdad. Así, para transformar esta falta de consenso en un comentario inteligente dentro del campo estratégico, es necesario evaluar las fuentes que provocan los cambios en el nivel de la desigualdad así como la relación que ellas guardan con los objetivos pretendidos por dichas estrategias. Uno de estos objetivos es el nivel de crecimiento económico. En el presente estudio, reviso las teorías que asocian el crecimiento económico a la desigualdad – sea

en forma negativa o positiva – así como lo que la evidencia de que se dispone nos informa sobre de la factibilidad de dichas teorías.

Palabras claves: crecimiento económico, desigualdad en el ingreso, globalización

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Women in the Armed Forces of the World: Recent Trends and Explanations

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
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
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
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Gerhard Kümmel

When Boy Meets Girl: The 'Feminization' of the Military
An Introduction Also to be Read as a Postscript

The Military and Military-Related Research

The military is an essential institution of any society, yet it is by no means an unequivocal one. Rather, the armed forces constitute a social phenomenon marked by profound ambivalence. They may act as the guarantors and defenders of peace, but may also be the violators of peace and the advocates of war. They directly and indirectly impact on society, on its institutions, its economy, its culture, as well as on the lives of its people whether they want it or not. They may save and they may cost people's lives. They may be regarded as a political chameleon insofar as they may be an instrument of any given state or government – be it democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian, fundamentalist or dictatorial. They may provide security while at the same time drawing heavily on a society's resources that may be already insufficient for further socioeconomic development. They may be engines of socioeconomic, technological and administrative progress and they may be inhibitors of social change.

Therefore, basically, the military is a double-edged sword. It may well be assumed that this will be valid for the present as well as for the foreseeable future, because, as the late Raymond Aron once wrote, 'Mankind has always lived dangerously'. Modern societies continue to live with insecurity and vulnerability, meaning that societies are still in need of the military, in need of maintaining armed forces and in need of providing them with sufficient resources. All the more important, then, is it to care about the military, particularly in democratic societies, and to strike an intelligent balance between the imperatives of military effectiveness and the need to create and

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maintain civil–military relations that do not allow the military and society to go separate ways, and to secure the political and democratic control of the armed forces (see Boëne, 2000; von Bredow and Kümmel, 2000).

In this endeavour, the social sciences cannot idly stand aside. However, in general, things military have long been standing at the margins of social scientific research interests and this situation has not fundamentally changed in recent years. One explanation for this can be found in a basic trait of organizations, namely to keep a distance from the outside world. Within the military, it could be argued, this tendency may be even stronger because of a certain military need (correctly or incorrectly perceived) to keep things secret. This means that it may be quite difficult for an interested researcher to secure access to his or her research field. And if access is granted by the armed forces, their motivation is often practical and sociotechnological in character. A second explanation is the anti-military views held by quite a few social scientists and the consequent lack of interest in studying the armed forces. Therefore, military sociologists are often viewed with some uneasiness, if not suspicion, and military sociological research in general is seen as empiricist, theory-free, status quo oriented and uncritical – although the discipline's findings are considerable (Kümmel and Prüfert, 2000).

However, things might be beginning to change. The end of the East–West conflict has somewhat eased the various apprehensions and prejudices towards military sociology because, along with the collapse of the Soviet empire, binary thinking in terms of good vs bad has become less intense and there is more tolerance. Also, processes of rationalization and modernization in organizations and in technological progress increasingly impact on the armed forces, thus establishing imperatives of efficiency. At the same time, the military faces a complex and diverse social reality that puts civil–military relations and their management high on the agenda. Taken together, this means that the military increasingly has to become a reflective, learning organization (on this concept, see Argyris and Schön, 1978; Riegraf, 2000). In this vein, 'objective self-analysis allows the military to be proactive (versus reactive) in its management of social change' (Dunivin, 1994: 544).

Women and/in the Military: Mapping the Debate

The situation sketched out a few lines earlier is quite different when it comes to the field of women in the military. Here, substantial amounts of research have been undertaken and piles of literature have been produced. Although, in general, the armed forces are perceived as conservative organizations hesitant or even resistant to social change and thus also to including females, in the course of time women have extended their military roles thereby challenging the common view of the armed forces as a male domain and the

male-warrior paradigm (Dunivin, 1994). This process of 'normalization' of female participation in the military can be attributed to a mixture of different factors, among them: women have been granted access to the military in times of a military emergency, i.e. in times of war; they have been recruited when there was a shortage of military personnel; and they themselves have forcefully demanded their inclusion in the process of women's emancipation and their fight for equal rights, for equality and for equity.

Indeed, the history of including women in the armed forces and also in paramilitary groups is a long one (see, for example, the contributions in DeGroot and Peniston-Bird, 2000). Whether as camp followers, nurses, revolutionaries, spies, soldiers in disguise or as regular female soldiers and as supreme commanders, women have engaged in a multitude of classifications and trades and continue to do so (Berkin, 1980; Elshtain, 1987; Wheelwright, 1989; Jones, 1997; Seidler, 1998; Skaine, 1999). Yet, the extension of military roles for women has not proceeded in a linear fashion. Rather, there are patterns or cycles of expansion and contraction to be observed (Segal, 1999: 577). In addition to these roles, women have, of course, been subject to the non-combat activities of military men; they have been taken as hostages and trophies, they have been killed, they have been wounded and they have been tortured, raped and utilized for prostitution (see Enloe, 1989; Albrecht-Heide and Bujewski-Crawford, 1991; Pollock Sturdevant and Stoltzfus, 1993; Stiglmayer, 1994; Hicks, 1994; Allen, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1996; Moon, 1997; Skjelsbaek, 2001).

As old as the history of opening the military to females, if not even older, is the controversy around this issue (see, for example, Goldman, 1982; Isaksson, 1988; Mitchell, 1989; Hurni et al., 1992; Vickers, 1993; Howes and Stevenson, 1993; Stiehm, 1996; Weinstein and White, 1997). At times, the discourse had its peaks, at others, the debate ebbed away (see also Seifert, 1999). The protagonists in this debate are numerous and, in an initial approach, they may be briefly sketched according to their basic orientation on this issue, ranging from those who are strictly opposed to any utilization of women in the armed forces to those for whom a conditional and limited access of females to the military is feasible to those who ardently support complete access for women. Within this spectrum, sometimes strange quasi-coalitions can be found. Both the military traditionalists and the pacifist feminists, for example, are opposed to women in the armed forces in general and in the combat arms in particular, and, interestingly, they converge in the reason they cite to support their argument. For both groups it is a position of essentialism. According to them, it is nature and biology that decide in the end and both subscribe to the myth of an inherently peace-loving female gender. Yet, their emphases differ somewhat. The military traditionalists primarily stress what they see as the genuine physical and psychological qualities of men such as aggressiveness, physical strength, stamina, willingness to endure exposure

to extreme physical danger and readiness to take lives and deny these attributes to women and the female body and psyche. They then go on to say that women are the ones to be protected by men because of their family roles of child-bearing and child-rearing (see also Stiehm, 1982; Seifert, 1996). Among the outspoken military traditionalists is the well-known Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld (2001), who maintains that the feminization of the military weakens it and leads to its decline, leaving the armed forces progressively more incapable of doing what they were invented for. Various female authors, like Stephanie Gutmann (2000), basically agree with these ideas, while writer Brian Mitchell argues that the integration of women into the military 'threatens to leave the American military no more disciplined, no more efficient, no more fearsome, no more military than the United States Postal Service' (Mitchell, 1998: xvii). In a later, somewhat lengthier passage he neatly summarizes his position:

> No one, it seems, is courageous enough to approach the issue of women in the military as one would any other issue, analyzing it with cold rationality in the simple terms of costs versus benefits. The problem, of course, with weighing the pluses and minuses of using women in the military is that there are too many minuses. A partial list would include higher rates of attrition, greater need for medical care, higher rates of non-availability, lower rates of deployability, lesser physical ability, aggravated problems of single-parenthood, dual-service marriages, fraternization, sexual harassment, sexual promiscuity, and homosexuality, all of which adversely affect unit cohesion, morale, and the fighting spirit of the armed forces. Against these many disadvantages, women offer the military one single advantage: they are better behaved. They lose less time for disciplinary reasons and are less prone to drug and alcohol abuse. And even this is not true for the Air Force, where men are as well behaved as women. From a strict cost-benefit standpoint, the military use of women makes sense for only a handful of jobs, largely in the medical professions. . . . For all other military jobs, the only reason to use women is not a military reason. It is a political reason driven by an ideology that is hostile to the military. (Mitchell, 1998: 340ff.)

The pacifist feminists, by contrast, deem women to be the peaceful sex per se and infer from this that women are superior to men and chosen to be the ones whose task it is to push for peaceful conflict resolution and eventually overcome war and the armed forces (see Ruddick, 1983, 1989; Mitscherlich, 1987). Hence, they express dismay at women's interest in joining the armed forces and strictly oppose the idea of a female infiltration of the military to undermine and change it, fearing that the more likely result will be the militarization of women (Enloe, 1983). Also, they fear that advocating military access for women puts females at risk since within the male domain of the military they are inevitably exposed to the violent behaviour of the men, in particular, to sexual harassment, sexual violence and rape. The Tailhook incident of 1991 is one of the most prominent examples (Office of the Inspector General, 1993; see also Francke, 1997), but a long row of

empirical evidence substantiates this proposition (see, inter alia, Firestone and Harris, 1994; Guenter-Schlesinger, 1999; Morris, 1999). Male sexualized behaviour is seen as entrenched in the male identity of the organization (Reardon, 1985); in other words, the hyper-masculine military environment is deemed to constitute a positive opportunity structure and thus to be conducive to sexual misbehaviour (on this argument, see Jackman, 1999; Kümmel and Klein, in press).[1] This first group of pacifist feminists, the radical feminists, heavily criticize patriarchy as oppressing women and perceive females to be structurally exploited by males. The second type of pacifist feminists, the Marxist/socialist feminists, share these concerns, but combine feminist approaches with classical socialist thinking, such as a critique of the military–industrial complex and the basic theoretical assumption that it is capitalism rather than patriarchy that lies at the roots of women's oppression.

Each of these groups may be subdivided into the hardliners on the one hand and the moderates on the other, with the latter willing to admit that women may be marginally used in the military, i.e. in the medical service. The latter indicate a shift towards women's access to the military being conceivable, but in limited or conditional ways. Acknowledging the changed socioeconomic and legal status of women in modern times, they basically accept the idea that women are entitled to lay down their lives for their country if they are willing to do so. They stress women's equal rights and responsibilities as citizens of a given country (see also Fenner, 2001; Fenner and DeYoung, 2001). It has to be added that among feminists, who, indeed, can be found across the whole spectrum of positions, there is a group that encourages female military enrolment as a means to change the military from within, like a Trojan horse, and to also change the gender order in society in general (see Zirngast, 1997: 132). Those advocating limited integration, however, differ among themselves as to the extent to which they are willing to open the armed forces up to women, i.e. in the number of classifications and trades women can enter. After the medical service it is functions in clerical administration or in communication that are deemed suitable for women. Others would go further, saying that women can well be used in combat support roles. Eventually, the ultimate line drawn by those who favour complete military access for women is the issue of women in combat roles (see also Quester, 1977). Here, it is usually the concern regarding combat effectiveness that prevents them from allowing women into the combat sector of the armed forces, implying that women cannot fight. This rings the bell of both military traditionalism and pacifist feminism and shows that within the debate there has been, is and will continue to be a reversion to a seemingly natural *conditio humana* that is anthropologically, biologically or sociobiologically based, and thus unalterable. Although these sociobiological arguments are heavily contested (see, inter alia, Goldstein, 2001: Ch. 3), and although evidence about the effects of the presence

of women in military units on military effectiveness, combat readiness and cohesion conflicts with the findings of empirical research indicating that mixed-gender units *do not* per se display less military effectiveness and cohesion (Moskos, 1985; Hoiberg, 1991; Rosen et al., 1999; see for homosexual soldiers, Kier, 1998, 1999), these arguments do heavily influence public and political debate (see Seifert, 1999: 45–7).

Supporters of complete female access subscribe to the rights-based arguments mentioned earlier, but take them one more step ahead. 'Equal opportunity demands that there be no exclusion from job prospects on the grounds of gender; and the wider demands of equality of citizenship seem to require that there be no civil rights reserved exclusively for men, and no special exemptions for women from civil duties' (Lloyd, 1987: 63). Since combat service usually affords career advancements in the military, barring women from these combat roles constitutes unacceptable workplace discrimination on the grounds of sex and even constrains their career prospects outside the military as, for instance, the case of Israel shows (see Klein, 2000). Feminists among the proponents of a full integration also stress the argument of the sameness of the sexes, implying that, basically, there are no or, at best, few physical and psychological differences between men and women. This has met opposition from military traditionalists, of course, but, interestingly, from military women also. Referring to the US, Laura Miller speaks of an alienation of military women from feminists, with the former striking a different balance between equity and difference, leaving more space for difference. In addition, to some extent, the way some feminists have been handling the issue of sexual harassment has furthered this estrangement. As Laura Miller (1998: 35) writes, 'By simultaneously portraying women soldiers as helpless victims of sexual harassment and yet potentially fierce warriors in battle, activists have put forth contradictory images that undermine their efforts.' In a similar vein, the feminist call for affirmative action as compensation for past female inequity may well have played a role.

This very brief sketch of the general positions of the participants in the discourse on women in the armed forces, ranging from two kinds of outspoken essentialist criticism to ardent rights- and equity-based support, leaves one with the impression of a highly controversial and polarized debate where the basic issue of difference and equity of the sexes is at stake. It has surely had its ups and downs and the actual participation of women in the armed forces does not constitute a linear process, rather it is a cyclical one with peaks and troughs. For the present, however, reflecting the political development in global security and a certain shift from traditional to non-traditional military operations, i.e. peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian intervention and military operations other than war (von Bredow and Kümmel, 2000), the overall trend in the world seems to be towards an extension of military roles for women. Throughout the 1990s

women played a more active and visible role in the armed forces than before. Accordingly, at least in recent years, notable advances can be observed in a number of countries around the world, but particularly in the western countries. Whereas some decades ago the debate generally centred on the principal question of whether or not to include women in the military, the discussion meanwhile has shifted towards the issue of women in the combat forces. This leaves us with the problem of identifying the factors and variables that influence both the debate and actual female participation in the military. And this is the purpose of this monograph issue.

The Issue's Contents in Brief

The contributions to this issue generally adopt an organizational/institutional perspective rather than a clear-cut feminist perspective and present single case and multi-case studies in women's participation in the military from every continent on earth. They are the outcome of research done in the framework of ISA's RC 01 (Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution). The countries analysed are Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Portugal, Israel, Zimbabwe, South Africa, South Korea, Australia and Mexico thus substantiating the proposition that the opening of the armed forces to women is a global and transcultural phenomenon, and providing a comparative perspective. Directly or indirectly, the case of the US serves as a kind of reference case although it is not explicitly dealt with.

Donna Winslow and Jason Dunn trace the integration of women into the Canadian forces by making the important distinction between two aspects of integration, one a legal standard where women and men are utilized in the military on equal grounds, the second a social or interactionist feature, the full acceptance of women as equals. While the first may be realized in considerable proportions, this is much less the case for the second aspect. Material legal integration has been achieved, as the authors show in their discussion on developments in the law and jurisdiction, in particular on the issue of discrimination. Here, they refer to the so-called SWINTER (Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles) trials of the 1980s and to the Human Rights Tribunal of the late 1980s that lifted the ban on non-traditional military roles for women, yet with the notable exception of females' service on board submarines.

In social terms, integration is being achieved to a far lesser degree.[2] Indeed, the authors point to notable differences between the services, with the air force more in favour of integration than the navy or particularly the army. Also, they argue that the normative reference systems of the soldiers in combat arms are more divergent from civilian society than is the case for combat support or communication and command troops. As a consequence,

since these soldiers adhere to the traditional values and orientations of the military organization and, in particular, to the paradigm of the masculine warrior, their resistance to female integration is pronounced, thereby constituting a sincere obstacle to further integration in the sense of acceptance.

Theoretically, the authors rely on Charles Moskos's well-known Institutional/ Occupational Model of civil–military relations that assumes a continuum ranging from a military system highly differentiated from civilian society (institutional orientation) to a military organization highly convergent with the structures to be found in civilian society (occupational orientation). They find divergence or traditionalism in the military to be most pronounced in the combat forces, but also in labour-intensive support units, and possibly at senior command levels as well. By contrast, convergence or civilianization emerges in functions dealing with medical care, education, administration, logistics, transportation, construction and other technical tasks. Both elements, then, divergence and convergence come to the fore when analysing the armed forces, which convinces them to speak of a segmented, plural military.

As Uta Klein shows, in Israel the security issue has long been of essential societal centrality. Though varying in degree, it has been highly relevant since the foundation of the state. Studies on the impact of the military on the political and societal system have generally resulted in the view of Israel as a unique case, namely a system which maintains democracy during protracted wars and prolonged conflict. The persistence of democracy has mainly been attributed to the permeable boundaries between the military and society, marking some sort of 'civilization' of the military. However, in recent years, a counter-movement can be observed that addresses some problematic aspects of Israeli civil–military relations, among them the linkages between military and political and industrial elites. This has led to the charge that the predominance of security and military power might have resulted in a militarization of Israeli society.

Largely neglected so far in these studies is the gender perspective, which is surprising given the fact that Israel is currently one of the very few countries in the world that draft women. Indeed, the conscription of Jewish Israeli women has been practised since the foundation of the state. Thus Israel serves as a very interesting case study on the impact of women soldiers both on the military and on society. Uta Klein's analysis maintains that the centrality of the armed forces and of security in society leads to a marginalization of women on a practical as well as on a symbolic level – symbolically because women are seen as unsuited for and incapable of defending the country (and taking part in the security discourse, too); and practically because Jewish Israeli men gain from their military service by accumulating social capital, by establishing contacts for their professional careers (networking) and by achieving material and symbolic benefits. The military turns out to be the

main agent of society in shaping gender roles and constructing masculinity. Thus it serves as the main source of gender inequality in a society in which the strategic and security political situation is constantly placed on top of the agenda.

The case of the Portuguese armed forces as put forward by Helena Carreiras shows a number of similarities to other countries. The historically dominant pattern of women's recruitment during periods of war, followed by exclusion and return to traditionally female occupations at the end of the conflict, is also applicable to Portugal, as is the increased participation of women in the military in recent years. Following a general European trend, the armed forces shifted towards an all-volunteer force and opened their ranks to women in a wide variety of services and positions. In theory, there is full integration, but practice shows very few women in combat roles. Of special interest, however, is the Portuguese way of integration because it is done on an ad hoc basis, a strategy called 'ex-post pragmatism' by the author. This means, for example, that there have been no preparatory studies. The fact that there was an intense debate on this issue of female soldiers only at the beginning, which has since ebbed away to become, nowadays, a non-issue in public debate is to be noted also.

South Africa is worth including in a study on women in the forces for a number of reasons. It is a country with a long history of large-scale racism and Apartheid and one that moved to democracy only a few years ago. Lindy Heinecken maintains that the driving force of expansion to full integration has been legislative. It was in the wake of the constitutional reforms that the South African armed forces were forced to implement full gender equality as part of their affirmative action programme to correct past gender and racial imbalances within the ranks. The implementation of affirmative action may be attributed to socialist feminism stemming from the revolutionary struggle. This is in marked contrast to the liberal feminism that is prevalent in western societies. Also, South Africa is a case displaying the cross-cutting of minority statuses: race, class and gender intersect in South Africa. For example, with demanding the choice to serve in combat roles, white women's views are in line with international trends, while African women seem far more ready to actually serve in the frontline. Thus, there are vast differences between white women and African women.

The military utilization of females in the South Korean armed forces has also attracted substantial media attention, writes Doo-Seung Hong. With the extension of military roles for women advancing, but without complete access achieved so far, the arguments of the debate sound familiar: advocates assert that equal opportunities should be given to women, while critics fear that the inclusion of females may be detrimental to operational and military effectiveness and may cause intra-organizational problems. The cross-nationally relevant issues of marriage, pregnancy, childbirth and child-rearing are

cited and they deserve particular attention in the South Korean case because, as the author shows, at times these concerns even meant prohibiting women from marriage and pregnancy. The overall trend in policy changes concerning the utilization of women in the military is primarily traced back to enhanced women's rights during the last three decades. Since the 1970s, gender discrimination has been critically challenged and the participation of women in the labour market has rapidly expanded. At the same time, the attitudes of military leaders towards women soldiers have also changed.

A comparative case study of two countries, Germany and Great Britain, and with a focus on legal issues is provided by Gwyn Harries-Jenkins. The cases of *Tanja Kreil* v. *Germany* and *Angela Maria Sirdar* v. *the British Army Board* negotiated at the European Court of Justice in the more recent past are not only instructive regarding the arguments put forward by all sides, but also involve a fundamental question of constitutional law, namely whether national or Community law governed the extension of military roles in European armed forces. The issue then assumes an international, or, more precisely, a European dimension. Both women complained about workplace discrimination in the military based on their sex. In the case of Tanja Kreil, the Court accepted her charge and ruled that national provisions did not override Community law. Accordingly, Germany was called to give women access to further classifications and trades within the Bundeswehr, and, in the end, the Ministry of Defence decided to open the military to women without any restrictions, meaning that they would be able to enter every classification and trade they wanted to.[3] The Sirdar case is different because it was not the generic issue of female recruitment that was at stake, but rather the specific question of women's exclusion from certain specialties, in particular from special forces. In the end, the Court followed the argument detailed by the British Royal Marines and confirmed the legality of Sirdar's exclusion. The two cases lead Harries-Jenkins to develop a very useful scheme of categories of military roles for research purposes in which he distinguishes and defines six categories: non-combatant, combat service, combat support, combat, direct ground combat and special forces. Western armed forces currently recruit women in the first four categories, some do so with regard to direct ground combat, but none allows women to serve in special forces. With regard to this last category, the author then discusses the problem of combat effectiveness in mixed-gender units.

Mady Wechsler Segal and her co-authors, Darlene Iskra, Stephen Trainor and Marcia Leithauser, undertake a comparison of three cases with a theoretical perspective. They extend Segal's theory of variables affecting women's military participation cross-nationally by analysing the cases of Australia, Mexico and Zimbabwe. Australia is a case in which the extension of military roles for women in the recent past has been driven by sociocultural change and the shifts in societal attitudes towards females in non-traditional

occupations and by the low degree of external threat. Thus, the Australian military allows women to serve on board submarines, but has, so far, refrained from opening ground combat roles for women. By contrast, the sociocultural and security political situation in Mexico is rather different. Here, the armed forces are focused on issues of domestic security, implying that working in the military is a high-risk endeavour. Combined with the cultural impact of 'machismo', this has served to limit military career and accession opportunities for women. The third country, Zimbabwe, emerged from a liberation war which was fought from the early 1960s until 1980. Women were utilized in this struggle for liberation in large numbers, but almost exclusively in non-traditional fields. After the war, about half of them were integrated into the national armed forces, making up about one-quarter of the personnel. Nowadays, their number is much smaller (less than 1 percent of the total force) and they serve in combat support and combat service support functions, but, recently, the Ministry of Defence has established a quota system for recruitment and promotion.

The three countries differ in geographic location as well as in how the dimensions of Segal's theory apply to each. Segal's model focuses on societal and institutional-level variables, in the military, in the culture and in the social structure, that affect the degree and nature of women's participation in the armed forces. While the model fits in a general sense, the authors found that other variables need to be added, and existing ones revised. Thus, they propose an expansion of Segal's theory to include additional factors and hypotheses for the relationship between each of these variables and the extent of women's participation in a nation's armed force, such as purpose of the military, military subculture and social values about force and power. Yet, the most important addition to the original model may be the inclusion of the category of politics.

What to Make of It?

The case studies in this monograph provide rich empirical material from countries all over the globe and they may serve as encounters of empirical reality and theory. The empirical reach, then, is selectively global so to speak. And the cases chosen combine both variations and similarities which are sufficient to engage in and go on with developing theories. Indeed, with regard to women's military participation little explicit theory building is to be found so far, and as Mady Wechsler Segal (1995: 758) wrote in the mid-1990s, 'It is time for systematic theory building.' In such a vein, in what follows I try to work on what has been presented in the case studies and develop some kind of general analytical model.

First of all, the issue of women in the armed forces can be put into the

larger context of change in the armed forces. Today's armed forces are considerably different from yesterday's armed forces, and tomorrow's military might look substantially different as well. The military sphere, then, is subject to multi-causal processes of change in the course of time. In principle, changes in the military may be rooted in three different, though interlinked spheres or systems. Change may be induced by developments in (1) the military itself; (2) the national context; and (3) the international system. To illustrate the depth of change, one may resort to research by Charles Moskos. Looking at the 20th century only and taking the USA as an example, his analysis comes up with a sequence of three periods in the development of armed forces. According to his scheme, one can distinguish the modern, the late modern and the postmodern eras as is shown in Table 1.

One can easily imagine and infer from this table that in each of the three eras the conditions for the integration of women into the armed forces have been notably different. Since the definition and the extension of military roles for women are contingent on a variety of factors an attempt to structure them may be in order. Here, I propose differentiating between five dimensions or categories impacting upon the role of women in the armed forces. This brief theoretical sketch resorts to and works upon one of the very few conceptual works in the field, done by Mady Wechsler Segal (1995) in her article in *Gender and Society* and advanced, revised and enlarged by her and her co-authors Darlene Iskra, Stephen Trainor and Marcia Leithauser in their contribution to this monograph.

The five dimensions or categories of factors are: (1) the international environment; the national context, subdivided into (2) politics, (3) society and (4) culture; and (5) the military itself. This model extends the one developed by Segal and Segal et al. and adds a fifth dimension or category to the research field. Given the impact of globalization as a driving force in international relations (see, inter alia, Waters, 1996; Beck, 1997) and given the impact of what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) called 'complex interdependence', it is deemed appropriate to elevate the international context to a separate category. This seems to be justifiable also when looking at the Portuguese, the British and the German cases in which the outcome might well have been different had it not been for the European context.

Within the international dimension, it is important to look at the international constellation present at a given time in history. The cleavages, the conflict lines and the likelihood or the presence of military conflicts structure and change the international constellation. They also shape the countries' perception of security threats. Changing threat perceptions, then, may impact upon the force structure, lead to shifts between the three services and initiate armament or disarmament programmes. Transformations of the security, political and strategic environment of a given country may thus lead to changes in the armed forces including the recruitment – or dismissal – of

Table 1 Three Eras in the Development of the Armed Forces

	Modern 1900–45	*Late Modern 1945–90*	*Postmodern, Since 1990*
Perceived threat	Enemy invasion	Nuclear war	Subnational (e.g. ethnic violence, terrorism)
Force structure	Mass army, conscription	Large professional army	Small professional army
Major mission definition	Defence of homeland	Support of alliance	New missions (e.g. peacekeeping, humanitarian, military operations other than war, peace enforcement)
Dominant military professional	Combat leader	Manager or technician	Soldier-statesperson/ diplomat; soldier-scholar; soldier-policeman; soldier-streetworker
Public attitude towards military	Supportive	Ambivalent	Indifferent
Media relations	Incorporated	Manipulated	Courted
Civilian employees	Minor component	Medium component	Major component
Women's role	Separate corps or excluded	Partial involvement	Full integration
Spouse and military	Integral part	Partial involvement	Removed
Homosexuals in military	Punished	Discharged	Accepted
Conscientious objection	Limited or prohibited	Routinely permitted	Subsumed under civilian service

Source: Adapted from Moskos (2000: 15).

women soldiers. Here, a pattern can be observed: in times of war, the need for personnel increases simultaneously expanding women's roles, whereas in the aftermath of war women are usually driven out of the military and a 'process of cultural amnesia' (Segal, 1995: 761) sets in: a 'gendering war talk'

(Cooke and Wollacott, 1993) begins, in which the wartime performance of women is minimized leading to an absence of women from war narratives in order to legitimize their return to the traditional places.

In addition, societies and especially their elites are interested in other countries and eager to learn how things are handled abroad. Call it the search for competitive advantages or a genuine interest in an international perspective, in our field the result is that armed forces of other countries and their relations to their home societies are studied quite attentively. Also, militaries get to know each other in joint warfare, in alliances and coalitions and in multinational military cooperation at large. In a sense, international demonstration, socialization, diffusion and dissemination effects (see Starr, 1991; Schimmelfennig, 1994; Schmitter, 1996; Axelrod, 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) may well be supposed to be at work. With an eye on female soldiers, then, the military knows how this issue is dealt with abroad, what kind of experiences have been made and what this means for their own armed forces.

As has been mentioned, the national context is subdivided into three distinguishable subsystems: politics, society and culture. In the dimension of politics, first of all the political system, the relationship of politics to the military and the provisions taken by the political sphere in terms of civil–military relations are crucial variables. Political change, political transformations like shifting from a democratic to an authoritarian political system and vice versa, may make a fundamental difference to the armed forces and to civil–military relations. Next, it is necessary to check for the modes of political change and the actors that are active on the political scene. In more open and less hierarchical societies, these are parties, organized interests, pressure groups, but also the media and the law. How they put forward and deal with issues concerning the armed forces on the political agenda and how they interact with each other influences political outcomes, in this case the decisions on what is to be done with the military. With regard to women in the military, one would have to analyse the positions of the political parties on this issue, how actively they promote this issue, whether there are women's pressure groups engaged in lobbying work for women's military participation in the corridors of power, if and to what extent the law is involved, i.e. whether there are law suits or court rulings, and how the media take up the issue.

Society, then, includes factors like demographic trends, the general economic development, the structure of the working population, the scope of occupational segregation and family structures, but also attitudes of society towards the armed forces. Industrialization, for instance, has worked to an overall increase of the number of women in the workforce and has also affected family patterns. The age structure of a given society and the birth rates may have an impact on women's inclusion in the military as well,

because the ageing of society and declining birth rates may result in recruitment problems and personnel shortages for the military due to a decrease in the cohort of eligible men. Hard times for the economy may result in cuts in programmes aiming at infrastructural or organizational improvement as well as in reductions in personnel and weapon acquisition. In situations like these, women may have difficult times on the labour market at large and with military jobs in particular, leading to a reduction of the percentage of women among the working population. By contrast, a flourishing economy boosts this percentage and may also increase the propensity of the military to recruit women because the number of male recruits may decrease due to higher wages paid in civilian jobs. Further on, the scope of the gendered segregation of occupations comes into play (see Reskin et al., 1990). It may be argued that high degrees of occupational gender segregation increase the difficulties of women to enter the armed forces whereas a situation in which women have already accessed formerly male domain jobs enhances their options. Closely connected to demographics, the shape of the economy and the segregation of jobs according to gender are family structures. And, lastly, the attitudes of society towards the military in general may change substantially, resulting in individuals having far less inclination to join the military. To cite just two catchwords for illustration, in the military sociological debate the terms 'warless society' (Moskos, 1992) and 'post-military society' (Shaw, 1991) have been used and they may indicate a substantial growth of military recruitment problems.

Within the cultural dimension are factors like the social construction of the family and of gender roles, societal norms regarding masculinity, femininity and the family, and the public discourse on gender roles. Transformations within the political culture of a given country and the change of social values and norms do not leave the armed forces unaffected. Sociologists relentlessly scan societies in order to identify and name these changes. Among the most popular are the heralding of the 'silent revolution' (Inglehart, 1977, 1989) or the diagnosis of the advent of individualization (Beck, 1986; Giddens, 1994). In terms of gender and family roles, societies define the social roles of men and women, and they mark to what extent deviations to these roles may be tolerated or when they go beyond the boundaries established. Societies, then, may either accentuate or minimize the importance of sex differences. Next, it is obvious that in the course of time, these definitions are subject to change. Due to the activities of the women's movement of the past decades, gender roles have indeed been widely discussed in society at large and they have resulted in the establishment of different, non-traditional role models for women.

The military dimension, eventually, entails elements like the changing image of war and warfare, the status of military technologies, the combat–support ratio, the force structure, the present status of women's

integration into the military and the modes of soldierly interactions. In particular, it is advances in arms, transportation and communication technologies that change the image of war, require a different format of a soldier and alter the combat–support ratio. In this vein, these advances also impact on the participation of women in the armed forces. The processes of the military's bureaucratization, technologization, miniaturization and computerization are often interpreted as undermining the traditional male-warrior paradigm because they imply that sex and gender play a diminishing role in order to be a soldier. Pushing buttons is gender neutral; also, technologization means increasing the importance of brainpower to the detriment of body strength. Equally positive for the inclusion of women is the shift in military operations from aggression/defence/deterrence missions to non-traditional missions such as peacekeeping and military operations other than war (see Däniker, 1992; von Bredow and Kümmel, 2000). Lastly, the military subcultures and the modes of soldierly interaction have to be studied because this is the very context in which women who want to enter the armed forces place themselves and this context may be either conducive, indifferent or detrimental to what Winslow and Dunn call social integration or acceptance. Though it can still be argued that within the military constructions of the feminine (either saints or whores) foster warrior heterosexual masculinity and group solidarity (Barkawi and Dandeker, 1999: 184), shifts are to be noted. The military is a gendered institution, but also a gendering one. As such, the military is principally capable of constructing multiple femininities and masculinities. Figure 1 illustrates the analytical model proposed here.

Avenues for Further Research

The approaches and analytical models put forward in this monograph in order to determine the factors influencing women's inclusion in the military may be regarded as a starting point for future research. The analytical models will have to be tested against more country cases to further refine and improve them. This includes single case studies, but what is needed even more is a comparative perspective. In fact, the 'cross-national study of women in the military is in its infancy' (Segal, 1999: 565). Some research, either on a descriptive, data-gathering level (see, for example, Office on Women in the NATO Forces, 2000) or with an analytical perspective, is undertaken within the framework of NATO members (Stanley and Segal, 1980). On the grounds of a comparative and analytical approach, then, it should be possible to investigate the crucial question of the *relative weight* of the variables.

Next, the gender issue will be of major importance in future research analysing the military as a gendered organization and, at the same time, as one that is doing gender, that is gendering (see also Padavic, 1991; Titunik,



Armed Forces
- Changing images of war
- Military missions
- Military technology
- Combat to support ratio
- Organizational structure
- Level of women's integration
- Personnel & accession policies
- Leadership
- Soldierly interaction
Society
- Demographical trends
- Structure of working population
- Gendered segregation of professions
- Economic development
- Family patterns
Women in the Armed Forces
Politics
- Political system and leadership
- Modes of political change
- Policies on race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality
- Political ideology
- Parties & organized interests
- Law
- Media
- Civil–military relations
Culture
- Social construction of the family
- Social construction of gender roles
- Norm system of masculinity, femunity, and family
- Discourse on gender roles in society
- Key social values power, equity
International Environment
- Security political context
- Civil–military relations abroad
- Armed forces in foreign countries
- International military cooperation

Figure 1 Factors Influencing the Integration of Women in the Armed Forces

2000; Wilz, 2001). This does not only refer to the roles of women and the social constructions of femininity, but to roles of men and the conceptions of masculinity. The debate on women in combat arms shows that the experience of battle is widely supposed to lie at the heart of military life. As David Morgan (1994: 172) writes, 'the moments of combat or action . . . are of such an intensity and at such variance with everyday routine that they are enough to underline the role of the military in the making of masculinities'. This might be the basic reason why, 'Despite far-reaching political, social, and technological changes, the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity' (Morgan, 1994: 165). From these grounds, the inclusion of females in combat functions is criticized by focusing on the following points:

> . . . the extent to which women, especially in a combat situation, might be defined as weakening or polluting; the extent to which feminine skills or aptitudes for caring and nurturing will be diminished through such participations; as well as the more openly expressed questions as to whether women would be able to cope with the rigors and deprivations of war and training. Other major concerns have been whether men will obey women officers and whether men will endanger themselves by protecting women in combat situation. But running through all these concerns and coloring them at every

> point is a concern with the overall symbolic order, the apparent loosening of boundaries between women and men, and the weakening of the links between nation, the military, and gendered identities. (Morgan, 1994: 171)

What can be observed in the military context, then, should this observation be correct, might be an erosion of conceptions of both femininity and masculinity giving way to an increasingly diverse range of masculinities and femininities within the segmented, plural military, impacting on the military culture, but presumably also on the larger society, because of the military's role in defining the cultural constructions of gender and thus gender in the larger society (see also Connell, 1999; Meuser, 1998, 2000; Böhnisch, 2001; Jurczyk, 2001).

Here, the comparative analysis of women's inclusion in the armed forces could well entail the use of gender-role or sexism scales known from social-psychological research and questionnaires dealing with perceptions of equity (see, for example, Bierhoff et al., 1986; Blanchard and Crosby, 1989; Benokraitis and Feagin, 1995; Tougas et al., 1995; Eckes, 1997; Swim and Cohen, 1997). Gathered from among male military and female military samples and from the general population at large on a time series basis, i.e. running the scales several times over a longer period of time, such findings could prove change and continuity in the system of gender images and equity perceptions within and among countries or groups of countries. This may be complemented by qualitative elements of research, for example, on the question of the reality of social integration of women, because 'When we get to the micro-level of interpersonal relations, our knowledge is less systematic ... there has not been as much theory building and testing concerning the conditions under which gender integration is more or less successful' (Segal, 1999: 574). What seems to be needed, then, are interviews and participant/non-participant observation echoing Laura Miller's (1998: 57) call for more ethnographic studies.

One last proposal for future research is to extend comparative research to include not only armed forces from different countries, but also business, administration and other organizations and compare the way they are dealing with the gender issue (see Halford et al., 1997; Heintz et al., 1997) to the military's way. In an ideal world, the admittedly long and encompassing research agenda just sketched briefly calls for an international group of researchers, of course. This is a complex matter, indeed, but according to a Chinese saying the longest journey starts with the first step.

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wish the interested reader a fruitful reading and hope that this publication may help stimulating further research.

Notes

1 Though not accepting the premise that the military environment is particularly prone to sexual harassment and sexual violence, the armed forces have increasingly become aware of the problem and have been trying to cope with it by implementing gender and equal opportunity training programmes (see Kümmel, 2002b). In addition, this issue points to the larger topic of sexuality in organizations (see Rastetter, 1994).
2 This also points to the issue of tokenism (see Kanter, 1981).
3 With regard to the German case and the integration of women into the Bundeswehr, it should be mentioned that the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Research (Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr – SOWI) is conducting a major and ongoing research project on this topic. So far, the project's publications include Kümmel et al., 2000; Kümmel and Biehl, 2001; Kummel, 2002a, 2002b.

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
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Donna Winslow and Jason Dunn

Women in the Canadian Forces: Between Legal and Social Integration

Introduction

Military organizations are considered to be conservative organizations that are resistant to social change. Like many other male-dominated institutions in society, the military has been slow in fully integrating women. Traditionally, most military organizations banned women from combat positions since war was seen as a man's world with no place for women. Women were characterized as having a different moral voice, i.e. one based on caring and compassion. And even though women have always been casualties of war, the battlefield itself has been considered to be an exclusively male domain (Dunn, 1999; Peach, 1994).

Canadian women have a long tradition of military service. They have been a part of Canada's armed forces for over a hundred years, when trained nurses were first called for active duty during the suppression of the North West Rebellion in 1885 (Schacter, 1997: 28; Robinson, 1985: 100; Committee on Women in the NATO Forces, 1982: 11). Canadian nurses have served continuously in this nation's forces. During the First World War, they were assigned on hospital ships, in field ambulance units and to overseas hospitals. They have also been wounded and killed in action during the World Wars. By the end of the Second World War, approximately 50,000 women had served in the women's divisions, 5000 nurses had served in the medical corps of the navy, army and air force and 53 nurses had died while on duty.[1]

Canadian servicewomen have been located in combat zones, been taken prisoners of war and killed, and Canadian civilian women have participated in irregular warfare (e.g. espionage and intelligence operations). However, at no time in their military history have Canadian women 'officially' participated as

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combat personnel in military assault units – ground, sea or air (Park, 1986: 3). In terms of the integration of women into combat, MacKenzie and Acreman argue that the Canadian Forces (CF) are at the forefront of social change. However, they also tell us that a 'concerted effort is required if we are to be successful in overcoming widespread resistance and reactionary attitudes regarding the employment of women in the CF and, in particular, their employment in the combat arms' (MacKenzie and Acreman, 1990: 18).

It is quite clear that acceptance of women in the military service and questions about their ability as leaders have been overshadowed by controversy over whether they should participate in combat and whether they could lead in battle. Much of the debate is rooted in attitudes, and changes in laws and regulations will not automatically alter social tradition (Staff Support Branch, 1978: 147).

Controversy over women in the CF reached a head in 1998 when *Maclean's Magazine* published a cover story exposing cases of alleged rape, gang rape and sexual harassment in the CF.[2] The magazine was inundated with so many letters, emails and telephone calls that it brought out the next issue with the same cover theme and continued to publish letters and editorials in subsequent issues. The stories raised questions about the culture of the armed forces and the place of women in that culture. Journalists accused senior officers of ignoring allegations of impropriety or making light of reported assaults (*Maclean's Magazine*, 3 July 1998). The Canadian public was shocked by cover stories titled 'Rape in the Military' or 'Abuse of Power'. The military was suspected of closing ranks and refusing to 'wash its dirty laundry in public'. Military women came forward on both sides revealing long held secrets of sexual assault or, on the other hand, defending the decency of their co-workers. These articles revealed the increased interest by the media and the Canadian public in the conduct of the armed forces. With increased scrutiny comes the demand for more transparency and accountability.

In this article, we examine the integration of women into the CF. The definition of integration has two parts. The first is a legal standard where women and men are incorporated as equals into the military. That is, according to Canadian law women and men have equal access to all occupations within the CF and there is no discrimination based on gender. The second is of a social nature. Here, integration is defined as the full acceptance of women as equals. Thus, it is a wider issue than women being legally allowed to enter male-dominated areas such as the combat arms (Dunn, 1999). We argue that the combat arms are far more removed from civilian society. As a result they emphasize the values and attitudes of the traditionally male-oriented military organization and, in particular, masculine models of the warrior, thus resisting female integration. As Cotton has pointed out, those with a latent role identity of soldier are more than twice as likely to reject the employment of

women in the combat arms than those with a civilian/employee role identity. Those with a combat identity find gender integration to be an emotional issue and feel that the employment of women in combat units would have a negative effect on cohesion and motivation in battle. While those with a civilian orientation are more likely to consider the issue in terms of trends towards increased female participation in the labour force and concerns for equality of opportunity between the sexes.

The basic difference lies in their relative frames of reference; for one, it is a secular issue to do with equal opportunities for 'qualified' persons in an employment sector; for the other, it is an emotional issue linked to military traditions and survival on the battlefield (Cotton, 1979: 85, 88).

This article is based primarily upon documentary research on gender integration in the CF. We also examined how scholars have addressed change within military organizations, in particular how certain sectors of the military react differently to change. This was pertinent to this article since we are particularly interested in how externally imposed human rights legislation has led to change within the CF; in this case, the full integration of women into the combat arms. In addition, informal interviews were conducted with CF personnel. There were approximately 20 unstructured, open-ended interviews done with CF personnel, who ranged in rank from major to major general. There were males and females interviewed, including infantry personnel and CF staff responsible for gender integration. These interviews, which were done during the period of January 1997 to November 1998, provided us familiarity with the topic as well as some insight into the obstacles that women have faced as they attempt to integrate into the CF.

Theoretical Perspectives

In the post-Second World War era sociologists such as Morris Janowitz observed change in the US military because of technological advances. Changing technology, according to Janowitz, created new patterns of combat and therefore modified organizational behaviour in the military. In short, the more complex the technology of warfare, the narrower the differences between military and non-military establishments (Janowitz, 1970: 143). Building upon the work of Janowitz, Charles Moskos made reference to a 'continuum ranging from a military organization highly differentiated from civilian society to a military system highly convergent with civilian structures' (Moskos, 1973: 266). This became known as the Institutional/Occupational Model. This model assumes a continuum ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one highly convergent with civilian structures (Moskos, 1988: 57).

According to this model, tension and interplay between institutional

(stressing divergence from civilian society) and occupational tendencies (stressing convergence with civilian society) characterize organizational change within the armed forces. Moskos, however, points out that to argue that the military is an institution or an occupation 'is to do an injustice to reality. Both elements have been and always will be present in the military system' (Moskos, 1988: 57). This seems to be reflected in what Moskos calls the segmented or plural military. The plural military is both convergent and divergent with civilian society and it simultaneously displays organizational trends that are civilianized and traditional. Moskos adds, however, that the segmented military 'will not be an alloy of opposing trends, but a compartmentalization of these trends'. He argues that the plural model does not foresee a 'homogeneous military' lying somewhere between the civilianized and traditional poles, instead, 'the emergent military will be internally segmented into areas which will be either more convergent or more divergent than the present organization of the armed forces' (Moskos, 1973: 275).

Moskos argues that divergent/traditional features in the military will become most pronounced in labour-intensive support units, combat forces and possibly at senior command levels. On the other hand, the convergent or civilianized features will accelerate in functions dealing with education, clerical administration, logistics, medical care, transportation, construction and other technical tasks. The divergent or traditional sector will 'stress customary modes of military organization', while at the same time, 'there will be a convergent sector which operates on principles common to civil administration and corporate structures' (Moskos, 1973: 277). This implies that different services in the military may have different attitudes towards the integration of women.

In terms of the service environments, the organizational characteristics tending towards convergence with civilian structures have been most apparent in the air force, somewhat less so in the navy, and least of all in the army. This has also been a pattern concerning the acceptance of women. 'Where the material technology of a service is similar to technologies found in the civilian labor force, and particularly where that technology substitutes capital intensive automated conflict for more traditional mass face-to-face battle, acceptance of women is higher' (Segal and Segal, 1983b: 255). In the US case, women have been integrated most fully into the high-technology US air force while the navy, with a more traditional structure but a high-technology base, is experiencing increases in female participation. However, the US military has not yet accepted women serving in the traditionally male ground combat specialties that do not have counterparts in the civilian labour force. Thus, the greatest restrictions to expansion are found in the army and the marine corps (Segal and Segal, 1983b: 255).

Convergence and Divergence Theory Applied to the CF

According to CF policy, it is important that the CF be integral to the society it serves, not isolated from it. Therefore the composition of the military should reflect the population it serves. If this is true, then the CF should reflect the diversity found in Canadian society. However, it does not. Even though women make up 51 percent of the workforce in Canada, in the CF only 13.4 percent are women (Department of National Defence, 1998: 13). However, it is important to note that there are inter-service differences in Canada similar to those found in the US military. We can see that the air force seems to be more at ease with the presence of women than the navy and particularly the army. For example, in the Sea Ops/Tech there are 298 (4.4 percent) women and 6500 men. The Air Ops/Tech has 718 women (8.5 percent) and 7704 men (Tanner, 1997: 14). This difference between the services was also found in the late 1980s. In its 1989 ruling, the Human Rights Tribunal made references to the 1980s SWINTER (Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles) trials and noted:

> The evaluation of the air trial concluded that social integration had occurred in a satisfactory manner in a majority of squadrons. Women had performed their tasks well, had received no preferential treatment, and a majority of servicemen agreed that women should be fully employed in previously all male units. The commanding officers believed that this integration was successful and did not compromise effectiveness because both men and women were held to the same high training standards. In other words, the inclusion of women would not detract from but would sustain the esprit de corps. The air service was, as a result, prepared to develop a workable rule regarding pregnancy, and to re-assess its physical selection standards so as to be gender-neutral in effect as well as intention. (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 26)

As of 1987, all restrictions on the employment of women in air force units had been removed. Major General Morton testified to the Human Rights Tribunal that air units were satisfied that women could be employed in combat roles in mixed gender units without compromising the operational effectiveness of the units. He stated that factors such as danger, living space and environment were less important than physical ability, stamina and acceptance by males. These could be dealt with in a slow and methodical manner. In short, the change could be managed without compromising standards (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 36).

Although these changes were occurring in the air force, the sea and land trials revealed more problematic results. Even though women were judged to perform jobs competently, there was unsatisfactory social integration, from the point of view of all parties. Women complained of the fishbowl effect. Men asserted that women lacked the necessary physical stamina and combat motivation, and that there was reverse discrimination. The SWINTER trial report suggested that many of the problems could be traced to initial poor selection and training, lack of identification of special skills needed,

inadequate job definitions, and poor organizational or management preparation (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 26–7).

Thus the military in Canada seems to be divided into those who represent what Moskos calls an institutional orientation (divergent with civilian society) and those who have an occupational orientation (convergent with civilian society) concerning the integration of women. Female participation continues to be highest in the more traditional types of MOC (military occupation) groups for women (e.g. medical/dental and support) and lowest in the operational type MOC groups (Tanner, 1997: v). Women constitute only a small percentage of the combat arms:

> Effective 30 Nov 97, women comprised 1.9 percent of the total strength of the combat arms officer corps and 0.9 percent of the total strength of soldiers in the combat arms. However, at the same time women comprised only 0.6 percent of the trained effective strength of the combat arms officer corps, and 0.6 percent[3] of the trained effective strength of soldiers in the combat arms. These proportions translate into a total of ten women employed within three different combat arms officer occupations, and 53 women employed within five different combat arms occupations for Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs). (Davis and Thomas, 1998: 3)

A History of Differences in Attitudes Between the Three Services

Differences in attitudes regarding the employment of women among the land, sea and air elements were noticeable in the late 1970s. In a 1978 questionnaire administered to 4314 CF members and their spouses, the results indicated that the answers given by those serving at sea were willing to 'see women serve at sea in support ships' and that there was no clear 'majority either for or against women serving in destroyers, but there was a majority *against* women serving in submarines'. Most indicated that they would be willing 'to serve with women on board their present ship'. The sailors also believed that 'women would either make no difference or improve the operational effectiveness in a support ship, but that their presence would have a detrimental effect on operational effectiveness of destroyers and submarines' (these being combat ships). What is also interesting here is that the sailors 'were in favour of women as aircrew, but were against the use of women as fighting soldiers' (Directorate Personnel Development Studies, 1978: 4).

Answers given by those in land combat units were different from the sailors: 'Personnel serving in the land force were strongly opposed (69 percent) to women being allowed to serve in the Combat Arms.' They did, however, believe that women should have the opportunity to serve in service units and in combat support. 'A majority (56 percent) of soldiers believed that the operational effectiveness of the Combat Arms units would be greatly impaired by the introduction of women. They foresaw less serious impairment to the combat support and service units.' What is also interesting here is that soldiers

> . . . were prepared to have women serve as aircrew and in some of the field units, notably service and combat support units. They were concerned about the physical and emotional makeup of women and the effect these might have on Combat Arms units' operational effectiveness. A slight majority were against women serving as sailors. (Directorate Personnel Development Studies, 1978: 5)

The answers of those serving on flying bases were generally in favour of women as aircrew. The majority of the respondents believed that women could serve in all aircraft types except high-performance aircraft. 'In the latter case, they judged that operational effectiveness would be degraded. Similarly, the majority of respondents considered women capable of serving in all types of air units except Tactical Fighter, Destroyer Helicopter and Tactical Helicopter squadrons'. Again, what is also interesting here is that 'a slight majority of the airmen sampled were against women serving as soldiers and sailors' (Directorate Personnel Development Studies, 1978: 6). As we saw earlier, attitudes within the air element changed towards women and, in 1987, the air force removed all restrictions involving women.

In November 1977, a poll was conducted by Gallup Canada for the Department of National Defence regarding the employment of females 'in active military combat roles' in an attempt to assess Canadian public opinion towards women serving as soldiers, sailors and aircrew. The results indicated that 55 percent of the respondents were in favour of females serving at sea as sailors, that 53 percent were in favour of female employment in land combat and that 62 percent were in favour of their employment as military aircrew. In May 1978, Gallup Canada did another poll. The results of this poll showed similar results, although the percentages were lower. In relation to females serving at sea, 50 percent of the respondents were in favour of the idea, while 44 percent were against it. In relation to land combat units, 49 percent were in favour, while 45 percent were against the idea. On the other hand, 58 percent of the respondents favoured females serving as military aircrew and 36 percent were against the idea (Directorate Personnel Development Studies, 1978: 10–11).

These findings, although not recent, are interesting, as they seem to demonstrate the idea of divergence/convergence. The air force as well as the public at large both seemed to have similar favourable responses in relation to the integration of women in the air force. However, in regard to the integration of women in the combat arms, the land personnel seemed to be against integration, i.e. divergent, and public opinion was more divided on the issue. That is, the air force (high technology) seemed to be more convergent with civilian society/attitudes and was more 'open' to changes. Again, this is particularly evident in the air force's 1987 decision to abolish its restrictions concerning women.

Differences in attitudes among the service environments are also noticeable when we examine the final reports of the social/behavioural science

evaluation of the SWINTER trials. In relation to the Aircrew Trial, almost all servicewomen and the majority of servicemen at the five operational trial squadrons assessed as satisfactory the performance of female flight engineers, pilots and navigators. 'At all squadrons except one, female aircrew were rated as displaying the normal range of flying abilities. Seventy-seven percent of the aircrew completing surveys in 1985 agreed that women should continue serving as aircrew in some capacity' (Park and Phillippo, 1985: ii–iii). Also, 93 percent of female aircrew and 74 percent of male aircrew believed that women 'should be liable for air combat operational duties on the same basis as men' (Park and Phillippo, 1985: iii). Based on the overall results of the Aircrew Trial social/behavioural science evaluation

> . . . a satisfactory social integration was achieved at four of the five squadrons with a partial acceptance of women at the fifth squadron. At four operational air squadrons, the majority of servicemen agreed that women had performed satisfactorily, did not receive preferential treatment, and should continue serving as aircrew in some capacity in the future. (Park and Phillippo, 1985: iv–v)

In relation to the Sea Trial, there were three major findings. First, women appeared to function effectively aboard the trial ship, the HMCS *Cormorant*. In particular, their fellow male crewmembers and the ship's captains consistently rated servicewomen during the trial period as capable of performing their trade tasks. Second, work relationships between women and men were repeatedly rated as satisfactory by both male and female crewmembers over the four-year employment. Finally, the majority of service members who completed attitudinal surveys during the four-year period supported the continuing employment of women aboard HMCS *Cormorant* (Park, 1984: ii–iii). However, the findings did not indicate that a completely satisfactory social integration of female and male crewmembers had been achieved. Within the mixed-gender crew, the contributions of men and women were not mutually valued. Servicewomen tended to remain segregated from the larger group of male crewmembers throughout the trial period and were accorded only a partial acceptance (Park, 1984: iii). The evaluation, however, did not 'show cause' for excluding women from continuing to serve aboard the HMCS *Cormorant* (Park, 1984: v).

As for the Land Trial, Park tells us that 'servicemen and servicewomen in the two trial units did not achieve a satisfactory social integration over the four-year trial period' (Park, 1985: ii). Instead, 'the attitudes and behaviours expressed by men and women in the two trial units showed that servicewomen, at best, were "accommodated not assimilated" . . . during their trial postings' (Park, 1985: 39). Almost 50 percent of the servicemen in the trials continued to view servicewomen as 'women first, tradesperson second, and soldier never'. Women were not considered to be reliable co-workers. Servicewomen themselves were demoralized and understood that they were

only tolerated by many men. The servicewomen in the trials were able to identify the primary reason for their unsatisfactory social integration. As one women stated: 'It's not the job . . . it's the men and the constant putting down. It's hard' (Park, 1985: 39). Finding little comfort in turning to other women for support, given that 'if we stick together, we're told we're not trying to fit in', they also found 'the guys who like us won't stick up for us.' The highlighting of differences between men and women and the voicing of distrust and resentment of each other prevailed throughout the trial period as the two sexes struggled to work and live together (Park, 1985: 39). In her report, Park concluded with some interesting observations, 'Just as certain women were found ill-suited for a field posting because of their lesser physical strength . . . certain men were found to be ill-suited for being in a mixed-gender unit because of their inability to work with women' (Park, 1985: 47–8). The distorting of perceptions to fit existing beliefs, the generalizing of one woman's difficulties to conclude that all women were incompetent and making additional objections once early complaints of the integration of women were found groundless were symptomatic of stereotypic and dysfunctional attitudes during the Land Trials (Park, 1985: 47–8). Nevertheless, the most important criterion in determining women's integration into an all-male unit – the overall impact that women had on a unit's operational effectiveness – was judged by the unit commanding officers, throughout the trial period, as *not* having been compromised (Park, 1985: 52–3). It was therefore concluded that mixed-gender combat service support units were in fact viable if certain steps were taken to facilitate gender integration (Park, 1985: 53).

According to Lamerson, the negative attitudes of men towards women entering non-traditional roles can be attributed to a lack of information about women's abilities in the new role. As the SWINTER Land Trial findings suggest, 'men's negative reactions to women were based on unfamiliarity in working with women in field units, failure to prepare men for the introduction of women into their unit, and hesitancy of men in accepting women as potential combatants' (Lamerson, 1987: 4). Men may feel considerable ownership of a unit, based on their perception of its roles as 'masculine'. This is particularly true of the views of combat roles. Lamerson also points out that, from the SWINTER experience, it was recognized that the more 'masculine' the setting the more resistant servicemen were to the integration of women (Lamerson, 1987: 6). Similarly, Park also found that 'the more "masculine" the setting, the greater confusion women experienced in identifying appropriate behaviours for themselves' (Park, 1986: 20). Although it could be argued that attitudes and other factors that led to the unsuccessful integration of women in the Land Trial were due to men not being 'familiar' with the idea of working with women, successful integration has still not taken place within the combat arms. Part of the explanation lies in the vision of combat as a masculine domain.

Women and Images of War

According to Weinstein and White images of war are 'overwhelmingly masculine' even though many women have served in armies and have abetted war efforts. They add that many women have died as a result of war, yet the myth of the male warrior has made female warriors nearly invisible (Weinstein and White, 1997: 55). However, there are stories of female combatants, such as Molly Hays (1778), Lucy Brewer (War of 1812), Sarah Borginis (Mexican War), Sarah Edwards (American Civil War) and Flora Sanders (First World War). There have also been influential women such as Maria Clausewitz, who edited her husband's classic *On War* after his death (Bourke, 1999: 306–44; Small, 1998).

Similarly, Stoddard argues that the myth persists that women have never served in combat even as the direct combat experience of the Second World War servicewomen continues to be documented (Stoddard, 1994: 4). M. Segal (1993: 81) tells us that the reason for this is that public discourse and other forms of social life are socially constructed to support a perception that women are not combatants. This social construction links women with peace and men with war. 'Much of the opposition to women in combat has been based directly on . . . ideological notions of gender' (Peach, 1994: 8). Carroll and Welling Hall argue that when we talk about women and the use of force, we are digging at the roots of what simultaneously makes women feminine and men masculine. Not a biological determinism that makes males aggressive and females passive, but how we as human beings have constructed and continue to interpret the world (Carroll and Welling Hall, 1993: 20). Thus, there is a widely held view that women have a role in society quite different from that of men. Women are seen as the bearers, not the takers, of life, and as the embodiment of peaceful rather than aggressive qualities. These attitudes made the idea of female frontline troops unthinkable (Charter Task Force, 1986: 3).

Segal and Segal point out that the military has traditionally been an 'exclusive male province characterized by prototypic masculine norms' (Segal and Segal, 1983a: 165). Military women are thus seen as disrupting both traditional stereotypes of women's roles and the traditional ways in which men have demonstrated their masculinity. Shilts seems to argue along similar lines when he says that 'the issue of women in the military was never about women; it was about men and their need to define their masculinity' (as quoted in Thomas and Thomas, 1996: 70). Herbert remarks that the military holds the male soldier, and particularly the combat soldier, as an ideal type, and that by seeking to emulate that which they are not and can never be, women are marginalized within the military (Herbert, 1992).

In their study of military wives in Canada, Harrison and Laliberté tell us that the military uses its 'socially constructed polarity' between masculine

and feminine in order to use masculinity as the 'cementing principle' which unites military men in order to distinguish them from non-military men and women (Harrison and Laliberté, 1997: 36). Similarly Thomas and Thomas maintain that when women can do 'a man's job', that job can no longer be used as a sign of manhood (Thomas and Thomas, 1996: 70). Robinson's work shows that hostility towards integration of women in the military has nothing to do with women's capabilities, but it has a great deal to do with the fear that women in combat would disorient men and deprive them of their unique role (Robinson, 1985: 102–3).

These beliefs affect female recruits in the CF. In her report on gender integration, Davis tells us that women must cope with symbols and behaviours which perpetuate and maintain male ideology in the CF. Davis describes how as women enter the 'man's world' they are struggling not only with questions surrounding their capability to do 'men's work', but with issues surrounding their identity as women. She adds that the male identity of the organization is 'strongly evident through sexualised behaviours and norms, such as male attitudes of paternalism, sexist male talk, joking and innuendo, pinups and calendars, and sexual harassment, in the day-to-day environment of work' (Davis, 1997: 185–6). Thus women represent a 'difference' that the organization as a whole has not fully embraced and integrated (Davis, 1997: 195).

Ideological identifications of the military as being masculine allow men to be the standard by which women are often evaluated (Peach, 1994: 7). This helps to perpetuate the stereotype that women do not belong in this institution, especially in combat positions. According to Weinstein:

> The issues of women in combat and sexual harassment make it clear that women are still not readily admitted into that hallowed inner male sanctum of the military. Military women are expected to be strong and independent (masculine norms), yet if they are too strong and/or too independent they are viewed as dykes. If, on the other hand, military women are too weak and too dependent on the men (feminine norms) they are viewed as incompetent drags on the system (they limit unit readiness). (Weinstein, 1997: xvii)

However, as Chandler et al. (1995: 127) point out, women's participation in real combat situations has rarely been fully tested and, 'where analyses of women's wartime performance have been undertaken, they largely confirm their positive contribution'. Even when studies have demonstrated that women do not degrade and may actually enhance the performance of their units in combat-support tasks, the impact of women on military effectiveness has been the subject of debate (Wilcox, 1992: 311). It is often argued that the integration of women threatens the cohesion of combat units, thus affecting combat capability – the core of military activity and identity. In addition, it has been argued that women are not able to meet the physical requirements for combat, thus threatening the safety of the units they are in.[4]

Resistance to Women in Combat

Some members of the Canadian military consider themselves to be unique and different from other government departments. The Conference of Defence Associations, in a paper called 'Recovery Measures for the Canadian Armed Forces: Advice for the Minister of National Defence', argues that the insistence of government on the matter of women in the combat arms

> ... is an example of how Canadians often move from naivety into the realm of stupidity. It is yet another example of the inability to grasp that armed forces are in fact unique within society. Recent policy directing the army to establish 25% of combat arms as females by 1999 – by lowering standards if all else fails – simply means that the combat effectiveness of the forces will fall and they will no longer be capable of guarding and advancing the national interest. It also illustrates 'civilianisation' since it puts the armed forces on the same footing as other uniformed parts of government. (Conference of Defence Associations, 1997: 7)

One of the military's differences is 'unlimited liability', which is the obligation to risk one's life as a member of the military. Unlimited liability is yet another argument against women in combat. It has been argued that the idea of women coming back in body bags would demoralize fighting units and threaten cohesion. Moreover, male soldiers might put themselves, their unit and the mission at risk in order to protect their female comrades. In an interview with the *Ottawa Citizen*, Retired Major General Dan Loomis stated that

> ... the problem with women isn't that they're not strong enough, isn't that they're not brave, isn't that they won't die well like the rest of us.... The problem is group dynamics in a small group. You cannot get away from the basic nature of our species. There's a natural protectiveness of men. (*Ottawa Citizen*, 19 December 1997)

Yet the position that women in the combat arms will degrade a unit's operational effectiveness is not borne out by studies. Despite the presence of women during the SWINTER trials, no degradation in operational effectiveness was reported. Robinson commented:

> Nevertheless, much speculation and many assumptions concerning women have been offered in attempting to justify the continuance of an outdated, discriminatory policy. These opinions are based primarily on myths and prejudicial stereotypes about women. No hard evidence has ever been produced in support of such attitudes. In fact, all evidence confirms that women have been combatants in times of war and continue to be; and, scepticism aside, they have conducted themselves just as well and, in some cases, better than their male counterparts. (Robinson, 1985: 101)

What is evident in reading some of the literature available on women in combat and arguments which surround their inclusion or exclusion is that for practically every argument used against women, there is a counter-argument that can be made. This is particularly true in the case of physical standards,

where there is a perception that women cannot live up to these standards. This has helped perpetuate the stereotype that women do not belong in the military, particularly in combat positions. In a position paper prepared for the Canadian Department of National Defence titled 'The Impact of Gender Integration on the Cohesion, Morale, and Combat Effectiveness of Military Units', D. Segal argued that there was no question that women and men were different (on the average) in a wide range of physical traits related to military performance. However, he did note that

> ... physical conditioning increases the capabilities of women, and that while average differences between the genders persist after conditioning, the gender distributions tend to overlap. Thus, where these abilities are relevant to particular military trades, it is rational to screen for the ability rather than for gender, thereby selecting the most qualified individuals. (Segal, 1986: 24)

Cropsey believes that the problem with women in combat has nothing to do with their ability to become pregnant, their strength and so forth.

> Sexual attraction between men and women is as likely to destroy camaraderie as it is to produce constant dissension among men in a group. The difficulty is not ... that men instinctually protect women, but that both men and women in couples will protect one another to the exclusion of what is good for the unit. (Cropsey, 1980: 72)

On the other hand, Robinson argues that it is

> ... ludicrous to think that, in the heat and dirt of battle, there would be time for romantic liaisons. Close attachments would perhaps be formed, because there have always been close friendships among combat soldiers. Such 'bonding' transcends romantic attachments and stimulates combatants to fight more fiercely when one of their number is killed. (Robinson, 1985: 101)

Segal (1986: 19) concluded that 'despite the fact that in the short run, as a new phenomenon, gender integration is frequently met with resistance which in turn may constrain cohesion, there is no indication that gender integration negatively affects the performance of military units'. He also found that while there were problems when previously all-male military formations were gender integrated, there was no firm scientific evidence that would justify the categorical exclusion of women from combat units on organizational grounds (Segal, 1986: 24). In short, the arguments used against integrating women in the combat arms seem to be more emotional than grounded in fact.

It should be noted here that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal made some interesting comments in relation to Segal's findings. For example, it cited his observation that the major basis for the categorical exclusion of women from combat units is cultural values regarding appropriate roles for women and resistance from male military personnel. The Tribunal concluded that:

> Women are, with training, capable of combat roles. The experience of women in combat in the Second World War bears this out. The decision of the air force bears this out. Performance was not an issue as a result of SWINTER trials. Cohesion and the physical and environmental elements are susceptible to management. Integration policies and practices can be designed and applied. We agree with the report of Dr. Segal that attitude is a major factor in making integration work. . . . Behaviour can to some extent be mandated, with sanctions and rewards as inducements but attitudinal change may not keep pace, and it is this element that must accompany the implementation of an integration policy. Leadership and commitment to integration are essential at the mid and upper levels of command because it is in the operational units that integration must take place. (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 60)

In brief, allowing women to enter combat positions is a controversial and emotional issue as it challenges the traditional ideology that war is a man's world where women do not belong.

Externally Imposed Change

In this section we examine the sources of 'external pressure' that led to changes in the combat status of women in Canada. In particular, we focus on the 1970 report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women; the 1978 Canadian Human Rights Act; Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985) and the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal's decision on the status of women in the CF (combat arms). It was these laws, regulations and rulings from civilian sources that eventually resulted in the opening of combat positions for women in the CF (full integration of women).

Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1970)

The report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women marked a turning point for women in the CF. It put pressure on the Department of National Defence to improve conditions of service for military women (Davis, 1997: 180; Robinson, 1985: 100). Of the 167 recommendations made for changes to provide a climate of equal opportunity for women in Canada, six pertained to women in the CF. These six recommendations were that: all trades in the CF be open to women; the prohibition on the enlistment of married women in the CF be eliminated; the length of the initial engagement be the same for women and men; release from the CF because of pregnancy be prohibited; the CF Superannuation Act be amended so that its provisions would be the same for men and women; and finally, women be admitted to the military college operated by the Department of National Defence (Charter Task Force, 1986: 3–4). Several of these recommendations were dealt with immediately. Married women could be enrolled in the CF. Women who

had children would no longer be released, and women and men became subject to the same initial engagement and superannuation terms. However, it took much longer for the military colleges[5] and all occupations to be opened to women.

The Canadian Forces Defence Council directed that there would be no limitations on the employment of women other than in the primary combat roles (Simpson et al., 1979, cited in Davis, 1996: 7). A decision was also taken to increase the number of women to a total of between 8000 and 10,000 by 1981. By March 1974, there were 2373 women in the CF, employed in 33 of 95 trades. This represented an increase from 1.8 percent of the total force in 1970 to approximately 3 percent of a total force of 81,000 (Davis, 1996: 8). Over the years, roles for women in the CF continued to expand. By 1978, women made up 5.9 percent of the CF and were employed in 81 of 127 classifications and trades (Davis, 1996: 8). Thus, although external pressure led to change the military still did not allow women to be fully integrated into the CF.

The Canadian Human Rights Act (1978)

In 1978, the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) was passed, bringing more external pressure to bear upon the CF. The Act prohibits discrimination on 10 grounds: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex (including pregnancy and childbirth), marital status, family status, a pardoned conviction and physical or mental disability (including disfigurement and dependence on drugs or alcohol) (Pinch, 1994: 7). The CHRA forced the complete reassessment of military policy as it stipulated that there should be no discrimination against women, except under bona fide occupational requirement (Suh, 1989: 171). Thus, the Act prohibited discrimination in employment practices with the exception that 'a job could be refused to a person who could not perform it safely, efficiently and reliably' (Davis, 1996: 9). Now, the CF had to demonstrate why it was not possible for women to go into combat. Hellstrom (1996: 94) tells us that the CF attempted to justify discrimination against women through the SWINTER trials.[6]

The purpose of the SWINTER trials was to determine the impact of employing mixed groups in various environments, and the main criterion against which the trials were to be assessed was the effect of mixed-gender groups on operational capabilities. Because of the importance of these trials in the determination of future policies for women's employment, and indeed for the justification of exclusion of women from some occupations (in contrast to the declared principles of the CHRA), considerable time and attention were paid to the design and assessment of the trials (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 19–20).

The aim of the trials (which were to last five years) was to assess the

impact on operational effectiveness of women's inclusion in near combat roles such as combat service support, field ambulances, aircrew in transport and search and rescue squadrons; at remote locations (such as Alert); and at sea, in the navy's only non-combatant ship, HMCS *Cormorant* (Hellstrom, 1996: 94–5). In the mid-1980s the results of the SWINTER trials were made available. In spite of methodological difficulties,[7] it seemed clear that a bona fide occupational requirement restricting the employment of women could no longer be sustained.

Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985)

On 17 April 1985, when the SWINTER trials were near completion, the equality section (Section 15) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect. Section 15 ensured that discrimination on the basis of sex (among other things) would no longer be tolerated unless bona fide occupational reasons could be established. A parliamentary committee was set up to examine areas that might be in conflict with Section 15 of the Charter. In its 1985 report, the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights recommended that 'all trades and occupations in the Canadian Armed Forces be open to women' (MacKenzie and Acreman, 1990: 3–4). According to the Human Rights Tribunal:

> The Parliamentary Committee's recommendation that all restrictions on women's employment be dropped was based on its belief that excluding women from so many job opportunities, most of them related to combat in an indirect way, had adverse consequences: it closed to women many well paid jobs after military service, because military training was not available to them; it hindered their promotion in the Forces because they lacked experience in occupations and units that were combat linked; and it excluded them from experience and training in leadership. (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 29)

The Committee concluded that 'the Canadian Armed Forces must revise its present policy, a process that has begun but is proceeding all too slowly' (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 30). The Canadian government's response to the Committee report was short:

> The Government is fully committed to expanding the role of women in the Armed Forces and will ensure that women will be able to compete for all trades and occupations. The Government shall vigorously pursue this policy in a manner consistent with the requirement of the Armed Forces to be operationally effective in the interests of national security. (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 30)

Within the CF, a task force was created to flesh out the government's response to the Committee report.

> A Charter Task Force was set up, one senses with some urgency, to determine the effect on CAF [Canadaian Armed Forces] policies of the Government response concerning the employment of women, sexual orientation, mandatory

> retirement . . . to examine relevant information . . . and to develop options so as to meet Government policy objectives (i.e. enhancement of individual rights and freedoms) within requirements of operational effectiveness and efficiency. (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 30)

The Charter Task Force recommended an expansion of the roles for women in the CF and that a programme be developed to provide detailed policy guidance and leadership training concerning mixed-gender employment (Davis, 1996: 10). In June 1986, Canadian Forces Administrative Orders 49-14 and 49-15 were issued to the regular force by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Administrative Order 49-14 outlined a general employment policy for the CF. This opened up all units or occupations to female members of the CF, and laid down one caveat:

> Any limitation on eligibility for employment resulting from the requirement that a member's participation be able to contribute to operational effectiveness will be confined to the minimum that must be imposed in order to achieve the required standard of operational effectiveness of the regular forces in general. (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 31)

At the same time, Administrative Order 49-15 addressed mixed-gender employment and reiterated a justification for the exclusion of women in some occupations and units.[8] The military was resisting gender integration on the basis that it affected cohesion and morale:

> Empirical evidence gained throughout the history of warfare has proven that the operational effectiveness of an armed force is decisively affected by a combination of human factors. . . . The stresses encountered in battle drive members of the units involved to their physical and psychological limits. The ability to continue to perform effectively under these extreme conditions requires a high level of physical and mental strength and stamina. Most importantly, effectiveness in battle is vitally dependent on a strong bonding among the members, which is essential to units' cohesion and morale. Empirical evidence has shown that human stresses are compounded by the added complexities of mixed-gender groups. Concern that such additional stress would seriously jeopardize operational effectiveness has resulted in every major nation in the world maintaining limits on mixed-gender composition in their armed forces, particularly in units which are most likely to face an enemy directly in battle. Consequently, in order not to jeopardize the operational effectiveness dictated by the needs of national security, the composition of some units will remain single-gender male. As a result, a number of military occupations will be restricted to men, and in a number of others, there will be a minimum male component. (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 32)

In 1987, a new set of trials were announced, called CREW (Combat-Related Employment of Women). According to MacKenzie and Acreman, the aim of the trials was not to 'test women' but 'to evaluate the impact of mixed gender units on operational effectiveness' (MacKenzie and Acreman, 1990: 4). At this time, 10 army units and four naval units were classed as single-gender male-only. They were combat units such as submarines,

destroyer, infantry, armoured, artillery and so forth. Thirty-three military occupations were single-gender male while 52 had a minimum male component (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 39). Hellstrom tells us that the CREW trials aimed to bring women initially into the hard sea trades, signals, field artillery and infantry, with follow-on trials in air defence artillery, field engineers and armour. The air force had already opened everything to women, including the fighter pilot classification, so it was not included in the CREW trials (Hellstrom, 1996: 96). Again, this demonstrates that women seemed to be more accepted in the convergent sectors (air force) than in the divergent ones (land combat arms). However, the CREW trials had hardly begun when a complaint of discrimination on the basis of sex, under the CHRA, was launched against the CF by four individuals – three women and one man – which ended before a Human Rights Tribunal. We now examine some of the conclusions that were made by this Tribunal.

Human Rights Tribunal

In 1989, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled that 'all trials of women in non-traditional roles were to cease and that women were to be fully integrated into all Canadian Forces roles, except service on submarines, during the following ten-year period' (Davis, 1997: 181). The case that was before the Tribunal involved three people who complained that they were individually denied entry to combat support or combat employment because they were women. The fourth complainant was a man who alleged that limiting the risk of combat duty to men discriminated against them. The complaints were made under Sections 5, 7 and 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act 'which prohibits discrimination on specified grounds, in this instance, sex, in the provision of services and employment, and which prohibits the establishment or pursuit, by an organization, of a discriminatory policy or practice' (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 1). The issues in this case were: should women generally be permitted to train for and enter into occupations and to perform roles which were combat related, occupations and roles which were closed to them at the time; would the operational effectiveness of the CF be adversely affected by the introduction of women into such occupations and roles; and could this assessment appropriately be made by professional military judgement (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 1–2).

According to Hellstrom, the CF's arguments before the Tribunal were similar to those used following the SWINTER trials, at the Parliamentary Committee hearings, in internal policy documents and in the Charter Task Force Report: the exclusion of women from combat, although discriminatory, was justified as a bona fide occupational requirement which ensured the operational effectiveness of the combat arms.

> They cited specific areas contributing to operational effectiveness where, they believed, women's presence could be detrimental. These included physical capability such as strength, endurance, the impact of pregnancy and child-related issues; environmental conditions such as lack of privacy, primitive toilet and sleeping facilities and the costs of modifying these; social relations and cohesion where the presence of women might be a complicating factor because of fraternization, harassment and favouritism. Eight years later, these arguments sound almost archaic, but it took the tribunal two years of hearings to find that the policy of designating certain occupations and units male-only was discriminatory. (Hellstrom, 1996: 97)

However, the Human Rights Tribunal found that the exemption from the CHRA based on the occupational requirement could not be supported by the evidence. According to Pinch, despite the best professional opinion and scientific evidence that could be mustered, the CF were unable to convince the Tribunal that restrictions should remain (Pinch, 1994: 8). Therefore, the Tribunal ruled that CF policy which designated specific units and occupations as male-only was an unjustified discriminatory practice. The Tribunal directed that all occupations and units in the CF be opened to women (with the exception of submarines because of privacy issues). It also ruled that the minimum-male requirement be eliminated; that gender-free selection standards be developed; that the integration of women take place with all due speed in order to achieve complete integration in both the reserve and regular forces within 10 years; and that this process be subject to external and internal monitoring (Hellstrom, 1996: 97).

The 1989 Human Rights Tribunal Ruling ordered the CF to carry out full integration of women within the next 10 years, i.e. by 1999. With the conclusion of the Tribunal order, the Human Rights Commission no longer has a direct responsibility to monitor the CF's activities and thus the CF has been left to its own devices and willingness to remove the barriers to women entering and staying in combat positions. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal expressed its disappointment over the CF's progress in integrating women into the combat arms over the 10-year period. 'Our view is that the Tribunal objectives have not been met', said the Chief Commissioner. 'In 1989, women represented 1 percent of all those in combat positions, while the current data provided to the Commission show women now represent 3.1 percent of those positions. No matter how you define "full integration", the numbers demonstrate that integration has not been achieved' (Falardeau-Ramsay, 1999a). The Commission believed that the reason for this failure was the attitude of some members of the CF towards female participation:

> The Tribunal Order required a fundamental shift in the manner in which the CF and its members viewed the role of women and their place in fighting units. Despite the results of studies conducted by the Forces itself prior to the Tribunal decision, which demonstrated that women and men could successfully work together in these environments, it is apparent that not all members have

been able to make this adjustment. Resistance continues even now. (Falardeau-Ramsay, 1999b)

A Question of Attitudes

Cotton and Pinch argue that men who are not 'entirely positive in their attitudes toward women's participation' make many of the decisions regarding women's employment and careers in the military. They add, 'In general, the trials have shown that the most serious problem has proved to be traditional male attitudes' (Cotton and Pinch, 1986: 244–5). Although the CF tried to resist change through trials such as SWINTER, their resistance was ineffective as it was eventually 'ordered' to integrate women. Thus, external pressures *forced* change in spite of resistance. In this case, external pressures forced the full integration of women. As the Canadian Human Rights Commission reported:

> Sometimes it takes nothing short of a binding order to remove a systemic barrier, and even then it may meet with considerable reluctance. This has been the case in the military profession. A tribunal order was required before women were fully accepted into combat and combat-related positions in the Canadian Forces, even in principle. (Canadian Human Rights Commission, 1994: 58)

However, in examining these changes we have not described additional obstacles that women have to overcome. These include certain attitudes towards change in the CF. The Canadian Human Rights Commission tells us:

> The Advisory Board's third report ... detailed a number of continuing attitudinal and procedural problems that make combat-related duties unduly difficult for women. They range from subtle signals from superiors that they are not welcome, to patronizing assignments and sexist remarks. Such behaviour indicates a lack of sustained support for the integration of women into the CAF. ... Given the Board's findings, and the current lack of statistical data, we can only be left wondering just how much progress has in fact been made since 1989. (Canadian Human Rights Commission, 1994: 58)

Similarly, in its 1996 annual report, the Human Rights Commission reported:

> The Commission has made it very clear to the Canadian Forces, at the most senior levels, that the integration of women is not receiving the attention it needs. The end of the ten-year deadline is almost upon us, and their representation in combat occupations appears to be stalled at a very low level. Incidents involving the treatment of a woman officer that came to light around the end of the year seemed to suggest that the Armed Forces' culture was still far from welcoming to women members. The Canadian Forces can hardly claim to be taking the tribunal order seriously if integration of women is not given a much higher priority, along with corresponding resources and

a more active involvement of senior management. (Canadian Human Rights Commission, 1996: 53)

In April 1995, the Minister's Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the CF issued its fifth annual report called *Half-Way Through the Transition: A Mid-Term Review of the Progress of Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces 1989–1994*. Once again, the Board made some interesting observations. While systemic barriers to the employment of women were gradually being eliminated in the CF, attitudinal barriers were still present among some of the supervisors and leaders. The Board, however, concluded its report on an optimistic note:

> This review has touched only lightly upon some of the issues that will be added to the matrix of change during the next five years.... The MABGICF [Minister's Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces] is confident that, given the evidence of ability and willingness to change, and to investigate further institutional options evidenced to date by the CF, the commitment that has been observed in the mid-term review will, if sustained, monitored and adapted in a timely and responsible manner, allow the institution to meet the requirements of the HRT decision, the expectations of the Canadian public, and the principles of equitable employment during the five years that remain in the transitional period. There is much that remains to be done; but a solid base for continued development has been established. (Minister's Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces, 1995: 35)

However, a recent study by Davis and Thomas indicates that the concerns of the Human Rights Commission over the years have not been exaggerated. Women in the combat arms are still finding themselves in an environment that often does not foster an atmosphere of acceptance. Their study, *Chief Land Staff Gender Integration Study: The Experience of Women Who Have Served in the Combat Arms* (1998), found that women regularly experienced an environment that was characterized by discrimination and harassment and that often conveyed messages of non-acceptance. It was also an environment that women perceived as having subjective and inconsistent performance standards:

> As gender issues in the combat arms are acted out, it appears that issues related to physical strength and stamina provide the curtain that masks other issues. As long as women are not as strong as men, it does not matter whether they have met the standards or not. The research suggests that when women meet the standards, the standards are questioned, the social and sexual activities of women are scrutinized, women's leadership ability is questioned, and women's perceptions of harassment and inequitable treatment are questioned. (Davis and Thomas, 1998: 7)

Davis and Thomas also tell us that women expressed considerable frustration that they were not 'even given a chance'. Women understood that they were not accepted nor welcomed within the combat arms (Davis and Thomas, 1998: 11).

> The environment has been defined by men and maintained to train and employ men. The world that women enter is a world that defines and reinforces gender roles in a way that is in conflict with the role of a woman in the combat arms. Consequently, a woman's motivation to take on a 'male role' is suspect. Within the combat arms, the motivations and behaviours of each woman are interpreted in a way that leaves no room for women to be there because they 'want to do the job'. On the other hand, women understand that they will have to become 'one of the guys' if they are going to succeed. In the end, there is no where for them to go because they cannot achieve either of these conflicting roles. (Davis and Thomas, 1998: 13)

For these women, the mental and physical demands of the work were not the real challenge of entering a traditionally male occupation. The real challenge was enduring the systematic rejection and bias against them that was evident in both covert and overt attempts to get them out of the combat arms (Davis and Thomas, 1998: 19). Asked to give advice to young women considering a career in the combat arms, many answered with a quick and decisive 'DON'T DO IT!' Many emphasized that a female combat arms candidate should make sure that she knew what she was getting into, and make sure that she was physically and psychologically prepared to enter a male-dominated environment that, for the most part, did not want women (Davis and Thomas, 1998: 28–9).

Promoting Integration

What can be done in the present to further the integration of women in the CF? A number of important initiatives are already underway. The CF has established the Defence Diversity Council and an Advisory Committee on Gender Integration and Diversity. The diversity-training programme has begun to sensitize all members in the chain of command to the issues. The CF has also developed a more effective harassment policy and has targeted recruitment of women as a priority. In addition there are efforts underway to redesign equipment from rifles to rucksacks so that it is more suited to the female physique. However, vigilance is necessary in order to remove barriers to women entering and staying in the CF and continuous research and monitoring will remain an important component of this task.

Moreover, future leaders in the CF will have to face an important number of challenges if they are to successfully address the issue of female integration. How long can women work in the CF while they are pregnant? Will the CF enable a woman to take maternity leave and return to her career without being sidelined as a result? As women enter the combat arms there will probably be an increase in the number of dual service marriages. How will commanders deal with a married couple in the same unit? How will this affect the employment and deployment of these individuals within the unit? How

will the CF tackle the question of postings and overseas deployments when there are children to be cared for and careers to be advanced? This question becomes even more pertinent in the case of single parent households. Will women be asked to jeopardize career advancement because they cannot be posted away from the family for six months? And on a daily basis how will single parents be able to meet the demands of the job and the family? What allowances is the CF willing to make for single parents or dual service couples? Policies concerning family support will need to be reviewed and enhanced in order to meet these new challenges.

As we have seen, although women have been allowed to enter the combat arms since 1989, they still face many barriers that are rooted in the negative attitudes of their male peers who still believe that combat is a male domain. This said, the long-term societal trend is clear: women will continue to enter the paid workforce, by choice or by necessity, and more will make the commitment to long-term careers. The CF must be in a position to take advantage of that trend if it is to meet its recruitment goals. In addition, the young men who will enrol in the CF of the future will be more at ease with women as colleagues and, hopefully, more supportive of them in new roles, than are many of the current middle-aged members of the CF. Thus, intergenerational attitudinal differences may resolve themselves in time. In the interim, leadership must do everything possible to create a climate of tolerance and acceptance for women.

Notes

1 The Canadian Forces' Charter Task Force reported that women in traditional and support roles served with distinction during Canada's wars. However, at the end of each war they were quickly demobilized (except for a few nurses and food services officers). 'During the Korean conflict, women were again recruited in other support occupations; however, until 1971 their numbers were limited' (Charter Task Force, 1986: 3). According to the Minister's Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces, the number of women in uniform varied during this period of time, with the largest number of women serving during the Second World War. When the enrolment of women was again permitted in the 1950s, they were restricted to traditional roles in the administrative, communications, logistics and medical fields (Weinstein and White, 1997: 57).

2 The magazine described 24 cases of sexual harassment and rape which occurred in the early 1990s.

3 As compared to 10,454 men (Tanner, 1997: 14).

4 Lack of privacy has also been cited as a reason for resisting the full integration of women, particularly in relation to deployment overseas and on field exercises where there is difficulty in supplying separate latrines, showers and sleeping quarters.

5 Women became eligible for subsidized education at civilian universities, in other words, the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP), but they only entered the military colleges with full cadet status in 1980 (Hellstrom, 1996: 93).
6 When the SWINTER trials began, the number of women in the regular forces had risen to over 5000. This was three times greater than in 1970 (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 19).
7 Certainly the reliability of the results of the SWINTER trials can be questioned. This is because combat situations cannot be easily simulated and because women were simply not assigned combat duties in the SWINTER trials. The Human Rights Tribunal found that, 'The limitations of the trials, the research methodology, the design of the tests and so on made the "results" less definitive than many had hoped' (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 28).
8 The annexes to Administrative Order 49-15 listed 21 units designated as single-gender male, some of which included destroyers, submarines, artillery, infantry and armoured units. Months later, five of these units were opened to mixed-gender employment. They included supply ships, field ambulances and military police. Approximately 40 military occupations were also designated single-gender male, including infantry, artillery and many naval trades. Again, some months later four of these were opened up to mixed-gender employment. They included pilot, flight engineer and air navigator (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 33).

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
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Uta Klein

The Gender Perspective of Civil–Military Relations in Israeli Society

Introduction

During the Israeli election campaign in 1999 a surprising newspaper advertisement appeared. Under the heading 'Gentlemen, It's Impossible Without the Ladies', it showed the candidates of the big parties, Dan Meridor, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu, dressed in women's clothes. The ad called for more women in the Knesset. Surprising and unusual was the text beneath the photo: 'Don't forget that every second voter is a woman. It is true: you all might be born leaders and excellent officers, but only women candidates in safe places on the party lists can represent the whole electorate.' The advertisement was especially unusual in mentioning the connection between the political success of male aspirants following a military career and the political failure of women. In this article civil–military relations in Israel are explored from a gender perspective. On the one hand, it is asked whether the drafting of women has changed the masculinity of the defence forces. On the other hand, the impact the centrality of the military as an institution and the military discourse has on gender relations in society is explored.

State of Research

The exceptional centrality of security to the national existence of Israel has led scholars to investigate the impact of the military on the political and civil system. During a first phase works concentrated on the 'classical' issues. The main question was whether the political sphere controls the military sphere,

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as the non-interference of officers in politics is seen as a sine qua non of democracy. Generally speaking, Israel was viewed as a unique case of a system which maintains a democracy during protracted wars and prolonged conflict (Perlmutter, 1969; Horowitz, 1982; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). The persistence of democracy was attributed to the permeable boundaries between the military and the civilian sector and thus to the 'civilization' of the military. The army was deemed a 'citizen army' and Israel was seen as a 'nation in arms' with the army not reflecting a specific group in society. *Because of* the extended reserve duty (of male Jewish citizens, a fact which has rarely been emphasized) and the connection between civilian and military elites in social networks, the role extension of the Israeli military is balanced by the civilization of the defence sphere – so the argument ran (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). Moshe Lissak (1983, 1984) described the Israeli case as a cluster of 'paradoxes' of civil–military relations. In general, these studies viewed Israel as a positive model of a successful partnership of the elites.

This research, however, is limited in scope, it is characterized by a weakness of the 'general theoretical framework for the study of civil–military relations' (Peri, 1983: 6). According to Baruch Kimmerling (1993: 206), 'ideological and value-loaded considerations blurred the issue'. Questions emerging especially after the war of 1967 and the occupation of Palestinian territory were neglected for a long time, but they were articulated during a second period of research, starting in the late 1980s and initiating a controversial debate on various aspects of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and its function in society. Scholars emphasized the effects of armed conflict on larger society, on its attitudes and values. The connection between military and political elites (Maman and Lissak, 1996; Etzioni-Halevy, 1996) became a focus of research as well as various aspects of military–industrial relations (Mintz, 1985; Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1989; Klieman and Pedatzur, 1991). Scholars began to discuss whether the predominance of security and military power has led to a 'militarization' of Israel. Ben-Eliezer (1995) talked about 'militaristic politics', Kimmerling (1993) used the term 'civilian militarism'.

Furthermore, on a micro-level, scholars started to investigate the communication and the interaction in military units (Ben-Ari, 1998), the meaning of battle and participation in war to individuals (Linn, 1996) and the period of defence duty as a transition period to adulthood (Lieblich, 1989, 1990).

The gender perspective, however, has been neglected in these studies. Apart from the important but occasional works of Bloom (1982) and Yuval-Davis (1985), this approach has gained interest only recently. In none of the aforementioned 'classical' works are questions of gender or gender identity construction in the IDF and in society taken into account. Only Baruch Kimmerling, in a short passage, mentions a 'machism culture', meaning that during wars society is divided into two major cultures: a '"warrior society" of males and the other "home front", basically women's society'

(Kimmerling, 1993: 216). Gal (1986), in his often referred to book on *the* Israeli soldier, dedicates one chapter to 'women in the IDF'. This is astonishing because Israel is unique in the sense that Jewish Israeli women have been conscripted since the foundation of the state of Israel.[1] Thus Israel serves as an interesting case study to analyse the impact of a most advanced – in terms of numbers – integration of female citizens in the defence forces on society and on the defence forces themselves.

In this article I present the major findings of my research.[2] I argue that although (Jewish) women are conscripted, the military in Israel is the main force in shaping *male* identity. Military service can be understood as a rite of passage to *male* adulthood. The military is perpetuating the stereotype of a woman as subordinate. In society at large the dominance of security and of the military discourse leads to gender inequality

Childhood, Adolescence, Gender and Conscription

Military service in Israel is compulsory for both men and women. The debate on the defence law during state formation is one of the longest ever recorded debates only because of the controversial discussion on the integration of women in the defence forces (Berkovitch, 1997). The religious parties viewed the integration of women as harmful because of their physical condition, the impact on morality in the institution and because of the feared impact on the birth rate. The secular forces viewed the integration of women as self-evident just as they saw the exclusion of married and pregnant women as obvious. In the end, religious parties and the ruling party agreed that Jewish men and women were conscripted on unequal terms.

The National Service Law (1953) specifies groups of persons that are automatically exempted from service: married [*sic!*] women, pregnant women and mothers, Christian and Muslim women. Further, in 1978, the government of Menachem Begin (Likud) enacted a law allowing women to be exempted for religious reasons if they wanted. The law, however, does not exempt men for reasons of religion, conscience, or marital status. Yet in practice Jewish religious men who are actually studying in a *Yeshiva*, are exempted. The length of service is different too. Men have to serve for three years, women for two. Regulations have changed a couple of times: in both 1993 and 1994 the length of service for women was cut back.

As a result of unequal conscription regulations and policies, about 90 percent of (Jewish) men are drafted as opposed to 60 percent of (Jewish) women. Stuart A. Cohen (1997: 93) states that 80 percent of the male recruits complete their statutory length of service. In comparison, only 15 percent of female conscripts complete 24 months. Furthermore, only men are regularly called to reserve duty up to the age of 50 or 52 years. According to the law

women have to be ready for reserve duty until the age of 24 years, only. In practice, however, almost none of them are called to reserve duty. In addition to this, men are accepted for service regardless of education, while women must have eight years of formal education. On the one hand, this means that the average qualification of female soldiers is higher. On the other hand, this practice 'reinforces the social handicap of those women' (van Creveld, 1994: footnote 3). According to Reuven Gal (1987), not meeting this education/intelligence criterion constitutes the second most important reason why women are exempted from military service. All in all these aspects of different conscription policies show that what is called 'universal' conscription is selective rather than universal, when the female population is concerned.

Among the Arab population, only Druse men are obliged to serve. Bedouin men can volunteer and Muslims are excluded. Thus my remarks about masculinity apply to the Jewish Israeli collective. On the one hand, the IDF creates a common bond between Jewish Israelis who come from different ethnic backgrounds, on the other hand it might be worth exploring whether the exclusion of most Arab males leads to the creation of what Robert Connell (1995) calls marginalized and subordinated masculinities along national ethnic lines within the group of male citizens.

Israel indicates specific characteristics of (pre-)military socialization compared to western countries. Long before conscription Israeli youths get acquainted with the military. In western societies, states 'without enemies', young men usually start to think about questions of security and, more concretely, whether they want to serve in the military or not at the age of 15 or 16. In Israel, however, due to the military situation, even children get used to questions of war and peace. Indeed, there is some sort of pre-military socialization. All of the male family members of Jewish children are 'somehow connected' to the defence forces. They are either doing compulsory service or reserve duty. Especially in the current situation, each Jewish Israeli family is coping with fear for their male members.

Another characteristic is the nearly universal conscription of male Jewish youths in Israel. The life of the late adolescent is directly connected to military service. The uniformity of male socialization is thus a culturally specific element of socialization in Israel, whereas even in those western countries with compulsory service young men decide whether to serve in the military or to do civil service. It is well known that the armed forces nowadays attract young men with specific biographies and do not represent the male collectivity of the population (Kohr, 1993). Moreover, in Israel, due to reserve duty the biography of nearly all Jewish men is connected to the military. In contrast to western states, we can speak of lifelong military socialization.

Military socialization and instruction in Israel begin at kindergarten and

school age. In school, Israeli Jewish youths prepare themselves to join tl military forces. Members of the IDF hold lectures to give information ar impressions of life in the Israeli army. Some youths volunteer for special uni or undergo pre-induction courses. Most of Jewish Israeli pupils take part the yearly *Yom Hakheulot*, a one-day course which is held in cooperation b the schools and the army. Gender differences are already at work at this sta because boys and girls are separated. Films portraying soldiers in action ar the excitement of military life are shown to the boys. The young men are to that physical exercise is essential in preparing for military service. Girl however, do not usually see films about women in action. Physical perform ance is scarcely ever mentioned. The main emphasis of the lectures and tall for girls is on more emotional questions involving military service, like sepa ation from parents. The school curriculum includes activities for boys orie tated to the role of fighter, like physical training and lectures on the comb units (Centre of the Chief Education and Youth Officer Headquarte Zahals, 1998). Military service for males is a *bodily* experience.

Military service is an inherent part of the maturation of boys, a rite passage to male adulthood. Male and female youths have very differe reasons for joining the army and participation means something ve different for their self-perception. When asked about their motivation serve in the IDF, males assign higher importance to normative reasons ('to b like everyone') and value roles, which can be recognized from outside: 'to b a fighter' and 'to do something prestigious' are the reasons named for pr ferring a certain job in the IDF. This shows a clear gender difference (Ma seless and Gal, 1993: 9). The female youths, by contrast, show a more intrins motivation ('meeting new people', 'doing something interesting') and publ recognition does not seem to play a big role (Mayseless and Gal, 1993: 13)

Parents play an important role in this context. They support their son maturation process and their fulfilment of the military task, feeling it as necessary, justified sacrifice. Mazali sees in this phenomenon the upholdir of what 'is arguably the most fundamental social contract in Israeli Jewis society' (Mazali, 1998: 275). By this, so her argument runs, soldier sons Israel are performing the task of resocializing their parents to the collectivit Even when the son is still a small child, it is the parents' assumption (and fea that he will become a soldier, possibly a member of a combat unit.

Cultural Memory

It is 'combat culture and its underlying Zionist ideology [which] powerful shape the masculine identity of Israeli Jewish Youths' (Kaplan, 2000: 127 Historical traits of gender images help us to understand current elements gender in a given cultural context. Therefore, some aspects of the history

Zionist masculinity are mentioned to understand a kind of 'overstress' in current Israeli military attitudes and thinking (Klein, 2000).

Zionism developed at the end of the 19th century as a reaction to pogroms in southern Russia and the eruption of modern anti-Semitism in Central Europe. Viewing the history of the Jewish people as one of continuous persecution, the Zionist movement aimed to renew the national life of the Jewish people in Palestine. The Zionists perceived the Diaspora Jew as passive and effeminate. The Zionist ideal of manliness was constructed as an antithesis of the Diaspora Jew. Physical strength and readiness to defend honour by means of fighting were the desired characteristics of the 'new Jew'.

We must not forget that the Zionist movement emerged as a kind of latecomer among European nationalist movements. As assimilated Jews had adopted traits of courage held up as ideals in the gentile world, the Zionist movement utilized symbols which were familiar to other nationalist movements: patriotic songs, glorification of the heroes of the past and military education. The ideal of manliness was very much the same as that of other nationalist movements. Zionism envisaged a nation like all other nations, and on the level of reform of the Jewish psyche its men were to be like all other men.[3] Nevertheless, a particularly potent drive stemmed from its rejection and contempt for the Diaspora. The complete transformation of the Jewish people could only take place in Palestine.[4] In so far the colonization of Palestine has also been a remasculinization-process (Klein, 1998).[5]

The Zionist ethos of masculine ideals of physical force and strength underwent an intensification because of the Shoah and is since engraved in Jewish Israeli society. It is part of the mythological *Sabra*, the prototype of the Israel-born new Jew, the native Israeli, as a person who is soft inside but thorny on the outside. The Jewish–Arab conflict and existence in a continuous state of conflict have enhanced this ethos. The state of Israel was 'born' in a war (Gal, 1986), which ended with armistice agreements and with the recognition that the conflict between Arabs and the Israelis was deep and complex. The Holocaust syndrome and political geography conditioned a sense of isolation. Israel regarded its neighbours as enemies, an attitude which has, so far, changed only with respect to Egypt and Jordan. In its 50 years of existence Israel has experienced six wars, each of which has strengthened the drive to excel in the military realm.[6]

Jan Assmann (1988, 1995) differentiates between a 'communicative memory', a kind of everyday memory which has a limited temporal horizon, and the 'cultural memory', which is characterized by its distance from everyday. Cultural memory is marked by the 'concretion of identity', which means, it 'preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity' (Assmann, 1995: 130). Cultural memory uses fixed points. Those are fateful events of the past, whose memory 'is maintained through cultural formations' – which can be texts,

rites, monuments – 'and institutional communication' – which is, for example, recitation, practice, observance. Assmann speaks of 'figures of memory' (Assmann, 1995: 129).

Which 'figures of memory' do we find in Israeli society? Which 'fixed points' are chosen? As David Biale (1994) has shown, the dialectics between power and powerlessness from biblical to modern times is one of the key issues in Jewish history. In Israeli historiography periods of exile over a long period have been left out as these periods might transpose a powerlessness of the Jewish people. In 1926, the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs had already drawn the attention to current needs of society which direct the perception of history. There is no objective memory preserving the past. Instead, there is always a reconstruction of the past which relates knowledge to a contemporary situation.

The Zionist movement arguing against supposed elements of the Diaspora constructed a kind of counter-history against the defenceless Jewish people. Chosen as fixed points were the heroes of history, warriors like Bar Kochba or the Maccabeans. Markers of national revival accordingly were a new interpretation of Masada and the Tel-Hai story, with its hero Trumpeldor.

The relation of memory, culture and current society, however, is the main question. Cultural memory is 'reflexive practice': each society has a body of texts, images or rituals used to stabilize the society's self-image. Strength is of tremendous importance to Israelis and their identity. Any sign of weakness is regarded as a threat to identity. Culture, especially myths and rituals, perpetuate the construction of the defence-oriented male as part of the negation of the Diaspora (Klein, 1998, 1999). Mirta Furman (1999) shows the transmission of messages emphasizing heroism and active self-defence during holiday celebrations in kindergartens. She has observed that folktales present the warrior figure, whose major trait is being Jewish and masculine, as a model of identification. Children are confused about history and presence and draw a connection between historical figures and their own brother or father participating in wars and reserve duty: 'The stories of exemplary personalities forge the emotional foundation for constructing attitudes and behavior, such as the belief in the necessity of military service and the inevitability of war' (Furman, 1999: 149). Thus, a Holocaust-code underlies the interpretations of current affairs. An example has been a tragic accident which happened in 1997. On their way to Lebanon, 73 young soldiers, members of the Israeli air force, died when two helicopters transporting them collided. Newspaper articles, television programmes and speeches of politicians in the following days and weeks named the dead young men 'the cream of the crop', 'the best of our boys', 'the best of our country's youth'. In one article it was mentioned that the helicopter disaster has 'reminded us all of our common fate, of the bonds of blood and steel, that bind us together'.

The agony of the families 'was a unifying force'. The then-Labour MK Ehud Barak reminded the population of the fact that 'in this bitter hour we are the IDF'. A psychologist at Bar-Ilan University explained in an interview: 'The Jews are world champions in dealing with tragedy, throughout our history, from ancient times through the Holocaust and during the years of statehood. It's part of our identity – not that we wish it so or have asked for it', and he called upon the political leadership to 'make a daily effort to preserve the feeling of brotherhood'.[7]

The IDF as a Gendered Institution

Usually societies and armies see the soldier as the embodiment of traditional male sex-role attitudes and behaviour. The socializing process during army service aims to teach toughness and masculinity and to eliminate what is regarded as effeminate. As the military in general is a male institution, it proves Michael Kimmel's (1996: 7) argument that masculinity is largely a 'homosocial enactment', that it is other men who judge masculinity.

Although in Israel (Jewish) women are drafted, military service proves to be a rite of passage to *male* adulthood. On the one hand this is a result of the expectation of society. Society still expects a young man – if he is not orthodox – to be ready to fulfil his obligation to serve. On the other hand it is a result of a gendered institution. Conscription on unequal terms and different lengths of service were mentioned earlier.

In a ranking which Segal et al. (1999) used to compare the integration of women and homosexuals in a cross-national survey, Israel was given a mean rank of 8.3 for women (on a scale from 1 indicating the most integrated to 18 indicating the least integrated). The US, Norway, Canada and Great Britain all achieved higher rankings.[8]

Until January 2000 – contrary to widespread myths – women were not allowed combat roles. The fighter in western societies is a symbol of masculinity (Morgan, 1994). With the introduction of the volunteer army in 1973, the US opened the armed forces up for women. The integration of women into the armies of European NATO member states has taken place more or less over the last decade. In most of the armies combat roles for women had been 'the last taboo'. Although the line between combat and non-combat roles in modern warfare is difficult to define, it seems that the exclusion of women in at least some of the roles had been of tremendous symbolic importance. So too in Israel. Women participated in the national project by undertaking auxiliary roles. The main tasks of women in the military in the first decades lay in social work, nursing and teaching (e.g. teaching new immigrants). Thus a sexual division of labour within the IDF developed which reflected the gendered roles of defence as a male duty and

motherhood as a female duty in society at large. This even works inside the military:

> The female soldiers in the IDF also have an additional, non-assigned though culturally encouraged function. With their visible femininity, in sharp contrast to the rugged army milieu, these women soldiers serve as a nurturing factor, especially in the combat units. They soften the atmosphere in the unit, bringing to the barracks a touch of warmth and affect, reminiscent of home and family. (Gal, 1986: 52)

To exclude women from war experience helped to exclude them from the myths of war experience. The battlefield remained the place of male comradeship. When in 1994 Alice Miller went to the Supreme Court for not being allowed to become a military pilot in the Israeli army, the former president Ezer Weizman told her in an interview: 'Did you ever see a man mending socks?'[9] However, former commanders of the Israeli women's corps argued combat restriction was not a sign of chauvinist attitudes but due to the risk of being taken as enemies by Arabs (Almog, 1992). In fact there is no proof that captured women had been treated more cruelly than men or more brutally than enemies are treated in wars in general (Bloom, 1991).

The exclusion of women had important effects on a material and symbolic level. Symbolically, female soldiers were not to disturb the male preserve and not to disturb the dichotomy of the male protector and the female protected in society (Stiehm, 1982). As combat units 'always receive the highest priority in every aspect of military life' and 'their members are always accorded the highest prestige' (Gal, 1986: 143), female soldiers in Israel (as elsewhere) could never obtain a high prestige. Status in the IDF is determined by the proximity to combat.

After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, professional roles were made increasingly more open to female soldiers because the IDF aimed to fill rear positions and male soldiers were being transferred to combat roles. Thus, in 1976, 210 positions out of a possible 706 were open to women and in only half of them were female soldiers represented (Halperin-Kaddari, 1997). Moreover, 70 percent of the female soldiers were transferred to office work. In 1996, about two-thirds of the positions were open to women, whereas one-third of the positions were combat-related (Izraeli, 1997). Some of the so-called combat-related positions had been opened up for women prior to this: they had started to work as constructors for ammunition, armour, combat engineering and infantry. They had also started to command men.

In January 2000, the parliament abolished the combat restriction for women. Even if figures have changed during the last decades, women in the Israeli defence forces are still overrepresented in person-related and administrative professions (Klein, 2001). According to a CHEN commander, 20 percent of all female soldiers are still appointed to office work.[10] However,

this number is disputed as the terminology has changed. Instead of 'secretary', new expressions are being used, which nevertheless mean more or less the same work. The other most popular areas for women have to do with education, welfare and communications. Interesting for the analysis of gender construction in professional roles are the reverse cases. In 1997 a male soldier was claiming that he was not allowed to serve as a male nurse, although he had the education. He was told that the IDF views nursing as a 'female occupation'.[11]

Combat restriction blocked the career path of women in the forces. Among the officers, the percentage of women in the rank of major general in 1995 was 0 percent, brigadier 0 percent, brigadier general 0.8 percent, colonel 2.2 percent, lieutenant colonel 10.3 percent and major 22.5 percent (Klein, 2001). Cohen (1997) has compared promotion to the next rank between female and male officers and he found that female colonels had to wait 13 months longer for the promotion.

Military service is a bodily experience, a physical exercise. Pictures in newspapers and official brochures show male soldiers mostly appearing in groups, always moving, sweating, exhausted, the eyes focused on a distant point. Female soldiers are shown more often alone or in twos, they smile, they are more static. Eyal Ben-Ari notes that masculinity is never simply achieved once and for all, but must be constantly accomplished. Military service is 'made up of a "series" of tests of manhood and soldiering' (Ben-Ari, 1998: 114). Even the style of walking is an example. One young man tells in a personal account:

> The hikes got longer, with heavier loads to carry. For every hike we usually got some reward. You hike for the strap of your rifle, for the paratroopers' insignia, for your cap. Gradually you learn to love those night marches, and you get to know yourself really well. Your odor, the sound of your footsteps.... You admire the performance of your squad leader – he walks, while you run, and you still cannot catch up with him. Gradually you discover that he knows how to walk – and you learn this too.... After 14 months of training together, I was able to identify my buddies from a distance by their way of walking, you know. (Lieblich, 1989: 5)

Sion (1997) has drawn attention to the function of breaking the distance between the soldiers and their commanders for strengthening the soldier's identification with the army. Commanders appear as father figures, mothers or older brothers and the 'high ranking officers, who are often removed from day-to-day contact with the soldiers, approximate God-like figures due to their importance and inaccessibility' (Sion, 1997: iii). In the first phase of the initiation rite, the basic training, the recruits go through an 'infantilization'. The second period, Sion argues, is aimed at their becoming fighters. 'The course starts after the final hike marking the end of basic training' and 'this turning point also involves a change in the relationship between the soldier

and their commanders with the latter becoming "big brothers" to the former' (Sion, 1997: iv).

Although motivation for combat units in Israel seems to be decreasing, it is still high compared to other countries. Interestingly enough, fewer than 20 percent of male soldiers in the IDF are combat soldiers. Nonetheless, the combat soldier, the fighter, is the ultimate proof of manhood and 'the military provides a continuum of situations that stimulate combat' (Kaplan, 2000: 137). To be a fighter first of all means to control feelings of fear. 'The confession "I'm afraid" is an admission all Israeli soldiers learned to deny during their instruction', writes Yaron Ezrachi (1998: 138).

The Impact on Society

It is especially important that it is men who are doing the reserve duty. According to Helman (1997), the participation of males in the military rests upon its construction in terms of a community, which is experienced as overlapping with society as a whole. 'Belonging to this community of warriors is experienced in terms of embeddedness in society, as a criterion of normalcy and as an entitlement that legitimizes participation in the associations of civil society' (Helman, 1997: 306).

The centrality of the military and of security in society leads to a marginalization of women on a symbolic level. Because they are not regarded as capable of defending the country and taking part in security discourse it is no wonder that in the public consciousness the soldier as a defender is male. Buildings to commemorate members of the forces who have died in uniform (which are found in each town, city or settlement) are called *Yad lebanim* (House of the Sons) and war memorials show women bidding farewell to sons or husbands going to war (for example the memorial by Mordechai Kafri at Balfuria) or women nursing wounded soldiers (by Moshe Ziffer at Nitzanim).[12]

The marginalization can be seen also on a practical level: Jewish Israeli men accumulate what Pierre Bourdieu (1983) calls social and symbolic capital, which grants them advantages in civilian life. They gain from their military service by accumulating social capital, by establishing contacts for their professional careers (networking) and by achieving material and symbolic benefits. By contrast, the capital Jewish women accumulate is not valued very highly on the civilian labour market. Service in the higher echelons of the army is a pathway towards positions of importance and influence in public life. The IDF until a few years ago provided a stepping stone for most of the senior officers who pursued a civilian career in economy. In high-tech industry the links between the defence forces and civilian employers are very strong. A manager says about Israeli companies:

'Israeli entrepreneurs have technological experience and prefer teams that have already worked together in the army or the defense industry' (Izraeli, 1997). In other fields, military experience is even a condition for getting a job: Israel's national airline, El-Al, until recently used to recruit its pilots exclusively from the military. Before a court decision in 1995, the defence forces excluded women from pilot training, so only men were chosen by El-Al. Research on the mechanisms to recruit and select job applicants in Israeli firms, which was done to study discrimination against Arab Israelis, shows that a third to a half of them considered individuals' army records when selecting managers, professionals, technicians, clerical staff and craft workers, and a third did so when hiring operatives and labourers. The firms consider 'army service as a means of screening out unreliable individuals and identifying potentially high achievers' (Wolkinson, 1994: 271).

A military background is regarded as a necessary precondition for public office. The percentage of women in the Knesset since the establishment of the Israeli state had never exceeded 10 percent, except in the current parliament where it has reached 12 percent. Beside the exclusion of women in the orthodox religious parties, the predominance of military experience in the society as a whole is responsible for stratification. Men convert their military rank into analogous positions of power in political parties.

Officers start a 'second career' following their military career at the age of 40–50. This is usually called 'parachuting'. The first phase of the change of high-ranking military personnel into the political realm had taken place in the 1950s and 1960s by the veterans of the independence war, Moshe Dayan, Yigael Allon, Chaim Bar-Lev, Moshe Carmel, Ezer Weizman, Yigael Yadin, Yitzhak Rabin and Chaim Herzog. After the war of 1967, political parties competed in attracting high-ranking officers. One of the most spectacular cases was the appointment of Ezer Weizman, former commander of the air force, to a minister of Herut in less than 24 hours after he had left the defence forces. Others include the former officers of Command Unit 101: Mordechai Gur, Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan.

Founders of new (Jewish-dominated) parties to the present day are often former high-ranking members of the IDF. This holds true for all political persuasions. Founders of left-wing and peace-oriented parties have also been former army officers (e.g. Matti Peled, founder of the United Arab List). The CVs of Knesset members show the significance of military experience and background. Except for the CVs of (most) orthodox and Arab Knesset members, the military position is listed directly after education and profession.

As the hegemony of the military is accepted by huge parts of Jewish society, it is ironically the peace movement which reproduced this hegemony for a long time but nonetheless used it for the opposition against the occupation of Palestinian territories. Militaristic values have been shared by Peace

Now activists, as they had army experience, often in an officer rank, and expressed their loyalty to the state. In 1978, a so-called 'officers' letter' was published to urge Prime Minister Begin to seek peace with the Arab states. Women were not allowed to sign! Even Yael Tamir, who had served as an officer, was prevented from signing (Klein, 2001). War – and peace too it seems – is seen as a man's affair. Only in the 1990s did women acquire more respect and were accepted in the movement and gained status. They started to criticize that the leadership was mainly male. The decline of militaristic messages 'enabled more feminist women to join in and encouraged further feminization, which in turn further undermined the militaristic credo of the movement members' (Feige, 1998: 105).

Conclusion

In spite of women's conscription in the IDF, the 'business' of war and conflict is exclusively male. As the concept of 'citizenship' is associated with the right and the duty of defending the country, military service in the feminist discussion is often seen as a way to achieve political rights. The Israeli example shows that the exclusion of women from politics, from 'first class citizenship', is maintained in spite of women's participation in the defence forces. They do not have control of the use of force. In other words: the inclusion of women in the military allows them to be militarized but not to be empowered. On the contrary: the 'security question' is used to keep women quiet, to exclude them from far-reaching political functions.

Although the Israeli army is still perceived as the main mechanism for building a national identity, it has particularly become the basis of a male self-image and a source for male social mobility in society. The military turns out to be the main agent of society in shaping gender roles, constructing masculinity, and thus it serves as the main source of gender inequality in society. In spite of the participation of women in the military, Israeli experience shows that ideologies of manhood and the dominant position of the military in society are deeply intertwined. This does not mean that the exclusion of women would be a solution or change their societal status. It would – given the centrality of security and military – increase gender inequality.

Tragically, we can observe this mechanism during the current crisis in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. During the 1990s, as a result of the Oslo agreements, an increasing public discourse on the centrality of the military and on the IDF itself had begun. One example has been the discussion about sexual harassment in the army. What was denied in the past, seems to become an issue of public debate. Since the introduction of the 1998 Sexual Harassment Prevention Law, the highest number of complaints filed has been in the Ministry of Defence. When the former general and then Minister of

Transport, Yitzhak Mordechai, was recently investigated on suspicion of sexual assault against an employee in his ministry, several women charged that Mordechai had harassed them as well during his army tenure (IWN, 2000).

In some circles, there has been a lot of confusion and alarm about a decline in the willingness to serve although motivation in general is still high. The movement 'New Profile', which works for the acceptance of conscientious objection in Israel, might be marginal, but at the same time it shows that there are young people refusing to take over an obligation for military roles. Whereas the last decade had produced a critic of the dominance of the military in many ways, the current disastrous situation means a relapse which has consequences for gender images also. Those forces of society are now coming (again) to the fore who want to prevent the breakdown of the hegemonic discourse and the development of a pluralistic society. As there is a clear connection between gender inequality and war, the demilitarization of society is the only guarantee for developing gender equality. One of the main aspects of demilitarization is the change of models for masculinity.

Notes

1 In China women are also conscripted, but as not even 10 percent of each age group are being called, this is negligible.
2 For the complete study, see Klein (2001).
3 The link between the construction of heterosexuality and masculinity is shown in *Unheroic Conduct* by Daniel Boyarin (1997).
4 The political Zionist approach was not the only one: Ahad Ha-Am advocated a spiritual Zionism, which rejected the emphasis on physical strength. According to his interpretation of Jewish history, the secret of the survival of the Jewish people was the respect of spiritual power and not to be impressed by physical strength. Instead of the fighters of Jewish history he praised Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai, who – as legend tells – fled from Jerusalem under siege hidden in a coffin and established the rabbinical centre Yavneh. The 'true Jew' in his view was not ashamed of physical weakness. Nevertheless, political Zionism represented by Herzl became the mainstream of the Zionist movement.
5 Even the transformation of language, the transformation of Yiddish as a female connotated 'mother tongue' into Hebrew can be read as part of the transformation process (Klein, 2001).
6 If we count the War of Attrition, then we can speak of seven wars. Each war, of course, was experienced in a different way. The most traumatic one was the Yom Kippur War (1973). The Lebanon War (1982) was a watershed, as it provoked the criticism of a huge part of the population and led to the rise of a strong peace movement. The Second Gulf War (1991) was the first local war which Israel did not join in actively – with a clear impact of this enforced passivity on male identity.
7 *Jerusalem Post*, 6 February 1997.

8 The study was carried out before the bill for opening all jobs went through parliament.

9 *Jerusalem Post*, 27 May 1996.

10 *Jerusalem Report*, 20 December 1999 ('Fighting the Wrong War?'). Women who serve in the defence forces were administratively controlled by the CHEN, an abbreviation of *Cheil Nashim*, which means Women's Corps. In Hebrew the abbreviation means 'charm'. From summer 2001 the Women's Corps began to be dismantled. In its place a body headed by the advisor for women's affairs is being established.

11 *Jerusalem Post*, 1 January 1997.

12 One exception is the memorial by Batya Lishanski at Hulda. Three portraits are carved in Jerusalem stone: one of an anonymous soldier, the other of Efraim Chizhik, leader of the Jewish forces in the 1929 battle of Hulda, and the other of his sister Sarah Chitzhik, who fell at Tel Hai in 1921.

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
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Helena Carreiras

Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces: From Visibility to 'Eclipse'

Introduction

The Portuguese armed forces included women for the first time in 1961, with the creation of an all-female corps in the air force. These first women were trained as parachutists with the mission of providing nursing assistance during the war in Portugal's overseas territories in Africa and served in combat areas in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau during the 13-year colonial conflict. Notwithstanding the fact that they participated in difficult rescue missions in combat areas, their position was still rather exceptional. For not only were they placed in a separate corps and limited to support roles, but they also had a particular outlook on their participation in the war. One of these nurses later declared: 'I went overseas to help those who needed me, never to participate in a war. I was given a gun for personal defence, but I never used it. Besides, our vision was very different' (Reis, 1978).

In addition, the whole experience may be considered rather limited, since no more than 50 nurses graduated during the whole period and at the end of the war only 16 of them remained on active duty. Moreover, the immediate interruption of female recruitment after the end of the war places the Portuguese case into the historically dominant pattern: recruitment of women during war periods, followed by their 'dismissal' and return to traditionally female occupations at the end of the conflict.

More than two decades later, the situation had changed dramatically. Following the general European trend, the Portuguese armed forces opened their ranks to women. In 1988, two young women were accepted by the Air Force Academy for careers as pilots and from that moment on the three services gradually allowed women into their various establishments, including service academies, without rank restrictions.

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Portuguese women found this an attractive opportunity. During the years of 1992 and 1993 about 3500 candidates applied for the army, navy and air force. Indeed, the number of female candidates has always been much higher than the number of those actually enlisted. In the year 2000 almost 3000 women were serving as volunteers in the Portuguese armed forces, in a wide variety of services and positions.

The most remarkable point is perhaps that this change has taken place without public, political or military controversy. How then did such change come about? More specifically, why, when and how did the Portuguese armed forces start to recruit women? To what extent was this related to changes in terms of force structure and military accession policies? Why do Portuguese women decide to enlist? How many are they? What duties do they perform? What problems and exclusions do they face? What was the reaction of political parties, women's associations and the media to gender integration in the armed forces? Did 'public' attention shift throughout the decade?

The Military

Women's Recruitment, Force Structure and Military Accession Policies

Women's military participation is affected by a wide variety of factors – deriving from military organizational features, social/economic structure and cultural and political values. In one of the very few essays aimed at explicit theory-building in this field, Mady Segal outlined a systematic theory of the conditions under which women's military roles may expand or contract, assessing the relative and combined effects of those variables (Segal, 1995). In her proposal, as well as in various other studies, one central observation is that different aspects related to the military's organizational structure, such as force structure and military accession policies, have always had a major impact on the determination of women's military roles. Despite the decisive influence of other macro-social variables on the creation of the conditions that explain the military's appeal to women, the reasons that originated the process from within the armed forces were often of a relatively more instrumental nature. Recruitment difficulties, along with an imperative need to enlarge the armed forces' social base, have constituted the driving force behind the expansion of women's presence in the military.

Recruitment shortages alone certainly cannot explain the shift from the strictly auxiliary status women formerly had in the armed forces to their full military integration accompanied by the expansion of job and career opportunities. Recruitment needs have not emerged with the same intensity in

different countries and depend, for example, on the existing system of military service – conscript or volunteer. The process has followed neither similar patterns nor identical rhythms, sequences and results. It is also important to distinguish between the first recruitment of women, the increase in their number and the conditions and circumstances for statutory change (equalization of status, hierarchical progression, salaries, suppression of all-female corps, etc.), access to jobs, specialization and combat positions and the opening of military schools and academies to women.

When evaluating patterns of women's integration inside the military, it is thus important not to underestimate the effective impact of the changing pattern of women's social and political participation towards greater equity, at least with regard to the formal and institutional criteria for their participation.

In any case, recent studies have clearly confirmed the fact that shortages of qualified men tend to increase reliance on women to fulfil military recruitment needs. It has been shown that nations considering a transition from conscription to a volunteer system tend to include plans to expand the military presence of women. An example is provided by Haltiner, who in his research into the end of mass armies in the West emphasized the importance of the 'women's ratio' (WR),[1] considered to be 'an excellent indicator of the Army format': 'the higher the WR, the lower is the mass army format of a force and the higher the degree of organisational role differentiation and specialisation' (Haltiner, 1998: 54). The author anticipates that, as a consequence, 'the degree of women's participation ... will only substantially increase if conscription is abolished and the personnel will have to be recruited entirely on the labour market' (Haltiner, 1998: 54). He further believes that the existence of compulsory personnel for the military is the *largest* obstacle to an increase in the women's military participation ratio.

Other authors seem to share this view, even when proposing a slightly different interpretation. In describing the same global tendency, Mady Segal claims that 'regardless of the method of accessing personnel, the crucial determinant for the number of women brought into the armed forces is whether the supply of men meets the number needed to fulfil the military's mission(s). The greater the need beyond available male labour, the greater the number of women' (Segal, 1995: 766).[2]

In any case, it seems unquestionable that, in general, modern nations with voluntary systems of military service have also been increasing women's military roles at a rate faster than those with conscription (notably Canada, the UK and the USA).

After one decade of slow but steady transformation, the Portuguese armed forces are presently initiating a similar process of transition to an all-volunteer force. This shift can be seen as the culmination of a process of structural transformation in the context of which the recruitment of women took

place. I thus examine the specific military conditions that have determined such change in the human landscape of the Portuguese armed forces.

The Portuguese Armed Forces in Transition: From Conscription to the All-Volunteer Force

From the beginning of the 1990s, a slow but clear – albeit not always peacefully accepted – tendency has developed towards what has since been called the 'professionalization' of the Portuguese armed forces. Plans to move from conscription to an all-volunteer system of military service were drawn up. The approval in 1991 of Law No. 22/91 (a revision of the military service law of 1987) was an important step in the direction of professionalization. A semi-professional system was created, based on volunteer and short-term contract regimes. New volunteer members were expected to progressively replace the pool of conscript soldiers. Two main changes were introduced:

- The reduction of the time of conscript service from the previous 12/15 months in the army and 18/20 months in the navy and air force to a mere four-months period;[3]
- The creation of new short-term regimes for 'voluntary' and 'contract' service. The first, lasting between eight and 18 months, is a precondition to application for a 'contract' term of service which varies from a minimum of two to a maximum of eight years.

Both measures are to be understood in the context of a profound transformation of the Portuguese armed forces in terms of personnel reduction, re-equipment and global redimensioning. From 1989 to 1998 there was, in fact, a reduction of 39 percent in the total force, corresponding to a decrease from 72,085 to 44,200 service members. There were two main reasons for this: a reduction in the number of conscript soldiers (Figure 1) and a similar reduction of career personnel from the Permanent Structure (Quadro Permanente, QP). The objective of this last measure was to achieve a re-equilibrium of the hierarchical pyramid, which had become completely distorted after the end of the colonial war.[4]

The reduction of conscription time to four months was one of the first indications of a shift towards what was referred to, in the law as well as in other documents and promotional material, as 'a new conception of military service', based on the key concepts of modernization and professionalization. However, the most important element of the model was the second measure: the introduction of special recruitment regimes of a voluntary nature. Under the new framework, after three to four months of basic training (SEN), volunteer soldiers could serve for a period of up to 18 months – the *voluntariado* regime – and then apply for a fixed-term contract – the *contrato* regime. A set of economic incentives was established in order to make these new regimes attractive to young people. These




Figure 1 Evolution of the Number of Conscript Soldiers in Portugal (1980–99)[a]
[a] The increase in 1992 is explained by the reduction of time of conscript service to four months and the corresponding increase in the number of annual incorporations.
Source: UAL (1998).

included vocational orientation, access to education, professional training, social security, financial allowances, fringe benefits and support for reintegration in civilian life after the end of the contract.

In the context of a clearly 'occupational' campaign, including television spots and other promotional initiatives, military service was presented as an opportunity for professional development and as an instrument for personal fulfilment. Although more 'institutional' values were not totally absent from the recruitment appeal, the rationale behind the arguments used was dominantly 'occupational': 'the proposed legal model aims at raising awareness among young people about military service *as a demanding professional activity*... countervailing the inconvenience of its short duration with appropriate stimulus to the reinsertion of the citizen in active civilian life' (MDN, n.d.).

Despite its initial ambitions, the model began to show signs of major weaknesses soon after being implemented. The following problems have been indicated (MDN, 1998a):

- In terms of cost-efficiency, it was considered excessively costly because it required the coexistence of two separate recruitment systems;
- It was also considered operationally inefficient due to its short duration, producing a large contingent of 'ill-trained' soldiers, with 'dubious usefulness';

- Due to organizational difficulties and lack of infrastructure, only a limited percentage of fit recruits were being admitted. This had been the case throughout the 1980s (and even before), but between 1992 and 1998 the admission rate decreased continually from 52 percent to 31 percent; the system was therefore seen as impeding equal treatment and fairness, since only a few of the sum of able citizens were actually recruited;
- Conscript soldiers had to be used by extending their four-month period to make up for the lack of candidates for the *voluntariado* regime, which in theory was to consist solely of volunteer soldiers; a notable number of conscript soldiers were also being used for short periods in general services that did not require a military specialization. This was later recognized as affecting 'the sense of usefulness of the armed forces' and as frustrating for young people's career aspirations;
- Finally, the system created instability, as a result of the permanent rotation of conscript soldiers.

Nevertheless, and despite these drawbacks, it was recognized that the system assured the transition from the old conscript model to a more versatile system and that it would lead to adoption of various measures concerning the reorganization of the armed forces: 'It was a political decision, which, by allowing the institution of a mixed system, has helped the creation of a new model of armed forces based on an all-volunteer force' (MDN, 1998a: 7).

Despite the fact that the this 'occupational' orientation proved to be more intense in its discursive and symbolic dimensions than in reality, the trend towards 'professionalization' intensified throughout the decade. The constitutional reference to conscription was eliminated during the last revision of the Portuguese Constitution in 1997. In 1999 a new military service law established what may be seen as the most challenging of measures in the reorganization process: the establishment of an all-volunteer force in peacetime, to be completed by 2004 after a four-year transition period.

According to recent national surveys, Portuguese public opinion has also slowly but clearly shifted to support a totally voluntary military service. In 1996 about two-thirds of the population supported an all-volunteer force as opposed to 31.5 percent who still preferred conscription (Carrilho, 1998). The same proportions held in 1999 (Matos and Bacalhau, 2001: 93).

In view of such a profound change in force structure and personnel accession policies, there is presently a fear that serious recruitment and retention problems will emerge. This fear is exacerbated because of a generally accepted failure of the social-economic incentive system that ought to have been established following the 1991 legislation, but which in fact was never adequately developed. Complementary regulatory legislation was never issued for many of the proposed measures. This is seen as partially accounting for the failure in attracting the necessary number of candidates, especially in the army.

These problems have different impacts on each of the three services. While the air force does not have conscripts and only a small percentage of navy personnel come from the conscript group, the army relies extensively on conscription to fulfil its personnel needs. It is thus in this last service that the situation is considered more problematic. Figure 2 and Table 1 summarize the contrasting profiles of the three services in terms of force structure.

As shown in Table 1, in 2000 the 'professionalization ratio' was already 100 percent in the air force, while conscript soldiers still accounted for 25.4 percent of the army. Given the heavier territorial structure of the army, this service is more dependent on large contingents of complementary personnel. Simultaneously, due to its technical specificity, the qualifications required by




Figure 2 Force Structure by Type of Contract (Portugal, 2000[a])
[a] Numbers of RV/RC and conscripts refer to the total incorporated during the year.
Source MDN (2000).

Table 1 Force Structure by Type of Contract (Portugal, 2000[a])

Service	*Career Personnel (QP)*	*Complement. Personnel (RV/RC)*	*Conscripts*	*Total*	*Prof. Rate*
Navy	8282	1897	607	10,786	94.4
Army	7358	10,730	6170	24,258	74.6
Air Force	3844	3107	–	6951	100.0
Total	19,484	15,734	6777	41,995	83.9

[a] Total force by 30 December 2000.
Source: MDN (2000)

the army are probably those that have the least interest or equivalents in the labour market, thus making it less attractive for young people concerned about their return to civilian life after relatively short periods in the ranks. It is thus not surprising that the army has shown greater resistance to the introduction of the all-volunteer force and posed more obstacles to proposed changes during the discussion of the law. According to Ministry of Defence sources, the process will consequently move more slowly than initially expected, namely in terms of the reform of command structures, centralization of resources and inter-service recruitment coordination. This may indeed constitute a real obstacle, since centralization is presented as one of the basic principles of the new model:

> The all-volunteer model requires a recruitment structure able to respond efficiently to the need to attract young citizens to serve in the military, to prepare and keep them for periods that simultaneously meet the armed forces' standards and assure their later integration in civilian life. This requires a concentration of efforts and is definitely not compatible with decentralized systems at the branch level. (MDN, 1998a: 11)

Besides centralization at the organizational level, various measures have been proposed with respect to the challenge of professionalization, especially the need to attract sufficient numbers of qualified personnel:

- First, and probably the most important axis of the model, is a renewed policy of socioeconomic incentives, including all those previously programmed – vocational orientation, access to education, professional training, social security, financial allowances, fringe benefits, return to civilian life after the end of the contract – and some additional measures concerning preferential treatment of ex-soldiers in public programmes and institutions;
- Emphasis on the public relations dimension of recruitment policy;
- A possible rise in the proportion of civilian personnel and of women.

Whether the increase in the number of women is to become a reality will depend on the specific implementation of the new law as well as on the impact of global socioeconomic conditions on military recruitment. This is where previous female recruitment policies become important, since they prepare the ground for future developments. Why, and under what conditions have the Portuguese armed forces started to recruit women? What kind of recruitment policies were defined?

'Ex-Post Pragmatism': The Portuguese Way towards Gender Integration in the Military

At the beginning of the 1990s, there were no policy documents that concretely referred to women's recruitment as an element of the new semi-professional context. However, the political conditions and the organizational atmosphere

were already there, favouring women's presence in the ranks or at least ensuring the absence of serious resistance. This must explain why no obstacles were placed in the way of the two women who, as early as 1988, 'knocked at the Air Force Academy door' and were welcomed despite the absence of specific legislation. According to senior officers in the Air Force Academy, the law subsequently had to be changed to conform to reality.

However, the whole process developed unplanned, in a markedly contingent way. Not only was there a total absence of previous preparatory studies,[5] but even policy-makers admit that a true policy definition was lacking and that decisions were being made on an 'ad hoc' basis. Indeed, they were frequently also made on an 'ex-post' basis, that is, a merely reactive attitude on the part of the services prevailed when dealing with the most immediate concerns involving the presence of women: uniforms, logistics, physical tests, pregnancy, maternity, etc. One of the most obvious examples of this 'pragmatic' approach was the way decisions were taken on the functions and occupational areas that should be open to women. Practical considerations (even if accompanied by somewhat obscure justifications such as 'easiness of women's integration') explained, above all other reasons, the initial selection of support areas (Carreiras, 1997). Very often the number of available posts for women or even their access to certain functions was exclusively determined by circumstantial and material conditions, such as the existence of adequate accommodation or sanitary facilities.

Curiously, the same dominant pattern would explain the rather surprising lifting in 1996 of all previous formal interdictions to women's access to combat roles in the army. According to the testimony of an officer responsible for policy definition at the Army Academy, the bar was removed after a women cadet was admitted to the Military Academy's artillery course. Once again, the law had to be changed accordingly.

Despite the almost anecdotal element of these reports, 'ex-post pragmatism' seems to have worked out extraordinarily well. The various services have demonstrated a notable capacity to adjust to the new situation and to rapidly find adequate solutions. This may account for both the smooth start of the process and the subject's 'eclipse' from public and political attention just a few years later. All three branches gradually opened to women – the air force being the absolute pioneer and the navy the most cautious – including all military academies and schools. Except for some areas of the navy – manoeuvres, diving and the Marine Corps – women are theoretically accepted in every military specialty. However, in practice combat areas have never been opened to female personnel.

Presently, in the context of the transition to a voluntary system, the need to recruit women was included as a relevant goal in official discourse for the first time. A significant increase in the number of women is considered an

important element for the success of the new model and a target of 8–10 percent women has been set:

> The voluntary enlistment of women in the armed forces will considerably enlarge the recruitment pool and the number of women in service is likely to grow. The incorporation of women and their participation in units deployed abroad has been a success; this reveals great possibilities for the future. It is thus foreseeable that the existing female contingent, which represents around 5 percent of active duty personnel, will grow to 8–10 percent of the total force. (MDN, 1998a: 14)

Politicians apparently became aware of the importance of recruiting women to meet the needs of the future all-volunteer force. The instrumental nature of this decision is clear in the legal text, which focuses explicitly and exclusively on the functional aspects of women's participation. Concerns about citizenship are still absent from the political discourse. One recent decision illustrates this well.

Among the innovations of the new Military Service Law, one specific measure aims at strengthening the relationship between citizens and the armed forces: the institution of a 'National Defence Day'. According to art. 11 of Law 174/99, at the age of 18 all young people must attend a one-day programme where they will be provided information about national defence objectives, the organization, missions and resources of the armed forces, and the existing possibilities in terms of military service, etc. Attendance is compulsory with only two exceptions – the case of prolonged sickness or residence abroad. Penalties are to be applied to those who do not comply. However, rather astonishingly, through somewhat obscure legal rhetoric, regulatory legislation in practice exempts women from this obligation.[6] According to a well-placed source in the Ministry of Defence, only economic considerations justify this paradoxical decision. Once more, instrumental considerations overcome political principles and the proverbial double standard is kept.

The bottom line is that women seem to be seen, as in so many other similar situations, as a kind of labour force reserve that the armed forces had to mobilize to deal with a current or anticipated lack of qualified personnel available on the job market. A series of questions thus remain to be answered: will the new socioeconomic incentive schemes – in the presumption that these will be effectively applied – be enough to attract young women as well as young men? If this is so, and admitting an eventual lack of male candidates, to what extent will policy-makers wish to raise female percentages in the total force? How much will the cultural/political rationale for setting ceilings (even if not explicitly recognized as such) lose ground to the more instrumental imperatives of necessity? Above all, knowing that the number of female candidates has been high in the past, the crucial question is: will these incentives be enough to *retain* women in the military? Will they provide

adequate answers to the type of problems and difficulties women usually face inside the armed forces? Given that no specific family policies have been elaborated, no monitoring or mentoring programmes instituted and no clear policy on sexual harassment drawn up, the answer is most likely a resounding NO.

Women

The Situation of Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces

If we consider the most recent process of women's military participation in western industrial societies – and take NATO countries as the empirical data source – a major observation is that there is great variation regarding the extent to which different countries have integrated women in their armed forces. Such variation, ranging from an almost total numerical absence, rank limitations, segregated training and functional restrictions to relatively open career patterns, access to combat roles and higher ranks and existence of specific family and equity policies, is due to a complex set of factors that in each case have affected policies and practices differently. However, despite this strong heterogeneity, at the beginning of the present decade all NATO countries had admitted and generally increased the number of women in their armed forces. In 2000 almost 300,000 women served as volunteers in the armed forces of 17 of the 19 NATO nations (see Table 2).

Portugal has not been an exception to the general trend, even if it is among the latecomers. After one decade of sustained numerical growth, in the year 2000 there were almost 3000 women serving in the Portuguese armed forces. They represented 6.6 percent of a total military force of around 44,000 soldiers (see Table 3).

In the Portuguese case it is probably too soon to analyse the evolution of women's representation since the process is still in its initial phase of development. As mentioned before, the present period is also one of predictable growth considering the forthcoming transition to an all-volunteer force. Remarkably though, the number of women has almost doubled over the decade, even if this increase has differed from service to service (Figure 3).

While, as mentioned, the navy has the smallest absolute number of women, showing an extremely moderate growth and a tendency towards stabilization, the army reveals a trend of accelerated growth, both in terms of absolute as well as relative numbers. Some 56 percent of Portuguese servicewomen are found in the army, 12.4 percent in the navy and 31.6 percent in the air force. The air force, which was the pioneer service regarding women's recruitment, slightly reduced its relative share in 1998 and then grew again over the next two years. The particularities of the various services, namely

Table 2 Representation of Women in the Armed Forces of NATO Countries (2000)[a]

Country	*N*	%
Italy	0	0.0
Poland	239	0.1
Turkey	917	0.1
Germany	4530	1.4
Norway	1030	3.2
Czech Republic	1935	3.3
Greece	6155	3.8
Denmark	1033	4.2
Luxembourg	29	4.2
Spain	6462	5.8
Portugal	2925	6.6
Hungary	2957	6.8
Belgium	3202	7.6
Netherlands	4170	8.0
UK	16,623	8.1
France	27,516	8.5
Canada	6558	11.4
USA	198,452	14.0
Total	284,733	12.7

[a] Values refer to active forces, conscripts included. When dimension of total force was not made available in the survey, data from the Military Balance (2000) was used.
Source: Organizational Survey, Annual Reports of the Committee of Women in the NATO Forces; *NATO Review*, Summer 2001: 34.

Table 3 Male and Female Representation in the Portuguese Armed Forces, by Service (2000)

	Male		*Female*		*Total*	
Branch	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
Army	24,497	94.0	1638	6.0	26,135	100.0
Navy	10,332	96.6	363	3.4	10,695	100.0
Air Force	6447	87.0	924	13.0	7371	100.0
Total	41,276	93.4	2925	6.6	44,201	100.0

Source: Ministry of Defence (Portugal).




Figure 3 Evolution of the Number of Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces (1994–2000)
Source: Ministry of Defence (Portugal).

the difficulties associated with service aboard ships (and their transformation in order to accommodate women), as well as the army's greater territorial component, help to explain the existing distribution. If we look at the situation of women in terms of the functions they perform, a fairly common pattern can be seen: they are concentrated in support functions, that is, administration, personnel, logistics and finance (Figure 4).

Table 4 shows the proportion of women in each occupational area. Here again we find them overrepresented in the health and support functions, making up 19.8 percent and 12.2 percent respectively of the total service members employed in such duties. It should, however, be noted that women represent 5.5 percent in the technical areas (engineering/communications), a percentage one point below the average, but still higher than the mere 1.9 percent of female personnel in operational functions.

Turning now to the position of women in the rank structure, we see that they are mostly employed in short-term contract service as complementary personnel (Figure 5) and are concentrated in the lower ranks (Table 5). In the year 2000 women made up 4.7 percent of the officer ranks, 4.3 percent of NCOs and 13.4 percent of enlisted personnel. It would seem, however, that their relative numbers are bound to increase, as they already represent 11.3 percent of cadets in the military academies. Most remarkable is the situation in the Air Force Academy, where 20.6 percent of all cadets are female.




Figure 4 Occupational Distribution of Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces (2000)
Source: Ministry of Defence (Portugal).




Figure 5 Percentage of Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces by Type of Contract and Service (2000)
Source: Ministry of Defence (Portugal).

Table 4 Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces by Occupational Area (2000)[a]

	Army			*Navy*			*Air Force*			*Total*		
Areas	*M*	*W*	*%W*	*M*	*W*	*%W*	*M*	*W*	*%W*	*M*	*W*	*%W*
Operational (combat arms)	5191	59	1.1	4904	45	0.9	2214	129	5.5	12,309	233	1.9
Support (adm./pers.)	8100	1141	12.3	2563	210	7.6	3583	628	14.9	14,246	1979	12.2
Technical	2263	164	6.8	2494	71	2.8	529	70	11.7	5286	305	5.5
Medical/legal	1098	276	20.1	370	38	9.3	201	99	33.0	1669	413	19.8
Total	16,652	1640	9.0	10,331	364	3.4	6527	926	12.4	33,510	2930	8.0

[a] Conscripts excluded.
Source: Ministry of Defence (Portugal).

Table 5 Men and Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces by Rank (2000)[a]

	Army			*Navy*			*Air Force*			*Total*		
	MW	*W*	*%W*	*MW*	*W*	*%W*	*MW*	*W*	*%W*	*MW*	*W*	*%W*
Officers	3210	155	4.8	1704	68	4.0	1709	90	5.3	6623	313	4.7
NCOs	7446	473	6.4	5727	6	0.1	3071	214	7.0	16,244	693	4.3
Enlisted	7410	900	12.1	3264	289	8.9	2377	561	23.6	13,051	1750	13.4
Cadets	576	40	6.9	187	18	9.6	296	61	20.6	1059	119	11.3
Total	18,642	1568	8.4	10,882	381	3.5	7453	926	12.4	36,977	2875	7.8

[a] Conscripts excluded.
Source: Ministry of Defence (Portugal).

In sum, when we compare Portugal to other countries with longer experience of women in the military, similar overall tendencies emerge. Even taking into consideration the specificity of the Portuguese case, namely in terms of the process's timing, a few aspects can be underscored vis-a-vis the situation of military women:

1. The limited – even if rapidly growing – representation in the total force;
2. There is overrepresentation in complementary personnel structures and in traditionally female areas;
3. And underrepresentation in higher hierarchical levels and operational functions.

Motivations, Expectations and Professional Identities

As mentioned before, a trend towards occupationalism seemed to emerge from organizational recruitment policies in the Portuguese armed forces when women joined the ranks. But what can we say about those first women's individual orientations? What kind of values and expectations did they bring to the military? Were they motivated by economic-related aspects, by an institutional sense of calling, or by 'pragmatic professionalist' values (Segal, 1986: 363–4)?

It has been predicted that, due to their usual position of disadvantage in the labour market, women tend to adopt, more than men, a 'market-oriented' approach, seeking to maximize economic advantages in terms of salaries, fringe benefits or job security. Despite the fact that women have historically always proved to be 'institutionally' driven, conceiving military service as a vocation or 'calling' (as was the case of military nurses during the First and Second World Wars), the new context is seen as potentially revealing a different motivational pattern. As stated by Patricia Shields in an article evaluating Moskos's Institutional/Occupational Model,

> ... according to the occupational thesis, variables such as wages and unemployment are critical in explaining enlistment, attrition and reenlistment. If these variables are effective at predicting female military participation patterns, they would certainly support the contention that women are attracted to the armed forces for occupational reasons. (Shields, 1988: 103)

Empirical research carried out in Europe and the US during the 1980s seemed, however, to highlight an opposite tendency. Drawing on the results of various studies on enlistment motivations, Shields shows that, paradoxically, women do not see the armed forces as simply another employer but rather are attracted by such unique characteristics of the military as discipline and adventure. One of these studies, referring to American military women, has revealed that the opportunity for travel and the feeling of being different from civilian women were among the most important motivations for enlistment: 'theirs wasn't just another job – it offered excitement, adventure, discipline and

structure' (Shields, 1988: 104). While job security is still indicated as a relevant reason for enlistment, the more 'institutional' characteristics of the armed forces (absent in the context of other civilian organizations) are dominant. Reynaud pointed to the same effect in the case of the French military, underlying the way in which the search for a structured environment and organized life as well as the need to escape routine have been among women's motivations (Reynaud, 1988). In a study of the first thousand women to join the Portuguese armed forces (including officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel) carried out in 1994, these results were confirmed to a certain extent (Carreiras, 1997). Sixteen indicators were used to measure institution/occupational motivations. The results are shown in Table 6.

A factorial analysis of principal components revealed the existence of four main factors that were named in terms close to the conceptual dimensions of Moskos's model. The results show that some of the items included in the core 'institutional' dimension acquired a major importance. 'The desire to work in a disciplined and structured atmosphere' was in fact the main reason given by a large percentage of women in their decision to enlist. Immediately following were 'the desire to serve my country' and the 'possibility of participating in a prestigious institution'. One of the 'lifestyle' dimensions of institutional factors also had considerable weight: 'possibility of pursuing a career that was traditionally closed to women'. As in other cases, Portuguese military women seem to have been attracted by the uniqueness of the armed forces, more than by mere circumstantial factors or the search for labour/economic security. More than a job or an 'occupation', military service is above all a challenge and a distinctive activity where structure and innovation coexist. This seems to be the main conclusion here, even if occupational dimensions are not unimportant. In fact, almost three-quarters of the women still consider 'job security' or the chance to find 'better professional opportunities than in civilian life' important reasons for joining the armed forces. When only the initial motivations for enlistment are considered, it is thus possible to identify the common presence of 'institutional' and 'occupational' features, a pattern that has been defined in theoretical approaches as 'pragmatic professionalism' (Segal, 1986).

It should, of course, be noted that such tendencies may vary depending on the positions individuals occupy within the organizational structure. Traditionally, officers trained in military academies and schools or those employed in combat-oriented functions tend to score much higher on institutional features than the remaining personnel. Even though women are underrepresented in top hierarchical positions, they may be expected to develop institutional orientations as they move into higher ranks. To the extent that they are excluded from these positions, their future 'institutional' orientation may, however, be diluted. Referring to career combat soldiers, Shields argues that

Table 6 Military Women's Motivations for Enlistment (Portugal, 1994)

	Motivations	*Important (%)*	*Not important (%)*
Institutional factors (core dimension)	The desire to work in a disciplined and structured atmosphere	87.9	12.1
	The desire to serve my country	87.2	12.8
	Possibility of participating in a prestigious institution	84.5	15.5
	Access to good civic training	79.0	21.0
Institutional factors (lifestyle dimension)	Possibility of pursuing a career that was traditionally closed to women	84.0	16.0
	To escape routine and live an active life	68.7	31.3
	The attractiveness of the uniform	57.6	42.4
	Possibility of travelling and getting to know other places	48.8	51.2
Occupational factors	Job security	74.5	25.5
	Better professional opportunities than in civilian life	75.4	24.6
	No employment alternatives	42.1	57.9
Circumstantial factors	The opportunity to leave parents' home and to start an independent life	24.3	75.7
	Military influences among friends or family	29.1	70.9
	Failing access to university	21.1	78.9
	Possibility of training/ education at a low financial cost	20.0	80.0

Source: Carreiras (1997).

> . . . the values that tie these men together and produce unit cohesion are institutional. Hence, as long as women are excluded from this inner circle, their institutional orientation on average will not reach its full potential. . . . The military is giving women a message that undermines female institutional values and, by implication, promotes an occupational orientation. (Shields, 1988: 110)

If we take the Portuguese case, it is possible to observe an interesting tendency when the question of change over time regarding motivations or expectations is addressed. Corroborating previous research findings, the results of the present study have also revealed a strong emphasis on the core dimension of institutional values by women cadets in military academies, as well as by those in 'operational' specialties (pilots, parachutists and air police). Yet despite this tendency, it is also among these groups that a greater awareness of difficulties and obstacles to women's integration has been reported. Even if the data collected do not allow for longitudinal analysis, it has been possible to identify an increase in critical evaluations over time. The longer the stay in the military, the higher the percentage of those who declared themselves to be discontented, wishing to leave or anticipating problems in the near future (Carreiras, 1997).

Considering the existence of different types of motivations, an hypothesis has been raised that explicitly addresses the possibility of change: institutional orientations may not be sustained or may at least suffer some erosion in the absence of material/economic incentives. Especially for those women who remain in the military and proceed with their military careers, the maintenance of high levels of institutional affiliation may thus to a large extent depend on the existence of guarantees in the fields of material security and economic reward.

This supposition does not apply exclusively to the case of military women. In an analysis of the potentials of the Institutional/Occupational Model in policy-making, Wood has argued that only if minimum material requirements are met individuals will accept the hardships associated with military activity, as long as they perceive themselves to be working for the common good of society (Wood, 1988). Insofar as such an objective is diluted, or material conditions are considered to be particularly deficient, their commitment will suffer and they will tend to adopt the occupational orientation characteristic of a specialist.

In the case of military women, however, the conditions under which a specific orientation may develop – and potentially influence role performance, career paths, attrition or re-enlistment decisions – are related to other variables that seem to affect women in ways not experienced by men. It is thus important to ask: Which factors influence change in professional orientations? How do they vary in the different institutional locations (e.g. rank, type of job) and social characteristics (e.g. age, class, race)? What type of relation is there between motivational patterns/expectations and women's career development? Beyond the scope of policy decisions that define women's roles at the organizational level, social structure aspects such as family and maternity, together with those concerning culture, must be considered. Some of these variables are crucial in explaining the military roles of women and deserve adequate attention.

The 'Public Sphere'

In 1990, the first – and only – prospective study on the topic of women in the Portuguese armed forces (Carrilho, 1990: 30) aimed at evaluating the conditions and constraints for female recruitment, concluded that in Portuguese society there was an overall deficit of information, debate and interest regarding the problem. This was especially the case of political figures, with successive governments and opposition parties showing a clear lack of willingness to introduce the issue into the political agenda. Yet it was also true for the military, where the lack of interest may well account for the aforementioned ex-post pragmatist approach to policy definition. To a lesser degree – and with at least one exception – the same could be said about women's organizations.

The main political and civic sectors of Portuguese society adopted an attitude of relative openness towards the issue of gender integration in the military, even though one born out of a mixture of ignorance and indifference. None of the political parties represented in parliament expressed a formal position. During parliamentary discussions of the new Military Service Law in 1987, where female voluntary service was mentioned for the first time, only casual references were made to the question. The positions of individual members of parliament were hesitant, unclear and cautious. While generally favourable to women's presence in the armed forces, they underscored the need to ensure equity and conditions of equal treatment between military men and women. The same problems were stressed by most women's associations and NGOs, though here positions diverged more clearly. The main governmental organization on women's issues – the Comissão da Condição Feminina – was extremely favourable. It mobilized debate on the issue, organized some meetings and one seminar and went so far as to fund the publication of a prospective study. The remaining women's associations maintained a passive attitude, expressing rather general positions and only when directly consulted. Some of them supported the measure and stressed the need to ensure equal opportunities for women, others opposed it on the basis of anti-militarist or pacifist principles. This situation mirrors to a certain extent the ambivalent attitude that has frequently been identified on the part of feminist movements vis-a-vis the question of female involvement in military activities (Boene, 1999: 89).

Coverage of the issue by the print media is another possible 'observation platform' of public opinion concerning the topic of women in the military. It may be taken as an interesting though limited 'barometer' of public sensitivity to the debate, both for what is revealed and what is ignored. Table 7 shows some preliminary data from an ongoing research project that includes content analysis of newspaper articles published in Portugal over the last

Table 7 Number of Newspaper Articles on Women in the Military in Portugal (1988–2000)

	Daily Newspapers						*Weekly newspapers*				
Years	*DN*	*CAP*	*CM*	*PUB*	*JN*	*Other*	*EXP*	*T&Q*	*IND*	*Other*	*Total*
1988–1990	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	3
1991	11	6	1	5	3	–	2	–	1	1	30
1992	12	2	4	2	4	1	–	2	–	1	28
1993–4	6	1	1	–	–	–	–	2	–	1	11
1995–6	–	5	3	1	–	–	–	–	–	1	10
1997–8	2	3	2	4	1	1	2	–	–	1	16
1999	–	–	2	1	1	2	1	–	–	–	7
2000	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	2	1	5
Total	31	17	14	13	11	4	5	4	3	8	110

DN = *Diário de Notícias*
CAP = *A Capital*
CM = *Correio da Manhã*
PUB = *Público*
JN = *Jornal de Notícias*
EXP = *Expresso*
T&Q = *Tal & Qual*
IND = *O Independente*

decade. A first striking observation concerns the small number of articles – 108 – which have been written.[7]

Not surprisingly, more than half of these articles were published during the years 1992 and 1993, immediately after women started to join the armed forces. The period marked the peak of public curiosity and, accordingly, the moment of highest visibility. Media interest waned sharply in the following years. As shown in Figure 6, despite some oscillations, reference to women in the military has become residual. Most remarkable is the fact that this tendency has remained unchanged over the last two years although, due to approval of the new Military Service Law in 1999, we might have expected some renewed emphasis on the 'women's issue' in the context of discussion on military personnel policies.

Content analysis of these articles has confirmed the aforementioned absence of conflict as well as a dominantly favourable attitude concerning the presence of women in the military. Results have also shown that the issue is treated in a rather superficial way. The very few articles that provide a deeper analysis refer to total or partial reproduction of research results from other countries or concern the very few that have been conducted in Portugal. Table 8 shows the results of a thematic classification of all articles.




Figure 6 Number of Newspaper Articles on Women in the Military in Portugal (1988–2000)

Table 8 Thematic Classification of Newspaper Articles on Women in the Military in Portugal (1988–2000)

Years	*Factual Information*	*Integration Problems*	*Relevant Cases*	*Total*
1988–90	3	–	–	3
1991–2	41	10	7	58
1993–4	8	1	2	11
1995–6	7	–	3	10
1997–8	6	1	9	16
1999–2000	7	3	2	12
Total	72 (65.5%)	15 (13.6%)	23 (20.9%)	110

It is possible to see that two-thirds of this corpus consists of merely informative articles. The issue of women's participation in the armed forces has been news whenever there is an event: specific enlistments, ceremonies, opening of a military academy to women, first women on board, etc. All these events are described and presented together with quantitative information and occasional comments made by military women. Besides factual information, this first thematic category includes articles on a set of more specific themes: uniforms (especially during the initial phase), conditions of access, relationship between women's recruitment and the professionalization of the military, and, above all, articles concerning daily life in a gender-mixed environment, training and functions performed by women soldiers.

Despite the fact that the tone of these reports is generally positive and sympathetic towards women, stereotypes of gender roles also emerge. Some of the titles are revealing: 'Officers Want Skirts', 'Recruits Avant-Garde', 'The Femme Fatale of the Platoon', 'Barbies in Uniform', 'Heroes in Tights'. As time went by, such events lost journalistic interest. On the contrary, among the dramatically reduced number of articles published after 1992, more emphasis was given to the concrete biographies of women who overcame institutional barriers for the first time or obtained a special status (e.g. the first woman to graduate from a military academy, first experience with a mixed-crew ship, first women to be deployed in an international mission).

In the 10 years after the very first experiences relatively few articles focused on integration problems. The majority included in this category were published in the crucial years of 1991 and 1992, when a number of problematic situations came to public attention.[8] In reality, the absence of news reports concerning integration difficulties does not necessarily mean that

problems do not exist. It likely has more to do with the absence of institutionalized solutions and channels that would make them more visible externally, as happens in many other countries. As mentioned in one of the most recent articles, the absence of complaints regarding sexual harassment, for example, derives from the fact that some have not been processed in written form. If this is the case, then the 'incidents are not counted in official statistics' (Pereira, 2001).

Independently of the impact these or other questions may have in the future, the image that remains from written press reports is one of a relatively 'soft' transition and the routine nature of women's presence in military units. Once the initial highly visible phase of the early 1990s was overcome, the issue of women soldiers vanished from the attention of the print media and public opinion. For the future, it is thus an essential question whether this is a lasting 'eclipse', or if specific circumstances, namely those pertaining to recruitment and retention problems, will bring new visibility to the role of women in the Portuguese armed forces.

Conclusion

Referring to discussions about the participation of women in the armed forces in Italy, Lorenza Sebesta wrote that 'the debate on women soldiers has developed following a logic of political opportunities, legal "pruderies" and scandalous curiosity of the media without ending up in any coherent policy in this field' (Sebesta, 1994: 41). This same observation could probably be made regarding the characteristics of debate in various other countries. In the Portuguese case, the same lack of coherent policies is an observable output. Two differences, however, must be pointed out: in the first place, it is less an absence of coherence than it is of policies as such; second, this has resulted from somewhat less extreme situations than those depicted by Sebesta. For at the political level there was no real debate, only opportunities; the legal framework has been rather open and 'progressive' at a general level, but empty in terms of concrete regulations. The ex-post logic prevailed: 'If problems have not yet been experienced, or at least have not proved to be so serious that informal ad hoc decisions wouldn't be enough to face them, why create regulations?' The flexibility allowed by such a procedure – which can be a positive element when it comes to avoiding normative rigidity and over-regulation of practice – may, however, show perverse effects if it allows discretionary and arbitrary solutions.

As for the media, the curiosity has not been so 'scandalous'; in fact, the predictably intense initial interest in the issue quickly vanished. Moreover, only a negligible number of newspaper articles addressed 'problematic' topics such as sexuality and sexual harassment. In the time-span of 10 years, 'women

in the armed forces' became a non-issue in the public agenda. We could well say that the early 1990s were characterized by public visibility, political indifference and military caution. Ten years on, we may instead talk of a public eclipse, growing political awareness (opportunism?) and military tolerance (acceptance?).

As for the women involved, it is certainly time to conduct new research. The advent of the all-volunteer force will give a new impetus to female recruitment and probably give military women higher visibility in the public arena. Whether future political debates will contribute to reverting the dominant instrumental approach to women's integration is still an unanswered question. In any case, the prevalence of such orientation whenever economic factors pressure policy decisions, together with the total absence of specific policies aimed at confronting 'erosion factors' – in areas such as family, parenthood, sexual harassment or equity – may pose rather serious questions to the development of the new model of military service in Portugal.

Notes

1 The percentage of women compared with the total armed force.

2 One should of course notice that indicators like the women ratio refer to a limited aspect of women's military participation, i.e. their relative numbers, leaving undiscussed more 'qualitative' variables such as the specific roles that women are assigned to within military forces. These are sometimes considered to depend more on other types of variables such as cultural values or gender equality (Segal, 1995).

3 Service is extendable, in exceptional circumstances, to eight months in the army and 12 months in the navy and air force.

4 In fact, the pyramid was almost inverted, with an excess of personnel in the higher ranks and a clear deficit in the lower officers' ranks. Because colonels were the most affected by this legislation (many of them were forced to compulsory reform) it came to be known as 'the Colonels' law'.

5 Apart from some short prospective essays written by officers in the framework of promotion courses in military institutes, there was only one sociological study at this time: Carrilho (1990).

6 While the exemption of women is not directly stated, the regulation exempts from the National Defence Day all those who have not been submitted to military registration, which is the case of women.

7 Besides consultation of the database of the Ministry of Defence – where systematic data collection covering the period 1994–2000 was carried out by the press services – direct research has been conducted in three of the most important Portuguese daily and weekly newspapers: *Público* (PUB), *Diário de Notícias* (DN) and *Expresso* (EXP). Since some of these sources also keep general archives, including thematically indexed articles from other newspapers, it was possible to compare information.

8 These situations relate to very circumscribed cases of sexual harassment and prostitution. Later on, a case of suspected violation would also attract the attention of the media.

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
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Lindy Heinecken

Affirming Gender Equality: The Challenges Facing the South African Armed Forces

Introduction

There is no doubt that even with greater numbers of women in the ranks and their proven capabilities that the military remains one of the most prototypically masculine of all social institutions. The reasons for this are diverse: to an extent they are historic, as for centuries men have been viewed as the protectors, women the protected and compassionate, and for fear of women's safety in the hands of captives; but largely, the motivations stem from the concern regarding effects that the expanded utilization of women within the ranks may have on 'operational effectiveness'.

There are numerous positions on women in the armed forces, with little consensus among both feminists and those within the armed forces as to whether women should serve in the armed forces, and/or in what capacities. These positions are to a large extent influenced by military, societal and cultural factors dominant in the larger society as well as uniquely female concerns relating to the biology of women and their child-rearing responsibilities.

South Africa provides an interesting case study in many respects. Legally, in the wake of constitutional reforms the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has had no option but to acknowledge the right of women to serve in 'all' ranks and positions, including combat roles. At the same time, it is a country with vast inequalities in race and class, which brings a new dimension to gender integration beyond that of 'equality of rights' commonly associated with the European debates. Taking this as background, this article attempts to string together the various issues relating to gender

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integration internationally, and to relate this to the challenges facing the South African armed forces.

Feminist Views on the Military

Feminists have adopted various stances with respect to gender integration and the armed forces, with little consensus on how to deal with the perceived inequalities that exist. In this section, the main positions are briefly outlined, as the dominant feminist positions within broader society impact on how the armed forces deal with gender issues.

The main split in perspectives is between the radical feminists, who ascribe the exploitation of women to men, the Marxist and socialist feminists, who name capitalism rather than patriarchy as the source of women's oppression, and the liberal or equal rights feminists, who fight for the equality of both men and women within the existing order (Haralambos and Holborn, 1995: 592).

From the radical feminist position, society is viewed as 'patriarchal', men being the primary benefactors of the subordination of women in society. The family is seen as one of the primary institutions perpetuating women's oppression and only revolutionary change in the structure of society, namely a social order based on matriarchy that recognizes the 'special qualities' of women, can bring about any real change. These special qualities reside in the biological differences between the sexes and certain social practices, although feminists have different views on this.

Some radical feminists propagating the 'sexists' position, claim that women should be excluded from the ranks of the military as their physical inferiority makes them unsuited for combat. The 'pacifists' maintain that the female tendency towards peacefulness and caring, for the giving and nurturing of life, runs contrary to militarism. All forms of gender discrimination and violence are linked to the connection between war and militarism (Haralambos and Holborn, 1995: 592). Virginia Woolf's pacifist feminist position, for example, seeks equality between the sexes not through admitting women to combat, but from 'liberating men from militarism' (Cock, 1992: 17). By implication pacifists are antagonistic towards the military and are dismayed by women wanting to serve in the armed forces (Miller, 1998: 37). Other anti-militarist radical feminists again support women's inclusion in the military, alleging that their unique feminine characteristics contribute to altering the nature of war, as well as their capacity to influence security policy from within (Hudson, 1998: 45).

In contrast to radical feminists, Marxist and socialist feminists attribute capitalism, rather than patriarchy, as the principal source of women's oppression and their relegation to lower paid and inferior status jobs (Haralambos

and Holborn, 1995: 593). Although Marxist and socialist feminists agree with radical feminists that women are exploited, they see greater scope for cooperation between women and working-class men (as exploited groups) than do radical feminists that want a social order based on matriarchy.

On the attitudes of Marxist/socialist feminists towards the armed forces there does not appear to be a clear-cut position, although one may assume that this will invariably be determined by the legitimacy afforded to the military by the people. Given the emphasis on class rather than gender, such feminists would probably adopt a more egalitarian approach to women in the armed forces depending on the prevailing social order. Some evidence to support this view is the role played by women in many revolutionary movements fighting for social and political change.

Most radical and Marxist/socialist feminists 'broadly' share the same aim as liberal feminists, namely equality between the sexes although their approach to bring about this equity differs. Liberal feminists strive to bring about gender equality through the existing social order, using the democratic system to reform the political, economic and social systems that perpetuate sexism and discrimination against women. This branch of feminism pushes for the fullest inclusion of women in the military, from conscription to the utilization of women in combat arms. They contend that 'the best way to ensure women's equal treatment with men is to render them equally vulnerable with men to the political will of the State' (Jones, quoted in Miller, 1998: 38). Unlike some pacifist feminists, they deny the traditional linkages between women and peace, asserting that it is only through social conditioning that women have learned passivity (Stephenson, 1982: 291). Women are considered no more peaceful than men and just as capable as men to serve in the armed forces. Physical differences are considered unimportant and the sexual division of labour based on ongoing traditions concerning the proper areas of labour for females and males used to reinforce the image of 'men as fighters', is rejected (Yuval-Davis, 1985: 651).

This brief evaluation of the various feminist positions reveals that there is no consensus among feminists as a lobby group on women in the armed forces. The history, culture and level of development within society often shape the different views. In South Africa, for example (in contrast to the liberal feminism of western societies), the feminist stance among mainly African women is associated with the revolutionary struggle leaning towards Marxist/socialist feminism, asserting the equal right of women to take up arms with men against repression and injustice. As Cock (1992: 21) states, 'the widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of the armed struggle and the notion of a just war means that the Western connection between feminism and pacifism is loosened in the South African context'. For black[1] women, women's rights remain subservient to the issue of race and the social, political and economic oppression they experience. Only recently have women begun

to challenge this 'triple repression', but even so this has not been from a feminist perspective aimed at empowering women, but rather at liberating them (Gouws and Kadalie, 1994: 218).

Currently, the women's movement in South Africa is growing in stature with a number of women participating in politics at both the national and regional level, pushing for a wide range of gender reforms through various gender caucuses and gender commissions. Official acknowledgement has been given to the plight of women in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Section 187 [1–3]) and a Commission for Gender Equality was established in 1997 to develop an inventory of legislation which discriminates against women. Areas of concern are the need to amend patriarchal customary rules, develop gender-sensitive policies and laws, institutionalize means to reduce violence against women and integrate gender considerations into macro-economic planning and national budgets. An Office of the Status of Women (OSW) has been established in the office of the Deputy President and one of the tasks has been to establish gender units within the various state departments, including the Department of Defence, to monitor and audit the progress of gender equality.

As such, the reform of policy relating to women in the military is legally and politically driven rather than through the intervention of any particular 'feminist' lobby demanding equal rights for women. Only recently has a small, but active feminist voice emerged among the senior female officer ranks pressing for greater participation of women in decision-making and greater sensitivity to gender. These voices will no doubt gain more momentum once the Gender Forums initiated in 1997 are established and begin to address the gender issues that limit women's career advancement.

Giving impetus to the cause is the appointment of a woman Deputy Minister of Defence in 1999 who has given 'political clout' to a more 'gendered' approach to peace and security, to policy formulation and the advancement of gender equality within the Department of Defence (Madlala-Routledge, 2000). A definite 'liberal' feminist position appears to be emerging among military women, which is supported, but at the same time challenged by the more pacifist position of civilian activists. This came out clearly at a conference on 'Women Making Peace in Africa' held in Pretoria in August 2000, which drew together a diverse group of women involved in peace-building and peace-making in Africa. Heated debates surfaced among feminists calling for the redistribution of military spending to social upliftment and development, vs the women in uniform who were advocating for greater participation of women in decision-making and policy formulation from within the ranks. Slowly, with legislative backing the SANDF is being pressurized by feminists both within and outside the military to recognize the role of women in 'peace and war'.

Utilization of Women in the Military

Behind these debates lies the legal and political requirement for the SANDF to implement gender equality. But this has posed certain challenges given the peculiar history, social and cultural uniqueness of South Africa. As is the case elsewhere in South African society, the participation of women in the armed forces has been significantly influenced by the legacy of Apartheid. In the past only white women were recruited into the former South African Defence Force (SADF). It was not until 1970, when a shortage of qualified white males was experienced during the height of the Border War[2] that they could join the permanent force. Although not in separate corps, their functional role was limited to supportive musterings, such as finance, personnel, logistics, intelligence, medical services and welfare (Cilliers and Heinecken, 2000: 253). This differed from the role of mainly black women serving in Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the revolutionary force of the African National Congress, where they did serve in many frontline positions. Many of these women, now integrated into the SANDF, have come out strongly in favour of gender equality.

Unlike many European countries (Segal, 1995: 766), the recent expanded role of women in the South African armed forces has not been due to a shortage of qualified men, nor due to a perceived threat to the nation, a shift to an all-volunteer force or change in mission definition. The driving force since 1994 has been legislative and incidentally this has coincided with the shift to an all-volunteer force and in mission focus as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and internal deployment become the most likely future roles of the SANDF.

In recent years there has been a dramatic impact on the gender profile of the SANDF. For example, in 1989 only 10 percent of the uniformed members serving in the military were women. This increased to 13 percent in 2000, rising rapidly to 20 percent by January 2002 – largely due to the legislative pressures for gender equality. The racial gender profile also changed significantly. In 1994, when the new SANDF was formed, there were only 712 African women (mainly from the former MK), compared to 5714 white women serving in the military. By January 2000, white women comprised only 25 percent of the total number of women in the military, compared to 61 percent African, just over 1 percent Indian and 12 percent Coloured. However, a disproportionate number of white women hold senior ranks, given that some have served in the former SADF since the early 1970s.

As the number of African women serving in the SANDF increases, this has brought to the fore a number of cultural considerations, hitherto unknown to the former 'white male'-dominated SADF. As Segal (1995: 770) points out, 'the social construction of gender, the importance attached to gender differences and cultural interpretations of gender has considerable implications for the inclusion and participation of women in the military'.

The greater the emphasis on ascription by gender, the more limited women's participation, the more egalitarian the social values, the greater women's participation in the military.

Although South African women are experiencing a sense of 'liberation' brought about by the removal of discriminatory legislation, they are still subject to cultural encapsulation specifically within the context of customary law. In fact, Section 211 of the Constitution of the RSA reinforces the importance granted to the preservation of cultural traditions of the various groups that make up society. Yet, many of these traditions or customs are based on gender ascription and subordination. African women remain subject to a patriarchal system that relegates them to a subordinate position economically, politically and socially. Despite legislative provisions prohibiting discrimination based on gender in the Bill of Rights, African women (particularly within the rural context) are still treated as minors, have limited access to land and property and are subservient to their husbands.

These cultural values invariably spill over to gender relations within the armed forces as can be seen from the results of a survey conducted by the Directorate Social Work (DSW) among members of the SANDF. Almost half (46.5 percent) of the men responded that it is natural for males to have control over women, that wives should do what their husbands tell them (41 percent) and that a man must do whatever he needs to do (including using violence) to ensure that his wife behaves properly (DSW, 2000: 36).

Suitability for Combat Roles

As is the case in other armed forces, once women participate in the military in greater numbers and in certain non-traditional roles, the debate shifts to concerns regarding their utilization in certain capacities. Should they be permitted to serve in all combat specialties? Should this be voluntary or compulsory? Are women physically and psychologically suited for combat? What effect will women have on cohesion, morale and ultimately operational effectiveness? Then there are the uniquely female concerns such as the effect of pregnancy on deployability, parental and family concerns and sexual harassment.

Implementing Gender Equality

In South Africa, there are no provisions limiting the career path of women in the SANDF and it is among the most liberal nations in this regard. Whereas prior to 1994 women were only permitted to serve in support roles, they may now be trained and serve in all ranks and positions including the infantry, artillery and armour, serve as fighter pilots and on naval vessels. Women officers, who were previously excluded from studying at the Military

Academy, now comprise almost a third of the student body and in 1999, the predominantly male student body elected the first female to serve in the prestigious position of student captain.

Yet, despite the formal provisions allowing women to serve in any position, opinion is divided both within society and the military on whether women should serve in combat roles. In an opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Security Studies and the Human Sciences Research Council in 1996 testing public opinion on the question 'should women be allowed to volunteer for combat duty', society was almost equally divided on women serving in the frontline (Cilliers et al., 1997: 6). Similarly, within the SANDF during the same period the Centre for Military Studies conducted a survey testing SANDF officers' opinions to the question whether 'women should be allowed to do combat duty in the frontline'. Of these officers, 40 percent were in favour, 12 percent unsure and 48 percent disagreed (Heinecken, 1998: 228–9).

With women now serving in combat roles, a more recent survey conducted by the SANDF's Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate (EOCD)[3] in February/March 1999 among all military personnel revealed some interesting findings. When military women were asked whether they would 'go into frontline combat if given the chance', most black African women (75 percent) and Coloured women (58 percent) said they would compared to 34 percent of whites. Similar findings were reported by race when asked whether they would be willing to trade a supportive role for a combat role. Opinion was divided on whether women should only receive such assignments if they choose, 41 percent supporting the volunteer option, compared to 47 percent who felt it should be compulsory for all, with the remainder being unsure.[4]

What is apparent is that white women's views are similar to western trends in that they want the choice to serve in combat roles, while African women appear more prepared to serve in the frontline. This may possibly be ascribed to the role of women in the revolutionary struggle and also the fact that white women appear less willing to serve beyond the borders of South Africa (Heinecken, 1999b: 57).

Genetic Suitability for Combat

Even where women meet the job specifications and have the ability to serve in combat, opinion remains divided especially in those positions where physical demands may exceed the physiological capabilities of women. To overcome this, most countries are striving towards 'gender-neutral policies' that specify which specialties (combat and non-combat) require muscular strength, endurance and cardiovascular capacity. This has been the policy adopted by the SANDF. Currently, men and women receive the same training and there is no gender-specific training 'policy', although gender separation does take place during basic training. This was introduced after

the SA Army Gymnasium found increasing rates of stress fractures in the lower leg and pelvis among women, ascribed mainly to the differences in the length of their stride and height compared to men (Gibson, 2002: 3).

In general, women are more positive about their capabilities than men. The EOCD survey revealed that while only 28 percent of women felt they did not have the ability to serve in demanding combat roles, 41 percent of males held this view. Once again the views differed by race, with more Africans (42 percent) than Coloureds (37 percent) and whites (30 percent) expressing the opinion that women do not have the physical capability to serve in combat. These sentiments were most strongly held by African men, as 60 percent of African women felt they had the physical ability to perform in combat (van Rensburg, 1999: 14). This is an important point in race/gender relations within the South African context, given the subordinate role of women within traditional African culture.

Impact on Social and Task Cohesion

Another argument frequently raised against the inclusion of women in combat units is their potential effect on male bonding and the subsequent impact on cohesion and morale. The same sentiments hold true in South Africa, as shown by the EOCD survey results where 56 percent of males and a remarkable 47 percent of females supported the view that the integration of women would have a detrimental effect on unit cohesion, morale, male bonding and operational effectiveness. In general, Africans (56 percent) felt more strongly than whites (49 percent) that this was so. This may seem contradictory given the role played by African women in the ANC's liberation army, but can be explained by yet another division within the SANDF, namely the attitudes of members of the former black homeland or TBVC armies (van Rensburg, 1999: 13). According to the Department of Defence personnel statistics there were virtually no women from the TBVC defence forces integrated into the new SANDF. The virtual absence of women from these ranks signifies that their lack of exposure to the capabilities of women, together with cultural considerations, probably influenced their attitudes.

In this regard, I would venture to say that given the racial tension that exists within the SANDF, social and task cohesion is stronger by race than by gender. Concerning social cohesion, the overriding factor is differences in culture and language between whites and blacks. As regards task cohesion (which is associated with the ability of the unit to harness the collective, knowledge, skills and experience of all members to meet unit objectives), it relates to perceived differences in standards and levels of training. Within the SANDF there are some serious differences by race on the impact of affirmative action on operational effectiveness. Many white officers feel resentment towards what they see as the promotion of inexperienced blacks to position not on merit but on race (Heinecken, 1999a: 194–200). The EOCD survey

not only substantiates this, but shows that these sentiments are on the increase, particularly among whites and Coloureds who are of the opinion that affirmative action, which includes the rapid advancement of women, has a negative effect on the SANDF's effectiveness (van Rensburg, 2000: 14). Whereas perceived double standards for men and women have been one of the factors affecting morale and cohesion in western armed forces, within South Africa the impact is clearly linked to race and gender, with the emphasis on race.

'Uniquely' Female Concerns

One of the most contentious issues within the SANDF is the issue of pregnancy and childcare and the creation of a more 'woman-friendly' environment within the SANDF. Women in the military together with the Deputy Minister of Defence have been forthright in stating that pregnancy must not be used against them, but must be taken into consideration when planning and deploying women (Madlala-Routledge, 2000). This is bound to pose a great challenge to the SANDF in the future. As means of comparison, during the Gulf War it was found that women were three times less deployable than men, primarily due to pregnancy (Report to the President, 1992: 20).

In this regard, it is of interest to note the EOCD finding regarding 'the effect which the admission of women into combat situations will have on mothers with small children, pregnancy and sexual harassment'. Almost 50 percent of respondents expressed their concern about the effect mothers with small children at home, pregnancy and sexual harassment may have on combat situations, with only 31 percent expressing no concern and the remainder being unsure. More women (56 percent) than men (46 percent) had their reservations about these issues. Comparative to previous findings on willingness to serve in combat, white women (64 percent) and Coloured women (61 percent) were more concerned than African females (31 percent) about the impact these issues would have on the assignment to positions that might involve a high probability of direct combat (van Rensburg, 1999: 14).

One must question the implication of these findings, given the fact that African women have more children than whites, are often single parents and primary breadwinners in their families (Sadie and van Aardt, 1995: 85). Miller (1998: 55) indicates that single parents are seen as the greatest burden to the military because of the restrictions childcare places on the parent. In South Africa, the majority of black women carry the full share of household responsibilities, although this appears to be changing in urban households. The extended families associated with traditional African culture may provide the support base, alleviating women from their childcare responsibilities while deployed. For decades, African women have been separated from their children in search of employment, leaving their children in the care of the elderly or relatives, something few white women have had to deal with.

This may explain why black African women may be more willing to be deployed for longer periods.

Nevertheless, with the breakdown of these traditional values and a growing number of single women serving in the SANDF, the full impact of pregnancy and childcare responsibilities on deployability is still to be seen. International findings indicate that the impact of pregnancy on deployability is especially high in units that are disproportionately female or understaffed (Harrel and Miller, 1997: 41; Shields, 1988: 108). Should it materialize as Major General Jackie Sedibe (2000: 8) hopes to 'have 50 percent of women in management positions', this will no doubt pose definite challenges for those responsible for future force preparation and force deployment.

Harassment and Physical Abuse of Women

Sexual harassment is another issue associated with female integration. Within the SANDF, both sexual and gender harassment is a rising concern. Reports are that black women experience sexual and gender harassment more frequently in the workplace than whites. Not only is harassment from male colleagues said to be widespread, but in gaining employment women are expected to provide sexual favours to prospective employers (Sadie and van Aardt, 1995: 85). Similar rumours exist within the SANDF, although the extent of both gender and sexual harassment within the ranks is unknown, nor whether there is any variance by race, rank, gender or work environment.

What has evoked far greater concern is the increase in incidents of rape and violence against women within the SANDF, a reflection of trends evident in broader society. While internationally the abuse of women is discussed mainly within the context of female combatants and prisoners of war, women and particularly black women are the disproportionate victims of violence within South African society. A recent national study on the experiences of 1000 women in metropolitan, urban and rural South Africa indicated that 63 percent of women had experienced sexual abuse. The average reported rape cases increased by 23 percent between 1994 and 1997 and these trends continue unabated (SAIRR, 1998: 44).

The Department of Defence has formulated a policy on Violence against Women and Children that declares not only to reduce conflict against women and children during armed conflicts, but within the SANDF, among its members and their dependants. The safety of women is a grave concern not only when leaving the unit late at night, but also when deployed in the field in remote and isolated circumstances offering little protection and privacy. These concerns are justified, in light of recent findings within the SANDF that 37 percent of female employees and 30 percent of military wives report having been subject to abuse or a violent relationship (DSW, 2000: 41). No aspect of human security is so vital as the security from physical violence, and where women are unsafe in their own homes, one has

to raise questions about their safety during deployment where their vulnerability is so much greater.

African conflicts in particular are associated with rape, plunder and murder – a reality which women serving in the SANDF will have to face as South Africa prepares to take on the responsibility of regional peacekeeper (Siders, 2000: 41–54). In Africa, with HIV/AIDS infection being as high as 60–70 percent among some Sub-Saharan armed forces, the deployment of women becomes even more condemning. Evidence from Rwanda shows how HIV-infected soldiers raped and used HIV as a weapon of war in the ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis (Anon, 1995: 3). Such realities bring to the fore another security dimension associated with the deployment of women on the African continent that stretches way beyond the politics of gender integration associated with western societies.

Conclusions

For women serving in the SANDF, the issue is no longer whether they may serve in combat, but whether they will do so in a 'gender-friendly environment'. Legally and politically the mechanisms are in place to ensure that policies are implemented, but true equality cannot be achieved where the support structures are absent and attitudes that render women inferior and subordinate remain unchanged.

Military women themselves are divided, with vast differences in attitudes between white and black on almost every front. White women in general have not adopted a 'feminist' stance aimed at transforming the patriarchal culture of the organization. While they have supported equal rights, they prefer the choice whether to serve in non-traditional roles as is clearly seen in the unwillingness to serve in combat roles, or to be deployed beyond the borders of South Africa. In contrast, black women have come out strongly even militantly in support of equal rights from a far more 'radical' feminist perspective, pressing for recognition of the special qualities of women and a more 'pacifist' approach to security.[5] This can be directly related to the cultural subordination they experience within society, the greater childcare responsibilities they carry and the fact that they have been the disproportionate victims of violence and rape in South Africa. These issues raise questions not only for leadership and deployability, but for their personal security when serving in isolated environments and when returning home after late night duties. This is besides the realities of African deployment, where women have been the target of abuse, are often at a disadvantage in sexual negotiations and more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection.

Immense human resource challenges lie ahead in implementing gender equality, that stretch way beyond the politics of gender integration associated

with women in combat. In South Africa, gender affirmation is embroiled in issues of race, cultural subordination and violence against women – both within and outside the context of combat. Although active attempts are being made to address these issues, existing attitudes and budgetary constraints constrain the SANDF's ability to turn policy into practice, especially where this relates to providing the support structures for women to enable them to function as equals.

As women in the military strive for the ideal of 'making and keeping peace in Africa', they will without doubt come up against the realities of African conflict, where women themselves have been used as weapons of war. A daunting task awaits women soldiers in South Africa that stretches way beyond the politics of gender equality, but touches on real issues of personal security, violence and the nature of warfare. Not only will the SANDF have to take these realities into consideration, but also the impact increasing numbers of women within the ranks will have on force readiness. Only time will tell whether the more 'gendered' approach to security has been too ambitious, or, as 'traditionalists' claim, at the expense of both organizational and operational effectiveness.

Notes

The article is based on a study commissioned by the Chief of the SANDF on behalf of the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate in June 1999.

1 Within the South African context, the term 'black' collectively refers to all races other than whites. 'Africans' in this context refers to black Africans and not whites born in Africa.
2 The Border War refers to the war between South Africa/South West Africa and Angola, which ended in 1989.
3 The survey was carried out in February/March 1999 and a total of 3307 completed questionnaires were received.
4 A possible explanation for the willingness of black women to serve in the frontline is the legacy of black women in the liberation movement and the racial repression they have felt, compared to white women, who see the utilization of women in combatant roles rather in terms of employment equity.
5 These sentiments emerged strongly during a South African Broadcasting production, *Two Way*, on 'Women in the Military', 7 August 2000. Repeatedly the military women participating stated the 'women should come forward as women', and play their role in transforming the 'militarist' culture of the institution.

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
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Women in the South Korean Military

Introduction

In January 2002, a woman was promoted to the rank of general for the first time in the history of the South Korean armed forces. She had served as a nurse officer in the army for 29 years since her commission. Much earlier, in November 1997, a woman colonel became a regiment commander in the army for the first time. Almost a year later, in October 1998, a woman major took the post of commanding officer at the training centre for draftees in an infantry division for the first time. In June 1997, a popular monthly magazine allotted more than 10 pages of space to an interview with the first woman infantry company commander (*Monthly Chosun*, 1997: 440–50). By May 1999, 93 women had served as a company commander or platoon leader. The assignment of women commanders at various levels of units has attracted attention from the press. This very attention stems from the fact that women have begun to participate on an equal basis in an organization that has traditionally been male dominated.

Over the past three decades, advanced countries have discussed the utilization of the female labour force in the armed forces. Advocates assert that equal opportunities should be given to women serving in the military while sceptics worry that the presence of women in the military may hinder the efficiency of an organization they deem more appropriate for men. These two contrasting views are not necessarily contradictory or mutually exclusive. However, what is clear is that the sceptics' argument has been gradually losing its legitimacy. Around the world, throughout the 1990s women played a more active and visible role in the military than before. As French military sociologist Michel Martin indicated, women have now stepped into the 'center' from the 'periphery' (Martin, 1982). The fact that 6.2 percent of the American military personnel who participated in the Persian Gulf War

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(1990–1) were women is not a surprising finding. Despite the differences by nation, globally the areas in the military which utilize females have been expanding.

However, the increase of female representation in the military may cause emergent intra-organizational problems. Thus, the issue of efficiency for military goal attainment as induced by the presence of women in the military becomes a theme to be investigated by military decision-makers and academics. South Korea is no exception in this respect. This article examines the status of women in the South Korean armed forces and the future plans proposed by the military policy-makers. It thereby explores gender integration in the military by looking at the positive and negative aspects of women's presence in the military as perceived by their superiors, colleagues and subordinates, both male and female.

The utilization of women in the armed forces and the proportion of women in the military vary even in western societies. For example, the USA, Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and Norway open the majority of military missions to women, whereas, in the past, Germany, Italy and Spain have to a certain extent limited their use of females in the military (Dandeker and Segal, 1996). Furthermore, Israel drafts females but does not assign them to units performing combat missions, while Australia allocates to women such duties as fighter pilot and submariner. Looking at the proportion of servicewomen in the armed forces in NATO countries in 1998, the US had 14.1 percent, Canada 10.8 percent, France 7.5 percent, Belgium 7.2 percent, the Netherlands 7.2 percent and Great Britain (the army) 6.7 percent (US Department of Defense, 1998). In Asia, servicewomen represent 4.2 percent of the total force in Japan (Japan Defence Agency, 2001), 4.5 percent in China (Li, 1993) and 2.1 percent in Taiwan ('Military Service', 2000).

Since the draft system in the US was abolished in 1973 and turned into all-volunteer forces, the percentage of women has increased; in the period of 1973–98 it jumped from 1.6 percent to 14.1 percent. In 1976 the US Military Academy at West Point admitted females for the first time in its history. Attitudes towards servicewomen changed substantially for the better, especially after the Gulf War. Research results of the US Army Behavioral Science Institute conducted in the mid-1970s indicated that women constituting up to 35 percent of the total human resources does not affect the capability of the units in a significant way. Furthermore, the units that consist of both sexes show more confidence and performance in their mission than same-sex units (cited in Rosen et al., 1996).

In Great Britain, between 1949, when the Women's Army Corps was established, and 1979, the percentage of women in the military was maintained at 2.5 percent with women being assigned mostly to administrative work. However, throughout the 1980s and thereafter, women became a major part of the military. By 1991, 100 of the 134 fields in the army were open to

women. In the same year, women were permitted to stay in the armed forces even after pregnancy, and in the following year the Women's Corps as a separate army corps was officially abolished, and women were integrated into the main body of the military (Dandeker and Segal, 1996). In France, gender discrimination has been decreasing since the mid-1970s. Equal opportunities in salary, fringe benefits and career have allowed women to move from a peripheral role to the core of the military. Before 1977, only five branches were open to women, but the new decree guaranteed that women enjoyed equal status as men in the military. In 1985, the French government allowed women to be assigned to all branches, and therefore gave equal opportunities to women, except for a few selected assignments such as fighter pilots and commandos (Boulegue, 1991: 343–62).

The overall trend of changes in policy towards the utilization of women in the military reflects enhanced women's rights during the period. Since the 1970s, gender discrimination has been critically challenged and the participation of women in the labour market has rapidly expanded. At the same time, military leaders' attitudes towards women soldiers have also changed. Even in the early 1970s, for example, military leaders in the US were reluctant to recruit women to the service academies.

Military Women in South Korea: A Historical Overview

In the case of Korea, during the past half-century, women have played a minor and non-substantial role in the South Korean armed forces due to constitutional and cultural restraints. Since 1949, only men have been obliged to serve in the military while a small number of women have been allowed to handle auxiliary functions under certain limited conditions.

Women in the Army

In September 1950, during the Korean War (June 1950–July 1953), the Army Women's Volunteer Education Centre, the first military training institution for women, was established under the Army Second Training Centre. Training in the Centre was carried out by women reserve officers who were called to active duty after the outbreak of the war. These officers had been commissioned as second lieutenants of the reserve a year earlier in July 1949 as a part of the programme to train female high school students. After three weeks of training, 491 women soldiers were produced for the first time and assigned to non-combat administrative support missions. Of these, 44 women were directly commissioned as officers and mainly assigned to the newly inaugurated TI&E (troop information and education) battalions or as platoon leaders of the education centre. In October 1950, the education centre was replaced by the Women Volunteers Training Centre, which then

disbanded in November 1951. Thereafter, the function of training women was dispersed to various branch schools such as the Army Infantry, Adjutant General, and Signal Schools, as well as to the Nonsan Army Training Centre until July 1955 when the Army Women's Training Centre was established. During the war, women served as TI&E personnel and POW investigators, and as propaganda personnel using radio broadcasts and leaflets to urge the North Korean military to surrender. After the war, the duty of women was mostly centred on shorthand, communications, typing, finance and other clerical work.

The issues of marriage and childbirth for military women have been very controversial since the 1950s. In 1950, only single women aged 18–29 were eligible to volunteer as soldiers, but in 1959 eligibility was modified to allow married women with no children under seven years old to apply for the officers training course. In 1963, the regulation was again revised to disallow married women to apply for both officers' and enlisted training courses. From the time when South Korean women first entered the military, no written regulation about marriage for servicewomen existed. However, in 1959, enlisted women who were already in the army were not permitted to marry during the period of obligatory duty, except for those in the rank of sergeant first class or above. In 1964, marriage itself was totally banned during service. However, the regulation was changed for women officers to permit marriage but not childbirth, so if the women became pregnant, they were discharged from active service.[1] Yet non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were prohibited from both marrying and giving birth. In 1984, women ranked sergeant first class or above were permitted to marry, but still childbirth was not allowed for both officers and NCOs. In 1987, childbirth was eventually allowed by army regulation because the prohibition of marriage and of childbirth for military women caused a constitutional violation. Thus, the proportion of those who applied for discharge from active service decreased considerably.[2]

Over the past three decades or so, the missions of servicewomen expanded and diversified. In June 1969, three company-grade women officers (non-nurses) were dispatched to Vietnam for the first time[3] and served as information, administrative and civil-psychological warfare officers. In the same year eight enlisted women completed airborne training in a month for the first time and became black-berets (airborne troopers). In 1975, a women's company was formed within the Army Special Warfare Command. In January 1974, the entry-level rank of enlisted women was raised from a private to a staff sergeant. Opportunities for education and training for high-echelon staff officers were opened to women in 1963 when a woman lieutenant colonel was admitted to the Army War College (AWC), but admittance of another woman did not take place until 1990 when the Women's Army Corps (WAC) was officially abolished. On 1 August 1989,

all women officers in active service were transferred to seven different branches, namely infantry, intelligence, quarter master, adjutant general, TI&E, finance and medical administration.

Women in the Navy and the Air Force

Women's presence in the navy and the air force was minimal in the early period of the armed forces. The policy of admitting women to these services has only recently been adopted. Interestingly enough, however, the Marine Corps admitted women during the Korean War. In August 1950, when the Marine Corps augmented three infantry battalions to carry out amphibious operations, 126 women volunteers were recruited to perform support duties in the rear areas. After approximately 40 days of training, they were commissioned as officers, NCOs or enlisted in the reserve. They carried out jobs such as nurses, propaganda personnel and clerks. However, by August 1951, all were discharged except for a few officers who stayed in service until 1955. Until quite recently, there were no women in the navy. As for the air force, in February 1949 the Women's Air Training Centre was established under the Army Air Command, and 15 women were recruited. The commanding officer of the centre was a woman ex-pilot who had been commissioned as a first lieutenant a month earlier. However, the centre was disbanded during the war, and thereafter, only a few women served as officers for a couple of years.

Nurses Corps

With the formation of the South Korean armed forces, women nurses were recruited by the military. In August 1948, 31 nurses were commissioned as second lieutenants in the army for the first time (ROK Army Headquarters, 1998). The navy produced nurse officers in April 1949. In 1949, the nursing section was established as a subdivision of the medical department in the Army Surgeon General's Office. In March 1951, nurse cadets were admitted to the Army Medical School and commissioned as officers after two years of training. In August 1967, the Army Nursing School was founded, and the first graduates of the school were produced in October 1970. In January 1971, the Army Nursing School was transformed and renamed the Armed Forces Nursing School as part of the programme combining medical personnel from the three services. In December of the same year, flight nurse officers appeared. In October 1974, a small number of male nurses were admitted. In December 1980, the school was changed to the Armed Forces Nursing Academy (AFNA) and courses upgraded to a four-year bachelor's degree.

With regard to the activities of nurse officers, six nurse officers were first dispatched to Vietnam as members of the ROK Armed Forces in Vietnam in September 1964. In January 1991, the ROK Armed Forces Medical Support Unit was dispatched to the Persian Gulf. In September 1994, six nurse officers

were dispatched to West Sahara as members of the first echelon of the peace-keeping operations. In April 1997, the Eighth Echelon was dispatched.

In the case of the navy, the first female naval nurse officers after the war were commissioned in 1977. Since 1983, the navy has recruited a few nurse officers each year among the graduates of the AFNA and assigned them to various units in the navy. In May 1996, women nurse officers participated in naval operations on ships for the first time in the ROK navy's history.

In the case of the air force, four army nurse officers who were transferred to the air force in March 1993 became the first women in that service since June 1950, when the channel of recruiting women in the air force was closed. At the same time, three nurses were commissioned as second lieutenant from the AFNA. These seven nurse officers formed the Air Force Nurse Officers' Corps (ROK Army Headquarters, 1998).

From Segregation to Integration: From the Women's Army Corps to Women in the Military

In January 1990, the Women's Army Corps was officially abolished as an independent corps. In 1990, 35 new women officers were produced in seven branches. In 2001, the number increased to 143 in 14 different branches. Today, all but a few branches such as artillery, armour and chaplaincy are open to women. The Ministry of National Defence (MND) aims to increase women's presence in the armed forces from the current 1.6 percent (as of November 2001) to 5.0 percent and to open almost all the branches by the year 2020 (MND, 2002). In 2020, about 7000 women are expected to make up about 5.0 percent of the total officers and NCOs in three services. The army's future plan for utilizing women includes raising the percentage of women officers to 6.3 percent from the current 2.5 percent and NCOs to 3.9 percent from the current 1.6 percent (see Table 1).

Since military education and promotion go hand in hand, women are being admitted on an equal basis to the officers basic course (OBC), officers advanced course (OAC) and the Army War College for officers, as well as to the specialty training course for NCOs. Today, women whose rank is that of major attend the Army War College. In 2003, the Women's Army School which has been a training centre for women officer and NCO candidates is scheduled to close and the officers training course will be integrated into the South Korea Third Military Academy, and the NCOs course will be taken over by the Army NCO School. Furthermore, up to the rank of major, those who are to be promoted will be selected by open competition regardless of gender.

While the rate of promotion and level of training for women in the military are becoming more equal to those of men, it is clear that there exist

Table 1 Long-Term Plan for Recruiting Women Officers and NCOs

		Army		*Navy*		*Air Force*	
Year	*Total*	*Officer*	*NCO*	*Officer*	*NCO*	*Officer*	*NCO*
1999	2085	1183	838	34	0	30	0
2001	2618	1459	953	49	0	67	90
2003	3327	1725	1060	94	40	140	268
2020	7038	3103	1927	323	700	415	570

Source: Kookbang Ilbo (8 March 2001).

many areas which are off limits to women. For example, women are not allowed in the units that perform combat missions, but are assigned as company commanders and platoon leaders at the army training centre, or as instructors and drill personnel at the education and training units. By law, women are prohibited from participating in combat directly. Therefore, those women who are already assigned to the training battalions of the infantry divisions as company commanders or platoon leaders will be replaced by men in wartime.

In 2000, the navy and the air force started to accept women for their officers candidate schools (OCSs). Both services disclosed their detailed timetable to utilize women NCOs in the future. In the same year, the air force announced that it would recruit women NCOs for the first time in its history (*Kookbang Ilbo* [Defense Daily], 3 September 2000). Single women aged 18–27 with high school education or over are eligible for admission. After a 14-week training period, they were commissioned as staff sergeants in May 2001 to serve for four years with options of an extension or long-term service. In 2003, all corps in the navy are expected to open their doors to women, including crews in combat vessels, except for submarine and special warfare units. In the air force, fighter pilot positions are now open to women as well.

Service Academies

The decision to admit women into the service academies was the most noteworthy of all the areas of the military to accept women. During the campaign for the 14th presidency in 1992, Democratic Liberty Party presidential candidate Kim Young-Sam had promised, if elected, to open service academies to women as part of his campaign strategies. After Kim was elected as President, the newly formed Administration Renewal Committee of the government demanded the MND open three service academies simultaneously to women starting in 1997. However, the MND reluctantly counter-proposed a step-by-step approach regarding the acceptance of women; at the first stage, only

the Korea Air Force Academy (KAFA) accepted women and the other service academies would wait and see how well the coeducation process went. The MND also expressed its view that since service academies were established to produce combat commanders, it was not appropriate to admit women into the academies. Politicians strongly urged the government to keep the election pledge, and the ministry in charge of women's affairs supported them.

The debates ended with a step-by-step implementation of admitting women to service academies. The KAFA became the first service academy to admit women in 1997, followed by the Korea Military Academy (KMA) in 1998 and by the Korea Naval Academy (KNA) in 1999 (*The National Defense News*, May 1997). Each service academy currently admits 10 percent women each year. Admittance for service academies is highly competitive. For example, during the 1999 academic year, only one out of every 20 female applicants for the KMA was selected, while one out of every 18 for the KAFA and one of every 56 for the KNA were admitted. The admittance of women to the naval academy is partially responsible for the KNA's having the highest level of competition among women that year. In January 2001, seven women KAFA cadets entered the basic flight training course for the first time. After a one-and-half year training course they will become full-fledged fighter pilots.

Academy graduates are utilized in the entire corps, while OCS graduates are assigned to technical, administrative and special corps. The personnel management guidelines of the armed forces stipulate that in principle there is no sexual discrimination, but women tend to be assigned to the posts that are deemed specifically appropriate for women. The guidelines also stipulate that, for the time being, certain duties are not to be assigned to women, such as being on the frontline of battlefields or in remote and isolated areas.

Perceptions of Military Women

Now that women have been admitted into the military, their effectiveness has become a critical issue. How do military personnel, both male and female, perceive women's role and effectiveness in the military? The Korea Institute for Defence Analyses (KIDA) has conducted a research project on the recruitment and utilization of women soldiers since June 2000. For part of this project a sample survey was carried out with 992 officers and NCOs, both male and female, from the army, navy and air force during the month of August 2000 (Dohkgoh, 2000).

The respondents were composed of 639 army officers and NCOs, 234 from the navy and 119 from the air force. According to rank, there were 378 field-grade officers, 292 company-grade officers (including four warrant officers) and 307 NCOs. The preliminary report of the project revealed the results as shown in Table 2. Overall, the evaluation towards women in the

military seemed positive although gender differences were detected on the role of servicewomen.

As expected, military women were more positive than their male counterparts on all aspects of military life. Men were also positive, but to a lesser extent. The most conspicuous results were attitudes about women's propensity for precision and meticulousness in their performance, particularly in administrative clerical work. Percentage differences between men and women showed that women were more likely to feel that they possess a strong sense of cooperation in their work and responsibilities. Also if equal opportunities were rendered to women, they felt there would be no reason for women to perform duties less adequately than men. Men tended to feel that military women carried out their duty properly, but in certain aspects they had reservations about women's roles and functions, whereas women appeared to be highly motivated and well prepared to serve in any area of the military just as well as men were.

The majority of military men and women recognized women's inferiority in terms of physical fitness, but discrepant views existed with regard to other kinds of ability between men and women (see Table 3). Women soldiers

Table 2 Attitudes towards Women Soldiers (in percentages of affirmative responses)

Statement ('Military women . . .')	*Men*	*Women*	*% dif.*[a]
Have no plan for long-term self-development	35.3	24.4	–10.9
Lack the sense of professionalism and challenge	34.5	19.3	–15.2
Are passive in self-expression	27.6	17.5	–10.1
Lack in comradeship among themselves	26.1	27.7	1.6
Show expertise on jobs as good as men	71.1	84.9	13.8
Are not inferior if chances are given to exhibit their ability	74.1	92.2	18.1
Are precise and meticulous in work	80.3	91.0	10.7
Have a strong sense of responsibility and do their best	71.4	95.1	23.7
Show a strong sense of cooperation in work	58.6	82.5	23.9
Are superior in administrative clerical work	74.3	89.2	14.9
Are good at management of and consultation with soldiers	64.9	80.7	15.8
Render vitality to units	65.6	78.8	13.2
N	801	166	

[a] Indicates percentage difference between men and women (women – men).
Source: Dohkgoh (2000).

believed that there were no differences between the sexes in self-confidence, leadership, ability to succeed in the military and response to stress, whereas men were reluctant to accept this view. A large number of men were certain that women were inferior in leadership, response to stress and self-confidence and to a lesser extent mental strength and ability to succeed in the military.

As to mental strength, a gender difference in assessment is most conspicuous. Nearly half of the female respondents believed in women's superiority over men in mental strength, while the other half believed that there was no gender difference in this area. On the other hand, 40 percent of males indicated women's inferiority. As mentioned, both men and women agreed on women's inferiority in terms of physical strength, but as far as mental strength was concerned, women were not willing to own the inferiority imputed to them by men but tended instead to attribute mental weakness to men. In many cases, views towards the opposite sex are likely to derive from superficial prejudgements because women's assignments in the lower-level echelons of units have been limited and, thus, many male soldiers have never had experience of working together with females.

Readiness, Cohesion and Morale: Positive and Negative Aspects of Women's Presence in the Military

In the 1960s to 1970s the issue of including women in the military was controversial among policy-makers and politicians because many believed that

Table 3 Assessment of Women's Ability as Military Personnel vis-a-vis Men (in percentages)

Criteria	*Sex*	*Inferior*	*No Difference*	*Superior*
Physical fitness	Men	91.1	8.9	0.0
	Women	77.7	22.3	0.0
Self-confidence	Men	53.5	45.5	1.0
	Women	12.7	63.9	23.5
Mental strength	Men	40.0	54.7	5.3
	Women	6.6	45.6	47.9
Response to stress	Men	54.6	41.2	4.2
	Women	21.1	49.4	29.6
Leadership	Men	68.5	30.7	0.9
	Women	25.3	68.1	6.6
Ability to succeed in the military	Men	39.8	58.2	2.1
	Women	15.7	67.5	16.9

Source: Dohkgoh (2000).

women's physical features limited their use in combat missions. Therefore, it was widely believed that it was costly to maintain women in the armed forces. Recently, some women's universities expressed a desire to the MND to set up Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programmes for female students on campus, but they received a negative response from the military authority by reason of budget and personnel constraints (*Chosun Ilbo*, 19 October 2001). Although gender integration is incessantly pursued by the Korean armed forces with respect to recruitment and utilization, it seems too early to make a definite assessment of the efforts to raise the quota of women in barracks. What, then, are the benefits of having women in the military? The remainder of this article discusses the advantages with a focus on three aspects: social representation, cultural integration with the civilian sector and the recruitment of high-quality personnel.

Social Representation

The armed forces have to be socially representative. The military is an organization that exercises and manages violence legitimately, so their presence should be morally supported by the people. Social representation stems from citizenship. Military service is seen as a right as well as an obligation of the citizenry. If being a citizen means carrying out one's obligations in order to guarantee membership in society, then disallowing opportunities limits one's citizenship (Hong, 1996: 213–24). Social representation in the military implies that the military organization should reflect the sociodemographic composition of the entire society. Therefore, it must not under- or overrepresent specific strata or groups, or recruit a disproportionately large number of individuals from an economically and/or socially deprived stratum.

The US armed forces have already experienced such a phenomenon under the all-volunteer system. For example, the percentage of blacks in the whole population in 2000 was about 12 percent, but as of May 2000 blacks represented 29 percent of enlisted soldiers in the army. In all services differences in racial composition are denoted by rank: in 2000 Caucasians comprised 83 percent of officers but 62 percent of enlisted personnel (US Department of Defense, 2000). The issue of gender cannot be equated with that of race, but discrimination and prejudice are widely perceived in a similar manner.

If we look at the representation of South Korean women in other professions, we can see decided variations. In 2000, women accounted for 17.6 percent of medical doctors, 19.0 percent of dentists, 7.8 percent of oriental medical practitioners, 57.6 percent of pharmacists, 55.6 percent of primary school teachers, 23.6 percent of high school teachers and 13.7 percent of college professors. On the other hand, women are underrepresented among government officials: women accounted for 13.3 percent in the national

government and 23.3 percent in local government (KWDI, 1999: 354–7). However, the proportion of women in these fields has continued to grow. The representation of women is becoming more prominent in various kinds of civil examinations. The latest statistics show that women make up 11.2 percent of mid-level government officials, 20.0 percent of diplomats and 3.3 percent of technical specialists, all of which marks a substantial rise as compared to the early 1980s. The statistics also indicate that 16.7 percent of those who entered the legal profession as a judge, prosecutor or lawyer in 2002 are women (*Chosun Ilbo*, 21 January 2002).

Women and Military Culture

It is clear that the presence of women in the military will have certain effects on military culture. Traditionally, the military has been regarded as a man's occupation and, in fact, in many fields skills and attitudes traditionally associated with masculinity are required. However, the nature of the military profession has changed and the areas that overlap with the civilian sector have expanded. The sharing of military and civilian areas implies a possibility of utilizing civilians in the military to a greater extent. The advance of science and technology has lessened the importance of physical prowess. Therefore, the area once viewed as 'pure' military has been decreasing and, instead, can be replaced by civilians. Areas of science and technology that are developed in the civilian sector enhance military technology, and vice versa. For example, computer networks have their roots in military communication systems.

Utilization of civilian personnel in the armed forces is coterminous with that of females. It is the presence of women in the military that integrates the military organization with civil society. Participation of women in the military by no means implies masculinizing women soldiers, but filling the deprived areas that might be present in the male-dominated organization. In the civilian sector, internal discord and conflicts are less likely to appear in the organizations that comprise both sexes than those that are single sex. Therefore, the presence of women in the military may contribute to forming a 'new' military culture in the sense that women may contribute to narrowing the distance between the military organization and civil society. It will also help to convert military culture from a 'militant society' to that of 'industrial society' (Spencer, 1967). The culture in militant societies has such characteristics as collective orientation, hierarchical rank, ritualism, uniformity and institutionalism, as opposed to the individualism, specialized role system, rationalism, diversity and 'occupationalism' (Moskos, 1977) that are equated with industrial societies.

Recruitment of a Quality Labour Force

The expansion of opportunities in the military for women may facilitate the recruitment of a higher-quality labour force for the armed forces. Gender discrimination still persists in the labour market, so a great number of qualified women do not enjoy equal employment opportunities. As women's desire to participate in the labour market increases, more women will pursue their own career path than before. Therefore, recruiting women soldiers to ensure quality human resources in the armed forces is a good strategy for solving personnel problems. For all three service academies, the competition rate for entrance was much higher among women than men. For the academic year 2002, one out of every 27.7 female vs 17.4 male applicants was selected as incoming cadets for the KMA, one out of every 26.6 female vs 13.4 male applicants for the KNA and one of every 17.4 female vs 10.4 male applicants for the KAFA. Furthermore, women scored the highest points in the entrance examinations in the KNA and the KAFA (*Kookbang Ilbo*, 8 December 2001).

Recently, recruitment of qualified young officers and NCOs has become a timely issue. It is advisable to place women soldiers in positions where men are not required. Furthermore, if we assume that the armed forces will be downsized in the future, we can also imagine that military personnel will be replaced by civilians and those in the service will be transferred to 'pure' military missions.

Concluding Remarks

The expansion of women's participation in the labour force is a social trend. In response to governmental policies on women's affairs the MND has been deeply concerned with the utilization of women in the armed forces. It became a policy issue to assign women to appropriate positions. The MND believes that women are less likely to be involved in corruption and frauds so that they can be more favourably utilized in corruption-prone posts. And it also deems that 'womanly delicacy and tenderness' would contribute to the formation of a new culture in the barracks (MND, 2001).

However, in a mixed-gender organization, women's active commitment to claim equality in the organization is required. This might place a greater burden on women. The success of utilizing women in the military depends on how servicewomen respond to expectations from the people and the military. Women must not play a supplementary role to men, but constitute full-fledged members of the organization. Currently, the South Korean armed services is experimenting with the issue of gender integration in assignments, allocation and career management of women soldiers.

Apparently, the appearance of a woman general, women fighter pilots and women combat vessel crew positions did not result in the unreservedly

enthusiastic acceptance of women on the part of the military community. There are still quite a few military leaders who are sceptical of the effectiveness of female soldiers and reason against the utility of women in the military. Military women have to make great efforts through self-sacrifice and more active participation in the military organization to overcome the prejudices that might remain in the minds of their male colleagues, superiors or subordinates. It goes without saying that male soldiers have to change their attitudes towards women in the military to make the armed forces a more gender-integrated organization.

In the next decade or two, South Korean society is likely to face structural change in every aspect of daily life more accelerated than in previous decades. Accordingly, the military institution should be more responsive to the changing environment. The missions and infrastructure of the armed services may have to be redefined and reorganized in order to incorporate social demands. In this sense, the underrepresentation of women in the military has to be carefully reviewed from a long-term perspective and various measures have to be explored to utilize women in order to attain the recruitment and retention goals of becoming the best qualified personnel in the armed forces.

Notes

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1 In 1965 it was permitted for nurse officers to get pregnant.
2 As of May 2000, 40 percent of women officers and 35 percent of women NCOs were married. And 28 percent of women officers and 20 percent of women NCOs had a military spouse (ROK Army Headquarters, 2000: 264).
3 Army nurse officers had been already dispatched to Vietnam as early as September 1964.

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
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Gwyn Harries-Jenkins

Women in Extended Roles in the Military: Legal Issues

The Historical Perspective

Over the past 30 years, women have come to play an increasingly important part in western armed forces. An international change in military personnel policies has been variously attributed to the downsizing of the military following the end of the Cold War; a demographic trough; demands in the parent society for the extension of gender equality; the example of the wider participation of women in the national labour force; the shift away from male conscription to the recruitment of an integrated all-volunteer force (AVF); shortages of male recruits; and legal restrictions on the exclusion of women. Even so, the absolute number of military women in the West continues to be small. Quantitatively, they continue to be underrepresented in armed forces in comparison with their relative numbers in society. Rarely does the proportion of women in the military approach 15 percent (US 14.0 percent; New Zealand 14.5 percent), let alone exceed this (Australia 16.8 percent). The position in a selection of western armed forces is given in Table 1. For comparison, the percentage of women in the 18–32 age range, from which military personnel tend to be drawn, is also given. There is still some way to go before women represent approximately half of the military population, which is the proportion they usually represent in the population at large.

It is significant that in some instances the increase in the percentage of women in a national military is not matched by an increase in their *absolute* number. Indeed, the latter may decline. This is shown in the case of Belgium where, although the percentage of women in the armed forces increased from 1.22 percent in 1976 to 3.75 percent in 1986, and to 7.60 percent and 7.70 percent in 2000 and 2001 respectively, the absolute number of women has declined from a high of 3473 in 1986 to 3202 in 2000 and 3190 in 2001. This

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Table 1 Representation of Women in Selected Western Armed Forces

Country	*Total Population (1000s)*	*Population Age 18–32 (1000s)*	*Female Population Age 18–32 (1000s)*	%	*Total Active Armed Forces (N)*	*Active Women Personnel (N)*	%
Belgium	10,126	1,987	977	49.2	41,428	3,190	7.7
Canada	29,512	5,990	2,955	49.3	57,526	6,558	11.4
Denmark	5,267	1,051	517	49.2	15,409	863	5.6
France	59,425	12,223	5,982	48.9	323,717	27,516	8.5
Germany	82,112	16,568	8,040	48.5	200,821	5,623	2.8
Greece	10,692	2,358	1,151	48.8	161,973	6,155	3.8
Italy	57,930	12,182	5,375	44.1	250,600	438	0.17
Netherlands	15,794	3,104	1,512	48.7	52,125	4,170	8.0
Norway	4,443	911	442	48.5	36,000	1,152	3.2
Spain	39,237	9,364	4,564	48.7	111,414	6,462	5.8
UK	58,882	11,528	5,637	48.8	205,222	16,623	8.1
USA	275,636	56,102	27,614	49.2	1,417,514	198,452	14.0

Sources. Calculated from Annual Review of Women in NATO's Armed Forces 2000–2001; IISS (2000)

inconsistency can be variously attributed to the overall downsizing of the national military establishment in general and to the consequences of a shift from male conscription to the multi-gender AVF in particular. Nevertheless, the continuing trend is for women here, as elsewhere in Europe, to play a more important role in western armed forces as an expanding range of military occupational specialties in those forces are now available to them.

In the process of opening up the military to women, the initial issue was the identification of the potential role of women in these forces (Goldman, 1973). The introduction of the AVF in the US subsequently prompted a major review of traditional policies which had excluded women from certain specialties (Moskos, 1982). A 1997 RAND report (Harrell and Miller, 1997) showed that for the US the policy of extending the roles of women in the military was going more or less according to plan. A subsequent review of British experience showed that by 1991, 100 of the 134 trades in the army were open to women (74.6 percent); a more liberal personnel policy in the Royal Navy was seen to be 'significant', because 'it was at the leading edge of gender integration policy during the late 1980s' (Dandeker and Segal, 1996: 36). Overall, this was a period in which the complexity of the debate surrounding the fuller integration of women into the western military was very evident (Fenner, 2001). This was particularly apparent in the often highly critical analyses of contemporary military personnel policy in the US at this time. The restrictions inherent in such a policy were seen to contrast markedly with the all-inclusive policies adopted by some European military establishments. In Denmark, for example, women from 1988 onwards had access to all military positions subject to the qualifications which were applied equally to male applicants. Sweden is more generally cited as an example of the way in which a pattern of change antedated and anticipated developments elsewhere in the West. A three-step reform programme ensured that by the end of its second phase in 1983, almost every post in the three Swedish services was open to women and men alike. Among the exceptions at this time were such occupational specialties such as fighter pilot, ranger soldier, submariner and service with the infantry, cavalry and armoured troops. When the final phase of the reform programme was completed in 1989, the political impetus was the refusal of the Swedish government to accept the claim of the Supreme Commander of its armed forces that medical and economic reasons justified the retention of a policy of exclusion. In a decision which mirrored political decisions taken in Canada, the government argued that it was constitutionally unlawful to deny women the right to serve in all posts in the armed forces. Accordingly, not only were combat service, combat support and combat posts open to women applicants, but, most significantly, so were direct combat on the ground specialties.

A continuing issue facing western European military establishments is whether *all* military occupational specialties can be opened to suitable and

qualified applicants, irrespective of gender. Associated with this is the very specific question of the nature of legislation which affects the employment of women in extended roles within the military. In contrast with the substantial body of literature which considers the moral questions and intellectual arguments associated with such employment, legal issues have received comparatively little consideration. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to review the current European situation, paying particular attention to the judicial intervention which has affected traditional military personnel policies.

The Legal Framework

In 2000, the *Court of Justice of the European Community* (ECJ) reached two major decisions relating to the recruitment of women to the military:

- Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-285/98)
- Sirdar v. The Army Board, Secretary of State for Defence (Case C-273/97).

Both judgments were rulings on the interpretation of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. Article 2(1) of the Directive clearly states:

> 2(1) For the purpose of the following provisions, the principle of equal treatment shall mean there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status.

Article 2(2) of the Directive, however, could arguably be said to accept exceptions to the general rule:

> 2(2) This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to exclude from its field of application those occupational activities and, where appropriate, the training leading thereto, for which by reason of their nature or the context in which they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor.

The Main Proceedings

In the first case, Tanja Kreil, who had been trained in electronics, applied in 1996 to serve in the Bundeswehr as a volunteer, requesting a role in weapon electronics maintenance. Essentially, this would be in a combat support role, as distinct from service in a combat or direct combat on the ground role. Even

so, her application was rejected by the Bundeswehr's recruitment centre. This decision was endorsed by its head staff office on the grounds that women were barred by German law from serving in positions involving the use of arms. Article 3a of the Soldatenlaufbahnverordnung (Regulation on Soldiers' Careers) laid down that women could only enlist as volunteers and only in the medical and military music services (bands). They were excluded completely from armed service.

Initially, Tanja Kreil brought an action in the Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) in Hanover on the grounds that the rejection of her application on the basis solely of her sex was contrary to European Community law. The Administrative Court decided to stay the proceedings and refer the case to the European Court of Justice (EJC) for a preliminary ruling on the question of whether the Council Directive of 1976, in particular Article 2(2), was infringed by Article 3a of the German Regulation on Soldiers' Careers.

Essentially, the ECJ was asked whether the 1976 Council Directive overruled the application of national provisions such as those of German law which barred women from military posts involving the use of arms and which allowed them access only to the medical and military music services. The applicant argued that this bar constituted direct discrimination contrary to the Directive; it was further argued that under Community law, a law or a regulation could not prohibit a woman from access to the occupation which she wanted to follow.

In response, the German government put forward three points:

- First, that Community law did not override the provisions of the German Soldatengesetz (Law on Soldiers) or the Soldatenlaufbahnverordnung (Regulation on Soldiers' Careers).
- Second, that Community law did not govern matters of defence, which formed part of the field of common foreign and security policy which remained within the member states' sphere of sovereignty.
- Third, even if the Directive could be applied to the armed forces, the national provisions which limited the employment of women, were justifiable under Articles 2(2) and 2(3) of the Directive.

The Italian and UK governments, in support, concentrated on two specific issues. First, that decisions concerning the organization and combat capacity of the armed forces did not fall within the scope of Community law. Alternatively, it was argued that, in the circumstances in question, Article 2(2) of the Directive allowed women to be excluded from service in combat units.
In its judgment of the 11 January 2000, the Court ruled

- That the Directive, which is applicable to employment in the public service, applied to employment in the armed forces;

- That Article 2(3) of the Directive could not justify greater protection for women against risks to which men and women were equally exposed. The Article, it was noted, was intended to protect a woman's biological condition and the special relationship which existed between a woman and her child;
- That the total exclusion of women from all military posts involving the use of arms was not one of the differences of treatment allowed by Article 2(3) of the Directive;
- That, having regard for the very nature of armed forces, the fact that persons serving in those forces might be called upon to use arms, could not, in itself, justify the exclusion of women from access to military posts.

Finally, the Court ruled in response to the question referred to it by the Administrative Court in Hanover, that national provisions, such as those of German law, governing the employment of women did not override Community law. The Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976, it was said, 'precludes the application of national provisions'.

This decision of the European Court was very much concerned with a fundamental issue of constitutional law. The basic question was whether national or Community law governed the recruitment of women to extended roles within national armed forces. Accordingly, one of the complex problems which had to be considered was that of derogation. This principle, defined by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as, 'the partial abrogation or repeal of a law', lessens the extent to which a particular law or regulation applies. In European Community law, derogation has to refer to a specific rather than general situation (Kreil: 16.17). In the Kreil case, the ECJ held that an exclusion from Community law which would apply to almost *all* military posts in the Bundeswehr could not be regarded, 'As a derogating measure justified by the specific nature of the posts in question or by the particular context in which the activities in question are carried out' (Kreil: 28).

This question of derogation had previously arisen in the case of *Sirdar* v. *The Army Board, Secretary of State for Defence* (ECJ, 1999, C 273/97). Angela Maria Sirdar had served in the British army as a chef from 1983 onwards. From 1990, she was posted to a commando regiment of the Royal Artillery until, in 1994, she was told she was to be one of more than 500 chefs to be made redundant in 1995. In July 1994, Mrs Sirdar received an offer of transfer to the Royal Marines, which had a shortage of chefs. The offer was subject to her passing an initial selection board and completing the All-Arms Commando Course (AACC). Subsequently, the offer was withdrawn, on the grounds that the Royal Marines did not recruit women, other than to the Royal Marines Band Service.

After she had been made redundant, Mrs Sirdar brought a case before the Bury St Edmunds Industrial Tribunal, arguing that she had been the victim of discrimination based on her sex. In the UK, the principle of equal treatment for men and women is governed by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Section 85(4) of that Act, however, stipulates that,

> Nothing in this Act shall render unlawful an act done for the purpose of ensuring the combat effectiveness of the naval, military or air forces.

The Tribunal, in the light of Section 85(4), referred a number of questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. In the first two of these, the critical issue was whether decisions taken by a national government with regard to employment, vocational training and working conditions in the armed forces for the purpose of ensuring combat effectiveness fell outside the scope of Council Directive 76/207/EEC. This issue was particularly critical with regard to marine commando units. The UK government, supported by the French and Portuguese, submitted that decisions concerning the armed forces, especially those taken for the purpose of ensuring combat effectiveness, fell outside the EC Treaty. The ECJ, however, ruled that these decisions did not 'fall altogether outside the scope of Community Law' (Sirdar: 20).

Up to this point, as in the Kreil case, the debate centred around issues of constitutional law which had only a limited extra-European interest. In responding to the fifth and sixth question submitted by the Tribunal, the ECJ however considered an issue of more general interest, namely that of the policy of excluding women from special forces. The question before the Court was, 'whether, and if so under what conditions, the exclusion of women from service in combat units such as the Royal Marines may be justified under Article 2(2) of the Directive' (Sirdar: 21).

The Royal Marines argued that they were a small force which was the 'point of the arrow head'. Within the Royal Marines General Service, which comprised 552 officers and 5337 other ranks, all were commando trained. Chefs were required to serve as frontline fighting troops for all marines were engaged and trained without exception, irrespective of their secondary specializations, to fulfil that primary role. The adopted principle was that of interoperability, which was the cornerstone of the operational capability and combat effectiveness of the Royal Marines as a military force.

Under Article 2(2) of the Directive, member states have the option of excluding from the scope of that Directive occupational activities for which by reason of their nature or the context in which they are carried out, sex constitutes a determining factor. The Court in the Sirdar case (para. 31) held that in the particular instance of the British Royal Marines,

> . . . the competent authorities were entitled, in the exercise of their discretion as to whether to maintain the exclusion in question in the light of social developments, and without abusing the principle of proportionality, to come to the

> view that the specific conditions for deployment of the assault units of which the Royal Marines are composed, and in particular the role of interoperability to which they are subject, justified their composition remaining exclusively male.

The rationale of the Court's decision in this judgment of 26 October 1999 made it clear that the organization of the British Marines differed fundamentally from that of other units in the British armed forces. Their adherence to the principle of interoperability accorded with the scope of the derogation from the individual right to equal treatment of men and women. The principle of proportionality was also observed, for the derogation in the particular instance of the Royal Marines remained within the limits of what was appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim in view.

In this legal decision, five points are important:

- First, it is at the discretion of a national government as to whether the principle of derogation will be invoked or not;
- Second, derogation can only be justified in *specific* cases, such as the need to maintain a policy of interoperability within the military organization;
- Third, such interoperability is to be seen as the cornerstone of the operational capability and combat effectiveness of a military force;
- Fourth, the measurement of operational capability is to be based on the professional assessment by military personnel of a given situation;
- Fifth, combat effectiveness is defined as the ability of an individual, unit or formation to carry out its mission successfully in any likely circumstance.

The Nature of the Evidence

Following the decision in the Kreil case, the Bundeswehr in January 2001 recruited 244 new women recruits who, classified as combatants, reported for basic training (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 January 2001). In the UK, the Royal Marines, to date, continue to exclude women from the General Service component of the force. Even so, the All-Arms Commando Course recruited its first three women trainees in March 2001.[1] The continuing importance of the two cases under review, however, is the way in which the legal debate which occurred tested the basis of the adopted exclusion policies. David Segal summarizes the position in his general conclusion that

> The legal issues seem to be the nature of evidence on this matter and who bears the burden of proof. If the decision is to be made on the basis of experience rather than prejudice, is it up to the armed forces to demonstrate that the presence of women degrades performance, as they argue, or is the responsibility of women to demonstrate that their presence does not reduce effectiveness? (Segal, 2000: 3)

Since the Kreil case was, essentially, a question of constitutional law, the legal issues in that instance were relatively straightforward. Once it had been decided that national law in this case did not override Community law, and in particular, the 1976 Directive concerning employment, Tanja Kreil won. The legal issues in Sirdar, however, were more complex. Armor identified the totality of these in another context, in his comments, 'it may be difficult to defend closure of ground combat units because of combat risks alone. It is possible to adopt other grounds for exclusion, such as fighting effectiveness, privacy considerations, morale or good order and discipline' (Armor, 1996: 24).

Because the applicability of the principle of derogation was linked to the pertinence of Section 85(4) of the British Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, the primary defence put forward on behalf of the Royal Marines in the Sirdar case argued that the exclusion of women was 'done for the purpose of ensuring combat effectiveness'. Accordingly, as Segal notes, the initial legal issue was 'the nature of evidence on this matter'.

From the legal perspective, a distinction has initially to be drawn between the *generic* issue of the recruitment of women to armed forces and the *specific* question of their exclusion from special forces such as the British Royal Marines Commandos. Generally, as we have seen, the position in Europe is governed by Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 as this was interpreted in the Kreil decision. 'Exclusion', however, still generates a continuing debate within European military establishments. Ultimately, the decision to extend the number and type of roles which are open to women is a political decision, but if conclusions are to be reached on the basis of rationality and reason, rather than prejudice, the relevant research and technical bases of decision-making are of critical importance. These form the relevant legal evidence.

A considerable body of evidence supports such bases but a preliminary issue is the relationship of this evidence to the specific question of the exclusion of women from *special forces*. The evidence relates to a variety of roles which are currently filled by women in the military but these roles differ markedly from such specific specialties as commando, airborne, ranger and so on. The difference can be more readily identified from the typology of roles given in Table 2. The table is for research purposes only; it does not necessarily accord with the categorizations adopted by European armed forces for operational and administrative reasons.

Generally, women are currently recruited in western armed forces to roles in categories 1–4. In some countries, they can serve in category 5 (e.g. Canada, Sweden) but in no case do they currently serve in category 6. However, before considering the research and technical bases of political decisions to open fully to women category 6, we need to be clear about the nature and scope of categories within the postulated typology.

Table 2 Categories of Roles in Armed Forces

	Category	*Examples*
1	Non-combatant	Military nurse
2	Combat service	Clerk; cook
3	Combat support	Instrument fitter; radar operator
4	Combat	Pilot; weapons operator
5	Direct ground combat	Tank crew; infanteer
6	Special forces	Marine commando; ranger

Category 1: Non-Combatant

Historically, women were formally limited to non-combatant roles, noticeably nursing. British experience in this area is illustrative of more general European military practice. After the establishment in 1856 of the first purpose-built military hospital staffed by civilian nurses, the Army Nursing Service was subsequently set up. More recently, this occupational specialism has been added to; today, these non-combatant roles include medicine and 'specialties allied to medicine'. There is, however, throughout the West a continuing tendency in the case of women personnel to identify them primarily with their traditional role of *military nurse*. Irrespective of the uniqueness of their status under the Geneva Convention, nurses in western armed forces, particularly battlefield specialists, require personal qualities very reminiscent of those attributed to the combat troops: 'strength, psychological and emotional stability, bravery under fire and willingness to risk capture' (Fenner, 2001: 11). Paradoxically, in a reversal of common problems of gender integration within the military, a universal contemporary difficulty in western armed forces is the assimilation of male nurses into a hitherto single-gender environment.

Category 2: Combat Service

During the First World War, major shortages of male personnel in those countries which had suffered very heavy casualty rates resulted in the recruitment of women to combat service roles. Initially, a cultural legacy was reflected in a considerable reluctance to employ women other than in traditional non-combatant roles. The success, however, of women in non-traditional civilian occupations, such as the munitions industry, encouraged the western military establishment to reconsider former policies. In April 1915 in Britain, for example, an Army Council Instruction (ACI) authorized the employment of women as uniformed cooks and waitresses in home-based military establishments (Beckett, 1985: 15). When the Women's Legion

received official recognition in February 1916, some of the 6000 women who were recruited by the end of the year served with the Royal Flying Corps. Here, their occupational specialties were not limited to the traditional women's tasks of clerk and cook, for they also included new technical roles such as motor-cycle dispatch rider (Hobart, 2000: 8). This latter role in the French army was more usually associated with the specialty of *automobiliste* (driver).

Category 3: Combat Support

From the Second World War onwards, women have been recruited to combat support roles. The history of their role has tended to concentrate on their employment in such visible areas as anti-aircraft batteries and operations rooms. In reality, the majority in the past served in conventional and mundane roles in communications and logistics occupational specialties. Increasingly, however, military establishments in Western Europe today seek to make greater use of the ability which women have displayed in these roles. Particular attention is paid to utilizing the intellectual ability, technical skills and manual dexterity which women have displayed.

A pertinent staffing issue is the limitation, if any, to be placed on the number of women to be recruited to posts in this category. For countries such as Italy, which have only recently moved from a policy of excluding women from the military to the limited recruitment of women technical officers, the question of imposing selection quotas is irrelevant. In other countries, however, particularly those which are considering shifting from a traditional personnel policy based on the draft to that of the AVF, the identification of appropriate force profiles is a matter of concern. The need to achieve a balance between equal opportunities policies, career planning strategies and the maintenance of recruiting standards emphasizes the importance of appropriate research and technical findings. These form the basis of the decisions which govern recruitment to these specialist roles.

Category 4: Combat

The distinction between combat support and combat roles is, in an increasingly technological military, less clear than hitherto. Nevertheless, the roles which constitute categories 4, 5 and 6 continue to be the core specialties within the western military. The changing nature of contemporary warfare has been noted in a number of studies[2] but combat roles continue to be uniquely characterized by their identification with direct offensive rather than indirect or defensive action. A difference, however, can be drawn between the military roles associated with categories 4 and 5. The former are most readily identified with *impersonal* or *distant combat*. This is seen in roles such as aircrew specialties, missile launch operators and a comprehensive range of billets on board ships. Notwithstanding the expertise which women

have demonstrated in these roles, they continue for a number of complex reasons to be underrepresented and there is a very real danger of tokenism (Enloe, 1983). Almost without exception, all western armed forces recruit women to these category 4 occupational specialisms, but in analysing problems of underrepresentation, the extensive body of research literature needs careful evaluation in the light of definitional problems.

Category 5: Direct Ground Combat

Although the distinction between category 3 (combat support) and category 4 (combat) may be exceedingly fine in many of the missions carried out by contemporary western armed forces, direct ground combat occupational specialties remain highly distinctive. In his 1994 guidance to the American services regarding women in combat, the then US Secretary of Defense allowed the closure of units whose primary mission was 'direct combat on the ground'. These units were defined as 'units that engage the enemy with individual or crew weapons and with a high probability of physical contact' (Aspin, 1994). The roles associated with individualist offensive action continue to be the definitional specialisms of the modern western military. They are typified by roles as tank crews or infanteers and, as such, have traditionally been exclusively male in composition.

Increasingly in Western Europe, women are being recruited to category 5 occupational specialties. A major complication, however, is the tendency for individual countries to be affected in their decision-making by past experience, particularly that of the Second World War. Although not directly relevant, Russian experience illustrates this. Apart from their role as partisans, women were actively recruited to an all-woman rifle brigade and a rifle regiment by the Moscow military district. Women tank crews fought in the Kursk battle, while more than 1000 graduated from the Central Women's Sniper School (Cottam, 1980; Dick, 2001). Nevertheless, after 1945 women did not serve in Soviet direct ground combat specialisms. Similarly, past experience led the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) to exclude women from these specialisms. Conversely, the Swedish decision of 1989 to recruit women to such specialisms marked the beginning of a trend away from decisions based on, or affected by, experience, to those based on legal requirements.

Category 6: Special Forces

Roles in special forces are highly distinctive. Such forces differ from conventional military formations in many respects. Acting independently or integrated with conventional operations, special forces have unique modes of employment, operational techniques and independence of action. They can be identified with service in such units as marines, commandos, rangers, airborne, special air service, special boat service, SEALS and the foreign legions of some European countries. A distinguishing feature is their

common principle of interoperability, most readily summarized in the maxim of the US Marines, 'every man a rifleman'. The principle is derived from the rigours of the environment in which these forces operate. Given that individual units or detachments cannot be readily reinforced when casualties are suffered, it is essential that all personnel, irrespective of their individual secondary occupational specialisms, will fight in the primary occupational specialism of combat soldier. Accordingly, all personnel are initially trained, irrespective of their subsequent specialization, to the same exacting standard. When the battlefield situation demands it, all are expected to exercise a common degree of controlled aggression.

Traditionally, women without exception have been excluded from this primary role in special forces. In some instances they have been recruited to these forces to fill combat service specialisms. In the US, women marines fill administrative roles. The British Royal Marines recruit women to the Royal Marines Band Service but not to the Royal Marines General Service. Women now serve with the French Foreign Legion in combat service posts. Nevertheless, their exclusion from a combat role continues.

Once a clear distinction has been drawn between the recruitment of women to occupational specialties in categories 1–5 and their exclusion from posts in category 6, we can look more specifically at the basic legal issues associated with such exclusion. Of the grounds for exclusion which Armor notes, the Sirdar case revolved around the question of maintaining the combat effectiveness of the Royal Marines Commandos.

Combat Effectiveness

The concept of combat effectiveness is surprisingly complex. Put simply, the measurement of such effectiveness is the ability of a military force to defeat an opponent. Janowitz (1964: 418), however, reminds us that a military grounded in pragmatic doctrine becomes a constabulary force which is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force and seeking viable international relations rather than victory. The incorporated protective military posture accordingly questions a simplistic definition of combat effectiveness. The concept is essentially multidimensional and no study has yet defined adequately a means of measurement, since its theoretical dimensions embrace such diverse variables as technical skills, morale, cohesion, leadership, efficiency and fighting ability as well as the basic concern with success.

A considerable body of literature examines these variables. Annotated bibliographies (Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, 1981, 1984) are complemented by specific analyses of such terms as 'morale' (Baynes, 1967) and 'cohesion' (Henderson, 1985), while the number of studies concerned with the fighting

ability of national armed forces is legion. Increasingly, moreover, the particular question of the combat effectiveness of special forces has received attention (Vaux, 1986; Stewart, 1991). Even so, the relevance of many of these studies, as hard evidence, when justifying the exclusion of women from special forces, is questionable. Since women have not fought in battle with such forces, there is no *direct* primary evidence as to the effect of their membership of such forces on the combat effectiveness of the latter. For evidence, we have to look at alternative case studies which may or may not have an appropriate relevance to the burden of proof.

Of these, an extensive source of evidence is the operational experience of women in combat support roles (category 3). During the Persian Gulf War, for example, western military establishments deployed personnel in this role largely without gender differentiation. Criteria for selection were based on qualifications, experience and job suitability. Women served under combat conditions to the extent that 'Military women', Fenner (2001: 17) notes, 'were killed, wounded and taken prisoner'.

The basic limitation of such evidence, however, is that it does not relate directly to the question of the effect of women serving on special forces on the combat effectiveness of such forces. An alternative source of evidence, accordingly, is derived from objective studies of the experience of women serving in category 4 roles – combat at a distance. These include service as combat aircrew and service on board ship. In the latter instance, there is no evidence that the presence of women affects adversely the combat effectiveness of the ship. Indeed, such a presence may be seen to have a calming influence during a period of high tension (Tanner, 1999). There is, however, a danger, as O'Neill (2001: 173) comments, that 'Much of the debate over women in combat has centered on a few highly publicized incidents.'

Such an emphasis, as in the case of Lieutenant Kara Hultgrass USN who met her death while piloting an F.14 navy fighter, tends to overlook the contribution more generally made by women in these category 4 roles. From a legal perspective, however, it can be argued that both combat support roles (category 3) and combat at a distance roles (category 4) are still very different from those situations in special forces in which combat effectiveness is essentially linked to individualist offensive action with a high probability of physical contact. Since women do not currently serve in western special forces, the more appropriate evidence accordingly is their experience in direct combat on the ground roles (category 5).

The amount of cogent evidence, however, is limited. Women in general have not served in these roles in actual combat conditions since the Second World War. We have isolated incidents. In the Panama invasion, women MPs were shot at and shot back. In rare instances, the distinction between combat support and combat on the ground has become increasingly blurred. Following the Persian Gulf War, for example, Canadian women from a combat

engineer regiment arrived on the Iraq–Kuwait border to clear mines and unexploded shells (Tanner, 1999: 44). Equally, women are deployed in peacekeeping operations where there is a very real possibility of risk. For the first time, a British woman officer led Gurkha soldiers into a war zone when she took 50 drivers from the Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment to Kosovo in July 2001 to supply weapons and ammunition (*Sunday Telegraph*, 10 June 2001).

More extensive objective evidence, however, can be obtained from the experience of women in direct combat on the ground roles in the training situation. Critics continue to assert that the latter cannot approximate 'real' combat conditions and that conclusions reached are of limited relevance. Even so, it is to be noted that persistent reference is made to three variables which may affect the combat effectiveness of integrated combat arms or which might affect the combat effectiveness of integrated special forces:

- The physical strength and stamina of women;
- Issues of privacy;
- Unit cohesion.

Physical Strength

The question of the required physical strength of the members of special forces or of ground combat units has to be seen, not in abstract, but against the functions of those units. The primary purpose of special forces is to provide high-capability military units designed for high-intensity amphibious and expeditionary operations as part of allied and national rapid reaction forces. Such military formations are capable of conducting sophisticated coercion, peace enforcement or peacekeeping operations. Essentially, these are flexible, militarily balanced forces based on a highly mobile, light infantry capability. Characterized by their high state of readiness, trained and equipped to operate in extremes of climate and terrain, the combat effectiveness of individual force members is substantially dependent on their level of physical strength and stamina. For the UK, the Equal Opportunities Commission, following more general European guidelines, stresses that,

> In the case of a fitness requirement the employer would need to show that the fitness level identified as a minimum was operationally necessary for doing the job in question ... and it could be demonstrated that individuals who met a lower standard could not actually perform the relevant tasks satisfactorily.

Accordingly, to establish appropriate levels of physical strength and stamina for employment in special forces, minimum standards have to be specified and validated. Objective criteria can be readily established. The ability to lift a 44-kg (97 lb) load to 1.70 m (5 ft 7 in), for example, represents the basic infantry standard for the British army. Safe limits of compressive loading, however, lay down that the maximum recommended load for an individual

should not exceed 40 percent of body weight (Cathcart, 1923). Regression equations given by Genaidy et al. (1993) accordingly suggest that 90 percent of males could lift a 46-kg (101 lb) pack without exceeding the safety margin calculated at 60 percent of the compression tolerance limit, compared with 50 percent of females. For the British Royal Marines, a basic criteria test is their ability to complete a nine-mile speed march in 90 minutes with a load of 14.5 kg (32 lb). The proportion of men in the UK likely to have sufficiently high aerobic power to achieve this task is said to be small, and in the case of potential women recruits, very small.

Research, however, indicates that such conclusions have to be treated with considerable caution. In considering the ability of individuals to lift a 45-kg (100 lb) load to a height of 1.32 m (4 ft 4 in), for example, Harman (1988) reminds us that the distribution of data for males and females may overlap in many respects. More specifically, the differences between sexes in terms of their ability to meet a lifting criterion may not be a consequence of gender but the result of 'anthropometric variability', most usually as a consequence of differences in lean body mass (Harman, 1988: 317). In this context, it is significant that 12 women aged between 32 and 48 who spent 23 days in jungle conditions in Brunei, in the area normally used to train special forces personnel, successfully carried a *bergen* (rucksack) crammed with over 50 lb (23 kg) of equipment.[3] It is to be noted, however, that notwithstanding their success, the women were not faced with the ultimate test for employment in the Royal Marines, namely, the ability to carry a load of 48 kg (105.6 lb) for 2 km and 36 kg (80 lb) for a distance of 20 km (12.5 miles) at speed.

It has, however, been put forward as evidence that the differences between the physical capabilities of men and women are not the result of nature but stem from disparate socialization (nurture). Differences are argued to be irrelevant to the debate about extending the role of women in the contemporary military. US Representative Patricia Schroeder (Colorado) thus commented, 'The real issue is training. Some women can indeed carry as much weight and throw as far and run as fast as some men in physical strength and endurance. . . . These women demonstrate that trained individuals can do anything' (Schroeder, 1991: 73).

The British Royal Marines have consistently argued that for employment in special forces, women and men should take and pass exactly the same training courses. Operational experience over years, it is argued, has demonstrated the need for a minimum standard of physical and mental robustness to ensure that these forces can meet the roles they have been given. To counter the argument that this training regime is unduly demanding, requiring more of potential recruits than would be required during service, it is argued that training is specifically related to anticipated operational requirements. The additional argument that gender-free training should be related to the

physical potential of the recruit appropriate to the proposed employment category is accepted. It is, however, stressed that the principle of interoperability dictates that there is only one employment standard for special forces personnel. Accordingly, evidence has to be presented to show that the required physical standards objectively reflect operational requirements.

More generally, the policy in the British army of subjecting women to the same rigorous training regime and tests as men has doubled the number of injuries among female recruits. Gemmel, reporting in the *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, found that the 'gender-free' policy introduced in 1998 is putting women soldiers at risk. Before 1998, women trained alongside men but were not expected to reach the same level of fitness. Since then, all recruits have been expected to reach the same standard of physical fitness, strength and stamina irrespective of their gender. From a comparative review of the number and nature of medical discharges under both systems, Gemmel found that while medical discharges for men remained below 1.5 percent, for women the number rose from 4.6 percent to 11.1 percent. He concluded that women are now eight times more likely than the male recruits to be discharged with an over-use injury. He suggests that,

> It is clear that there are differences in muscle physiology, bone architecture and body composition that interact to place women at a substantial disadvantage when training or working to the same output as males. Health and safety guidances require employers to make allowances for these gender differences, yet this has been overlooked in the interests of meeting equal opportunities legislation. (Gemmel, 2002)

It is noted, however, that intensive and lengthy training of some six months' duration might ensure that the number of injuries is reduced. Nevertheless, from a legal perspective, there is a very real concern that a more litigious attitude is likely to develop within the military when injuries are occurring to more women (*The Times*, 3 January 2002).

Privacy

While the nature of the evidence relating to the physical ability of recruits to special forces units is, irrespective of gender considerations, primarily objective, issues of privacy can be highly subjective. Regulations associated with Health and Safety at Work legislation may cover the minimum standards to be attained in the barracks or on board ship. Even in submarines, it is possible to design accommodation, as in the Collins class of diesel-powered submarines, to ensure a degree of privacy, though the problem in nuclear-powered submarines may relate more to the potential effect of radiation on pregnant personnel than to simple issues of privacy. The impact of privacy, or its lack, upon combat effectiveness is an issue of much greater concern where personnel are deployed in the field.

Some 15 years ago, Moskos (1985: 30), in a survey of the experience of

US servicewomen in the field, concluded that in Honduras, 'women were never really comfortable with the lack of privacy in the field'. A more recent Canadian study specifically links the issue of privacy to its effect upon team-building.

> Effective group dynamic is key to a successful team. Part and parcel of this is living with men in close quarters without discomfort. When a section/detachment/crew share an arctic tent, it's a great way to get to know each other. (Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1999: 30)

From an individual perspective, the willingness to accept such conditions is highly subjective. 'When living in a tent group privacy will be nil, therefore do you really need it in a bivouac situation? It depends what you're most comfortable with' (Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1999: 30).

An alternative perspective suggests that few individuals, regardless of gender, are happy with the most basic domestic arrangements dictated by operational requirements. Long periods in restricted patrol bases, slit trenches, four-person tents and observation posts mean that restricted and shared sanitary arrangements are invariably necessary. No allowance can be made for decency, dignity or privacy for personnel. The provision of separate field accommodation, notwithstanding the requirements of general legislation, is claimed to be both impracticable and undesirable in most circumstances.

From a legal perspective, however, it is less a question of absolute standards, as important as these may be to the individual, than the effect of privacy, or the lack of it, upon combat effectiveness. Again, in the absence of the experience of gender-integrated special forces in actual combat situations, consideration has to be given to the alternative evidence. Among this is evidence as to the relationship between issues of privacy and combat effectiveness in on board ship situations. Additionally, cross-reference can be made to debates about the retention of homosexuals in the armed forces, for much play was made of the problem of ensuring the privacy of non-homosexual personnel. In evaluating such secondary evidence, the issue of its direct relevance to the specific situation of personnel in special forces is critical.

Unit Cohesion

A major issue in discussing the legitimacy of recruiting women into special forces is the potential effect of gender integration upon unit cohesion. It can be argued that, today, the dominance of sophisticated military technology increasingly suggests that the social psychological processes of small groups are, at best, secondary considerations. Whether such a hypothesis can be extended to include special forces, however, is far from agreed. An alternative point of view recognizes that a discernible characteristic of such forces is the emphasis placed on the small cohesive unit – the team – as a basic

tactical, fire and manoeuvre entity. This implies that for such forces, the concept of cohesion continues to be a primary determinant of combat effectiveness.

Further evidence can be obtained from a number of general studies of gender integration in the contemporary military. The RAND study, for instance, in considering the effects of integrating women into units previously closed to them, concluded that recruiting women did not lessen the cohesiveness of the unit and that 'gender integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale' (Harrell and Miller, 1997: 95).

This confirms the conclusion previously reached by Hoiberg (1991) on the basis of historical evidence and general studies, that cohesion and bonding are not adversely affected by the presence of women in the military group. This also reflects the earlier findings by Moskos (1985) that mixed-gender units in the field, as opposed to the training situation, do eventually develop into cohesive units. Even so, there is still a pervasive belief among males in special forces that their situation is different, not least because of the need in the field for close proximity and a significant reliance on a commonality of experience. The validity of this belief, in the current absence of women in such units in an actual war situation, is difficult to prove or disprove. There are studies which have considered the issue of gender integration in combat support and combat posts. More rarely, analysts have evaluated levels of gender integration where units have been on active duty on international humanitarian missions (Miller and Moskos, 1995). A most pertinent conclusion in this context is reached by Rosen et al. (1999) in an analysis of such integration across five situations. It is noted that, 'In the deployment studies, the strongest negative effect of percentage of women occurred in Somalia, where troops had the greatest likelihood of being shot at despite the fact that this was officially a peacekeeping deployment' (Rosen et al., 1999: 381–2).

Underlying these discussions about the validity of such evidence is an ongoing debate about the reliability of postulated links between combat effectiveness, group cohesion and male peer bonding. The standard relationship is reflected in the assertion by Furukawa et al., that 'Psychological readiness for combat comprises five dimensions including horizontal cohesion, vertical cohesion, individual morale, confidence in group combat capacity, and confidence in leaders' (Furukawa et al., 1987: 2).

The nature of this relationship has been examined in a number of studies. These have considered direct combat on the ground situations (Moskos, 1970; Hockey, 1987) as well as the specific case of cohesion in special operational forces (Simons, 1997). A more critical approach to the relationship between these five dimensions and the combat effectiveness of a unit is to be seen in analyses of the dysfunctional aspects of cohesion (Winslow, 1999). Two specific methodological criticisms are very pertinent. The first questions the supposed effects of such factors as male bonding (Dandeker and Segal,

1996: 33). More significantly, the primary link between horizontal integration (peer bonding) and combat effectiveness, based on the classic research of Shils and Janowitz (1948), is now subject to question. David Segal (2000: 3), for instance, suggests that their research together with that of Stouffer and his colleagues, as well as that of S.L.A. Marshall, 'must for methodological reasons be regarded as heuristic rather than conclusive, and contemporary research, which is also not yet conclusive, seems to stand the argument on its head'. From these and comparable criticisms (Rush, 1999) it can be inferred that there is conflicting evidence. Only the court can decide which it prefers.

Postscript

In considering the legal issues associated with the recruitment of women to extended roles in the contemporary European military, this article has focused on two issues:

- The burden of proof;
- The nature of the evidence.

With regard to the first of these, actions brought in Europe under employment law or equal opportunities legislation are governed by the normal rules of evidence. This is seen in both the cases under discussion. In Kreil, the proceedings in the Administrative Court of Hanover (*Verwaltungsgericht*) and subsequently in the ECJ, placed firmly on the German government the burden of justifying the exclusion of Tanja Kreil from the Bundeswehr. The basic issue was one of constitutional law. The German government was obliged to show that established national legislation which excluded women from service in combat arms was not overruled by subsequent European Community law. Notwithstanding the support of other European governments, the German authorities were unable so to convince the ECJ. In this case, the principle of derogation could not be established by the defending government. Tanja Kreil won her case.

The burden of proof in Sirdar was more complex. As in Kreil, any successful defence to the action began from the premise that the UK government would be able to establish the principle of derogation. This meant justifying through valid arguments based on sound evidence an exception to Article 2(1) of the Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976, which laid down the principle of the equal treatment of workers, irrespective of gender. A body of established legal precedent related to the implementation of the Directive. Specifically, the Directive was said to apply to employment in the public service (Case 248/83 *Commission* v. *Germany* [1985] ECR 1459, para. 16). In Kreil, the Directive was ruled to apply equally to employment in the armed forces (Kreil, para. 14),

a ruling which could be said to imply acceptance of the Institutional/Occupational thesis. Accordingly, the UK government, as respondents in the action brought by Angela Sirdar, had to justify an exemption to the provisions of the Directive. Again, legal precedent had to be taken into account. It has been ruled previously that gender might be a determining factor in employment in such posts as prison warders (Case 318/86 *Commission* v. *France* [1988] ECR 3559, paras 11–18) and for certain activities such as policing activities performed in situations where there are serious internal disturbances (Case 222/84 *Johnston* v. *Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary* [1986] ECR 1651, para. 26). Such precedents, however, repeatedly stressed that derogations provided for in Article 2(2) of the Directive could apply only to *specific* activities.

In Sirdar, these 'specific activities' were identified with the particular role of the Royal Marines Commandos. The nature of this role was established from the expert evidence provided by the UK government. Considerable emphasis was placed on the argument that,

> In a small corps, in times of crisis and manpower shortage, all Royal Marines must be capable at any time of serving at their rank and skill level in a commando unit.... Employment of women in the Royal Marines will not allow for interoperability. (Sirdar: 7)

Once the concept of 'specific activities' had been established the respondent was obliged to advance evidence that there were grounds for an exemption to Article 1 of the Directive. The basis of the claim by the UK government was the exception to the general provisions of the British Sex Discrimination Act 1975, allowed by Section 85(4) of the Act. This linked an exemption to 'ensuring the combat effectiveness of the naval, military or air forces'.

The burden of proof in this context rested with the government as respondent. The normal adversarial nature of the action obliged each party to provide the best available evidence. The nature of such evidence, however, was highly problematic. The 'best' evidence was that based on extensive research and technical studies. The persistent dilemma, however, was the absence of primary evidence derived from precise research into the experience of women in direct combat on the ground as members of special forces. A substantial body of secondary evidence was, nevertheless, available.

As we have noted, this related to the experience of women in combat service, combat support and combat at a distance roles. In rare instances, this was extended to the experience of women serving in combat zones such as the Gulf War or, more generally, in peacekeeping missions. Additionally, there was a limited amount of evidence available relating to the experience of women in direct combat on the ground roles in the training situation.

Of this evidence, the most compelling was that associated with studies such as the Canadian Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and

Roles (SWINTER) trials, which took place between 1979 and 1985. In these, two specific evaluations were carried out:

- Operational commanders of the trial units were to assess the overall impact of servicewomen on unit operational effectiveness.
- A social science based evaluation was to determine the human relations consequences, if any, of introducing servicewomen into hitherto exclusively male roles and environments.

Overall, the findings of the latter evaluation suggested that the employment of servicewomen in 'new' roles was feasible, although acceptance of social integration did vary between environments (Park, 1986).

What emerged from the legal discussions in Sirdar was the difficulty of providing proof which would complement this secondary evidence. Much of the available empirical evidence in favour of the widest possible employment of women related to their experience in non-European armed forces. Apart from the issues of cultural specificity which arose, such evidence could not readily be extrapolated to recruitment into specific special forces. This suggests that further research is required into the *likely* effect on combat effectiveness of employing women in extended military roles. A number of critical areas can be identified.

- The precise physical requirements for the successful implementation of direct combat on the ground roles in special forces need to be established.
- The feasibility of developing physical training programmes designed to maximize the potential of servicewomen needs to be investigated.
- The links between social cohesion, task cohesion and combat effectiveness in specific armed forces require further research.
- The culture existing within national armed forces requires examination to understand barriers or enablers to the integration of women into extended military roles.

Finally, it is impossible to speculate about the effect of gender on combat effectiveness without specifically defining the context within which the military task is carried out. This includes not only the mental and physical requirements of that task but also the operational environment within which it is performed.

Notes

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the Army Research Institute, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

1 The three volunteers were Captain Claire Phillips and Lance Corporal Joanna Perry of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, together with Captain Pip Tattersall of the Adjutant-General's Corps. Were they to pass the course it was not envisaged they would become Royal Marine Commandos per se. They would continue to wear the badges of their own units while working in combat support roles with No. 3 Commando (*The Times*, 23 March 2001). Captain Phillips, together with eight male recruits, withdrew from the course at the end of the second week of training. Corporal Perry, who was injured in week four, withdrew; Captain Philippa Tattersall, who was formally failed in her last week for below standard military skills, was 'returned to the Adjutant-General's Corps' (*The Times*, 5 June 2001).
2 These include Segal (1993), Clarke (1993), Dandeker (1999) and Donnelly (2000). Of the annual official publications published by national Ministries of Defence, the British *Strategic Defence Reviews* (London: The Stationery Office) are most useful as are the publications of SOWI (Bundeswehr Institute of Social Research). A critical review of the future role of women in the military consequent upon major changes of defence policy is given in Kennedy-Pipe (2000).
3 The 12 women had all had mostly professional careers, as lawyers, teachers, airline pursers, doctors and nurses. Seven were mothers of two or more children. Their average age was about 40. After three days acclimatizing at the British army camp at Sittang in Brunei, the women were dropped by helicopter in Ulu Tutong. Given that they were not under the sort of military pressures that soldiers experience in the jungle, not one woman had to be taken out of the jungle for illness or injury – 'statistically very much at odds with military training operations in the same jungle' (Burden, 2001: 293).

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
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Darlene Iskra, Stephen Trainor, Marcia Leithauser and Mady Wechsler Segal

Women's Participation in Armed Forces Cross-Nationally: Expanding Segal's Model

Introduction

The last several years have witnessed examples of women's non-traditional military participation all over the world. Consider, for example, the following recent news reports: Albanian housewives clearing mines in Kosovo (Strauss, 1999); the gender integration of Israeli army posts including those involving combat (Associated Press, 2000); the presence of women snipers in Chechnya's guerrilla army (Warren, 2000); and Eritrean women fighting alongside men in the war for independence against Ethiopia (Hatch, 2000). While these recent examples of women's expanded roles in armed conflict may suggest that women's military participation is increasing worldwide, history does not display a monotonic trend. One need look no further than to the USA since the Second World War to see examples of the expansion and contraction of women's military participation. The fact that women's participation in armed conflict varies considerably across time and between countries and cultures prompts the question, 'What factors determine the nature and degree of women's participation in armed conflict?'

In an effort to answer this question in a systematic fashion, Mady Segal's (1995) article in *Gender and Society* proposed a cross-national theory of the factors determining women's military participation. This model is comprised of three components: a cultural dimension, a societal dimension and an institutional one. For each of these dimensions, Segal lists several variables and offers testable hypotheses for each. Her theory also offers some guidance as to how the variables interact in determining women's military participation.

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None exist in a vacuum, of course, and factors from one dimension may override the factors of another, under certain conditions.

Segal's analysis goes a long way toward furthering our understanding of the complex set of interrelated variables that determine women's military participation. An important limitation of the model, however, is that it is based primarily on women's military roles in western democratic countries. Segal's own empirical research has focused primarily on the US military and, with collaborators, on the NATO nations (see Stanley and Segal, 1987; Dandeker and Segal, 1996). Our research on Australia, Mexico and Zimbabwe brings this limitation to light and presents a unique opportunity to assess further the cross-national applicability of this model. Although Australia most closely follows the western model, these countries represent three different continents and distinctive histories, cultures and social practices. By studying the roles and participation rates of women from such diverse countries, our purpose is to strengthen Segal's theory by validating applicable aspects of the model and recommending revisions where necessary. Reviews of the literature and social science indices show no other critiques of this model.

Utilizing Segal's model, we analyzed women's historical and current participation in the armed forces of each country. In our research, however, we came across instances that did not fit neatly into the framework. To incorporate these instances into the model, we found it necessary to add to or revise Segal's variables. In particular, we concluded that a fourth dimension was needed to create a stronger model. We determined that *political* factors in each country also play a considerable role in defining women's armed forces participation.

Following a discussion of Segal's original model, we present the results of our research. Next we discuss how our research challenges Segal's model and propose revisions and additions to the hypotheses and the model. We conclude with recommendations for further research in order to continue the refinement of this model and to expand its applicability.

A Brief Review of Segal's Model

The Segal Model

Segal developed a means to analyze the degree and nature of women's participation in the military empirically (see Figure 1). The three variables included within this model are broadly defined as military, social structure and culture. Segal posits that due to the social construction of military culture and its inherently masculine nature, increases in the degree and extent of women's participation in a military organization are likely (1) when the changing mission and culture of the military are perceived by policy-makers and the

populace to be more compatible with women's service; (2) when women are perceived to be changing in ways that make them more suited to military life; and/or (3) when the national security situation is so dire as to require the military support of all citizens (Segal, 1995: 758). Segal also posits that in periods of conflict, military roles for women expand, then contract as the threat diminishes; the primary impetus of women's participation is the military's need for personnel. In peacetime, Segal proposes that the more egalitarian the society, the more likely it will be that women will seek and be accepted in non-traditional occupations, including those in the military. Consequently, there are various factors within each of the broadly defined variables that affect women's participation rates in both peacetime and war.

Military Variables

The factors that determine women's military participation include the national security situation, extent of technology in the military, the combat to support ratio, the force structure and military accession policies. Segal hypothesizes that women's participation in the military increases during periods of high or low threat to the national security; when the military is technologically advanced; when the combat to support ratio is low; when the force structure relies on reservists for wartime mobilization; and/or when military accession is through volunteers rather than conscription. In contrast, during medium-threat scenarios, in a military with low technology and a high combat to support ratio, or in a conscripted military, women's participation is low. In each of the three countries studied, the women enter the military as volunteers. However, although Australia has an all-volunteer force, both Mexico and Zimbabwe have limited conscription. This frames our discussion and hypotheses of the participation of women. As stated in Segal's model, when men are conscripted, even on a limited basis, the participation of women in the military will be more limited.

Social Variables

The social structure variables include demographic patterns, labor force characteristics, economic factors and family structure. Segal hypothesizes that: 'When the supply of men does not meet the demand for military labor, women are drawn into service' (Segal, 1995: 766). This is true whether the dearth of men is a result of smaller birth cohorts, lower propensity to enlist or increased military activity (Segal, 1989). Similarly, the extent to which women participate in the labor force and the degree of occupational segregation also determine women's involvement in non-traditional occupational roles, such as the military. Economic factors also weigh heavily. In good economic times, there are more employment opportunities for women, especially in the military, as men seek higher-paying civilian jobs. As the economy slows down, women tend to leave the workforce, and the military,



MILITARY
• National security situation
• Military technology
• Combat to support ratio
• Force structure
• Military accession policies
SOCIAL STRUCTURE
• Demographic patterns
• Labor force characteristics (women's labor force participation and occupational sex segregation)
• Economic factors
• Family structure
CULTURE
• Social construction of gender and family
• Social values about gender and family
• Public discourse regarding gender
• Values regarding ascription and equity
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY
(degree of representation and nature of activities)

Figure 1 Theory of Factors Affecting Women's Military Participation

as more men are available to join (Segal, 1995: 767). Finally, the hypothesis that the greater the family responsibilities for the average woman, the less women's representation in the armed forces indicates the conflict between family and military service. Segal states that 'the nature of military activity is socially constructed in many cultures as negatively related to family roles' (Segal, 1995: 768; see also Segal, 1986 for a thorough analysis of the conflicts and demands between the military and family institutions).

Culture Variables

The extent to which a culture defines or emphasizes gender differences or gender equality has a strong effect on women's military roles. Segal hypothesizes that 'the more egalitarian the social values about gender, the greater

women's representation in the military' (Segal, 1995: 769). The social construction of family and social values about family are also determinants as described in the preceding paragraph. As social expectations about child-rearing and family care change, the acceptance of women in greater public roles follows. Societies that provide family-friendly programs or other alternatives to the 'traditional' work ethic will have more women in the labor force, and an associated increase of women in the military.

Research Design

In her conclusion, Segal invites further analysis of this model. We used a multiple case study design to evaluate the effectiveness of the Segal model in describing disparate military, social and cultural examples. This research design allowed us to examine the model from three different perspectives, allowing for triangulation and for individual biases to be mitigated. Furthermore, it allowed the researchers not only to describe and explain the phenomena, but also highlighted the need for revisions to existing social theory (Babbie, 2001: 285). The data for the case studies came from literature reviews conducted on each nation's armed forces. In addition, supplementary data were obtained from representatives of the defense establishment in the countries, such as military attachés and embassies.

A limitation of this approach is that the results cannot be generalized to populations outside our limited range of cases; e.g. we have not claimed that Zimbabwe is representative of all African nations in its relation to Segal's theory. Additionally, none of us is an expert on these particular countries, and language constraints, limited studies and/or literature availability in the countries chosen limit obtaining reliable and complete information. We therefore also invite additional research into the model as it applies to non-western countries. Despite this limitation, the case studies that follow allowed us to evaluate the Segal model critically.

Australia

The Segal model more closely defines the participation of women in the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) than either Mexico or Zimbabwe. Although Australian women have increased their participation in the paid labor market over the last 50 years, they remain primarily in gendered occupational specialties, such as clerical and administrative positions in the public sector and service industries (van Acker, 1999: 167). The military has followed the basic pattern of society, slowly increasing its utilization of women, and opening new roles to them.

Military Variables

The isolation and vulnerabilities of long lines of communications and trade have framed Australia's national security posture. While Australia is focused on threats to its domestic security, it also has a policy of limited forward defense (Downes, 2000), thus the force structure for a country of its size is relatively small. It has relied on a volunteer force since the 1970s. The total active duty ADF is only about 55,200, with about 7400 (13.4 percent) women, as compared to the USA with approximately 1.35 million in uniform and about 194,800 (14.4 percent) women (Manning and Wight, 2000: 29).

As in Segal's model, the ebb and flow pattern of military needs is duplicated in Australia. During the Second World War, women were recruited into the ADF when Australia faced the very real threat of invasion by the Japanese, and were discharged from the military soon after the war. Women continued to play a minor role in the ADF until 1990. Currently, Australia is experiencing its longest period of peace, and is expanding both the numbers of women and the jobs they can perform in the ADF (DEO [Defence Equity Organization], 2000). The low level of threat to Australia, coupled with its reliance on military volunteers, has resulted in an increase in participation by women in the ADF. This follows Segal's model.

The small peacetime volunteer force and changing world events precipitated a change in the force structure and focus, from combat to peace-support operations (Downes, 2000). According to Segal's model, this should encourage women's participation. However, the culture of the Australian army remains traditionally male. It also has the smallest percentage of women (10.3 percent) as compared to the navy (14.8 percent) and the air force (17.1 percent) (DEO, 2000: 2). Social norms and the construction of ground combat as a male prerogative frame government policies, which continue to prevent women from serving in those roles. The effect is to exclude women from about 45 percent of the army's positions (Smith, 1995: 539). Women are performing combat roles at sea and in the aviation community (Manning and Wight, 2000), but public opinion on the issue of combat roles for women is ambivalent, with 42 percent in favor, 47 percent against and 11 percent undecided (Smith, 1995: 541).

The military has not been forced to further expand the roles of women because the Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 does not require the military to meet the equal treatment standard for women in regard to combat-related roles. The services are free to develop their own policies in this arena (Smith and McAllister, 1991: 372). The primary catalyst for the expansion of opportunities for women has come from shifts in societal attitudes toward women in non-traditional roles, but the ADF also initiated change and amended policies before being required by civilian authorities to do so (Downes, 2000: 197). These policies follow Segal's model.

Social Structure Variables

Australia follows the demographic pattern described in the Segal model very closely. The number of eligible males between the ages of 18 and 24 has declined, with a concurrent reluctance to commit to the military and its conservative values. Additionally, technological changes require a higher quality recruit, and the equal opportunity climate encourages women to participate more fully in all aspects of society (Smith and McAllister, 1991: 371). These changes, both demographically and socially, have served to open new roles for women in both the officer corps and other ranks.

Partly as a result of the changing family structure in Australia, women's paid labor participation rates have increased. In 1901, women made up about 20 percent of the labor force. By 1961, the rate was 30 percent, and by 1991, it had risen to 41.8 percent. However, only 59.3 percent were full-time workers, as compared to 90.8 percent of men. In 1991, women comprised 76.1 percent of the part-time workforce, jobs that were often low paying, with few benefits and undertaken to supplement the family income (van Acker, 1999: 167). Because women continue to dominate the unpaid labor force of domestic work, their opportunities for career development are low. While women have increased their participation in professions such as law and medicine, they tend to remain at the bottom rung of the occupational ladder. Minority women are even more economically challenged. Non-English-speaking migrants tend to work in the clothing or footwear industry. Additionally, indigenous women are not well represented in the labor force, and tend to rely on the welfare system for subsistence (van Acker, 1999: 169–71).

Despite these barriers, Australia is moving toward a more egalitarian work structure, which, according to Segal, also increases women's participation in the military. The legislation that increased equal opportunity in the civilian labor force also increased opportunities for women in the ADF. Although problems remain, women are making advances toward equality in Australian society. Thus, it appears the changes in the social structure, as defined by the model, have all contributed to the increase in women's participation and roles in the ADF.

Cultural Variables

Australia's democratic tradition suggests a commitment to equality and diversity, yet equal opportunity legislation for women's equal rights in Australia has only been passed in the last 25 years. Legislation enacted in 1977, followed by the Equal Opportunity Acts of 1984 and 1985, gave women greater rights in dealing with discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status, sexual harassment and other employment-related issues (Marles, 1999). As a result, women are entering the paid labor force in increasing numbers (van Acker, 1999: 167).

The percentage of women in the civilian labor force has increased at a much faster rate than women in the military. In 1980, women comprised about 6 percent of the ADF and have increased to 13.4 percent today (Manning and Wight, 2000). In some sense it appears that the ADF has taken the lead in equal opportunities for women. Except for the exclusion from ground combat, the ADF has integrated women into many non-traditional roles, pays equally by rank regardless of their job (unlike their civilian counterparts) and in fact has surged ahead in international military policies by assigning women to submarines. Thus, Segal's model holds true in the sense that as the society moves toward greater equality, the broader women's military roles will be. In general, however, women in Australia are still relegated to maintaining the home in the private sphere, with men maintaining their hegemony in the public sphere (van Acker, 1999: 3). As in other western countries, women's military participation is increasing per Segal's model, but we doubt that the numbers will ever achieve parity with women's civilian labor force participation.

Australia has followed the model developed by Segal to a large degree. Women's participation in the ADF is increasing because Australian social structure is moving toward greater opportunity for women in the labor force and greater economic equity between the genders. Also, cultural and social values are moving toward more egalitarian roles for women, although there is still resistance to changing the gendered roles within the family. Finally, the military's emphasis on domestic security, voluntary accession policies and a low national security threat have all contributed toward greater roles and opportunities for women in the ADF and increased military participation rates of women.

Mexico

Mexico has a long and varied military history that, at various times, has prominently featured the participation of women, while at other times has largely ignored women's contributions. The roots of women's participation in armed conflict can be traced to well before the grand warriors of the Aztec empire, to the early Meso-American tribal images that reflect the significant economic and reproductive power women held in that society.

In more recent history, the influence of Mexican women fighting, supporting and ameliorating conventional and revolutionary armed conflict can be traced from the Wars of Spanish Independence from 1810 to 1821, through the Revolution of 1910–17, to the current efforts of the Zapatista reform movement in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas (Salas, 1990; Soto, 1990). In modern Mexico, women's military roles have reflected their status in society; they have served as cooks, nurses, prostitutes and

occasionally combatants. These roles persisted until the 1930s, but embodied cultural perceptions of male domination that continue today (Merrill and Miro, 1997; Salas, 1990; Soto, 1990).

Today, women are members of the all-volunteer Mexican army, navy and air force, albeit serving in reduced numbers and traditionally non-combatant roles of logistical support, administration, social work, law and medicine (Merrill and Miro, 1997). The nation maintains a reserve force of nearly 300,000 men (Ackroyd, 1994; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999; Merrill and Miro, 1997) yet in early 2000 the reserves were opened to a very small percentage of women (Rodriguez, 2000). It is estimated that across all services, women comprise no more than 4 percent (less than 6000) of the military force; however, the numbers of women are increasing slowly (Merrill and Miro, 1997). Military promotion opportunities have also been limited for women and the highest rank a woman has attained in the military is major general in the medical corps (Merrill and Miro, 1997).

Military Variables

The national security environment of Mexico is characterized by a focus on internal stability and maintenance of the ruling political regime. Historically, Mexico has shown relatively little concern for outside threats to its territorial integrity, which has resulted in the maintenance of a military force nearly one-half the per capita size of other Latin American nations (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999; Merrill and Miro, 1997).

The Constitution of 1917 and the Organic Law of 1926 defined the primary and enduring functions of the military as preserving domestic stability, supporting social development and preventing foreign economic domination (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999; Merrill and Miro, 1997). Even at the height of the Cold War, Mexico seemed less concerned about East–West tensions as an external threat than it was concerned about economic domination from the US and the effects on Mexican labor markets and internal stability (Merrill and Miro, 1997; Williams, 1986). The reliance by Mexico on its military as an internal security force differs slightly from the Segal model. The focus on domestic security and stability, coupled with a pervasively gendered culture, serves to limit women's participation, and is described later.

Despite being a volunteer force, the Mexican military offers limited military career and accession opportunities for women. The only commissioning source for officers entering the combat branches of the military is the three military service academies (Colegio Militar [Infantry, Quartermaster, Armor, Engineer, Artillery], Escuela Naval [Surface Warfare] and Colegio del Aire [Pilots]). These schools remain firmly closed to the admission of women (Blanco, 1996; Langer and Lozano, 1996; Merrill and Miro, 1997). Although the law guarantees equal rights for women, in practice they may serve only

in support and administrative roles; they are forbidden from serving with combat infantry and marine units (Instituto del Tercer Mundo, 1999; Langer and Lozano, 1996; Merrill and Miro, 1997).

With a focus on internal stability and development, the Mexican military is a rather low-technology force. The army is the dominant military service in Mexico and the most prestigious units of the army are the male-only cavalry forces (Wilkie et al., 1995). The army's low-tech, infantry-based force structure has been driven by the focus on domestic action (Stevens, 1994). Additionally, the reserve forces are ineffectual, serving primarily as a symbolic entity with little more than a social integration function. As such, the military does not have a tremendous need for a large combat support element. These various factors support Segal's model that predicts lower opportunities for women's service in the military under such conditions.

Mexico began to modernize its military in the 1970s largely in response to increasing internal social concerns, culminated by the Zapatista National Liberation Army revolt in the Chiapas region of southern Mexico in January 1994 (Vasquez, 1994). The modernization program has concentrated on upgrading current ground and naval armaments in support of the prevailing internal security requirement. Instead of introducing new technologies and varied approaches to warfare that might encourage the participation of women, the Mexican military has improved the capabilities of traditional ground forces, which, de facto, discourage increased participation by women.

Social Structural Variables

While the military's small size and infantry orientation explain women's minimal military roles, several social structural factors are also influential. During the Mexican Revolution, many women actively supported and served in the military for political and economic reasons, while others sought legal, political and social gains for women in the areas of marriage and divorce, reproduction, education and labor force participation (Vasquez, 1994). The Mexican Constitution of 1917 guaranteed women specific rights and prompted the creation of organizations and conferences devoted to the expansion of women's rights, not only in Mexico but also across Latin America (Fisher, 1994). In recent years, additional legal reforms have increased women's access to education as well as provided basic labor rights, such as equal pay for equal work, maternity leave and improved women's health benefits. The literature attributes this success to both the increasing role women are playing in general social movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as an overall increase in feminism in Mexican society (Fisher, 1994; Soto, 1990). However, Mexican society, and the military more specifically, remains essentially gendered, which limits the greater participation of women and draws them toward participation in other agents of social change.

Despite the traditional social barriers to women's increased involvement in the labor market, the data show that women are experiencing moderate increases in social and economic opportunity in Mexico. Since 1950, the percentage of women in the Mexican labor force has more than doubled from 12.9 percent to 27.1 percent in 1990 (Wilkie et al., 1995). This period was marked by the discovery of significant natural resource deposits in Mexico and a broad-based expansion of Mexican industry and trade with the US (Blanco, 1996). That expansion created the need for a significantly larger and more diverse labor force. Evidence of this is the participation of women in industry that doubled between 1950 and 1980 and today nearly equals the participation rate of Mexican men in the industrial sector (Wilkie et al., 1995).

Analysis of this information in terms of the social structural characteristics in Segal's model provides strong evidence that the lack of participation of women in the Mexican military may be attributable to social advances and the increased demand for women's labor in the larger economic market. In contrast, the relatively low demand for women in a static military labor market, combined with social inequalities of available roles in the military, discourages women from seeking greater access to the armed forces.

Cultural Variables

While the military and social structural variables are important, an analysis of the cultural variables informs much of the relationship between women and the military institution in Mexico. At the very heart of Mexican culture and social character is the contrast between the complex father- and mother-centered relationship systems and the competing interests that occur (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970). As a result, a system of 'machismo' and 'marianismo' exists, where the prominence of patriarchal aggressiveness and a male-dominated political and economic system combine with matriarchal virtue, morals and the significant religious influence of the mother figure of Mary. This results in widely divergent culturally defined roles for men and women in Mexican society (Stevens, 1994; Vasquez, 1994).

The social construction of women's inferior roles and the central position of the family combine with the overwhelming nature of the male-dominated elements of hierarchy in Mexico to deny broader access to women. The Mexican family remains the strongest social institution and explains much of the relationship between women's participation in the military and societal attitudes about military service. In general, family role definitions form expectations that domestic work and child-rearing responsibilities are solely women's occupations, and opportunities for jobs beyond the household are undertaken only in terms of providing family necessities (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970; Soto, 1990). This has contributed to the historical closure of the military to women and persists today in the normative exclusion of women from entrance into the military service academies and from serving

in combat elements. Conversely, the influence of 'marianismo' on society has likely served to keep women away from military service and drawn them toward greater involvement in social movements apart from the male-dominated political and military structure. The Segal model, therefore, is consistent with how, in Mexico, social values about family and gender roles negatively influence the participation of women in the military.

Zimbabwe

As an African country and former colony, the case of Zimbabwe adds important insights to the discussion of women's cross-national armed forces participation. From providing food for and support to soldiers to fighting alongside men in guerrilla warfare, Zimbabwean women have a long history of varied participation in the armed struggles that took place during the almost 100 years of British colonial rule. Women's armed force participation was particularly striking during the Liberation War from the early 1960s until 1980, when the country won its independence. Today, while women continue their tradition of service in the country's official military, their participation differs dramatically from that of military men.

In terms of numbers and roles, estimates differ significantly as to Zimbabwean women's participation in the Liberation War. Approximations of women guerrillas range from 1500 to 20,000 and from a very small percentage to one-third of the total guerrilla forces (Kriger, 1992; Muchena, 1984). The role of women in these forces also is difficult to determine. Some assert that women guerrillas were often asked to perform traditionally feminine tasks such as cooking, spying, hiding munitions, sewing and fundraising (Kriger, 1992; Muchena, 1984). Moreover, while some women fighters maintain they enjoyed equal treatment with their male counterparts, others assert that they were expected by male leadership to act as prostitutes for the male soldiers (Kriger, 1992). Once liberation was won in 1980, the two liberation forces and the Rhodesian Security Forces (the British forces) were combined to form the Zimbabwean Defence Forces; it is estimated that about one-half of the women guerrillas from the liberation armies were integrated therein (Muchena, 1984).

Today, however, according to informal estimates from defense officials, women make up less than 1 percent of Zimbabwe's military. The ranking system and conditions of entry are supposedly the same for women and men; however, very few women currently occupy the highest ranks. Recruit training, which differs for men and women, is reported to be segregated initially and later gender-integrated. Women serve only in combat support and combat service support roles, primarily as medics, clerks and staff officers.

While on paper 'the government recognizes the right of women to compete for all ranks and posts including combat positions, depending on their capabilities' (Zimbabwe Defence Policy, 1996), the current military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo sees women in combat zones but not as combatants. An embassy official explained that it would be problematic for women to lead men into battle.[1] Recently the Defence Forces have expressed a commitment to promoting equal employment policies and practices 'suitably adapted to the demands of the service' (Zimbabwe Defence Policy, 1996) and a working environment free of gender discrimination (Mutszunguma, pers. comm.; Zimbabwe Defence Policy, 1996). Additionally, the Minister of Defence has proposed a quota system for recruitment, promotion and assignment in special missions to encourage the greater participation of women (Zimbabwe Defence Policy, 1996). As only limited information on Zimbabwe's military is currently available, how these new policies affect women's participation remains to be seen.

Military Variables

The fact that women served in non-traditional roles and in seemingly high numbers during the Liberation War supports Segal's hypothesis that at the high end of threat to a society, women's military roles increase. Similarly, the significant decrease in women's armed force participation today corresponds with the decreased threat to national security in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Interestingly, white women's participation on the Rhodesian (British) side was limited to approximately 400 women, primarily in administration and communication capacities (Godwin and Hancock, 1993). The striking contrast in black and white women's participation during the war highlights the difference in women's participation in revolutionary (Zimbabwean) and official (British) forces, supporting Segal's claim that revolutionary movements tend to see women's greater participation. Furthermore, the fact that only one-half of women guerrillas were incorporated into the Zimbabwean Defence Forces and that women constitute only a very small percentage of today's military upholds Segal's theory that while women are often actively involved in revolutionary movements, once a new government is established with a new organized force, women leave the military and return to more traditional social roles.

Social Structure Variables

Despite historical examples of women as warriors and social movement organizers, Zimbabwean women initially were barred from combat roles during the formation of guerrilla units in the 1960s. Eventually, however, women's successes in support capacities and the inevitable need for personnel opened the doors to women in combat. This provides support for Segal's hypothesis that when the supply of men does not meet the demand for

military labor, women are drawn into the service. Furthermore, this personnel need seems to have outweighed factors that initially restricted women, such as gender ideology.

Following the end of the war, women secured at least a measure of social equality with men. This came as a result of women's significant role in the Liberation War as well as the influence of women's interest groups. In the workplace women are entitled – at least in theory – to equal pay for equal work and to maternity leave. Black women, for the first time under the law, gained status as adults (as opposed to minors) and won the vote in 1979, the same year that black men did. Perhaps Zimbabwean women's greatest gain in postcolonial Zimbabwe is a government that has expressed in numerous public statements a commitment to gender equality. Despite these gains, however, women continue to face significant barriers to education, economic and political power, and reproductive freedom (see Folbre, 1988; Seidman, 1984). Today, for example, 17 percent of women as compared to only 8 percent of men are illiterate (Copson, 2001).

The social structural factors in Segal's model seem to play a more significant role in determining women's armed force participation today as compared to during the Liberation War. This may be because revolutionary movements upset social systems allowing for other factors, such as political ones, to direct women's participation. In recent years, as a result of postcolonial difficulties and government corruption, Zimbabwe has continued to face a serious political, economic and social crisis (Copson, 2001). Unemployment is reported to exceed 50 percent, and at least 70 percent of Zimbabwe's population live in poverty (Copson, 2001). This corroborates Segal's finding that high unemployment rates are associated with low opportunities for women in the military.

Women's ambiguous social gains in post-independence correspond to their involvement in the military: while women are participating and while governing bodies profess gender equality as a goal, women continue to be limited in significant ways.

Cultural Variables

The feminized roles and tasks to which women guerrillas reportedly were relegated demonstrate that gender ideology maintained a key role in circumscribing women's participation in the Liberation War. Strongly masculine-oriented social constructions of gender and family also resulted in the discouragement of both birth control and abortions for women soldiers (Sister Namibia Collective, 1997). Compared to their participation today, however, women's considerable role in the revolutionary war supports Segal's hypothesis that the less the emphasis on ascription by gender, the greater women's military role. Due to the nature of liberation wars, a great emphasis is placed on nationality and/or race. As Zimbabwe's example suggests, we

might speculate that in terms of ascription in national liberation wars, gender identity is de-emphasized in favor of national identity.

With regard to post-liberation gender equality, there seems to be a prevailing sentiment that women are entitled to equal treatment in the public domain, but that wives are and should be subordinate in the homes. For example, in the years since liberation, polygyny and wife beating continue to be national problems. This persistence of traditional constructions of gender and family corresponds with women's limited roles in the current military force, supporting Segal's hypothesis that the less egalitarian a society's gender values, the more limited women's military representation.

It appears that women's significant and varied participation in the Liberation War was largely determined by military factors (national security situation, personnel need) and political factors. Today the participation of women in the institutionalized armed forces seems to be more heavily influenced by social and cultural factors. Because such a limited amount of information exists on this country however, more extensive research is needed to substantiate these findings.

Discussion

An analysis of the variables described by the Segal model go far in explaining women's military participation in Australia, Mexico and Zimbabwe, but they do not fully capture several significant factors that further define these societies, the armed forces and gender relations cross-nationally. While the model fits each of these countries in a general sense, we discovered that revisions and additions could be made that might better explain the dependent variable, participation, cross-nationally. The additional variables and hypotheses related to each new variable are presented below (see Figure 2).

Social Structure

The social structure dimension of this model was the most stable across the three cases and explains women's participation equally well in all three countries. Therefore, this aspect of the model remains unchanged. We hypothesize that social structure, as it pertains to women's interests and issues, exhibits greater commonality across cultures and national boundaries, whereas political, military and culture issues tend to be more narrowly framed in terms of national level concepts and problems. For instance, while economic and labor force characteristics differ widely cross-nationally, a common interest in women's social and economic development frames the debate regardless of the degree of development of a nation's business or industrial infrastructure. Therefore, social structure is predicted to be the most consistent of the model's dimensions cross-nationally.



ARMED FORCES
• Purpose/function of the armed force
• Subculture ideology
• Subculture demographics
• Military technology
• Organizational structure
• Military accession policies
SOCIAL STRUCTURE
• Demographic patterns
• Labor force characteristics
• Economic factors
• Family structure
WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN ARMED FORCES
CULTURE
• Social construction of military
• Social values about force, power, domination
• Social construction of gender and family
• Social values about gender and family
• Public discourse regarding gender
• Values regarding ascription and equity
POLITICAL
• National security situation
• Civil–military relations
• Political ideology
• Current leadership
• Public policy regarding race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, etc.
• Sources of change other than armed conflict

Figure 2 Amended Model

Culture Variable

While other variables in the model are important, an analysis of the culture and social conditions in a society inform much of the relationship between women and their participation in military forces. Through this dimension, the underlying values and concepts of social relations are created in a society. In particular, social values about force, power and domination determine how

the military is perceived in the society and, perhaps more importantly, how the society views conflict, and its resolution.

Proposed hypothesis: The greater the emphasis on power, authoritarianism, hierarchy and conformity, the more limited women's participation in the military.

This variable is rooted in the level of social inequality and the unequal distribution of power in a society and the extent to which the society prefers institutions that provide certainty or require conformity in order to solve social problems. Nations with a strong colonial heritage, such as Zimbabwe, may have developed a sense of dependence on institutions of control and domination that establish conformity to colonial social values above self-determination. Post-revolutionary responses to such systems of domination will often resemble the pre-revolution structures because of the pervasive nature of colonial systems of control. This situation tends to foster social inequality in the case of women, resulting in a lower level of participation in institutions representing domination and conformity.

In the case of Mexico, the heart of the Mexican social character is a contrast between the father-centered relationship systems based on conditional love, obedience and hierarchical struggles for power and resources, and the mother-centered relationship systems in which love is unconditional and attachment complete (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970). As a result, a system of machismo, or power and conformity, pushes women away from the military, and marianismo, or virtue and moral superiority, draws women towards social involvement apart from the male-dominated political and military structure (Stevens, 1994; Vasquez, 1994) and partly explains their low rate of participation.

In Australia, as in most western democratic states, the ideals of equality and individual liberty shape the nature of social relations in the nation. While institutions such as the military may display gendered structures and behaviors, the general sense in the society confirms a commitment of equality for all. Issues of women's roles and participation in the military are openly debated, and there is a lower level of social inequality, so women participate in the military at a fairly high rate.

Armed Forces (Military) Variable

First, we are proposing that a more explanatory name for this dimension be used. It has become apparent in the years since the end of the Cold War that conflict and war have not diminished, but have become much more pervasive and diverse. Strictly defining this dimension in traditional western concepts of warfare and military organization ignores the strong influence revolutionary, intra-state and asymmetrical forms of conflict have on societies. For this purpose, we have renamed this dimension armed forces, so that it can be employed more broadly in cross-national analyses.

Purpose or Function of the Armed Forces Within the armed forces dimension, we have added a variable titled 'purpose' or 'function' of the armed force, which, when combined with the culture, evokes the social construction of the military in a society. If, for example, society views the military's purpose as offensive, the social construction of gender – which traditionally identifies women as the givers and not the takers of life – will tend to limit women's participation. If, on the other hand, its purpose is to defend or protect, since this is more in line with cultural ideals of womanhood, it is likely that women's participation would increase.

Proposed hypothesis: The more offensive or aggressive the function or purpose of the armed forces is perceived to be, the more limited women's participation. The more defensive the armed forces is perceived to be, the greater women's participation.

In the case of Zimbabwe, the purpose of the guerrilla forces was national liberation and it functioned as a revolutionary group to overthrow the colonizers and guarantee the right to self-determination. As may be the case in most revolutionary movements, while conducting offensive action, the purpose of the force is seen as defending essential ideals or values that are threatened by the ruling regime. Alternatively, we might predict that the more connected the armed forces are to the state, the more limited are women's roles and participation. This is the case in Mexico, which appears to confound our hypothesis, but rather confirms it further. In Mexico, the military is functionally designed and operationally oriented as a defensive force. In reality, however, the military is deployed throughout the country with the intent of preventing internal disruption, fostering government-sanctioned social development and protecting the government in force. This system of control and domination, accentuated by a history of military action against the populace, explains why the military has had little appeal with large numbers of women in Mexican society. This leads us to a corollary of the hypothesis: *the more the military is employed in direct action against the society, the more limited women's participation.*

In Australia, the military is geared towards national defense and participation in global security under the auspices of the United Nations. While Australia has not been involved in a defensive war since the Second World War, the ADF has participated in the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, defined socially as defending against international aggression. It is currently involved in peacekeeping and other humanitarian operations. The outward focus of the military, and the trend of an increasing percentage of women in the ADF, supports the hypothesis that there will be more women's participation.

Ideology of the Armed Forces Subculture Another variable that evolves from the function of the armed forces and is related to its role in society is the ideology of the military subculture. Specifically, the extent to which the military perceives itself or is perceived by society as elite combat warriors vs egalitarian citizen-soldiers will affect women's participation.

Proposed hypothesis: The more elitist and warrior-like the views of the members of the armed forces, the more limited the participation of women.

The Australian army continues to be the most gendered and combat-oriented service in the ADF, and maintains the lowest participation rate for women. In contrast, the military in Mexico is less a specific warrior class and more an elitist social element that seeks to maintain its limited access from more diverse membership, such as women. In the case of Zimbabwe, the relatively high rates of participation of women in the Liberation War could be explained in part by the existence of a strong citizen soldier ethic and the fact that it was largely young men and women in the guerrilla forces (Kriger, 1992), who perhaps had less traditional views of gender. A corollary hypothesis might be: *the younger the forces (including the leaders) the more egalitarian the gender ideology, and therefore the greater the participation of women.*

Organizational Structure Another variable that helps to explain women's participation is the armed force's organization and structure. Since guerrilla and revolutionary forces are often ad hoc groups formed with a single objective in mind, they tend not to be as bureaucratic and hierarchical as are institutionalized militaries. While some sort of hierarchical structure usually emerges in these forces, they are not as formalized, and there tends to be at least an ideology of equality among the combatants. For this reason, women may not be as limited in these situations.

Proposed hypothesis: The more bureaucratic and hierarchical the structure of the armed forces, the less women will participate.

In Australia, participation rates of women have increased as the bureaucratic barriers within the military have been disestablished. For instance, one of the single most important events in the participation of women in the ADF occurred when the Australian Defence Academy was opened as a joint service, mixed-gender, primary commissioning source for officers. This signaled a change from segmented, bureaucratized systems of organization to a coordinated and integrated approach that encouraged the participation of women, and resulted in greater opportunities for women, regardless of branch of service. In Mexico, however, there is a significant hierarchical relationship between the military services, with the army wielding considerably more

influence and resources than the other services. There is little coordination or cooperation between services. The fact that the army (of which the air force is a subcomponent) and the navy are still administered by entirely separate Cabinet-level officials indicates that the military bureaucracy is not seeking broader integration. A corollary hypothesis might be: *the more combined and 'joint force' oriented the armed forces are, the greater the participation of women, and the more an individual armed service (army, navy, air force, marines) orientation exists, the more limited women's participation.*

Political Variable

As depicted in Figure 2, we have added a fourth dimension, political, to the basic Segal model. The variables included in this dimension are: civil–military relations; the political ideology of those in power, and subsequent public policies regarding minorities and women; and sources of political change other than armed conflict. In addition, we believe the national security situation, listed as a military variable in the original model, is more fully explained as a political variable, as governmental and political policies and decision-making more closely define it.

Civil–Military Relations A nation's civil–military relations significantly influence the participation of women in the armed forces. A consideration of the unique political systems of each individual state and the interaction process between the political leadership and the military brings a fuller understanding of societal perceptions of the military. In a progressive democratic regime, the lines between military and civilian are clear and authority is firmly established in civilian hands. In other states this arrangement is not as well defined and is evidenced by unique relationships and power structures between the politicians and military leaders. These relationships emerge from a variety of circumstances such as shared revolutionary experiences or an extreme sense of nationalism (Camp, 1992; Finer, 1988; Wager, 1995). The result is a fragile balance between authority and governance by civilians on the one hand and direct control of the political process by the armed forces on the other. Consequently, we predict that women will tend to involve themselves in power situations, and thus regimes, that are viewed as legitimate and non-oppressive.

Proposed hypothesis: In states with stable, well-defined, legitimate civilian-led governments, women's participation in the armed forces will be greater than in states where the military as an institution exercises substantial influence over the political process.

As a liberal democratic regime, Australia is the prototypical example of stable civil–military relations. There is no confusion about civilian control of the military and the military's role in the hierarchy. The fact that most of the

world's governments experience much greater involvement by the military lends credence to the inclusion of such a variable in the Segal model. In Mexico, subordination of the military to the civilian government following the Revolution of 1910–17 resulted in civil–military relations that, while appearing stable, were actually a system of political domination and collusion by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (originally led by army generals) and the military (Ackroyd, 1994). In the case of present-day Zimbabwe, President Mugabe's 20-year rule can hardly be described as a stable, well-defined, legitimate civilian-led government. His strong connection with the country's military is undoubtedly a factor in women's low participation.

Political Ideology of Those in Power The political ideology of those in power is also influential in determining women's military roles. We would argue that the more the political leadership is based on ideals of equality, the greater the participation rates of women. This is an important consideration to add, since a country's leadership does not always correspond with the general social values of the people. In the case of a dictatorship, for example, this variable becomes a very significant determining factor of women's military participation. Additionally, changes in liberal or conservative ideology of the government will affect the extent to which traditional social construction of gender and family is emphasized.

Proposed hypothesis: The more liberal the ideology of the political leadership in the state, the greater women's representation in the armed forces.

In Zimbabwe, during the Liberation War, the guerrilla movement was based on Marxist ideals of equality and women's participation was significant. After liberation, women's groups helped to ensure the incorporation of women guerrillas into the country's new military. Today, however, Mugabe's regime is a far cry from liberal, progressive leadership and is reflected in women's minimal military participation. It will also be interesting to note the effects of an end to single party domination in Mexican politics and the recently elected Mexican President's policies on social change and social institutions, such as the military.

In Australia, the privatization of social services with the election of a conservative government in 1996 greatly reduced the availability of affordable childcare. As a result, fewer women can seek outside employment, including the military. A related hypothesis would be: *the more egalitarian the public policy initiatives of the ruling power, the greater the rate of participation of women in the armed forces.*

Sources of Change other than Armed Conflict Although not addressed in detail by Segal's theory, the impact of women's participation in social and

revolutionary movements and increasingly in the formal political structure of the state is an important characteristic that should be considered. The patriarchal nature of many societies has served as a barrier to women's involvement beyond direct action in revolutionary movements. Similarly, the centrality of social values about the family often causes women to take more conservative views toward the radical social change envisioned by many guerrilla and revolutionary groups (Lobao, 1998; Seitz et al., 1993).

We propose, then, that the breadth of opportunities and the means by which women influence change in a society will determine their involvement in social development. If women can realize equality, expanded opportunity and attainment of women's interests through participation in grassroots social organizations, feminist groups and other non-governmental organizations (domestic NGOs), they will tend to do so before participating in large numbers in formal, patriarchal power organizations like legislatures or the military. Particularly relevant are the increasing influence and participation of Mexican women in domestic-oriented NGOs. The unique environment of women's domestic NGOs, working primarily in areas such as health and reproduction, violence, human rights and education, supports a variety of social development issues, and acts as a parallel form of political involvement for women (Tarres, 1998). However, as the governing process in Mexico becomes less dominated by a single party we posit that women would participate in the political and military institutions to a greater degree.

Proposed hypothesis: The greater the diversity of methods and opportunities for non-violent social change that exist in a historically patriarchal and discriminatory society, the less likely are women to join the armed forces.

Since Australia is a liberal democratic state, there exists the possibility of non-violent revolution at every election. Likewise, as more women enter the public sphere in the legislative and judicial branches of government, the more likely women are to join the military because public policy initiatives that foster their service are enacted and enforced to a greater degree. In Mexico, the increasing literacy, labor force participation and declining fertility rates among women suggest social values about women's roles in society are changing. While the participation of women continues to increase in the traditionally patriarchal political structures of the party, women have realized the largest gains in the less patriarchal legislative and judicial branches of the Mexican government (Blanco, 1996; Camp, 1998; Perez Duarte and Norona, 1996). In Zimbabwe under colonial rule, black women's ability to initiate social change was significantly limited and may have encouraged their significant participation in the guerrilla forces. Today there are groups that have withstood the current regime's intimidation and continue to fight for social and political change. It may be the case that Zimbabwean women are more

interested in supporting these groups rather than a military perceived as a corrupt and discriminatory arm of the current government.

Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Research

As Segal indicated, all of these variables are interrelated. For example, the political dimension directly affects the purpose, structure and policies of the military. Military personnel are recruited from within the country, so they presumably reflect the values and norms of their society. Social structure also reflects the values and norms of society. Ultimately, in a democracy, the people generally dictate the ideology of the state by the type of political leadership they empower to lead the country and create its laws.

Segal also hypothesized that the impact of the variables in the model is not necessarily equal; there may be conditions under which one dimension overrides or influences another. This is especially evident when a nation is at war or undergoing a national crisis. It is also important to evaluate how a nation's values and institutions are redefined or re-established after a crisis. We hypothesize that these two conditions are significant in a nation's response to gender equality and women's military participation during and following periods of change or stress.

The end of the Cold War has brought many changes to the global society. When Segal first developed this theory, much confusion remained about the effects of the 'New World Order'. Since then, many militaries have downsized even while they are participating in an increasing number of non-traditional military operations involving coalition and peacekeeping responsibilities, often under the auspices of authorities such as the United Nations or NATO. Additionally, many countries have eliminated conscription and have instituted all-volunteer military forces, which is positively correlated with the increased involvement of women (Haltiner, 1998; Moskos et al., 2000). In light of these dramatic changes and assuming a reduced global threat, as Segal hypothesized, there has been a rise in the participation of women in the military globally, with an associated increase in women's participation in combat specialties, especially aviation and shipboard combat. However, few countries allow women unrestricted freedom to participate in ground combat. We suggest that, as the tendency to participate in non-traditional and coalition-based military operations increases, broader international pressures to equalize women's participation in these and other countries will also increase.

We have recommended the revision or addition of several hypotheses in the basic Segal model. While these seem to fit the three countries offered as case studies, future research and study are required to understand fully the complicated relationship between societal and cultural norms and the participation of

women in the armed forces. Furthermore, the additions we have made to the model, such as the political variables, need to be tested on more country case studies. In particular, further research should continue to look at women's military participation in equally diverse countries, such as those in Asia, South America, or countries of the former Soviet Union, to validate and refine Segal's model and our proposed additions.

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1 Lieutenant Colonel Romeo Mutszunguma, Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Defence Attaché (personal interview, 2001).

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
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Abstracts/Résumés/Resúmenes

Gerhard Kümmel
When Boy Meets Girl: The 'Feminization' of the Military

In this introductory article, first the theme of the monograph issue is explored, developed, and put into the context of the overall debate on woman and the military and women in the military respectively. Next, the major findings following from the various contributions and case studies are presented. In addition, the theoretical explanations of the articles are critically examined and synthesized in a model of the various factors that have to be taken into account when analysing the integration of women into the armed forces. This model covers the armed forces, politics, society, culture and the international environment as the crucial dimensions. Eventually, further routes for research are sketched out, pointing to the need for a systematic comparative approach. This may be interesting in order to revise and further develop the model of influencing factors advanced here and to identify the relative weight of the various variables involved. Such an approach may also be fruitful in order to examine the role of the military as both a gendered and a gendering organization. Here, a cross-national investigation of gender role images in the military and in society is suggested. The comparative approach may even be taken one step further by comparing the military to business, administration and other organizations of society.

Keywords: explanatory model, international comparative research, military, sexism, women

Gerhard Kümmel
Quand le garçon rencontre la fille: la 'féminisation' du militaire

Ici le thème du livre sera exploré, développé et placé dans le contexte de la discussion globale concernant, respectivement, la femme et le militaire et les

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femmes dans les forces armées. Seront présentés ensuite les conclusions principales provenant des diverses contributions et études de cas. De plus, les explications théoriques contenues dans les divers chapitres seront examinées d'un œil critique et synthétisées dans un modèle reprenant les divers facteurs qu'il faut considérer dans une analyse de l'intégration des femmes dans le militaire. Ce modèle recouvre les forces armées, la politique, la société, la culture et l'environnement international comme dimensions cruciales. Ultérieurement, d'autres chemins de recherche seront dessinés où le besoin d'une approche comparative systématique sera souligné. Ceci peut être intéressant pour la révision et le développement continu du modèle des facteurs d'influence ici proposé ainsi que pour l'identification du poids relatif des divers variables qui en font partie. Une telle approche peut également être fructueuse en ce qui concerne l'examen du rôle du militaire en tant qu'organisation qui est caractérisée par la prépondérance de la gent masculine et la tendance de perpétuer celle-ci. Dans ce contexte, on suggère de mener à bien un examen transnational des images de rôle de genre dans le militaire et dans la société. On peut même aller un pas plus loin dans l'approche comparative en comparant le militaire au monde du commerce, de l'administration et à d'autres organismes de la société.

Mots-clés: femmes, militaire, modèle explicatif, recherche internationale comparative, sexisme

Gerhard Kümmel

Cuando los chicos se encuentran con las chicas: la 'femenización' del mundo militar

Este ensayo pretende explorar y desarrollar el tema del libro y situarlo en el contexto del debate global sobre la mujer y el mundo castrense así como la situación de la mujer en las fuerzas armadas, respectivamente. A continuación, se presentarán los principales resultados de las distintas contribuciones y estudios de caso. Asimismo, las explicaciones teóricas de los capítulos serán sometidas a un examen crítico y se verán reunidas en un modelo de los diferentes factores que se han de tener en cuenta a la hora de analizar la integración de la mujer en las fuerzas armadas. Este modelo abarca las fuerzas armadas, la política, la sociedad, la cultura y el entorno internacional como sus elementos cruciales. Finalmente, se trazarán nuevos caminos emprendidos por la investigación, haciendo hincapié en la necesidad de buscar un enfoque comparativo sistemático. Ello podría ser interesante cuando se trata de revisar y seguir desarrollando el modelo de factores influyentes presentado en este libro y de identificar el peso relativo de los distintos factores implicados. Este enfoque también podría ser provechoso a la hora de examinar el papel de las

fuerzas armadas como organizaciones que por un lado reflejan las relaciones entre los dos sexos y que por otro lado las determinan. Se sugiere un análisis transnacional de los papeles de los sexos en los Ejércitos y en las sociedades. Este enfoque comparativo puede incluso ir más lejos al comparar el mundo castrense con el de negocios, la administración y otras organizaciones sociales.

Palabras claves: fuerzas armadas, investigaciones internacionales comparativas, modelo explicativo, mujeres, sexismo

Donna Winslow and Jason Dunn
Women in the Canadian Forces: Between Legal and Social Integration

In this article the authors examine the integration of women into the Canadian armed forces. The definition of integration has two parts. The first is a legal standard where women and men are incorporated as equals into the military. The second is of a social nature. Here, integration is defined as the full acceptance of women as equals. The authors argue that the combat forces are far removed from civilian society. As a result they emphasize the values and attitudes of the traditionally male-oriented military organization and, in particular, masculine models of the warrior, thus resisting female integration. This article is based primarily upon documentary research on gender integration in the Canadian armed forces. The authors also examine how scholars have addressed change within military organizations; in particular, how certain sectors of the military react differently to change. In addition, informal interviews were conducted with forces personnel.

Keywords: Canada, legal integration, military, social integration, women

Donna Winslow et Jason Dunn
Les femmes dans les forces armées canadiennes: entre intégration légale et sociale

Dans cet article, les auteurs examinent l'intégration des femmes dans les Forces Canadiennes. La définition d'intégration consiste de deux éléments. Le premier est une norme légale par laquelle femmes et hommes se trouvent intégrés au sein du militaire à termes égaux. Le second revête un caractère social où l'intégration est défini comme l'acceptation complète de la femme sur un pied d'égalité. Les auteurs soulignent que les armes de combat divergent davantage de la société civile. Par conséquent, celles-ci mettent l'accent sur les valeurs et les attitudes de l'organisation militaire

traditionnellement masculine et, plus particulièrement, sur les modèles masculines du guerrier, résistent ainsi à l'intégration des femmes. Ce chapitre est basé en première ligne sur des recherches documentaires de l'intégration des femmes dans les Forces Canadiennes. Les auteurs ont examiné aussi la façon dont les spécialistes académiques ont abordé les changements dans les organisations militaires et, plus particulièrement, comment certains secteurs des forces armées réagissent différemment à des changements. De plus, des entretiens informels ont été menés avec des effectifs des Forces Canadiennes.

Mots-clés: Canada, femmes, intégration légale, intégration sociale, militaire

Donna Winslow y Jason Dunn
La mujer en las fuerzas armadas canadienses: entre integración legal y social

En este artículo, los autores examinan la integración de la mujer en las fuerzas armadas canadienses. La integración es definida de dos maneras. La primera se refiere a un estándar legal donde la mujer y el hombre son incorporados en filas de forma igualitaria. La segunda se refiere a su aspecto social, donde la integración se define coma la plena aceptación de la mujer como ser igual. Los autores argumentan que las unidades de combate son muy diferentes a la sociedad civil. Como resultado de ello, enfatizan los valores y actitudes de la organización militar que tradicionalmente se orienta en el hombre y, muy particularmente, en el modelo masculino del guerrero, con lo que se resiste a la integración de la mujer. Este artículo se basa sobre todo en la investigación documental sobre la integración de los sexos en las fuerzas armadas canadienses. Los autores también analizan la forma en que los científicos estudian las transformaciones producidas dentro de las organizaciones militares, y en particular, las diferentes reacciones de ciertos sectores de los Ejércitos frente a estos cambios. Además, realizaron entrevistas informales con personal de las fuerzas armadas canadienses.

Palabras claves: Canada, fuerzas armadas, integración legal, integración social, mujeres

Uta Klein
The Gender Perspective of Civil–Military Relations in Israeli Society

The exceptional centrality of security to the national existence of Israel has led scholars to investigate the impact of the military on the political and civil system. Nevertheless, this research had been limited in scope. It has been

claimed that the army is a 'citizen army', that Israel is a 'nation in arms', and that therefore the army does not reflect a specific group in society. The newer 'generation' of scholars emphasizes the effect of armed conflict on the larger society, on its attitudes and values. One subject, however, which has been neglected so far is the gender perspective. This is astonishing because Israel is unique in the sense that Jewish Israeli women have been conscripted since the foundation of the state of Israel. In China women are also conscripted, but as not even 10 percent of each age group are called up this is negligible. Thus – from the perspective of sheer numbers – Israel serves as a very interesting case study of the impact of an advanced integration of female citizens in the defence forces on society and on the defence forces themselves. The article examines whether, although (Jewish) women are conscripted, the military in Israel is the main force in shaping male identity and whether military service can be understood as a rite of passage to male adulthood. It also analyses whether the dominance of security and of the military discourse leads to gender inequality in society at large.

Keywords: gender, Israeli defence forces, masculinity, military service, rite of passage

Uta Klein
L'homme, la femme et relations civiles–militaires en Israël

L'importance centrale que revêt la sécurité pour l'existence nationale d'Israël a mené des chercheurs académiques à examiner l'impact du militaire sur les systèmes politique et civil du pays. Néanmoins, l'étendue de cette recherche est resté limitée. Il a été soutenu que les forces armées sont une 'armée des citoyens' et qu'Israël est une 'nation sous armes' et que, par conséquent, son armée n'est pas à l'image d'un groupe spécifique de la société. La plus récente 'génération' de chercheurs académiques met l'accent sur l'effet d'un conflit armé sur la société en général, sur ses attitudes et sur ses valeurs. Un sujet qui a été négligé jusqu'ici, cependant, est la perspective des rôles de l'homme et de la femme. Ceci est étonnant car Israël est unique dans le sens que les femmes juives israéliennes ont été appelées aux armes depuis la création de l'État d'Israël. En Chine, les femmes sont aussi appelées au service militaire mais, comme moins de 10 pour cent de chaque groupe d'âge est appelé, les chiffres sont négligeables. Par conséquent, d'une point de vue numérique, Israël sert comme une étude de cas très intéressante sur l'effet de l'intégration la plus avancée de citoyennes dans des forces armées sur la société et sur les forces armées concernées elles-mêmes. L'étude porte entre autre sur la question si, bien que les femmes (juives) soient appelées, le militaire en Israël représente la force principale dans la formation de l'identité masculine et si le service militaire peut être considéré comme un rite

de passage vers l'âge adulte des hommes. Plus loin, une analyse est faite pour déterminer si la dominance de la sécurité et du discours militaire mène à une inégalité sexuelle dans la société en général.

Mots-clés: forces armées israëliennes, genre, masculinité, rite de passage, service militaire

Uta Klein

El hombre, la mujer y las relaciones civiles–militares en Israel

La extraordinaria importancia primordial que tiene la seguridad para la existencia de la nación de Israel ha motivado a científicos a estudiar los efectos del ejército sobre el sistema político y civil. Con todo, el alcance de este estudio es limitado. Se ha sostenido que el ejército es un 'ejército de ciudadanos' y que Israel es una 'nación armada', y que por ende, el ejército no refleja ningún grupo específico de la sociedad. La nueva generación de investigadores subraya las repercusiones de conflictos armados en la mayor parte de la sociedad, en sus posturas y valores. Sin embargo, un tema que hasta ahora ha sido tratado con negligencia es el de los sexos. Nos sorprende porque Israel es único en el sentido de que las mujeres judías de Israel han sido reclutadas a prestar el servicio militar desde que se creó el Estado de Israel. En China, también se recluta a la mujer, pero como ni siquiera el diez por ciento de cada grupo etario están siendo incorporados, es algo que se puede dejar de lado. Es por eso que, desde el punto de vista numérico, Israel sirve como un estudio de caso muy interesante sobre la influencia ejercida por la integración más avanzada de ciudadanas en las fuerzas defensivas sobre la sociedad, y sobre las fuerzas defensivas mismas. Se ha estudiado si las fuerzas armadas israelíes, a pesar de que las mujeres (judías) son reclutadas, constituyen la fuerza principal en moldear la identidad masculina y si el servicio militar puede ser considerado un rito de inicialización para los varones. Asimismo, los autores han analizado si el dominio del tema de la seguridad y el discurso militar conducen, en general, a una falta de igualdad entre los sexos en la sociedad.

Palabras claves: fuerzas defensivas israelíes, género, masculinidad, rito de inicialización, servicio militar

Helena Carreiras
Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces: From Visibility to 'Eclipse'

Ten years after women began to join the Portuguese armed forces, the whole question of gender integration in the military seems to have been almost entirely dismissed as an issue in terms of institutional priorities, political initiative and public awareness. This article addresses some of the factors that may help explain this apparent 'eclipse' by focusing on the social, political and organizational contexts of women's military participation. After reviewing the factors that lay behind the decision from within the armed forces to recruit women, as well as the initial reactions on the part of different sectors of Portuguese society, it proceeds with an analysis of military policies regarding the armed forces' new members. Data are presented on the number, relative percentages, institutional location and sociological profile of military women. A content analysis of newspaper articles on the topic of military women published in the course of the last decade completes this empirical scrutiny. Finally, questions are raised concerning the social and political meaning of women's presence in the Portuguese armed forces.

Keywords: military, Portugal, public debate, women

Helena Carreiras
Les femmes dans les forces armées portugaises: de la visibilité à 'l'éclipse'

Les forces armées portugaises ont intégrées des femmes pour la première foins en 1961 avec la création d'un corps entièrement féminin dans les forces aériennes. Plus de deux décennies plus tard, la situation avait changé dramatiquement: en suivant la tendance générale en Europe, les forces armées portugaises ouvrèrent leurs rangs aux femmes. En 1988, deux jeunes femmes furent acceptées à l'académie de la force aérienne pour des stages de formation menant à une carrière de pilote, et à partir de ce moment les trois services progressivement acceptèrent des femmes dans leurs divers organismes, y inclus les écoles des services, sans restrictions concernant le grade. Les femmes portugaises ont considéré cela une occasion attirante. Pendant les années 1992 et 1993, quelques 3500 candidats firent une demande d'emploi dans les forces terrestres, navales et aériennes. En l'an 2000, presque 3000 femmes ont servi comme volontaires dans les forces armées portugaises dans une grande variété de fonctions et postes. Le point le plus remarquable, peut être, est que ce changement a eu lieu sans une controverse publique, politique ou au sein du militaire. Cet article aborde les questions suivantes:

Comment ce changement a vu le jour? Pourquoi, quand et comment les forces armées portugaises ont commencé à recruter des femmes? Dans quelle mesure ceci était lié à des changements concernant la structure des forces armées et la politique d'accession militaire? Quelles sont les raisons pour lesquelles des femmes portugaises se décident à s'enrôler dans le militaire? Quel est leur nombre? Dans quelles fonctions servent-elles? A quels problèmes et exclusions doivent-elles se confronter? Quel était la réaction des partis politiques, des associations de femmes et des média à l'intégration des deux sexes dans les forces armées? L'attention publique, a-t-elle changée au cours de la décennie?

Mots-clés: débat publique, femmes, militaire, Portugal

Helena Carreiras
La mujer en las fuerzas armadas portuguesas: de la visibilidad al 'eclipse'

Las fuerzas armadas portuguesas por primera vez incorporaron a la mujer en 1961 con la creación de un cuerpo exclusivamente femenino en la Fuerza Aérea. Más de dos décadas más tarde, la situación cambió de forma dramática. Siguiendo la tendencia general en Europa, las fuerzas armadas portuguesas abrieron sus puertas para las mujeres. En 1988, aceptaron a dos mujeres jóvenes a la Academia de la Fuerza Aérea para la carrera de piloto. Desde entonces, los tres Ejércitos han admitido a la mujer en sus distintos establecimientos, inclusive las Academias, sin restricción alguna. Las mujeres portuguesas lo consideraron una oportunidad atractiva. Durante los años 1992 y 1993, postularon alrededor de 3500 candidatas a la Fuerzas Terrestre, Naval y Aérea. En el 2000, casi 3000 mujeres sirvieron como voluntarias en las fuerzas armadas portuguesas, en una gran gama de servicios y puestos. Quizás el aspecto más notable de todo ello es que estas transformaciones tuvieron lugar sin que se produjeran controversias públicas, políticas o militares. Este artículo trata la siguiente cuestión: ¿A qué se debe este cambio? ¿Por qué, cuándo y cómo empezaron las fuerzas armadas portuguesas a reclutar a las mujeres? ¿Hasta qué punto estuvo relacionado este cambio a las transformaciones estructurales en las fuerzas armadas y las que tuvieron que ver con la política de ingreso a los Ejércitos? ¿Por qué se deciden las mujeres portuguesas a alistarse? ¿Cuántas son? ¿Qué funciones desempeñan? ¿Qué problemas y tipos de exclusiones tienen que afrontar? ¿Cuál fue la reacción de los partidos políticos, asociaciones de mujeres y los medios de comunicación frente a la integración de los sexos en las fuerzas armadas? ¿Cambió la atención de la opinión pública durante la última década?

Palabras claves: discusión pública, fuerzas armadas, mujeres, Portugal

Lindy Heinecken
Affirming Gender Equality: The Challenges Facing the South African Armed Forces

In the wake of constitutional reforms, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been compelled to implement full gender equality as part of their affirmative action programme to correct past gender and racial imbalances within the ranks. In this article, the challenges this poses for the SANDF are discussed. A theoretical overview of the various feminist positions on women in the armed forces is provided and related to current debates and policy decisions on gender equality in South Africa. This is followed by a discussion of the various factors that have influenced the participation of women in the South African armed forces and the potential impact increasing numbers of women may have on military effectiveness. Recent empirical findings are used to demonstrate how military, societal and cultural factors impact on the attitudes of women, and towards women serving in the SANDF. In conclusion, as women soldiers prepare to make peace rather than war in Africa, some of the challenges they face in a society and on a continent where they themselves have become the subjects of violence, are deliberated.

Keywords: civil–military relations, military, military effectiveness, South Africa, women

Lindy Heinecken
L'affirmation de l'égalité des deux sexes: les défis auxquels les forces armées sud-africaines sont confrontés

A la suite des reformes constitutionnelles, la Force de Défense Nationale Sud-africain (FDNSA) a été forcée à mettre en œuvre l'égalité totale des deux sexes comme élément de son programme de mesures anti-discriminatoires afin de remédier à des déséquilibres de sexe et raciales parmi ses rangs. Dans cet article, sont discutés les problèmes y afférents auxquels est confrontée la FDNSA. Une vue d'ensemble théorique des divers positions féministes concernant les femmes dans les forces armées est donnée et liée aux discussions et décisions politiques actuelles concernant l'égalité des sexes en Afrique du Sud. S'ensuit une discussion des divers facteurs qui ont eu une influence sur la participation des femmes dans les forces armées sud-africaines ainsi que de l'effet potentiel qu'un nombre croissant de femmes pourrait avoir sur l'efficacité du militaire. Des résultats de recherches empiriques récentes sont utilisés pour démontrer comment des facteurs militaires, sociales et culturelles ont un effet sur les attitudes des femmes et vis-à-vis le service de

femmes dans la FDNSA. En conclusion, vu le fait que les femmes se préparent à faire la paix plutôt que la guerre en Afrique, se trouve une discussion de quelques défis auxquels elles sont confrontés dans une société et un continent où elles ont fréquemment été les victimes de violence elles-mêmes.

Mots-clés: Afrique du Sud, efficacité du militaire, femmes, militaire, relations civiles–militaires

Lindy Heinecken
Afirmar la igualdad entre los sexos: los desafíos para las fuerzas armadas sudafricanas

Tras las reformas constitucionales, la South African National Defence Force (SANDF) se veía obligada a implementar la igualdad integral entre hombres y mujeres como elemento de su plan de acciones que venía dirigido a corregir las desigualdades raciales y entre los sexos a nivel de rango, que tuvieron su origen en el pasado. En este artículo, se revelarán los desafíos que ello implicaba para las fuerzas armadas sudafricanas. Se dará una orientación teórica de las distintas posturas feministas sobre el tema de la mujer en las fuerzas armadas y las pondrá en relación con los actuales debates y decisiones políticas sobre la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres en Sudáfrica. A continuación, se discutirán los distintos factores que han influido en la participación de las mujeres en las fuerzas armadas sudafricanas y las consecuencias para la efectividad militar que podría haber tenido el creciente número de soldados mujeres. Se usarán recientes resultados empíricos para demostrar cómo los factores militares, sociales y culturales afectan la actitud de las mujeres y hacia las mujeres que sirven en las fuerzas armadas sudafricanas. En conclusión, como las mujeres en filas están preparándose para buscar la paz en vez de guerra en África, se reflexionará sobre varios de los desafíos que tienen que afrontar en una sociedad y en un continente donde ellas mismas han sido víctimas de la violencia.

Palabras claves: efectividad militar, fuerzas armadas, mujeres, relaciones civiles–militares, Sudáfrica

Doo-Seung Hong
Women in the South Korean Military

This article examines the changing role of women in the Korean armed forces and explores the issue of gender integration in the military. During the past half-century, the utilization of women in the armed forces has been limited

in Korea due to constitutional and cultural restraints. Yet the expansion of utilizing females in the military is becoming a global trend. Since the Women's Army Corps was abolished as an independent corps in the early 1990s in Korea, women have been assigned to various corps of the army, the navy and the air force. By 2020 the Korean armed forces plan to recruit women to a level of 5 percent of the total officers and NCOs in the three services. Overall, the evaluation of women in the military appears to be positive, although gender differences are detected in the role of servicewomen. This article highlights the advantages of women's presence in the armed forces with respect to social representation, cultural integration and the acquisition of quality human resources.

Keywords: Korea, military, military effectiveness, women

Doo-Seung Hong
Les femmes dans le militaire sud-coréen

L'allocation de femmes à des postes de commandant à divers niveaux d'unité a attiré l'attention de la presse écrite parce que ceci est un phénomène nouveau en Corée. Cette attention est due au fait que les femmes ont commencé à participer sur un pied d'égalité dans une organisation qui traditionnellement a été dominée par les hommes. Dans les dernières trois décennies, des pays industrialisés avancés ont entamé une discussion portant sur l'emploi de la main-d'œuvre féminine dans les forces armées. Ses défenseurs maintiennent que des chances égales devraient être données aux femmes servant dans le militaire, tandis que les gens sceptiques craignent que la présence de femmes dans les forces armées pourrait entraver l'efficacité d'une organisation qu'ils considèrent être plus appropriée pour les hommes. Ces deux points de vue contrastés ne sont pas nécessairement contradictoires ni s'excluent-ils mutuellement. Cependant, il est clair que le point de vue sceptique est entrain de perdre progressivement sa légitimité. Vu sur une échelle globale, dans les années 90 les femmes ont joué un rôle plus actif et plus visible que jamais auparavant au sein du militaire. Néanmoins, l'agrandissement du nombre des femmes représentées dans les forces armées pourrait donner naissance à des problèmes potentiels à l'intérieur de l'organisation militaire. Par conséquent, la question d'efficacité en ce qui concerne l'accomplissement d'objectifs militaires posée par la présence de femmes dans les forces armées devient un sujet à explorer par les décisionnaires militaires et des académiciens. La Corée n'est pas une exception dans cette évolution. Cet article examine le statut des femmes dans les forces armées coréennes et les projets futurs proposés par les responsables de la politique militaire. Est également exploré l'intégration

des femmes au sein du militaire en examinant les points de vue des supérieurs, pairs et subordonnés – féminins et masculins – concernant les aspects positifs et négatifs de la présence de femmes dans le militaire. La tendance générale des changements de la politique vis-à-vis de l'emploi de femmes dans le militaire reflète la croissance des droits de la femme dans cette période. Depuis les années 70, il y a eu une condamnation progressive de la discrimination conte la femme, et la participation des femmes dans le marché du travail a vu une expansion rapide. En même temps, les attitudes des chefs de corps militaires vis-à-vis des soldats féminins ont changé aussi.

Mots-clés: Corée du Sud, efficacité du militaire, femmes, militaire

Doo-Seung Hong

La mujer en las fuerzas armadas de Corea del Sur

La asignación de mujeres como comandantes en diferentes niveles de unidades ha llamado la atención entre la prensa porque supone un nuevo fenómeno en Corea. El hecho de que llama tanto la atención se debe a que las mujeres han empezado a participar, sobre una base igualitaria, en una organización que tradicionalmente ha estado dominada por los hombres. En los últimos tres decenios, se ha discutido en varios países industrializados progresivos sobre el empleo de la mano de obra femenina en las fuerzas armadas. Sus defensores argumentan que las mujeres que sirven en los Ejércitos deberían disfrutar de la igualdad de oportunidades mientras sus críticos temen que la presencia de mujeres en los Ejércitos puede impedir la eficiencia de una organización que consideran más adecuada para los hombres. El contraste entre estas dos opiniones no significa necesariamente que se contradigan o se excluyan mutuamente. Sin embargo, queda claro que poco a poco, el escepticismo está perdiendo su legitimación. En la década de los noventa, las mujeres jugaron un papel mucho más activo y visible en las fuerzas armadas del mundo que nunca antes. No obstante, el aumento de la representación femenina en los Ejércitos podría aumentar los problemas internos en las organizaciones. De este modo, surge el tema de la eficiencia de la persecución de objetivos militares, provocado por la presencia de la mujer en las fuerzas armadas, que requiere la investigación por los órganos de decisión y las academias militares. Corea no es ninguna excepción en este sentido. Este artículo estudia el estatus de la mujer en las fuerzas armadas de Corea y los programas de futuro propuestos por los órganos políticos. También analiza la integración de los sexos en los Ejércitos enfocando los aspectos positivos y negativos de la presencia de la mujer en las fuerzas armadas, tal como están concebidos por sus superiores, compañeros y subordinados, tanto hombres como mujeres. La tendencia general de la

cambiada política relativa al empleo de la mujer en las organizaciones militares refleja el aumento de los derechos de la mujer durante toda esta época. Desde los años 70, la discriminación de los sexos ha sido fuertemente desafiado y la participación de la mujer en el mercado laboral ha aumentado rápidamente. Al mismo tiempo, también ha cambiado la actitud de los líderes militares hacia las mujeres como soldados.

Palabras claves: Corea del Sur, efectividad militar, fuerzas armadas, mujeres

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins
Women in Extended Roles in the Military: Legal Issues

The cases of *Tanja Kreil* v. *Germany* and *Angela Maria Sirdar* v. *The British Army Board* recently negotiated at the European Court of Justice are instructive not only regarding the arguments put forward by all sides, but also because of a fundamental question of constitutional law involved, namely whether national or Community law governed the extension of military roles in European armed forces. The issue then assumes an international or, more precisely, a European dimension. Both women complained about workplace discrimination in the military based on their sex. The Court accepted Tanja Kreil's charge and ruled that national provisions did not override Community law. Accordingly, Germany was called to give women access to further classifications and trades within the Bundeswehr, and, in the end, the Ministry of Defence decided to open the military to women without any restrictions, meaning that they would be able to enter every classification and trade they wanted to. The Sirdar case is different because, here, it was not the generic issue of female recruitment, but the specific question of their exclusion from certain specialties, in particular from special forces, that was at stake. In the end, the Court followed the argument detailed by the British Royal Marines and confirmed the legality of Sirdar's exclusion. The two cases lead the author to develop a very useful scheme of categories of military roles for research purposes in which he distinguishes and defines six categories: non-combatant, combat service, combat support, combat, direct ground combat and special forces. Western armed forces currently recruit women in the first four categories, some do so with regard to direct ground combat, but none allows women to serve in special forces.

Keywords: Germany, legal issues, military effectiveness, military roles for women, United Kingdom

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins

Les femmes dans des rôles plus amples au sein du militaire: les questions légales qui en découlent

Les cas juridiques de *Tanja Kreil contre l'Allemagne* et de *Angela Maria Sirdar contre l'Armée britannique* qui ont été traités par la Cour de Justice Européenne plus récemment ne sont pas seulement instructifs en ce qui concerne les arguments avancés par toutes les parties concernées mais aussi à cause d'une question fondamentale de loi constitutionnelle qui y est impliquée, c'est-à-dire si l'expansion des rôles militaires dans les forces armées de l'Europe est régie par la législation nationale ou celle de la Communauté Européenne. Par conséquent, cette question revêt d'une dimension internationale ou, plus précisément, européenne. Les deux femmes se sont plaintes d'une discrimination à leur lieu de travail militaire et ceci, sur base de leur sexe. La Cour a accepté la plainte de Tanja Kreil et a jugé que les dispositions légales nationales n'outrepassent pas les lois communautaires. Par conséquent, l'Allemagne a été appelée à donner aux femmes un accès à des fonctions et des métiers plus amples au sein de la Bundeswehr et, en fin de compte, le ministère de la défense allemand a décidé de rendre le service militaire accessible aux femmes sans aucune restriction, ce qui veut dire qu'elles ont accès à toutes les fonctions et tous les métiers qu'elles désirent. Le cas de Sirdar est différent parce que l'enjeu n'y était pas la question générale de recrutement de femmes mais la question spécifique de leur exclusion de certaines fonctions de spécialiste, particulièrement des forces spéciales. En fin de compte, la Cour s'est rangée du côté de l'argument avancé par les British Royal Marines et a confirmé la légitimité de l'exclusion de Sirdar. Les deux cas ont mené l'auteur à développer un projet très utile de catégories de rôles militaires pour des fins de recherche, dans lequel il fait la distinction entre six catégories et en énonce les définitions: non-combattant, service des trains des unités de combat, service de soutien au combat, combat, combat direct au sol et forces spéciales. A présent, les forces armées occidentales recrutent des femmes pour les quatre premières catégories, certaines les considèrent pour le combat direct au sol, mais aucune ne permet aux femmes de servir dans les forces spéciales.

Mots-clés: Allemagne, efficacité militaire, questions légales, rôles militaires des femmes, Royaume-Uni

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins
La mujer en papeles ampliados en las fuerzas armadas: los temas legales implicados

Los casos de *Tanja Kreil/Alemania* y *Angela Maria Sirdar/Comisión del Ejército británico* negociados ante la Corte Europea de Justicia en el pasado reciente no sólo son instructivos por los argumentos presentados por todos los partícipes, sino también porque estuvo implicado el tema fundamental de la ley constitucional en el sentido de si las leyes nacionales o comunitarias rigen la extensión de los roles militares en las fuerzas armadas europeas. Entonces, el tema adquiere una dimensión internacional, o para ser exacto, una dimensión europea. Ambas mujeres se quejaron de que habían sido víctimas de discriminación sexual durante el trabajo en las fuerzas armadas. La Corte aceptó el cargo de Tanja Kreil y decidió que las disposiciones nacionales no prevalecen sobre las leyes comunitarias. Por consiguiente, Alemania fue requerida a permitir a las mujeres el acceso a otras clasificaciones y profesiones dentro de la Bundeswehr, y al final, el Ministerio de Defensa decidió abrir las fuerzas armadas a las mujeres sin restricción alguna, de modo que pudieran acceder a cualquier clasificación y profesión que quisieran. El caso de Sirdar es diferente ya que no se trataba del lado sexual del tema de reclutamiento de las mujeres, sino de la cuestión específica de su exclusión de determinadas especialidades, en particular de determinadas unidades. Al final, la Corte siguió el argumento presentado por los British Royal Marines y confirmó la legitimidad de la exclusión de Sirdar. Estos dos casos llevaron al autor a desarrollar un esquema de las diferentes funciones cumplidas por las organizaciones militares, que es de gran utilidad para fines científicos. Se distinguen y definen seis categorías: no combatiente, servicio de combate, servico de sostén al combate, combate, combate directo en tierra y fuerzas especiales. Las fuerzas armadas occidentales actualmente reclutan a mujeres para las primeras cuatro categorías, algunas de ellas las aceptan para el combate directo en tierra, pero ningún ejército europeo recluta a mujeres para las fuerzas especiales.

Palabras claves: Alemania, cuestiones legales, efectividad militar, Reino Unido

Darlene Iskra, Stephen Trainor, Marcia Leithauser and Mady Wechsler Segal
Women's Participation in Armed Forces Cross-Nationally: Expanding Segal's Model

In this article the authors analyse and extend Segal's theory of factors affecting women's military participation cross-nationally through a literature review

on three very different countries, Australia, Mexico and Zimbabwe. These countries differ not only in geographic location, but also in how the dimensions of Segal's theory apply to each. Segal's model focuses on societal and institutional-level variables, in the military, in the culture and in the social structure that affect the degree and nature of women's participation in the armed forces. While the model fits in a general sense, the authors find that other variables need to be added, and existing ones revised. Thus, they propose an expansion of Segal's theory to include additional factors and hypotheses for the relationship between each of these variables and the extent of women's participation in a nation's armed force, using examples from Australia, Mexico and Zimbabwe.

Keywords: military participation, political variable

Darlene Iskra, Stephen Trainor, Marcia Leithauser et Mady Wechsler Segal
La participation de femmes aux forces armées: une expansion du modèle de Segal

Dans cet article, les auteurs analysent et portent à étendue internationale la théorie de Segal concernant les facteurs influant la participation militaire des femmes au niveau transnational. Pour cela ils font une revue documentaire de trois pays très différents, l'Australie, le Mexique et le Zimbabwe. Ces pays diffèrent l'un de l'autre non seulement par leur situation géographique mais aussi en ce qui concerne l'application des dimensions de la théorie de Segal à chacun d'entre eux. Le modèle de Segal est concentré sur des variables sociales et institutionnelles dans les forces armées, dans la culture et dans la structure sociale qui ont une influence sur la nature et le degré de la participation des femmes dans les forces armées. Bien que le modèle soit valable pour y être appliqué en termes généraux, les auteurs trouvent qu'il faut rajouter d'autres variables et revoir les variables existantes. Par conséquent, ils proposent une expansion de la théorie de Segal en ajoutant d'autres facteurs et des hypothèses concernant la relation entre chacune de ces variables et le degré de participation des femmes dans les forces armées d'une nation en utilisant des exemple provenant de l'Australie, du Mexique et du Zimbabwe.

Mots-clés: participation militaire, variable politique

Darlene Iskra, Stephen Trainor, Marcia Leithauser y Mady Wechsler Segal
La participación de mujeres en las fuerzas armadas: la expansión del modelo de Segal

En este artículo, los autores analizan y amplían la teoría de Segal acerca de los factores que afectan la participación de la mujer en las fuerzas armadas a nivel transnacional, a través de un repaso de la literatura sobre tres países tan diferentes como Australia, México y Zimbabwe. Estos países se distinguen no solamente por su situación geográfica, sino también por el modo en que la teoría de Segal se deja aplicar a ellos. El modelo de Segal se concentra en las variables que se dan en los niveles de sociedad e instituciones, tanto en las fuerzas armadas, como en el mundo de la cultura y en la estructura social que influyen en la medida y el modo de la participación de la mujer en los ejércitos. Aunque en general, el modelo se adecua a la realidad, los autores opinan que habría que añadir otras variables y revisar las que ya existen. En este sentido, proponen una ampliación de la teoría de Segal para incluir nuevos factores e hipótesis que se refieren a la relación entre cada una de estas variables y el grado de participación femenina en las fuerzas armadas nacionales, con los ejemplos de Australia, México y Zimbabwe.

Palabras claves: participación militaria, variable política

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
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
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


Current Sociology



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Book Review Essays

Current Sociology has not previously carried book reviews. With its relaunch as a peer-reviewed quarterly in 1997 at the World Congress of Sociology in Montreal, *Current Sociology* changed. Beginning with Volume 49 in 2001, the journal added two more issues per year, monograph issues edited independently as the Sage Studies in International Sociology. Embracing further innovation, *Current Sociology* is now adding a new section of book review essays.


These will not be book reviews per se, but essays on groupings of recent books (typically two, perhaps three, on rare occasions, four) on topics that are of related interest to sociologists internationally. This new initiative has the endorsement of the Publications Committee and the Executive of the International Sociological Association. The first of the book review essays are expected to appear in Volume 51 (2003) of *Current Sociology*. Book review essays will be invited by the Editor.

We, the Editors, the Editorial Board, and staff of *Current Sociology*, as well as the members of the Publications Committee of the ISA, are immensely excited about this new initiative. It is one which we believe will be of great interest to busy sociologists worldwide, in exposing them to interesting new books and their ideas in a timely and enjoyable manner.

Susan McDaniel
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Dennis Smith
Incoming Editor, *Current Sociology*, September 2002

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
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Maureen Baker

Child Poverty, Maternal Health and Social Benefits

Adult Poverty, Children and Poor Health

The Innocenti Report Card (2000) of *Child Poverty in Rich Nations* notes that the poverty rate[1] among children living in two-parent families is higher in North America, the United Kingdom and Australia than many other 'rich' nations. For one-parent families, the rates are much worse: over 55 percent of children in American one-parent families and about 52 percent in Canadian one-parent families live in poverty. This report notes the strong relationship between child poverty and having parents who are unemployed, outside the labour force, or earning 'low wages'.[2] Poverty rates are also higher if the lone parent is the mother.

In some countries, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, the vast majority of lone mothers rely for most of their income on social benefits, which are deliberately set below the minimum wage (Baker and Tippin, 1999: 22). In recent years, governments in all the liberal welfare states[3] have developed welfare-to-work programs to encourage welfare recipients to move more quickly into paid work. When lone mothers enter the workforce, however, they often cannot support their families. The jobs they find are often temporary, low paid, part-time, and seldom include flexible work hours, paid sick leave, or extended health benefits (Dooley, 1995; Harris, 1996; Vosko, 2000). Their job qualifications are typically lower than partnered mothers, and many lone mothers experience childcare and other problems that interfere with keeping a job or progressing through the ranks. More often than partnered mothers, lone mothers suffer from health problems (Dorsett and Marsh, 1998; Whitehead et al., 2000; Cook et al., 2001; Curtis, 2001; Sarfati and Scott, 2001).

This article examines the health issues of lone mothers and their children living on social benefits in New Zealand, which is an example of a liberal

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welfare state. The article asks how health problems interact with time outside the labour force, low wages and low benefit levels to keep lone mother families living in poverty. Does poor health prevent some lone mothers from finding and keeping a job, or do low income, stress and poor living conditions make these mothers and their children unhealthy? These issues are discussed by referring to a larger project, which examined the self-reported health status of lone mothers and their children, their experiences as beneficiaries who are expected to find paid work, and their views about their ability to hold a job and improve their family's financial circumstances.[4] This article focuses on some of the women's stories, taken from 120 qualitative interviews, about how children's illness and disabilities and lone mothers' own health have influenced their job prospects and their family income.

Studies from many countries reveal that children who are raised in impoverished families, with few material and cultural resources, typically suffer from multiple disadvantages throughout life. These disadvantages include lower achievement in school, higher rates of behavioural problems and juvenile delinquency, early school leaving, higher unemployment rates, poor physical and mental health, and premature death rates (Hobcraft and Kiernan, 2001; Roberts, 1997; Ross et al., 1996).

Although social activists and researchers tend to focus on 'child poverty', the Innocenti Report Card makes it abundantly clear that children are living in poverty because their parents are outside the labour market or working for low wages. Politically, more 'mileage' can be gained from highlighting the consequences of poverty for children than for adults. However, policy solutions must address the barriers to sustaining employment and improving the circumstances of low-income parents. Our interviews reveal that lone mothers try to shield their children from the worse consequences of low income, shortage of food, living in poor neighbourhoods, abuse and high stress levels, but they are not always able to do this. Health problems cut into their already low income from social assistance and keep some lone mothers out of the workforce, thus augmenting family poverty. At the same time, the stresses and deprivations of living on social benefits lead to further deterioration of the family's health.

Welfare, Paid Work and Poor Health

The countries with the lowest child poverty rates allocate the highest proportions of Gross National Product to social expenditures. The Innocenti Report Card (2000) indicates that the 'social democratic' countries of Sweden, Denmark and Finland top this list, while Mexico, Turkey and Japan fall below the 'liberal welfare states' of Canada, United States, United Kingdom and Australia.[5] Furthermore, there is considerable cross-national

variation in the effect of tax and social programs in reducing child poverty. In liberal welfare states, governments and taxpayers normally accept the position that public assistance should be available only when personal or family resources are exhausted, or when the family clearly cannot cope. Increasingly, these countries have focused on personal responsibility for family well-being, the employability of welfare recipients, and contractual obligations to retrain or search for paid work as a condition to receiving government benefits. Benefit levels are deliberately set below minimum wages to encourage beneficiaries to spend as little time as possible on welfare.

Research from the United States indicates that 'welfare mothers' who move into paid work are most likely to remain employed and less likely to return to social benefits if they have prior work experience, more than 12 years of schooling, and fewer than three children (Harris, 1996; Cancian et al., 1999). Job instability is also related to physical and mental health problems, substance abuse, family stresses, employer discrimination, violence by a partner, and inappropriate work behaviours. Riccio and Freedman (1999) found that health and personal problems made continuous employment impossible for about one-third of the participants of a California welfare-to-work program.

Whitehead et al. (2000) compared lone mothers in Britain and Sweden over two decades and found more poverty and poorer health in Britain. Nevertheless, in both countries, lone mothers reported poorer health than married mothers. The authors present three hypotheses about the relationship between lone motherhood and poor health. Lone mothers (including those who are employed) may suffer from 'time poverty', which elevates stress levels and leads to illness. The kinds of work they do compared to married mothers may be more stressful and dangerous. And finally, they may suffer from lower social support. These factors may help to explain the poorer health of Swedish lone mothers compared to married mothers, despite low levels of poverty, high standards of housing and relatively generous social services in Sweden. Our own research in New Zealand investigated further the relationship between lone motherhood, low income and poor health.

Health, Domestic Purposes Beneficiaries and the Transition to Paid Work

In New Zealand, we designed a study involving mailed questionnaires and personal interviews with lone mothers on the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB), an income support program permitting lone parents to care for their children at home. We also conducted focus groups with case managers working for the welfare department. The questionnaire, returned by 244 'work-tested' sole mothers, focused on their health status and use of health

services. The focus groups and interviews with 14 case managers examined the role of health in case management practices and welfare policy. Personal interviews with 120 work-tested lone mothers discussed their family health and welfare-to-work experiences. The study was located in three regions on the North Island representing different socio-economic and ethnic areas.

The SF-36 questionnaire we used measures health-related quality of life and was previously used by the New Zealand Ministry of Health in the national health survey *Taking the Pulse* (New Zealand Ministry of Health, 1999). As well as questioning the health status and use of health services by respondents and their families, it also asks for background details about their household, employment and education. Our questionnaires were mailed to lone mothers receiving the DPB, with children over 6 years old, who were subject to a work test. This means that none were exempted from paid work or training for reasons such as disability or sickness. The questionnaire results were compared to the results of the national health survey.

First, we found that the lone mothers on the DPB reported poorer health than did women in the general population, but no significant differences were apparent by ethnicity or place of residence. Second, a higher proportion of the DPB sample had used public hospital emergency services and reported a higher rate of unmet health need in the past year. For example, they had not gone to a doctor or not picked up a prescription when needed. The major reason given was cost (76.9 percent of respondents who had not visited a GP when needed said this). We calculated mean scores for the eight components of health measured by the questionnaire and these were lower for beneficiaries on every measure, as Figure 1 indicates.

We asked our DPB sample what issues prevented them from taking up paid work (see Table 1). Among other reasons, about one-third said that their health or their children's health prevented them from taking a job, which is quite striking when it is considered that these women had not met the policy criteria for exemption from their work/training obligations due to health problems or disabilities. A higher percentage of those who reported their health as a reason for not taking a job had lower educational attainment and lower incomes. These findings are consistent with research in other liberal welfare states.

We then asked case managers how they view and assess beneficiaries' health, and how they consider health issues in case management strategies and practices. With written guidelines and advice from colleagues and supervisors, case managers retain discretion to exempt a woman from the work test or defer it, to seek additional medical advice, and to recommend specific benefit entitlement or supplementary assistance. The results of this phase of the study are reported in Tippin and Baker (2001). To summarize, case managers reported that some clients are reluctant to discuss their mental health because of the perceived stigma or lack of awareness of problems.




Figure 1 Comparison of SF-36 Health Scores of DPB Women and NZ Women
PF – Physical functioning
BP – Bodily pain
VS – Vitality score
RE – Role-emotional
RP – Role-physical
GH – General health
SF – Social functioning
MH – Mental health

Table 1 Main Issues Preventing Women on the DPB Taking up a Paid Job

Issue preventing paid work	*Percentage reporting*
The care of children	52.5
Inability to find a job	38.1
Lack of training	30.0
Poor health	29.1
Transport difficulties	27.5
Poor health of child(ren)	21.7
Poor health of other dependants	9.4

Emotional health is difficult to assess without first building rapport, but client interviewing is strictly scheduled and time is scarce. Given the level of health problems among lone mothers, we found it striking that the discursive parameters of a sustainable welfare-to-work policy in New Zealand and elsewhere so frequently marginalize health issues (Tippin and Baker, 2001).

DPB mothers were personally interviewed to obtain more details about their health, family circumstances, and interactions with case managers. The rest of this article discusses some of these women's stories, emphasizing their children's health and how various family health problems constrained their efforts to support their families and pull themselves out of poverty. To understand their personal circumstances, it is necessary to present some information about the local benefit and health systems.

The New Zealand Benefit and Health Systems for Lone Mother Families

In 1973, the New Zealand government developed the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB), an income support program to enable lone parents to care for their children at home.[6] After 1984, New Zealand experienced a period of 'neo-liberal' restructuring (Kelsey, 1995). In 1991, the (conservative) National government reduced the level of social benefits (including the DPB) and raised the minimum qualifying age to 18 years. It also introduced new employment expectations after 1995, a new abatement scheme in 1996, and enforced new work tests after 1997 (Wilson, 2000: 79). After-school and school holiday care was also expanded for the children of DPB recipients. Now, lone parents on the DPB, whose youngest child is aged 14 years or over, must be actively preparing for full-time work unless they are exempted for some reason (including sickness or disability). If the youngest child is between 6 and 13 years, the parent is subject to a part-time work test. Those with younger children are expected to attend annual planning meetings (WINZ, 1999). The Labour coalition government has recently introduced legislation to make work-testing more flexible and personalized rather than adhering to strict age categories. If passed, DPB recipients with preschool children could be asked to seek paid work.

Although the DPB was designed to be gender neutral, most recipients are women. In 1998, 87 percent of recipients were women. Of all recipients, 94 percent were sole parents, 2 percent were women alone and 4 percent were people caring for sick or infirm family members. Almost three-quarters of recipients of the DPB are separated or divorced (Wilson, 2000). Only 9 percent are under the age of 20, while three-quarters are between 20 and 40 years old (Wilson, 2000).

The New Zealand public health system, initiated by the first Labour government in the 1930s, was also eroded with the restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s. Government subsidies for visits to doctors and hospitals were reduced, requiring patients to pay larger user fees. Now, visits to family physicians (except for preschool children and pregnant women) cost about $45, although diagnostic tests are often free and prescriptions are heavily

subsidized. Visits to hospital emergency wards also require user fees even though New Zealand has public accident compensation insurance (Barnett and Barnett, 1999).

Social benefit recipients receive a Community Card that reduces the cost of physician visits and further subsidizes prescriptions. Some lone mothers on the DPB would be eligible for temporary exemptions from work and for additional sickness and disability benefits to defray health-related expenses. However, many low-income families in New Zealand live in substandard housing with no heating or costly electric heaters. The high winter rainfall in Northland and the Auckland area and the lack of central heating create housing with indoor temperatures around 10–15 degrees Celsius in the winter. This encourages the growth of mould and leads to a high rate of bronchial ailments. Furthermore, these families are often short of money for food and preventive health care.

The lone mothers we interviewed provided rich details about many aspects of living on social assistance and their relations with the welfare department, health system and labour market. However, only a few examples can be presented in an article of this length. Interview comments have been extracted that focus on the children's and mothers' health, illustrating the relations among poverty, family health problems and lone mothers' ability to earn their way out of poverty.

The Interviews

Children's Health Problems

Many of the lone mothers we interviewed reported that their children experienced disability or health problems requiring their constant care. For example, a lone mother with two daughters and the care of her elderly mother has been on the DPB for over a decade despite the fact that she has a university education. She discusses the situation of her older daughter, for whom she receives a child disability allowance:

> 'She's severely autistic so she doesn't talk. She's still in nappies. She needs feeding. She needs constant supervision because, yeah, she's got no idea of safety. So although she's mobile, she still has a wheelchair. She's constantly on the move, she doesn't sleep so well ... Career-wise, I can't establish a career. Even the part-time work I do really messes things up [her benefit is cut].'

She has refused several jobs because of her 'family responsibilities' and has been turned down for others because she is over-qualified. She now works about six hours a week and struggles to make ends meet.

Another lone mother with three children was very distressed during the interview because the welfare office had been asking her to find paid work.

She has a son with disabilities and because he has reached the age of 21, she is no longer permitted to use him as a reason to remain on the benefit. He is expected to purchase care and she is expected to move off the benefit into the labour force. With considerable anxiety in her voice she said:

> 'I won't give him up. I'll come off the benefit and I'll scrape, but I'm not giving him up. I'm not putting him in a home because he . . . would die. So hence, I'm at the doctor's on Prozac, continually at the doctor's at the moment 'cause I'm so stressed out . . . You know, I've not asked [the welfare department] for any money before, whereas last week I had to ask for money to pay for food because I've been to the doctor's so much. And I mean when you're paying $48 for papers to be signed [by the doctor] to say you're not well and stuff like that, I mean, out of what I get there's nothing left and I had to ask for a food hamper, which is beyond me asking.'

Lone mothers told us that they often delay taking their children to the doctors, waiting to see how serious the illness will become and if it is worth the expense. Some already owe money to their doctors. One mother with five children said:

> 'My son had come in the night before and he was feverish so I made an appointment to see the doctor . . . But I had no money again and already had a $300 account there, and it was, like, what if I could get him better before lunchtime? . . . I can avoid taking him to the doctor . . . It's not easy to find $10 or $15 . . . But if it's something I know I can't cope with, I will sit at the doctor's and wait it out even though I know I've got a bill.'

A mother with two children made a similar comment about her daughter:

> 'I don't rush to the doctor . . . I watch her and watch her and watch her before I actually take her to the doctor. And often, I'll ring the nurse and say this is happening to her, do you think I need to bring her in? Because the money's just not there . . . and at times I'm paying to go to the hospital and paying to go to the doctor and getting prescriptions, the food budget is the one that goes . . . I won't go into debt so therefore our food budget gets hit . . . Yeah, I'll eat less or do without while they eat.'

Low benefit levels mean that mothers with family health problems find medical and prescription costs prohibitive. So too are other health-related expenses, including preventive measures. One university-educated beneficiary who works part-time noted:

> 'As soon as [the welfare office] found out that the interest rate on my mortgage went down, they took my money off me so then I couldn't afford to pay the health insurance that I had put up. Indirectly, the fact that they give you so little normally affects your ability to stay healthy. I would love to buy the children some vitamin tablets, but at $10 a bottle you hesitate again.'

A woman who has three children and has been on the DPB 'on and off for 10 years' reported many health problems, both her own and her

children's, interfering with paid work. She quit a full-time job and accepted part-time work after suffering from 'bad depressive periods, stress-related' after leaving an abusive marriage. She worked part-time for a while but then decided that she needed to improve her career options by moving to the city. She reported that her children 'couldn't cope' in the city:

> 'My son burnt the house down . . . he ended up trying to stab his sister in the head – all sorts of things were happening . . . I just had to give up work.'

A mother with two grown children, the younger just left home, mentioned that the family has experienced a number of health problems since they moved to Auckland 10 years ago and she went on the DPB. These, combined with her own health problems, interfered with upgrading her qualifications and earning a living:

> 'They [her children] were both susceptible to allergies . . . I think just because I was stressed, I got chronic fatigue and my son . . . now has chronic fatigue . . . my daughter, after six months, got whooping cough. I was not well enough to look after her so I had to send her back to her father . . . I was hoping to look for work but all that stopped when I got sick . . . I [later] decided I would go back [to university] . . . I got a scholarship to go back but I wasn't able to do that, as I wasn't able to attend and be there to look after my son because he was quite seriously sick. He needed 24-hour care . . . there would be trips to the emergency room in the middle of the night.'

Case managers may allocate special allowances to lone mothers, such as a child disability allowance, to defray the cost of extra medical expenses. However, one mother was offered a disability allowance for her asthmatic son but declined to accept it because she said she had to pay the doctor $25 to fill out the form in order to receive an extra $1.80 a week on her benefit. She mentioned that she already owed the doctor $325 but had to take her son to the doctor:

> 'Sometimes two, three times a week and I'd get charged $25 . . . As it gets colder (on winter nights), [the asthma] gets worse and worse so I have to run an overnight heater just to keep the air at a certain temperature . . . So then I get a really big power bill . . . This winter he has been the worst that we've had. He's popped both eardrums.'

This woman has arranged to work near her son as part of her work requirements but her jobs are clearly low-level and not very lucrative.

Although a few mothers appear to use their children's illness as an excuse not to enter paid work, most take their mothering role very seriously and sincerely want the best for their children. Some mothers with child health problems make 'deals' with their doctors and chemists to pay off their debts in instalments. Other mothers use their food money to pay for medical

expenses and then return to the welfare office to request a food voucher. Some deprive themselves of food in order to pay their health-related debts. Most mothers with child health problems also tried to work as much as possible to pay their extra health-related bills, although not all reported this extra income to the welfare office. For those lone mothers with family health problems, the health subsidies appear to be too low.

Women's Poor Health

Some of the lone mothers we interviewed told us that the DPB had allowed them to regain their health, which most believe declined through too much stress. One mother with two children said:

> 'When I went on the DPB and took a year off [paid work], my health gradually got better because I didn't have the stress of full-time work and being on my own and having kids . . . I did have time to recuperate, albeit that I couldn't pay the bills because I was on the bare DPB . . . My health really came right after that year when I went back to work part-time. I got $100 more a week as a result of working 20 hours – and this made a big difference in not panicking when the power bill arrived . . . I am very loath to add any more stress to my life . . . Every time I see an envelope with [the welfare or tax office name] in the letterbox, I don't want to open it . . . it is always bad news.'

Other women continued to experience poor health while on the DPB. Their health is clearly worsened by avoiding visits to doctors because of the high cost or not taking time off their part-time work, housework and caring activities to permit themselves to recover. One lone mother said:

> 'I don't go to the doctor myself, ever. I had pneumonia last year and didn't go and ended up getting pleurisy . . . I finally went up there [to the doctor] and he said: "My God, you're a sick woman. You need to be in the hospital." And I was, like, yeah, well I'm a single mother, so flag it. I'll just go back home and carry on! . . . Most of the groceries I buy are for my son . . . In the last six months, I've lost about 8 kilos 'cause I just can't afford to feed me too much.'

Another mother of three made a similar comment when discussing various health problems:

> 'I've had a couple of minor operations while on the benefit. You know, they [hospital staff] used to say: "Now go home and go to bed." [Laughter] You know, you can't go home and go to bed, because you can't. You've got kids to cook for and you've got clothes to get clean and you've got all that stuff to do and so that's just a luxury that is not available. And so you just have to plough through it, which means that it takes you longer to recover. Much longer than it should.'

Lack of social support seems to raise the stress level of many lone mothers, which aggravates their physical health. One immigrant woman took her children back to the United Kingdom but returned after experiencing 'serious relationship problems' with a new partner (she hinted at physical abuse). Her ex-husband then took her to court for removing the children

from New Zealand. Now she is trying to upgrade her qualifications in order to find a part-time job. She said:

> 'I have got very, very stressed out at times . . . and I got a viral infection about four months ago and the doctor said that it was because of my stress and what I was under and the problems at home. It sort of enhanced it more and I ended up being in hospital for a week . . . By the time I finished [her course] and I got home, the children would be home from school and then it's making dinner and doing homework and housework and washing and shopping and then by the time – they go to bed at 8:30 – that was my time to study . . . So quite often I'd sit up till about 3 o'clock in the morning and I'm one of those people who don't eat when I'm under stress as well. I don't think about my health . . . [I] basically just run myself down but usually until the cold sores pop up, I don't realize that I'm in that situation.'

Later she mentioned that her best social support was her 12-year-old daughter, who is:

> '. . . quite mature for her age and if she can see, it's like she can sense things before I know they're there, and she'll, you know, just give me lots of cuddles and she'll make me cups of tea and, you know, and she'll even make me something to eat if she knows I've not had anything.'

However, the fact that this child feels the need to 'look after' her mother places a rather heavy burden on her.

Another woman, who lives with her asthmatic daughter, told us she had cancer when she was pregnant with her daughter and now has just been diagnosed with Chrone's disease. Recently, she quit her part-time job for health reasons but her case manager disapproved and cut her benefit. She angrily reported the conversation with her case manager when she went to the welfare office to ask for a food voucher:

> '. . . and I got a medical certificate. She's seen it. She signed it and . . . I mean it is so frustrating . . . I've got no money. My daughter, I mean, shit, we're onto our last couple of slices of bread. When I say we have no food, I mean we have no food and it was just so frustrating because this woman turned around and said to me: "You're working!" And I said: "No, I'm not!" '

The beneficiary was angry because the case manager cut her benefit and then called her former place of work to verify that she was not working. Meanwhile, she had no food and had to borrow money from a neighbour.

Many lone mothers reported that health problems interrupted their attempts to find work, retrain, or to hold onto a job. One lone mother was doing a double major at university and raising three children:

> 'I had to cut back this semester because I got really sick after the first semester doing three [courses]. It was just too much . . . raising three children and doing a degree is just far too much. You try to do it as quickly as you can because you want to be independent. But when you don't have an ex-husband helping you out and you don't have a family around, it's just about impossible really to do it and do it well, you know, being able to cope without stress.'

Some beneficiaries appear to use poor health as an excuse for not working. One lone mother, on the benefit for nearly 20 years, cares for two of her three children at home. She discussed her interactions with the welfare office:

> 'Four years ago . . . they called me up and said, right – you've got to get a job and it was a big meeting and I was thinking, right, I've got to get a job, you know, got to get a job . . . Well I went home for another year and sat there and they called me up again: "Oh, what have you done?" Oh, well I said, I'd thought about doing this correspondence course . . . I got away with another year.'

She eventually took a correspondence course but received poor results. Now she argued that arthritis prevented her from performing most kinds of jobs:

> 'I can't . . . I doubt if I could, I mean waitressing – not that I want to be a waitress – but you know holding plates and that. Like I couldn't do stuff like that. And I mean but I hate computers. I mean I would hate to sit in an office all day. Yeah, I honestly haven't got a clue. I kind of hope someone will just one day come and offer me [a job].'

Most lone mothers struggle to study or work but some are forced by poor health to cut down on their activities. A mother with two children, on the DPB for many years, went back to university (while receiving the DPB) to upgrade her education but had to quit due to poor health. She mentioned that she had arthritis and cancer, but had not told the welfare office much about her health problems. Nevertheless, she is now working at three part-time jobs to try to pay her bills. When asked if she discusses her health problems with her case manager, she replied:

> 'Personally, I say as little as possible, as little as possible, because it just comes back and bites you.'

The fact that this woman has not reported her medical condition means that she doesn't have a medical exemption and her case manager would pressure her to work more hours per week than her doctor would recommend. Yet she was reluctant to reveal too much about her 'weaknesses' for fear that her case manager would use this information against her.

Many of these women are coping simultaneously with their children's health or disability problems and their own poor health at the same time as welfare officers are pressuring them to find paid work or increase their working hours. In most cases, lone mothers with medical certification would receive a temporary exemption from the requirement to find work until their health improved, but some women in our study withheld information from their case manager. They feared that any change in their status would lead to further stigmatization, intrusive personal investigations or a reduction of their already low income.

Conclusion

The link between poverty and poor health suggests that wealthier people can afford to purchase more nutritious food, drier and warmer accommodation, better hygiene, warmer clothes, preventative health services, and better health care when they become ill. In addition, poor people are more likely to work in dangerous positions with low job control, live in high crime areas, and to engage in riskier lifestyles (Clarke, 2000).

To understand how health issues affect the prospects of moving out of poverty for lone mother families on social benefits, we must reconsider and contextualize what 'health' means for many of these mothers. From our New Zealand study, it is apparent that health is a very 'social' concept in a welfare-to-work setting. The health of the entire household, including lone mother, her children and other dependants must be considered. A child's poor health tends to reinforce the mother's sense that she is solely responsible for the family, as well as a sense of self-sacrifice and concentration on the needs of the children. Where social supports are lacking and there are few family or community ties, life tends to appear even bleaker. Health also has multiple components and meanings: physical, mental, emotional and for some, spiritual. Together these elements comprise a sense of well-being, and help determine whether and under what circumstances a mother is 'well' enough to undertake paid work.

Moreover, our research indicates that health for the lone-mother family is embedded within the experience of poverty, the relative lack of resources, and constraints on aspirations and opportunities that these entail. It is poverty that makes poor or uncertain health so consequential for these women and their families. Having insufficient funds to go to the doctor or get a prescription, to deal with an unexpected health problem, and experiences at the welfare office that diminish self-esteem and confidence, are examples of the many factors that affect the paid employment prospects of low-income lone mothers.

Our New Zealand research reinforces the finding of overseas studies that one-third of lone mothers on social benefits report poor family health or disability problems. The health of lone mothers is much poorer than married mothers or women of comparable age. Combined with low levels of education, sporadic employment experience, and transportation and childcare issues, the health problems of lone mothers and their children interfere with their ability to fulfil the requirements of welfare-to-work programs. If these lone mothers cannot sustain continuing employment, they cannot improve their incomes. In liberal welfare states such as New Zealand, reliance on social benefits tends to prolong poverty for lone mothers and their children.

Our interviews illustrate that these lone mothers suffer from considerable stress, which encourages the development of both physical and mental

health problems. Leaving an unhappy marriage, which in some cases has been abusive, is difficult for many women who cannot pay their bills or cope with the children alone, and some go back to their partners several times before they separate permanently and go on the benefit. Retaining the primary or sole responsibility for children makes it difficult to upgrade their qualifications or find paid work, especially if their children experience health problems, disabilities or behavioural problems. The welfare office offers temporary exemptions from work or special benefits to lone mothers with health problems, but this often requires expensive visits to the doctor for certification.

Many lone mothers, in New Zealand and in other liberal welfare states, clearly need more assistance than they are receiving, in terms of income support, childcare services, housing and transport subsidies, and counselling. If policy makers are serious about resolving 'child poverty', they need to review social assistance levels and the accompanying special benefits relating to medical expenses, disability allowances and counselling. In addition, they need to help address the barriers that many parents experience in trying to maintain employment, especially by providing childcare for school-aged children but also by improving public transportation for school children and parents. Minimum wages and working conditions need to be regulated to permit parents to earn enough to support themselves and their children. Finally, health care needs to become more affordable for low-income families.

Our New Zealand research indicates that the current welfare-to-work program places unreasonable demands on some lone mothers. They are expected to search for and maintain paid work without adequate social supports. Neither the social benefit system nor the public health system adequately addresses the poor physical and mental health of many lone mothers expected to exit from welfare. Without more acknowledgement of these problems and more public support, about one-third of lone mothers may be unable to pull their children out of poverty due to poor family health.

Notes

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1 Poverty rates are usually defined in cross-national research as incomes (after taxes and government transfers) that are less than 50 percent of the national median, adjusted for family size.

2 Low wages are defined as full-time workers with wages less than two-thirds of the national median.

3 This term by Esping-Andersen (1990) included Canada and the English-speaking countries, which tend to target social benefits to the poor and expect most

individuals to support themselves and their families on their own wages. He contrasts liberal welfare states to corporatist welfare states (that rely mainly on contributory social insurance programs) and social democratic countries (that provide many universal benefits and services).

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5 New Zealand is not included in this survey.

6 Australia introduced a similar benefit in the same year, now called the Sole Parent Benefit.

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
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Belinda Clayton

Rethinking Postmodern Maladies

Postmodern views that examine any claim to objective truth with scepticism challenge the scientific foundations of western medicine. Concepts of health and disease have long rested upon humanist assumptions that grant human beings a place of privilege in the book of life. Yet modern medical technology is inadvertently calling into question the notion of an essential human nature, including the nature/culture dichotomy that has supported this assumption. Reflective of biotechnology's challenge to the nature/culture divide is the postmodern 'disorder', where biomedically definable diseases have been replaced by syndromes of unclear aetiology. This article considers the current proliferation of 'disorders' within a perspective that denies traditional Cartesian biomedical models. By considering postmodern maladies in terms of the shifting social paradigm in which they have emerged, mind/body dualism is no longer a satisfactory model of explanation.

From a Postmodern Perspective

Contrary to the Durkheimian notion of social facts to which individuals are subject, this article suggests individuals and social facts are interwoven. It is fundamental for the purpose of this article to understand illness as meaningful only within the social, historical and/or linguistic context in which it has developed. This challenges the western biomedical modernist perspective by suggesting social life has a *real* effect on biology. This perspective views medical categories as social codifications. In other words, organic disruption does not constitute ill health prior to the social meaning it is given. Indebted to the poststructuralist tradition, postmodernism has embraced this disintegration of humanist traditions. Consequently, postmodern maladies question the foundation upon which the privilege of the rational as opposed to phenomenological explanations of reality are built.

The suggestion that knowledge is relative and any inherent 'meaning' is

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reliant on the interdependence of binary systems provides a new framework with which to view disease. Disease is not an isolated entity, unanchored until confronted. It is the construction of a concept that has meaning by virtue of its interrelationship with the subject's social reality. The subject and the disease are constituted by and constituting one another. This article is an exploration of the mind and body united at the site of intersection between self and world; a notion reiterated by Halberstam and Livingston (1995: 19), who suggest 'Posthuman bodies are the causes and effects of postmodern relations of power and pleasure, virtuality, sex and its consequences.'

Postmodern theorists are critical of modernism's philosophical groundwork. Deconstruction of modernist assumptions of truth have allowed a greater intellectual freedom of thought; one inclined to relativity, not absolutes. Postmodernism in its backlash against views held dear to modernism embraces a greater tolerance of difference and/or the insignificant other, going so far as to deny the distinction at all. Disaffected with modernism's belief in rationality and science, and articulated in the philosophies of Nietzsche and later French poststructuralists Saussure, Derrida and Foucault, postmodernism has radicalized pre-existing notions of ultimate truth. By 'deconstructing' modernist systems of knowledge, and reworking the structure of our world in terms of 'intertextuality', new ideas about subjectivity have developed. The concept of 'meaning' has been fundamentally challenged by Derrida's consideration of the ambiguity of language. The inability of language to anchor truth, except in relation to the signified, has far-reaching implications, particularly as this notion undermines the certainty of origins and subsequently selfhood. If subjectivity is in a continual state of flux, the body and mind are unstable referents. Therefore, the body as a site of experiential metamorphic production is worthy of further investigation.

Testified in the array of 'psycho-somatic' disorders is the uncertainty of the boundary of self and other. In *The Precession of Simulacra* French cultural theorist Baudrillard suggests an underlying sense of melancholy inherent in postmodern experience is the result of a world of ambivalence. He writes of 'a liquidation of all referentials' (Baudrillard, 1983: 4), the result of an oversupply of images that replace previous notions of truth with a shallow world of simulation. This insecurity is marked by the way we feel about the world. 'Our age is characterised by invisible latent threats working quietly in the air we breathe and the bodies we inhabit' (Mansfield, 2000: 169–70). Consider the following: panic attacks, a fear of the outside; depression, a fear of life; chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), a fear of carrying on; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), a fear of idleness; obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), a fear of imperfection; anorexia nervosa, a fear of weight gain. Even deep vein thrombosis (DVT) is said to have its roots in the fear of flying (Hughes, 2002: 9)! The defining mood of postmodernism is fear, and nowhere is this sentiment so clearly articulated as through the text of the

body. Syndromes, disorders, disfunctions and phobias, are these labels merely a last ditch effort to retain a hold on a scientific reductionism that is slipping into dissolution? Greaves suggests that 'The use of the word syndrome is an important link in this chain of thought because it provides what are seen as legitimate grounds for the belief that there must be a cause and hence a real disease' (Greaves, 1996a: 8).

The reduction of reality to social, historical and/or linguistic constructions is considered deeply pessimistic. There are, however, other interpretations of postmodernism that embody more positive undertones. 'Constructive postmodernism' characterized in the writing of David Ray Griffin (1988) understands causality to be mutually dependent. This perspective focuses on the interdependence of systems and opposes dogmatic versions of rationality where one aspect of the dynamic precedes the other. This framework permits a conceptualization of disease that respects different traditions and replaces distinctions between nature and culture with notions of continuity. Even Baudrillard's disaffection with the 'world of hallucinations' has the potential for a more positive reformulation of health and disease. Baudrillard says: 'For if any symptom can be "produced", and can no longer be accepted as a fact of nature, then every illness may be considered simulatable and simulated, and medicine loses its meaning since it only knows how to treat "true" illnesses by their objective causes' (Baudrillard, 1983: 5). This challenge to the biomedical model of health may enable not only a more coherent understanding of our current biological afflictions, but the social world in which they manifest.

The Challenge to Dualism

Cultural identity has long been a focus of sociological enquiry as cultural insights into subjectivity form the basis of knowledge. Regardless of the sociological methods used to theorize about the social, the ontological and epistemological assumptions upon which most theories rely are indebted to Aristotelian logic. However, postmodern maladies deny the logic that is committed to something necessarily being either 'a' or 'b'. These distinctions are no longer relevant in an oscillating world where bodies and their histories, past, present and future are never clearly defined. The traditional definition of a self as a distinct and autonomous subject is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Retrospective analysis is always incomplete, always in a state of becoming. Similarly, 'bodily forms are recognizable because they occupy the overlap between now and then' (Halberstam and Livingston, 1995: 3). But essentially, what is at stake here is the philosophical construction of a theoretical distinction between the mind and the body. Descartes' Cartesian legacy reinforced in western medicine is not a paradigm that will simply dissolve

into the abyss when the entire foundation of human knowledge is supported by this framework.

Western medicine has tended to focus on the body in terms of the causal interactions of divisible parts. It has successfully maintained this compartmentalization of the body by using the scientific model to sift, sort and categorize scientific investigation. Yet the idea that technology is a separate entity that humans can utilize to alter their experience of the world can no longer be an assumption, particularly when biotechnologies such as organ transplantation make it unclear where technology begins and the body ends or vice versa (Machado, 1998: 3).

As grand narratives are no longer consistent with the postmodern perspective, and small narratives have become the preferred alternative, validation of subjective experience is reflected in the emergence of 'relativistic' approaches to medicine. 'Clinical legitimacy [clinical success without scientific validation]', can be seen as a trump card that overrides 'scientific legitimacy'. 'It is the Shibboleth of a postmodern movement among GPs towards healing and the "art" of medicine as opposed to the "science" of medicine per se' (Eastwood, 2000: 95). Simultaneously at this time of holistic pursuit, there are moves to reinforce evidence-based medicine, reliant on induction and observation. Yet how can we define the concept of ill health against health, when the apparently stable demarcation between mind and body is no longer a taken-for-granted assumption? Particularly when the current array of 'clinically legitimate' cases of illness, such as DVT, bipolar disorder (formerly manic depression), ADHD, CFS, etc. produce themselves in such a way that cannot be sufficiently understood, except in terms of mind and body unity. How do Cartesian models of medicine explain the ability for multiple personality disorder (MPD) sufferers to switch physical characteristics such as eye colour when switching personalities (Talbot, 1996: 99)?

The Problem with Genetics and the Nature Debate

Predictably, the human genome project has taken precedence over other medical sciences in the pursuit of categorically determining the increasingly elusive essence of humanity (Fox-Keller, 1992: 292). The ardent hunt for the total DNA sequence that aims to establish an indisputable human nature is progressing relentlessly. Molecular biology, the study of molecular structures and their interactions within living organisms, is the postmodern version of microbiology (in as much as it reflects the current thinking). It is a branch of science that has been responsible for the recent discovery of the genetic code. However, it is also a reflection of the paradigm shift we are immersed in. This new perspective has evolved largely as a result of the dissolution of academic boundaries, a melding of physics and biology, especially as many of the key

figures behind the deciphering of the human genome had their backgrounds in the natural sciences (Capra, 1982: 117). However, even with the spectacular results that have been achieved in the field of genetics, the Cartesian view is still the only framework within which biological research is undertaken. The limitations imposed by reductionist models are becoming apparent when trying to understand whole, multicellular organisms such as human beings. Emphasis on molecular structure, the basic biological building blocks, fails to take into account *how* these structures interrelate and communicate, and *why* they switch on and off as they do. This point is neatly summarized by Sheldrake as he metaphorically compares the body's as yet unexplainable ability to assemble a self-organizing system as 'rather like delivering the right materials to a building site at the right times and expecting a house to grow spontaneously' (Sheldrake, 1991: 107).

What are the social implications when the mechanistic view of the body, privileged in genetic research, encompasses the entire field of medicine? The term 'genetic disease' covers an array of disorders that are no longer limited to genetic diseases but also include 'abnormalities' within the genetic discourse (Yoxen, 1984: 49). The sequencing of the human genome does not equate humanity with a DNA sequence, as there is no singular human genome. There can be no genetically 'normal' human being, as each individual sequence differs, and all human beings carry susceptible genes and 'abnormal' genes. In fact, we are constituted by genes that are more or less diseased, and the question, what triggers the physical expression of these features coded in our genes, remains unanswered.

The task of science is to define humanity by identifying difference. At present, this search is in terms of genetics. Genetics is essentially a mechanistic view of health and disease. However, it is the revelation that genetics plays only a relatively small and unpredictable role in the manifestation of disease that reinforces the interconnection of nature and culture. From the social perspective, the notion of genetic destiny has been absorbed into the public consciousness. 'Genetics' has itself become a cultural icon, 'One that has assisted in the production of powerful images that endow the gene with a complexity of meanings that have altered the way we think about ourselves' (Love, 2001: 112). Western society is immersed in perpetual fear of giving life to a looming genetic defect. Lifestyle choices that may contribute to genetic mutation manifest as a pathology of guilt for individuals who failed to adhere to society's insistence on self-discipline and surveillance. What types of diseases will we begin to witness as a result of the 'genetic construction', the silent but deadly time bomb that each and every one of us must carry within us. Our fate is no longer confined to the external forces alone, but perceived in the internal operations as well. We imagine ourselves to be immersed in a constant state of threat from all avenues. Yet as immunologist Miroslav Holub's findings suggest, 'it is an illusion to think that we survive viral and

bacterial threats by eliminating them, in fact we survive by incorporating them into our bodies. Gene fragments from organisms that caused previous devastating plagues like the Black Death have been found in the genetic make-up of modern humans' (Holub, 1997: 114).

Ironically, in pursuit of human essentialism this mind/body dichotomy may be the vehicle for the revelation of its mythic structure. Even with current understandings of health and disease in terms of genetics, findings suggest that the dominant assumption of disease as an external entity is possibly too narrow. Evelyn Fox-Keller suggests that genetics may well be the science that dissolves the nature/culture dichotomy in medicine, where 'culture has become subsumed under biology' (Fox-Keller, 1992: 297). However, the result of such postmodern discourse does not eliminate the distinction between binaries, it shifts it, says Fox-Keller: 'the demarcation between culture and biology (or between nature and nurture), is now made by the demarcation between normal and the abnormal' (Fox-Keller, 1992: 298).

The promise of defining humanity with genetic technology is as elusive as ever. Even with 'progress' in the science of 'genetic disease' there has been 'no persuasive evidence linking any psychiatric disease to a single locus' (Robertson, 1989: 222). Molecular biology is faltering to understand disease and human identity solely in terms of our biological nature. Instead, there is a reversion to posthuman discourse that disallows for biology to be 'scientifically' defined as 'natural' but instead a nodal intersection of metamorphosing cultural discourses. As Halberstam and Livingston suggest: 'the time has passed when resistance could effectively be imagined in terms of a sovereign, local, man's-home-is-his-castle body. Instead, biology is revealing itself as an "interdependence of networks" and a production of a site of "control strategies"' (Halberstam and Livingston, 1995: 2). Rethinking boundaries in terms of fluidity is a concept at the core of this article. Adherence to strict binary distinctions can no longer provide a sufficient framework to explain social phenomena, particularly disease. If the 'nature' of disease cannot be understood in terms of immutable characteristics, then the concepts of disease and health cannot be confined to biomedical explanations. The body is the site of the social, where self and world intersect. It is a mistake to believe that pathogens 'out there' are entirely accountable for ill health when we reconsider disease as a reflection of the culturally interactive experience.

On the basis of genetic evidence that suggests 'the actual genomes of any two individuals will differ as much as three million bases' (Fox-Keller, 1992: 294), is it true to claim the existence of fixed 'natural' laws? When the assumed stable referent, the 'other', is no longer considered stable, can anything be objectively identified when identity is dependent on the relation to the 'other'? As genetic research stakes out its final claim to biological determinism, it may inadvertently find it fails to secure such an ambitious assertion.

The Inseparability of Nature and Culture

There is an assumption that diseases are value-free objective facts, yet as models of health vary widely from culture to culture, and from era to era (Capra, 1982), transhistorical universal notions of health are unconvincing. However, there is one characteristic common to all concepts of disease, namely that disease manifests from the interrelationship of humans with their environment. Diseases of the past, such as measles and small pox, flourished due to high population densities and the very worst of human diseases, tuberculosis, influenza, cholera, typhoid and polio manifested as a result of human–animal co-habitation (Porter, 1997). The modern western world and its modern western diseases similarly reflect this interrelationship. Current threats such as AIDS, Ebola, heart disease and degenerative diseases question not only if the claim 'medicines triumph over disease' (Porter, 1997: 30) was premature but whether such a symbiotic relationship between society and environment could ever be severed.

The humanist project dependent on a stable subjectivity is no longer an unquestioned assumption. The ability of the human body to produce a reflection of an individual's social reality is a display contrary to scientific reductionism. Observations do not interpret themselves, they require an interpreter. An interpreter is a complex and subjective instrument inseparable from the social conditioning from which it is constituted. As the genetic scientist observes the human DNA under a microscope, and 'reads' the book of life, is it not the scientist who is reading one's self? Is it not DNA looking at DNA? Subsequently, can the biomedical model unquestionably deny the possibility that the world interprets itself and is the subject of its own interpretations, interconnected and self-reflexive? At a fundamental level, objective science and modernist theories that support allopathic medicine are seriously thrown into question when physics reveals paradoxes such as 'reverse causality', the proposition that causality itself is context dependent, born of an interconnecting and self-reflexive world (McGuire, 1996: 7).

This rethinking is a profound assertion in many ways, leaving no branch of knowledge unaffected. In particular, it suggests that the most accurate and relevant locus of knowledge is the body, not the mind, for the posthuman body is a phenomenological subject, a subject whose metamorphic display of cultural and social experience is perhaps the most accurate narrative of the social reality. I am not suggesting a privilege of the body over the mind, as my argument depends on their intrinsic connection. I am suggesting a re-evaluation of the foundation that has supported the mind and its rationality as the *only* valid means to knowledge, especially when postmodern maladies suggest the body displays the text of the dynamic vacillation of the subject with the world.

Hysteria, the Postmodern 'Syndrome'

Theoretically, medicine has severed the relationship of self and world, or mind and body. However, the body's mutable nature, brought clearly to the fore with rapid changes in science and technology, has prompted a reconsideration of these 'facts'. Sociological reassessment concludes that 'facts' are only 'facts' because of the certain value societies have placed on particular 'truths'. Scientific facts are beginning to be understood as the result of social forces operating inside and outside the scientific community. This article challenges the idea that social facts are things external to the individual. Contrary to Durkheim's suggestion that social facts are external to individuals (Durkheim, 1982), recent shifting social attitudes suggest that individuals participate fully in the creation of their experiences. The confusion that currently exists over what essentially defines an illness is evidence of the confusion over 'facts'. The proliferation of 'hysterical' and overtly psychosomatic illnesses of postmodernity, such as CFS, OCD, ADHD, panic attacks and depression, has defied medical specific definitions. Although hysteria is not a recent phenomenon, as it was the ancient Greeks who first labelled the condition, and an exclusively female one at that (Fancher, 1996), terms being used to describe these contemporary hysterics, such as 'syndrome', embody an apprehension to commit to absolutes as in the past. As recently as 1973, the American College of Psychiatrists regarded homosexuality as a disease. It is not coincidental that the amendments to this classification have taken place at a time when long-held previous assumptions about the world are being fundamentally challenged.

In this era of psychosomatic production where we fail to explain illness in terms of mind/body dualism, postmodern disorders could all be grouped under the term 'hysteria', especially in the Freudian sense of an 'intrapsychic conflict', where he initially claimed different aspects of one personality competed for mutually exclusive goals that manifested in somatic symptoms (Fancher, 1996: 375). However, like Elizabeth Bronfen, who in her book *The Knotted Subject* moves away from the predominantly historical and typically gendered explanations that Freud later alluded to, I draw focus to her embrace of 'a traumatic rather than a sexual etiology of hysteria' (Bronfen, 1998: xiii). Trauma in a postmodern sense is not the disruption of an otherwise stable psyche, but rather an unbounded experience of constant disaffection providing the backdrop for postmodern subjectivity. Hysterical subjectivity is postmodern subjectivity. Medical anthropologist Cecil Helman (1994) explores the way different cultures shape their suffering. He has found that a universal 'language of distress' is evident in the conversion of psychological disturbances into physical symptoms typically expressed as fatigue and listlessness.

When disease and health are perceived in direct relation to the cultural

and social formations in which they evolve they clearly fit the hysterical mould. Symptoms mirror the psychosocial conditions of experience and produce a subjectivity that escapes the clutches of reductionist medical diagnosis. Ill health can only be defined against a cultural construction of health. The stability of this construction is an illusion. However, belief in its reality has produced the appropriate bodily contradictions, mutations and confrontations to uphold this mythic border of health. As we become increasingly sceptical of notions of stable entities, these dichotomies are dangling precariously. Melancholia, now referred to as depression, associated with the disaffection of the postmodern promises of technological, scientific, cultural and social innovation, has no known location. Nor does it represent itself as the result of an original trauma as Freud and Charcot suggested. It permeates the entire psyche, and cannot be articulated within traditional medical discourse. Although hysteria was always elusive, and 'consistently shown as cheating the rules of the medical game' (Bronfen, 1998: 115), the increase in psychosomatic disorders gives credibility to the shifting paradigm that views the mind and body holistically. Helman reiterates this point when he describes culture-bound disorders where particular organs are preferential for particular cultures. In France, there is the *crise de foie* (liver), whereas in Iran it is *narahatiye qalb* or heart distress. Britain prefers disorders of the bowel, and in Australia, I would suggest the organ of choice for women would be the breast. Is breast cancer the manifestation of a society's obsession with stereotypical femininity, an inescapable focus of western culture?

Perhaps the most telling 'symptom' of postmodern anxiety is the unrelenting focus on the conditions that reflect the greater mood: first, heart attack and associated heart conditions, second, personality disorders such as schizophrenia and MPD. According to Greaves, their reality is due to the metaphorical reflection of the current social mores. 'These two conditions have come to be described in common parlance as a "split personality" and a "heart attack" respectively, both graphic expressions of assaults on the integrity of individuals one on the mind and the other on the body' (Greaves, 1996b: 81). They are sustained by the self-reflexive nature of disease, a reciprocation that is ensured by the process of identification and projection.

From this perspective, the body can be understood as latent potentiality, always in the process of becoming. It cannot be caught and objectively claimed, as it is always reworking itself according to its cultural/biological interconnection. Much has been written about the female hysteric, however another telling sign alluding to the interconnection of the self and world is the emergence of the male hysteric. Although Jean Martin Charcot was the first physician to claim male hysteria as a condition in the late 19th century, it has been widely ignored until recently. At present, there is either a re-emergence or an unveiling of cases whereby males are susceptible to the same 'hysterical' symptoms as females. In the case of ADHD, males outnumber

females, 10 to 1 (Diller, 1999). Is this phenomenon western culture attempting to narrate a new understanding of the role of the 'male' in this uncertain world?

As gender differentiation becomes less defined, disorders such as male phantom pregnancies known as 'couvade syndrome' have begun to emerge. Is it coincidental that these syndromes have developed alongside the cultural feminization of men evident in classifications such as the 'SNAG' - sensitive new age guy? Although women have twice the risk of developing an anxiety disorder of men, unprecedented numbers of men are suffering from typically female disorders such as body dismorphic disorder (BDD), anorexia, bulimia, depression and CFS. In the case of OCD and panic disorder, males and females are affected equally (De Silva and Rachman, 1998). There are also suggestions that the number of male sufferers would in fact be higher, had they reported their cases, as women traditionally report their illnesses to doctors to a greater extent. The extreme manifestation of all such psychic disorders is suicide. There has been an alarming increase in the rate of youth suicide over the past 30 years particularly in western countries such as Australia and especially for males aged 20–4 years (Berman and Jobes, 1995), born and bred within the postmodern culture.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to secure the body as the site of a dialogic interpretation of the past and future simultaneously. This notion is being reinforced in other areas of research such as quantum mechanics where the current view of causality 'means that the past does not determine the present but instead that the present seems to be a result of a "transaction" or "agreement" between the past and the future' (McGuire, 1996: 7). Halberstam and Livingston (1995: 1) suggest 'The existing medical/aesthetic disciplinary monopoly over "the body" is being challenged.' I would suggest this challenge is evident in postmodern disorders that display phenomenological notions of 'meaning', and knowledge denying the separation of the cultural from the natural. Such a challenge suggests the primary locus of knowledge be in the body's display of the 'present', the body constituted from a constantly fluxing past and future.

Nothing is as fundamentally shattering to allopathic medicine as the proposition posed by the posthuman body that challenges the Cartesian assumption of an autonomous self and demands a rethink of notions of subjectivity based on a mind and body split. This article has attempted to reconceptualize preexisting notions of subjectivity that are upheld by its antithesis, objectivity. We are subjective expressions of society at large. By validating subjectivity as a bodily perception of reality we no longer privilege objectivity and the construction of this binary division is no longer assumed. By

understanding postmodern maladies as a reflection of the social, we embrace phenomenological knowing. Merleau-Ponty (1968) spoke of a knowledge that cannot be possessed. This type of knowledge is experience, and experience denies the distinction between self and other, mind and body, nature and culture. This knowledge is born in the relation between the binaries. The binaries allow for difference, for without them there would be just one. However, it is the combination of distance and proximity, that is always shifting as reflected in culturally specific diseases.

The search for absolute truth that has driven science perpetually since the philosophy of ancient Greece can no longer rest on an essential nature of humanity. Sociologically, the general agreement has always tended towards this plasticity of human nature. It is only recently that this denial of human 'instinct' or 'predisposition' is being validated in the scientific realm and hence gaining credibility. Rationality in science has limited our understanding of individuals and society, most evidently in the area of medical science. Necessarily notions of subjectivity are shifting towards more sociological conceptualizations, in order to fit the current shifting paradigm that questions absolutes. The postmodern world of flux and flow denies claims of certainty as does the postmodern 'syndrome'. Similarly, this shift in social perception ensures an unprecedented challenge to western medicine's objectification of disease. But more importantly, postmodern maladies confront the rationality behind the theoretical distinction between nature and culture and reveal the dichotomous relationship between self and world to be a fabrication.

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
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Suhasini Bhatnagar and Suraksha Agrawal

Surname Endogamy among the *Brahmin* of India

Introduction

The dizzying succession of migrants, invaders, armies and emissaries that have come into the Indian subcontinent over the centuries have left it with a unique spectrum of sociocultural heritages. The main invaders were the Greeks, the Pathan, the Shakes and the Kushanas. However, before these invaders India's population was divided into four major groups based on profession (Bhasin and Bhasin, 1994).

Being a huge land mass, the various groups are separated from one another by cultural and social as well as geographical distances. These separations might have resulted in the formation of unique populations, due to breeding in cultural isolation undisturbed for many generations. The different invaders brought a variety of cultural as well as biological traits and these historical and social processes led to the evolution of a unique social organization. The emerging pattern of social organization based on endogamy and a system of marriage rules among subdivided populations has produced a kind of biological mosaic – a wide genetic diversity characterized by differing frequencies of genetic traits, clinical and regional variations and also uneven distributions of either very high or very low frequencies of a few characteristics scattered among certain populations. Another important dimension of Indian populations, especially among small populations, is that they offer the potential for microevolutionary forces to occur, which bring rapid changes to the frequency of certain genetic traits (Malhotra and Vasulu, 1993).

The four major groups or *varna*, namely the *Brahmin*, which is at the top of the social hierarchy, followed by the *Kshatriya*, *Vaishya* and *Sudra*, are the backbone of the caste system in India. The castes are divided into

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subcastes and individuals belonging to these groups are required to practise endogamy, i.e. the system which compels an individual to marry within a certain group. The subcastes are further divided into mutually exclusive subgroups known as *gotras*, whose members are forbidden to marry within the same subgroup (i.e. they are required to be exogamous). For this study we focus on the main group *Brahmin* and two of its subgroups, namely *Bhargavas* and *Chaturvedis*, who practise surname endogamy, i.e. where one's surname is inherited patrilineally.

Because of closed populations the rule of exogamy is applied at some level, hence there are a number of customary restrictions attached to the Hindu marriage system. Furthermore, among these closed endogamous groups there has recently been a move towards non-endogamous marriages, breach of the rules of exogamy, intercaste marriages and so on, in order to select a better partner. Each of these groups was to some extent isolated from the others so usually marriages occurred within the group and rarely between subgroups. The practice of group endogamy made the populations different and isolated from each other. As a result of these isolating mechanisms, the population is subdivided into groups of varying sizes, different degrees of breeding isolation (endogamy) and a great deal of variation in the mating pattern, all of which invariably results in a wide genetic diversity (Malhotra and Vasulu, 1993). We have focused on three isolated groups with the aim of studying the endogamy coefficient and the effect of endogamy on the microdifferentiation in these populations. The statistical parameters used were F_{IT} (total endogamy coefficient), F_{IS} (non-random inbreeding coefficient), F_{ST} (a priori endogamy coefficient) and R_{ST} (average within-group conditional endogamy).

Materials and Methods

The present study included 583 individuals, all of whom broadly belonged to the group *Brahmin*, and could be categorized as *Bhargavas* (N = 196), *Kanyakubja* and *Sanadhaya Brahmin* (N = 196) and *Chaturvedis* (N = 191). We collected detailed information about the mating patterns and drew up two-generation pedigrees to gather information about the *gotras* of the father and mother before and after marriage. Before collecting the data, regional directories of these populations were collected, detailed computerized lists were prepared and random numbers were generated by the computer. For each individual we collected the two-generation extended pedigrees and care was taken so that the data were not collected from related individuals. Generation I denotes the index case generation and generation II pertains to the parental generation of the index case.

We have translated estimate of kinship within population to *gotra*

endogamy, which has been calculated according to the method of Relethford (1988).

Results

Male to female ratio and the age distribution are more or less equal in all three ethnic groups. The mean age of *Bhargavas* is 46.10 ± 13.3 years for males and 43.02 ± 13.3 for females; with age ranging from 15 to 74 years for both sexes. For *Chaturvedis* the mean age for males is 48.05 ± 14.98 and for females it is 41.70 ± 12.07, ranging from 17 to 80 years for both. The mean age for *Brahmin* males is 44 ± 10.2 and for females 42 ± 13.2, ranging from 15 to 70 years for both.

Gotra Frequency Distribution

The frequency distribution of different *gotras* in two of the populations is shown in Table 1. It is interesting to note that among *Bhargavas* all the six *gotras* reported in literature are represented in the present study. Two-generation pedigrees were drawn for each subject to be sure that the sample selected for the present study adhered strictly to endogamy. The distribution of different *gotras* among *Bhargavas* reveals that the frequency of *Kashyapi* (23.98 percent), *Galav* (20.92 percent) and *Vidd* (22.95 percent) is represented almost equally, followed by *Gandaya* (13.77) and *Vatsa* (12.76 percent). *Kochasti gotra* is represented the least (5.62 percent).

Among *Chaturvedis*, the *gotra Shroshravavas* was highest (30.37 percent) followed by *Dhaumya* (28.79 percent), *Bharadwaj* (24.60 percent), *Vashistha* (11.52 percent), *Dakshya* (2.62 percent), *Kutsa* (1.58 percent) and *Bhargava* (0.52 percent). It should be noted that the *Bhargava gotra* of *Chaturvedis* is different from the main *Bhargava* group.

In the present study the analysis for *Brahmin* was carried out on two major classes i.e. *Kanyakubja* and *Sanadhaya,* as in both these groups *gotras* with the same name do not marry one another. *Kanyakubja Brahmin* have professionally seven branches or *gotras* known as *Gautam, Shandilya, Bharadwaj, Upmanyu, Kashyap, Kastip* and *Garg*. Each of these *gotras* is a class by itself. The percentage distribution of different *gotras* is *Shandilya* (45.57 percent), *Kashyap* (14.75 percent), *Garg* (13.58 percent), *Gautam* (9.64 percent), *Upmanyu* (6.84 percent), *Bharadwaj* (6.84 percent) and *Kashyap* (2.78 percent).

Kanyakubja Brahmin are further divided into four subdivisions, namely *Saryupari, Bhumihar, Jijothiya* and *Sanadhaya. Bhumihar* and *Jijothiya* are not at all represented in our samples and *Saryupari* are represented in only 13.26 percent of our study group. However, *Sanadhaya* are present in 37.24 percent of our study group. *Sanadhayas* are further divided into eight *gotras.*

Table 1 Surname Concordance for *Kanyakubja* and *Sanadhaya Brahmins*

Kanyakubja				Sanadhaya			
Gotra	*Concordant marriages at* gotras	*Discordant marriages*	*No. of individuals within same* gotra	Gotra	*Concordant marriages at* gotras	*Discordant marriages*	*No. of individuals within same* gotra
Bharadwaj	2 (22.22)	3 (4.68)	5 (6.67)	*Bharadwaj*	2 (14.30)	23 (40.35)	25 (34.24)
Garg	0	10 (15.63)	10 (13.33)	*Kashyap*	0	2 (3.50)	2 (2.73)
Gautam	0	7 (10.93)	7 (9.33)	*Katyayan*	3 (21.43)	4 (7.01)	7 (9.58)
Kashtip	0	2 (3.12)	2 (2.66)	*Parashar*	0	1 (1.75)	1 (1.36)
Kashyap	1 (11.11)	10 (15.62)	11 (14.66)	*Sawarniya*	0	6 (10.52)	6 (8.21)
Shandilya	5 (55.55)	29 (45.31)	35 (46.66)	*Shandilya*	5 (35.72)	8 (14.03)	13 (17.80)
Upmanyu	1 (11.1)	4 (6.25)	5 (6.66)	*Upmanyu*	2 (14.28)	8 (14.03)	11 (15.06)
				Vashistha	2 (14.28)	5 (8.77)	8 (10.95)
Total	9	65	75		14	57	73

Numbers in parentheses are percentage values.

The percentage distribution of the different *gotras* is shown in Table 1. We have only included data for *Kanyakubja* and *Sanadhaya Brahmin* as they constitute a total of 75.51 percent of our sample *Brahmin* population. The other groups, i.e. *Saraswat* and *Saryupari*, represent only 10.89 and 13.48 percent respectively. A detailed analysis for these two groups has not been conducted as the sample size is too small to reach any significant conclusion and as both these groups are further subdivided into large number of *gotras* which are further subdivided into groups according to surnames.

Concordant Marriages at *Gotra* Level

In *Bhargavas* and *Chaturvedis* concordant marriages at *gotra* level in both generations have been calculated. Among *Bhargavas* the percentage of concordant marriages varied from 0 to15 percent in different *gotras*. However, the mean concordance in generation I was 9.5 percent and for generation II, 8.6 percent. In the *Kochasti gotra* there was zero percent concordance, as individuals belonging to this *gotra* do not marry among themselves.

Among *Chaturvedis* marriage within the same *gotra* is higher: compared to *Bhargavas* mean concordance in generation I is 6.39 and in generation II it is 29.02. *Chaturvedis* of the *Kutsa gotra* do not marry among themselves either.

For calculating the concordant marriage pattern among *Brahmin* we have considered only two major classes i.e. *Kanyakubja* and *Sanadhaya*. The difference of concordance in the two generations was statistically not significant ($p < .05$). The percentages of concordant marriages in the same *gotra* were calculated for *Kanyakubja* and *Sanadhaya* as 21.25 percent and 2.8 percent respectively.

The estimates of microdifferentiation from random endogamy using parameters like F_{IT}, F_{ST}, F_{IS} and R_{ST} for both generations across the three populations are shown in Table 2. These values have been calculated on the basis of *gotras* in each population.

The total inbreeding coefficient (F_{IT}) was found to be highest for *Kanyakubja Brahmin* at a value of .07 in generation II, followed by *Chaturvedis* (.058) and lowest for *Bhargavas* (.028). When the values for generation I and II were compared it was found that there was no statistical difference across the two generations.

The weighted mean value of within-group a priori kinship (F_{ST}) ranged from .0482 (*Bhargavas*) to .0502 (*Sanadhaya Brahmin*) in generation I, with no significant change in generation II.

The reduced variance of the mean value of within-group a priori kinship (R_{ST}) was found to be highest, at .071, for *Bhargavas*, followed by *Chaturvedis* (.045), *Kanyakubja Brahmin* (.0058) and lowest for *Sanadhaya Brahmin* (.0034).

Table 2 Estimates of Genetic Microdifferentiation from Random Endogamy in the Three Populations

Populations	F_{IT}	F_{ST}	F_{IS}	R_{ST}
	Generation I			
Bhargavas	.028	.0482	–.0213	.071
Chaturvedis	.058	.0625	–.0052	.045
Kanyakubja Brahmins	.030	.0689	–.0409	.0058
Sanadhaya Brahmins	.048	.0502	.0978	.0034
	Generation II			
Bhargavas	.028	.0482	–.022	.053
Chaturvedis	.0576	.0624	–.0052	.060
Kanyakubja Brahmins	.07	.0688	.0012	.0013
Sanadhaya Brahmins	.0224	.0502	–.0292	.0048

Discussion

The caste system is one of the basic elements of Indian social structure. The caste has been defined by Karve (1961) as an endogamous group or an extended family wherein the members are related to one another either by blood or by marriage. This definition explains well the interrelationships between castes and marriages in India. Because of the high degree of stratification of Hindu society into numbers of castes and subcastes, it has become difficult to select mates of choice. However, as a result of urbanization and westernization, there are now exceptions occurring to the system of endogamy. According to historical data, the rules of endogamy have been followed since the middle ages, hence it is believed that small clusters might have been created within the populations. These clusters may share socio-cultural patterns and because of the close mating system they might also share the same genetic background.

In the present study we have tried to analyse the data for three populations: namely *Bhargavas*, *Chaturvedis* and *Kanyakubja* and *Sanadhaya Brahmin* by using various statistical tools like F_{IT}, F_{IS}, F_{ST} and R_{ST} to demonstrate the effect of endogamy on microdifferentiation in these populations (Imaizumi and Kaneko, 1997).

Subdivision of Gaurs are (i) *Kanyakubja* or *Kannaujiya* (ii) *Saraswaat* (iii) *Gaur* (iv) *Maithila* and (v) *Utkala*. These subgroups are further subdivided into *gotras* and further into surnames.

Bhargavas are believed to have originated from *Rishi Bhrigu*. Among the six *gotras*, which are *Kashyapi, Kochasti, Vidd, Gandaya, Galav and Vatsa*,

are further subdivisions into 36 different *kuldevies*. This division into *kuldevi* is based on the deity they worship.

Among *Chaturvedis*, who originated from the great *Kannaujiya* stock, there are seven *gotras, Bharadwaj, Bhargava, Vashistha, Kushik, Dhaumya* and *Dakshya*, which are further divided into 64 *als*. All seven *gotras* are represented in the *Chaturvedis* among our study population. However, *Bhargava* and *Kutsa gotras* are the least represented with a frequency of only .52 percent and 1.58 percent respectively. In both generations studied, *gotra* distribution was almost equal. However, the principle of exogamy is followed at *gotra* level and not at *als*.

It is clear from the preceding description that the Hindu caste system is highly complex and because of this complexity a high degree of microdifferentation might have taken place, and our data support this thesis.

- Total endogamy coefficient (F_{IT}) has the highest value for *Kanyakubja Brahmin* followed by *Chaturvedis* and *Bhargavas*.
- Weighted a priori endogamy coefficient F_{ST} has almost the same value for all the populations over the two generations, thus emphasizing the importance of the practice of endogamy for the three groups. As mentioned before, the rule of exogamy at *gotra* level is important in the Hindu caste system. However, because of mate scarcity there is an increase in same-*gotra* marriages among *Chaturvedis*. The mean concordance over all *gotra* among *Chaturvedis* is 17.1, which is higher than the other groups we studied: in *Bhargavas* it is 9.5 and for *Kanyakubja Brahmin* it is 3.8 and for *Sanadhaya Brahmin* it is only 2.6.
- F_{IS}, or non-random inbreeding coefficient, is lowest for *Chaturvedis* and highest for *Brahmin* meaning that endogamy among *Sanadhaya Brahmin* is random. They practise exogamy strictly at the level of *gotras*. However, among *Chaturvedis sumgotriya* (concordance at *gotra* level) or positively assortated marriages have increased from a mean concordance of 6.4 from generation I to a mean concordance of 29.0 for generation II, which is quite significant.
- R_{ST} refers to the average within-group conditional endogamy. This value is highest for *Bhargavas* in generation I and there is a decline in this value for generation II, indicating that there might be an increase of non-*Bhargava* marriages. In the past, *Bhargava* was a more closed community practising exogamy at the level of *gotras*, but because of a lack of proper mates the rules of exogamy have been relaxed and presently they practise exogamy at the level of *kuldevies* and not at *gotra* level, which means that there is an increase in same-*gotra* marriages among *Bhargavas* also.

Our results indicate that despite their close proximity these populations are very different in a number of distinctive marital patterns, the differences

being primarily maintained by their mutual cultural isolation. These populations are suitable for a theoretical analysis of microevolution because of their specific ethnohistory, the migrations that have taken place, their continuing mutual isolation and, furthermore, documented historical events which might have affected these populations at both the sociocultural and the genetic level.

All these populations live in similar environments (in terms of climate, nutrition and physical activities) in a relatively small geographical region, and they might have evolved initially from the same ancestral population. Our unpublished data reveal that at a genetic level *Bhargavas* and *Chaturvedis* are different from one another. Genetic distance analysis indicates that *Chaturvedis* split from the main group of *Brahmin* at an early date followed by the splitting of *Bhargavas* from the main group. Differences in F_{IT}, F_{IS}, F_{ST} and R_{ST} observed in the present study therefore are not due to differences in origin or physical environment. These differences may be attributed to migrations from various other parts of the country, or to foreign invaders affecting these populations at the sociocultural level, or to differing degrees of isolation, different population sizes, or other factors not immediately evident.

The coefficient of *gotra* endogamy was found to be highest among *Kanyakubja Brahmin*, indicating that in this close-bred population there are more *sumgotriya* (same-*gotra*) marriages. Historically, the same-*gotra* marriage was once the norm but then there arose the need for its prohibition. With the disappearance of pastoral society and the clan ownership of cattle, and the emergence of monogamy and ownership of property and later urban civilization, the *gotra* as an institution and a consideration for matchmaking vanished and marriage outside one's *gotra* became the rule. However, the practice has not been totally abandoned, as is evident from our study. Similarly, *Bhargavas*, who used to practise exogamy at the level of *gotras*, have recently begun to allow *sumgotriya* marriages and to practise exogamy at a level lower than *gotra*, i.e. at the level of *kuldevies*. *Chaturvedis*, however, still practise strict exogamy at the level of *gotras* but due to the shortage of proper mates they have also started *sumgotriya* marriages, which may be illustrated by the R_{ST} values, which were .045 for generation I changing to .060 in generation II. Our results indicate that the endogamy coefficient among *Brahmin* is .003 (average value), among *Chaturvedis* it is .06 and among *Bhargavas* it is .05.

Though endogamy is a characteristic of subdivided populations within a caste, tribe or other groups, there are wide variations in the level of endogamy. The caste system is a dynamic institution that provides a mechanism to retain caste hierarchy and also allows flexibility of sociocultural practices and laxity in relation to certain types of preference in choosing a mate from another caste. The institution of endogamy followed by the three

populations in this study is different from first-order structural endogamy (Biondi et al., 2000). First-degree structural endogamy is measured for any given individual as a procreative link formed by blood marriage or inbreeding. Our populations follow a higher order endogamy, as they do not generate any biological inbreeding beyond that already present in the founder populations.

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
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Göran Therborn

Back to Norms! On the Scope and Dynamics of Norms and Normative Action

The Norm: Messages and Issues

A norm and its adjective 'normal' may have at least three messages for us. First of all, a norm tells us what something is. What is a meter? A concern of scientists at the time of the French Revolution. What is a vegetable? A matter of current EU regulation. Second, the norm can tell us about the distributive structure of a population, what is 'normal' in it. Third, norms tell us what we ought to to do.

As a definition, as distribution, and as a rule of action, the norm tells us what we should expect. In all its meanings, a norm reduces uncertainty and contributes thereby to social order. True, that deceptions of expectation are interpreted differently. What does not correspond to the norm's definition is false, not genuine. What falls outside the expected distribution is abnormal, deviant and possibly pathological. Who does not act according to the norm, acts wrongly. However, common to all cases is that the falsity of the expectation does not invalidate the norm.

In this article we are mainly concerned with norms in the third sense and with issues they raise for social theory and social analysis. What is the significance of norms in human action? When do norms govern actors and their actions? What is the relationship between normative and non-normative action? What are the dynamics of norms? Why and how do norms change?

Norms constitute a crossroads of a large number of scientific disciplines, which rarely have the opportunity to stop for a moment to talk to each other. Business administration, criminology, decision theory, economics, ethics, game theory, law, organization theory, pedagogy, philosophy, political science, psychology, sociolinguistics, sociology, theology, all of them (to a variable extent) are grappling with issues of norms and normative action.

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A definition might be useful to have in the background from the beginning. A norm may be said to be a prescriptive or a proscriptive statement telling us Do! or Don't! (It may also take the form of an encouragement or a discouragement, Please do! or Please don't!) A norm in this sense covers a whole spectrum of mechanisms for its maintenance, from legal norms backed up by a special apparatus of adjudication and sanctioning, to moral norms, located only in the conscience of the individual, and with a wide range of what are usually called social norms in between, subject to the approval or disapproval of a set of actors.

By normative action, we may mean action driven by a norm about the right thing to do. Normative action, some might prefer to call it deontological action, is often distinguished from teleological or instrumental action by not being consequentialist, or not being outcome-oriented. That is not the whole truth, however. Normative action does not calculate the consequences or outcome for the actor herself, but an ethic of responsibility, as Max Weber called it, may very well consider the consequences for others than the actor. The classical juridical maxim of normative action, *fiat iustitia, pereat mundus*,[1] is not to be taken as a reliable guide to normative territory.

The Paradox and the Challenge of Homo Sociologicus

There is a paradox in current sociology. While the general external perception of sociological (wo)man is a person driven mainly by social norms, within the current mainstream of the sociological discipline it is hard to find any substantial treatment of norms and of normative action. In contemporary social theorizing, the main interest in norms has been generated from the problematique of rational choice, (cf. Ullmann-Margalit, 1977; Bicchieri et al., 1997).[2] The major recent sociological contribution by James Coleman (1990) came from a new rational choice-inspired current in sociology, and so does the anthological overview by Hechter and Opp (2001).

The Neoclassical Synthesis in sociology – founded by Talcott Parsons (1937) through a re-reading of the 19th and early 20th-century sociology which established a classical canon – allotted a crucial importance to norms. Indeed, the attention to non-random 'normative elements' in the ends of actors and in the selective standard relating the actor's situation to his end was what defined the Synthesis as a 'voluntaristic theory of action' (Parsons, 1937: 74ff.).

Parsons's postwar formulations (e.g. Parsons, 1951) centred on the social system and its 'structural-functional analysis', rather than on a theory of action. But the latter was not abandoned (see Parsons and Shils, 1953), and the social system analysis kept the centrality of norms. Social systems were seen as characterized, first of all, by their values, from which norms derived, indicating concrete patterns of action.

The less theoretically ambitious, more empirically concerned 'middle-range' variant of Neoclassical sociology developed by Robert Merton included investigations of norms and of anomie (normlessness) as a centre-piece of analysis (Merton, 1957).

Neoclassical sociology did not manage to consolidate itself and to monopolize the discipline, however. On the contrary, from the early 1960s onwards it came under increasing attack, to disappear as a possible paradigm in the 1970s, without being replaced by any alternative of equal systematicity and influence.

After Parsons and Merton, sociologists have tended to take norms for granted: important, sure, but neither central nor exciting. In my opinion, this is an unfortunate abdication from participation in current central debates within the social sciences and economic history, wherein norms and normative institutions are key topics.

From this historical turbulence it did not necessarily follow that norms should fall out of focus, but they did. For this, there seem to have been two major reasons. The first was the character of the discipline, the second was the path of intra-disciplinary controversies in the 1960s and 1970s.

First, most sociologists have always taken their discipline as an empirical one more than anything else, interested above all in concrete, empirical issues. The Neoclassical Synthesis was largely a theoretical enterprise, and it never came to rule or to dominate the whole empirical field. This never-ending diversity was further sustained by a conception of the social, shared by most sociologists, whatever their other disagreements. That is, that the social has emergent properties and is irreducible to elementary action. The empirical concerns and the anti-reductionist epistemology and ontology reinforced each other in making it possible to avoid or ignore basic issues of action. You could very well make interesting findings about, say, workplace relations, interpersonal encounters, city life, levels of living, social mobility or gender patterns without bothering much about basic springs of social action or basic properties of social systems.

Second, the path that the major theoretical controversies in sociology took also contributed to obscuring norms from view.

The Parsonian Synthesis was theoretically vulnerable on two flanks. One was its general conception of the norm-driven actor, which allowed little room for other motivations, except for cases of 'deviance', which as deviations from normality were by definition of marginal or secondary significance. Critics (most influentially Wrong, 1961) attacked prevailing sociology's 'oversocialized conception of man'. Much later, a latterday semi-Parsonian formulated the problem as the contingency of action (Alexander, 1988). The other vulnerability was on its macro-side and concerned the source of norms. Parsons derived the latter from values and the overarching culture of the social system. Critics (Dahrendorf, 1959; Rex, 1961 and others)

raised the issue of power, that norms may be imposed, and therefore subject to conflict.

The synthesis was also empirically vulnerable, once under attack. Parsons had many gifted disciples, mainly in the USA, and inspired a considerable number of empirical works, both micro and macro, but what the Parsonian Synthesis offered was an analytical and interpretative framework, not explanations of previous empirical puzzles. There was no empirical breakthrough that could be marshalled to the defence of the Synthesis.

The Neoclassical Synthesis of sociology disintegrated, and was followed by a number of different approaches, the diversity of which was not as devastating as it might seem, because of the empirical orientation of the discipline. Each approach contributed something to the knowledge of the social world.

The wide range of options offered may be summarized into two major strands. On the one hand, there was a turn from the normative to the cognitive and the communicative, from socialized culture members with internalized norms to 'knowledgeable agents' (Giddens) and communicators (Habermas, 1981). On the other, there was first a substitution of structure for the actor, in forms of historical materialism and in inspirations from structural linguistics and anthropology. The 'structuralist' turn then led to a renewed concern with 'structure and agency', the most influential results of which were probably Anthony Giddens's (1984: 25ff.) conception of the 'duality of structure', emphasizing that structural rules are both a resource drawn upon by actors and an outcome of action, and Pierre Bourdieu's (1987: 127ff., 155ff.) conceptualization of actors' dispositions as their 'habitus'.

The normative remained out of focus, while always present in the background. Only by exception have major recent sociologists placed 'the moral dimension' or the 'moral order' and the 'normative-affective' in the limelight (Etzioni, 1988; Wuthnow, 1987, 1991).

In other words, it would be misleading to see sociology as characterized by a conception of homo sociologicus as Normative Man, in contrast to Maximizing Economic Man. Rather, we might capture a central aspect of the different perspectives of economics and sociology by their notions of the key explanatory variables in a theory of action.

Explaining Social Action

The analytical skeleton of explanations of action might be laid out thus. The basic elements are a set of actors, situations (or conditions) and actions. In idealist emanationism, the situations would disappear, and in extreme structuralism the actors would be reduced to their situations, but here we are concerned with mainstream, cross-disciplinary social science. Given the task of explaining social action, we are left with two dimensions, with which we can

ACTORS	SITUATIONS	
	Given/Random	*Variable*
Given/Random		Neoclassical economics Rational choice Behaviourist and experimental psychology
Variable	Mainstream sociology, anthropology, and political science Dynamic psychology	

Figure 1 Modes of Explaining Human Action

distinguish two major social scientific modes of explanations by their treatment of the set of actors and of the set of situations.

Factors on the explaining side of the equation may be divided into variables and givens or randoms. The latter two are by no means synonymous, but they have one important thing in common: you do not have to investigate them. From a perspective of empirical social science, then, givens and randoms may, for the moment, be treated as equivalent (see Figure 1).

In the characteristic economic mode of explanation, action is explained by variations of the situation, basically by changes in (relative) prices and incomes. Actors are given, assumed to be utility maximizers, with 'stable preferences':

> ... preferences are assumed not to change substantially over time, nor to be very different between wealthy and poor persons, or even between persons in different societies and cultures ... The assumption of stable preferences provides a stable foundation for generating predictions about responses to various changes. (Becker, 1976: 5)

Situational variability consists of the probable cost–benefit consequences of different options in moments of choice. When (probable) incentives change, actors act differently, in a predictable way. The assumptions of maximizing and of stable preferences do not necessarily require any exclusively egoistic or pecuniary preferences, not even that preferences have to be universally the same. The crucial point is another one, that economic explanations and predictions are characteristically produced from a baseline of actors with given preferences, decision rules and constraints.

Sociologists – and anthropologists and mainstream political scientists – start from the expectation that actors differ, across categories and groups of

various sorts and over historical time. In the sociological-anthropological vision, social action varies because actors vary. They belong to different groups or cultures, they have different positions, roles or locations in social systems or networks, or they have different material or symbolic resources. An important task of the sociological research agenda is to find out how, how much, and how many actors differ.

On the other hand, the variation of situations, or circumstances, of action tend to be taken as random or given, although it may be taken into account in a way similar to economic explanations taking in the variability of actors as a constraint. The options available to the sociological actor typically vary, not with the immediate action situation, but with the actor's values, norms, or interpretation of the situation and with the actor's location in social structure.[3] Sociologists' tendency not to bother with situational variation is what is expressed in the old quip of sociology being the discipline of why people do not have any choice.

Normative Man may then be seen as part of a larger set of explanatory frameworks, in which action is accounted for mainly in terms of the variable characteristics of actors, rather than in terms of expected outcomes of variable situations.

Putting the two explanatory perspectives together on the same plane like this may be taken as a way of formulating mutual challenges, the sociological questioning of the given/randomness of actors, and, vice versa, the economic questioning of the given/randomness of situations, either given as reducible to the structural location, to the interpretations and/or the evaluations of the actors, or randomly variable.

Normative and Other Action

Normative action, denoting actions for the sake of what is (perceived as) right, is one of three major springs of human action, together with teleological action with a view to reach certain ends, and emotional action, expressing feelings of anger, grief or joy.

Not all kinds of norm-conscious or norm-following action are normative action. People may follow norms for several different reasons, and only one set of reasons constitutes what is called normative action here. Norm-following may be instrumental, either for the sake of its rewards or for fear of the costs of violation. We may conform out of a desire to belong and/or to be held in esteem and respect, or out of fear of ridicule, ostracism, dismissal, or legal punishment. There are good reasons to expect that much human behaviour is motivated by variable mélanges of utility maximation and normativity.

Normative action, following norms for their own sake, may occur for

different reasons. At one pole we have subconscious habit or routine, whose origins of learning we may have lost, or at least we do not usually think of them. Many of our most frequent, everyday actions are of this sort; our way of speaking, our body care and comportment, our diet and our style of work. In other words, we do a number of things because we take them as the right thing to do, without thinking much, or anything about it.

At the other end, normative action may follow from (what is perceived as) rational knowledge about the consequences of such action on the world, while disregarding (or paying only secondary significance to) the utility of the outcome to the actor.

Between the poles of norm-conforming action out of habit or out of rational knowledge, there is a wide range of normative action, which raises the most interesting analytical questions. As far as I can see, we may approach this range of norm-following between habits and rational insight from two angles.

On the one hand, we may follow a norm out of our *identification* with the norm source and its values. The norm source may be a person, an organization, or a doctrine. This is not just a question of an 'internalization' of a norm, but above all a linking of our individual sense of self to the norm source. The latter then provides the meaning of our life (for the time being). For it we may even be prepared to risk our lives, in order that the norm source may live. Nation and religion have been the most common norm sources calling for the preparedness to the ultimate sacrifice of one's own life. But identification is also important in much less heroic modes, with parents, teachers, extraordinary peers, or with 'stars' of entertainment or sports as objects of identification. We may also identify ourselves with a procedure, as the legitimate manner of doing things, for example, by democratic voting or by due process of law.

Within the collectivity we identify ourselves with, our actions tend to follow certain norms. In extreme cases, the Others are treated as subhuman, with regard to which no norms apply. The wars of the Yugoslav succession have provided the world with recent examples. In this way the actors' collective identity may determine the range of valid norms.

On the other hand, we may follow a norm out of *self-respect*. This is a product of deep internalization, the preconditions of which we shall come back to later. Among most of us, there are certain things we do not do and certain things we do, regardless of what other people are doing. Otherwise we would have feelings of disgust, revulsion and self-contempt, not to mention shame and guilt. These 'don'ts' may range from eating 'dead animals' to 'scabbing', from police denunciation to cheating, from begging to exploiting people in distress.

As far as I know, neither norm-following from identification nor out of self-respect has been much explored yet, at least not in sociology.

With regard to their functioning in human interaction, norms may be divided into at least three main types. The first consists of *constitutive* norms, which define a system of action and an actor's membership in it. They are the constitutive rules of a game. With respect to the actor, they are norms of conduct, prescribing what a full member of a social system must do, proscribing what she must not. Such norms of conduct involve proper language, hygiene and bodily comportment and manners. They include codes of honour and definitions of human dignity and of proper social competence.

The second set is made up of *regulative* norms, denoting actors' expected contributions to, or expected performance or execution of tasks in, the system. Work norms, family roles and other social role-scripts, and norms of members'group behaviour, are common examples.

Third, we may distinguish *distributive* norms,[4] designating how rewards, costs and risks should be allocated in a given social system.

In other words, norms define the meaning of social membership, members' expected contribution to the social system, and the proper rewards of their membership and/or contribution. As such, norms are ubiquitous, and they are central to any functioning social system, large or small.

These three kinds of norms are of unequal social importance. Of primary significance and the ones most deeply internalized are the norms of conduct, as they define what constitutes full, competent membership of a social system. Unless you speak the language and unless you 'behave', you do not belong, you are an outsider. You are not a normal adult, a Swede, or an economist, for example. The three kinds of norms tend to have different depths and different dynamics. Normally, so to speak, it seems that norms of conduct are most deeply internalized in actors, and their violation calls forth the strongest reaction. Gross violations of norms of conduct are usually met with rejection and exclusion, even revulsion and disgust.

In terms of internalization, I am not sure whether there is any strong tendency for regulative or distributive norms to be more deeply internalized than the other, but it seems that distributive norms tend to call forth the stronger reaction against their violation. A sense of unfairness and injustice is a strong and powerful spring of action. Regulative norms of contribution or performance, on the other hand, are significant as criteria for status attribution in social systems.

Norms are usually not single rules, but form part of hierarchically ordered systems, ranging from supreme principles to rules of situational application. This provides normative action with an intrinsic flexibility of interpretation and implementation that is often overlooked. Borrowing from Merton (1957: 140) and a slightly different context, we may distinguish different modalities of normative action, such as innovative, conformist and ritualistic, with an ascending order of loyalty to the lowest, most situationally specific norms of the system.

Institutions and Other Systems of Action

A general discussion of norms has to relate to institutions, a frequently used and loosely defined word these days. Though institutions and institutionalization are seen primarily in cognitive terms by some sociologists, referring to 'typification' and to the establishment of a collective definition of (a part of) the world, a norms or rules perspective is the most common.

Institutions, then, should be taken as delimited complexes of norms, including constitutive norms of conduct, regulative ones of contribution/execution, and norms of distribution. The norms of an institution may be formal or informal, explicit or tacit. Attached to these institutional norm complexes are systems of sanctions against violations of the norms. In complex societies, these institutional sanctions are usually, though not always nor by definition, backed up by law and legal redress or punishment. The family (of a specific historical kind) is the classical sociological point of reference when thinking about an institution, but one may also think of, for example, private property, or parliamentary democracy as institutions in the same sense.

In order to get an overview of institutions it may be worth while to locate them on a spectrum of normative and non-normative action and to distinguish some fundamentally different modes of institutional regulation.

Non-normative, and Thereby Non-institutionalized Action

Here we find a large variety of singular individual actions and action strategies, as well as ephemeral forms of interaction, such as casual encounters or crowds. Norms impinge upon actors only as part of the general constitution of human actors through social learning, most basically the rules of language.

But here also are long-term systems of interaction, *power plays*. Relations between sovereign states, gangs, or interlocking sovereign individuals exemplify this pattern, which may also be frequently found within dictatorial states. Interaction of this sort need not necessarily be violent or fraudulent, but the check is the relation of power and rational interest. Norms enter into the consideration of actors only in terms of cost and benefit.

Institutions or Institutionalized Systems of Action

Institutions are of two major kinds with respect to their normative regulation. Both have a constitutive normative framework delimiting proper and improper behaviour. But they differ in their regulation of proper moves. In one, actors are free to choose a strategy and to make their moves accordingly. In the other, the kind and often the sequence of moves are prescribed by norms.

We may call the first set of institutions competitive games or *normative frameworks* of (legitimate) maximation. As 'games' they have a normative

constitution, proscribing a number of moves, but within the game, actors are both allowed and expected to maximize their utility. All competitive games are of this kind, but the most important institutions of this type are (varieties of) civic societies and markets. Civic societies and markets, in turn, may be seen as a framework of institutions in plural, constitutions, the rule of law, property rights etc. Within the frameworks, which proscribe power plays of force and fraud, actors may maximize their utility. However, the institutional frameworks are not necessarily congruent with each other.

The second major set of institutions we might name *role-plays*. The theatrical metaphor is quite apt here. The play may be read and staged differently, the parts may be interpreted differently, and actors' performances differ. The social as well as the theatrical script allows the actors several degrees of freedom, but there is always a set of parts to be played. True, role-plays off the theatrical stage seldom prescribe the lines of the actors, but rather a delimited range of possible lines and moves.

Role-plays are not less important than markets in contemporary social life. Every modern society has at least three major social theatres, at which important role-plays are performed every day. One is the *family*, a play which has been re-written drastically in recent times. But the parts of father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, grandmother, grandfather, etc., are still there with their expectations, obligations, rights and their courses of prescribed action.

The second is the *world of work*, with its huge number of job-roles, each with their norms about what to do, what not to do, and how to do it. It should be added that jobs are roles, even if the job is to operate on the market. The sales representative too has a part to play. The world of work has, on the whole, tended to be more normatively regulated in recent history, by law, by the growth of professionalization and more unevenly by collective bargaining.

The third major stage is that of *organized representation*, with its plays of democratic politics, of association and of lobbying. What a government minister, a politician, a delegate or a representative may or may not, must or must not do is largely prescribed by constitutions and statutes, directives and public opinion.

The enacting of the normative role-plays constitutes 'obligatory action' or 'rule-following' behaviour in the sense of March and Olsen (1989: ch. 2), but with a differentiation of norms from, as something more specific than, the 'rules' of March and Olsen and many other 'institutionalists', by which the former mean:

> ... the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies around which political activity is constructed. We also mean the beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that surround, support, elaborate, and contradict those roles and routines.

FIELD OF ACTION/(MOVES)	FRAMEWORK OF ACTION	
	Normative	*Non-Normative*
Normative		(Personal morality)
Institutional	Role-plays	
Conscientious	Normative order	
Non-normative	Markets	Power-plays

Figure 2 Systems of Action

Markets and role-plays often have more of a symbiotic than a competitive relationship to each other. In many contexts, markets allocate the tickets to the plays going on. The labour market allocates tickets to the occupational role-plays, the electoral market to the plays of representations and the sex and marriage markets to the family plays.

There is a further third kind of important institutionalized action, which is much more strict in its normative prescription than the role-play. But it is usually treated as a special part of an institution or of an organizational role-play, rather than as an institution in itself. This is *ritual*, ceremonies or formal procedures. They are not expected to be interpreted or implemented variably, but strictly according to rule, to liturgy or protocol, although the art of their enactment is rarely the same among all legitimate actors. Rituals are displays of norms, and are therefore important in reinforcing attachment to the latter.

Non-institutional Normative Actions

Institutions do not exhaust the normative. At the other end of the spectrum of human action, we find a large variety of action from *personal norms*. They range from, for example, volunteering to participate in a just war to pursuing a conception of a righteous life. A personal morality may often prescribe and proscribe very strictly, but the actor retains the option of making an 'exception'. There are also, in the world, a number of social norms, which do not form part of an institutional complex, although they may be related to other rules, recommendations or prohibitions for social interaction. They regulate social traffic, define conscientious action and make up a functioning, non-institutionalized *normative order*, 'Do not litter! Don't drink and drive!'

Two new fields of normative concern successfully demanding new normative orders pertain to how humans should relate to their environment, and how the new capacities of biogenetics and medicine should be used and allocated.

We may summarize this discussion in Figure 2.

Conditions of Norm Conformity

Within contemporary sociology there is, to my knowledge, no systematic attempt to formulate a temporary conclusion from findings about determinants of norm conformity and norm violation. Results from pedagogy and criminology would be very pertinent here. We may assume that norm conformity and violation as processes over time have a tendency to follow a logistic model, an S-curve, with thresholds and tipping points (Schelling, 1978). But what are the variables and the mechanisms behind the model in this case? That is, behind the given situation of the actors? In case we should be interested in strengthening or weakening conformity, where should we intervene?

There seem to be three sets of key variables. One is obviously the *socialization of the actors*. This is not only dependent on the framing, the length, the consistency and the intensity of their instruction. It is also crucially affected by the actors' identity formation: that is, with the amount of self-respect and self-confidence they have, and with the strength of their identification with the norm source. The process of identity formation leads easily to either virtuous or vicious spirals, because of the effects of the socializers upon the socialized, of parents upon children, of teachers or leaders upon followers. An unsure, unattractive, inconsistently norm-conforming socializer tends to produce successors with little self-confidence and little attachment to the norms taught, traits which then are likely to be transmitted to the next generation.

When processes of identification are lacking, even totalitarian power of the socializers is seldom sufficient to instil the norms desired. This seems to be a general problem of prison management and national occupation; instead of the official norms being internalized, their following is met with tacit counter-norms. Evasion of the official norms may become a rule.

This leads us to the *boundaries* of normative identification. The socialization of values and norms varies not only in depth, but also in range. Normative action may end with the family, as 'amoral familism', among the believers, of 'fundamentalism', or with the nation, and express itself in chauvinism, imperialism, or 'ethnic cleansing'. There have been some noteworthy extensions of normativity to humanity in recent decades, after the defeats of fascism and of colonialism, as human rights, but in the last year or so there has also been a renewed demonization of enemy others as 'terrorists', to whom no human rights should apply.

The perception of others must be considered in another way too, less dramatic perhaps but even more important in everyday life. That is, as the *perception of the compliance by others*. If you believe that most other people do not cheat, you are more likely not to cheat yourself, than if you thought that the majority of people are cheating. While there may be norms you

follow out of self-respect, the wish not to be a 'sucker' bears heavily on norm-conformity.

Then there are the *institutions*. The more clearly formulated, internally consistent, compatible and interlocked with other institutions a given institution is, the more likely its norms are to be followed. And the fact is, of course, that institutions – be they private property, parliamentary democracy or the nuclear family – vary considerably in those respects from one social system to another.

Finally, the normal intertwining of different kinds of motivation among human actors should make very important the *coupling of norms and incentives/sanctions*. The higher the reward structures, the more tightly a punishment pattern is correlated with the norm system, the more norm conformity is to be expected. Once said, this is self-evident, to the border of banality. But to work out an optimal coupling of norms and incentives in complex societies, with a large variety of norms and many reward paths, is no easy task of institutional design. Nor is it facilitated by a frequent academic bifurcation of concern with norms and with incentives.

The Dynamics of Norms

The dynamics of norms involve two different kinds of problématique. One refers to the normative practices over time for a given actor or population of actors. The other concerns the supply of, and the demand for, norms within a given population. The former includes issues such as norm interpretation, norm-following or deviance, opportunism, trust, monitoring and norm enforcement. The latter involves questions of not only individual learning and cultural evolution (as in game theoretical approaches, for example: Bicchieri et al., 1997) but also of the rise of moral outrage and sentiments of injustice, calls for (de)regulation, normative discourse, moral entrepreneurs, social movements, normative mobilizations, legislation and the setting up or change of judicial organizations. The forces of change may be intrinsic to normative human action over time, or extrinsic of social conditions crucially bearing upon norms and normative action. We shall deal here with both problematics and their dynamics, starting with extrinsic forces affecting the supply and demand for norms.

Crucial Extrinsic Forces of Normative Change

From sociological experience, there appear to be at least three major forces of change affecting both the following of given norms and the demand and supply of norms. One stems from perception/cognition, the second from power relations, and the third from processes of identification.

Most obvious, perhaps, is that changing circumstances, new experiences

and new knowledge tend to call forth demands for changes or abolition of old norms and for the creation of new ones. Actors' experiences and perceptions of alternatives, and scientific findings, change foci of attention and notions of what is important or not. For instance, the strict norms imposed upon the members of combat, military, political and religious units, will lose their significance to the unit leaders in times of peace and compromise. When wars are won, or deintensify, human rights abuses may be detected. Or, the conduct and the contribution of children become less important to parents, who themselves are working outside the home and whose pay is sufficient to support the family.

Experiences of the depression of market economies called for a a tighter normative framework of the economy, whereas experiences of the 1980s in the UK, the USA and Chile have spawned deregulation and privatization worldwide. Scientific knowledge about the effects of tobacco or of global climate change, for instance, have generated prohibitions of smoking and norms of emissions into the air.

A particular cognitive aspect bearing upon norm dynamics derives from (the perception of) distributive outcomes. The latter are important in affecting the demand for norms. Norms of distributive justice, of fairness and of reciprocity, whatever their historical origins, are normal in human populations and are, as a rule, strongly held. Perceptions of their violation bring demands for sanctions and/or for stricter regulation. Both historical experience and psychological experiments point to the importance here of a given point of reference, often the status quo.

Second, there are changes in the relations of power – the latter being taken as a summary of resources and options perceived to be available to the actors. With respect to the dynamics of norms, relative power is effective through two very different mechanisms, following from the different functioning of norms. A major function of norm-setting is to control the actions of others and a major function of norm-following is to affirm oneself. The former brings us to relations of power and utility, the latter to questions of power within the problematics of identity and self-respect.

With respect to norms as controls of others, James Coleman's (1990: 247–8) distinction between 'targets' and 'beneficiaries' of norms is pertinent. The main point is that the people setting and maintaining a norm are not necessarily overlapping completely with the people expected to follow the norm. Norms of what children must and must not do are usually set and maintained by adults, who often see no reason why they themselves should follow them. Patriarchal norms about female behaviour are also usually of this disjoint kind, particularly with regard to virtue and sexuality. In the current attempts at global norm formation, some clearly refer to conjoint norms, such as the ones against greenhouse gas emissions, whereas others, like the efforts at proscribing war crimes, are primarily aimed at certain targets, while not being fully disjoint in Coleman's sense.

This spectrum from fully conjoint to fully disjoint norms is significant for the dynamics of norms, as it points to the variable relationships between norm-setters and targets, where relations of relative power weigh heavily.

In so far as there is any difference between the beneficiaries and the targets of a norm, norm-following, norm-establishment, and norm-disestablishment are likely to alter with changes in the relative power of targets and beneficiaries. In so far as we have to do with the normative complexes called institutions, we should expect the former changes to be slower than the changes of relative power. These power relations operate on the micro as well as the macro level, between fathers and daughters or principals and agents as well as between social collectivities and states. With respect to the norm conformity of given actors, changed power relations between targets and beneficiaries affect both the (dis)incentives and the identification of the former, for example, if war criminals are brought to justice it is normally the defeated ones.

Furthermore, the power of the source of normative identification, relative to alternative sources, also governs the dynamics of norms. The importance of this relative power is most clearly discernible with regard to affiliation to or disaffiliation from broad systems of values and norms, such as religions and secular ideologies, where the power or efficiency of the norms themselves are too indirect, complex or uncertain to be attainable by rational knowledge only. The world religions spread with the relative power of arms and traded prosperity. Affiliations to socialism increased with the power of the Soviet Union and disaffiliations from socialism with its decline and collapse. The recent strengthening of religious norms in the Islamic world is, in large part, due to defeats and frustrations, to the weakening, of secularist models of development.

Third, the establishment and the vitality of norms are governed further by the unpredictable supply of sources of identification. The latter may often be seen as moral entrepreneurs, and should be treated as a specific force, alongside the perceptive cognitive changes which they also try to bring about. The charisma of such figures of identification is a significant variable. The concept was developed with respect to founders and leaders of religions, but it may refer to secular stars as well.

Personal charisma can neither be transferred nor inherited. But its force, and that of all objects of identification, may be reproduced. This is where narratives become crucial, narratives of the founders and other heroes or of the key moments of the religion, the country, the movement, the corporation, providing exemplars to successive generations. Icons and other visual images have the same purpose – of reproducing a source of identification over time. Rituals strive to keep our collective memory alive and their power in this respect is sometimes immensely impressive, such as those of religions more than a thousand years old.

A widening of a known set of sources of identification means (other

things being equal) a weakening of their relative power. Very ambitious normative enterprises, such as monasteries, sects and totalitarian states, therefore try to close off their members or inhabitants from the external world.

Intrinsic Processes of Normative Change

Regardless of what happens to the cognition/perception of actors, to power relations and to the supply of sources of identification, there are at least two intrinsic issues which any system of normative action has to face over time: demography, and the necessary interpretation of norms.

Human actors are language-using, culturally learned and consciously deliberating animals. This means that all norms are subject to actors' interpretation. The sociological starting-point – that actors vary – leads sociologists to suspect that actors are likely to interpret a given norm differently.[5] Conformity may be defined narrowly or widely. It may be emptied of meaning and become 'ritualistic', for public view only. But it may also be expressed in innovation, through a new interpretation of the norm or of the body of norms and their internal ordering.

Sociological experience would expect normative innovation to cluster somewhere at the top of the given social order, with the resources and the overview frequently associated with such positions, or on its border margin, close to another norm system. Ritualistic conformity and rupture with existing norms are expected primarily in the lower part of a given hierarchy and, in the case of rupture, among the marginals.

From the inescapably interpretative character of norm-following there follows a demographic problem, which differs from the evolutionary genetics used by game theorists (see Axelrod, 1997). New members of a family, a church or a party, new employees of an enterprise or new citizens of a state are unlikely to be identical to their predecessors. Their interpretations of the given norms therefore have a tendency to differ, at least somewhat, on the basis of the newcomers' specific experiences. Older members of institutions and organizations are normally aware of this and actively try to socialize the newcomers into the norm system.

A ritual may be characterized as a display of a norm system, and the norm prescribing the ritual guides no other action than the display of the norm system. It is therefore less subject to actors' interpretation than other norms, which have the function of guiding actors in their life. While rituals are under relatively little pressure of change, as long as the norm system is intact, other norms should be expected to undergo a continuous evolution or drift. The pace and the direction of the latter are in principle amenable to predictions from the location of the actors in historical social systems. Among the three kinds of norms distinguished above, those of contribution are more subject to interpretative evolution than the more deeply internalized norms of conduct and of distribution.

Envoi: Normative Challenges

Norms do not only constitute an analytical crossroads of disciplines. They are also central civic issues in today's world. How to deal with massive and violent violations of norms is a major issue in most domestic societies, confronted with violence in schools and other youth milieux, with outbursts of xenophobia and with crime. Institution-building is a key task on the agenda in many parts of the world, of effective state-building in Africa and other parts of the poor Third World and of constructing capitalist markets and democratic government in the post-Communist countries. On a world scale, there are several attempts at global norm formation, with regard to human rights, environmental pollution and protection of the global commons such as the oceans or the primeval rain forests. The globalization of markets is calling forth demands for global normative frameworks of economic transactions. Global 'governance', or constitutive and regulative global norms, has become a top item on global agendas.

In front of these concerns and interests, sociologists should return to a core part of our discipline, thinking about and looking empirically into the establishment of functioning norms, the operation of norm conformity, the evasion and the violation of norms and the dynamics of norms. Decision theory and other kinds of formal rational choice approaches have made significant contributions to a theoretical understanding of norms. But there is also a need for perspectives on norms from substantial and empirical concerns, of the functioning and change of institutions, of international relations, and of human rights, as well as of small groups and social movements. The wide-ranging discipline of sociology has an enormous variety of experiences to draw upon for theorizing and for systematic, comparative analyses of norms and normativity and of their relation to non-normative action.

Norms are important not only to a social order, but also to social change, and for explaining social action and social change. It is high time for the latterday sociological neglect of them to end.

Notes

1 Let justice be done, may the world perish.
2 The American Economic Association devoted a special conference session a few years ago to the question of norms (Kreps, 1997; Lindbeck, 1997).
3 The latter may sometimes be referred to as the 'situation' of the actor, but that 'situation' is a more or less permanent feature of the actor, not to be conflated with the circumstances of a piece of action to be explained. The alternatives are culturally defined or 'structurally patterned'.
4 Distributive norms may also be taken as a second sort of regulative norms.

5 Rational choice sociologists may be surprised by this. Hechter and Opp (2001: 411) find the ambiguity of norms 'the most striking conclusion' of the substantive contributions to their anthology.

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
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Abstracts/Résumés/Resúmenes

Maureen Baker
Child Poverty, Maternal Health and Social Benefits

This article begins with a discussion of the relations among family poverty, poor health and employment. It argues that some lone mothers are unable to keep their children out of poverty because poor health interferes with finding or maintaining employment. These issues are discussed with reference to the international literature, and also in the light of the results of a New Zealand research project that examines the self-reported health status of lone mothers on social benefits, their experiences as beneficiaries, and their views about the government requirement to seek paid work. These lone mothers were not exempted from the work test for health or disability reasons, but the questionnaire results indicate that their self-reported health status is well below that of New Zealand women of comparable age. About one-third report health problems, either their children's or their own. Excerpts from 120 qualitative interviews illustrate the challenges that many one-parent families face when they attempt to exit from welfare.

Keywords: child poverty, maternal health and employment, welfare to work

Maureen Baker
Pauvreté des enfants, santé de la mère et aide sociale

L'article débute par une réflexion sur les rapports entre la pauvreté de la famille, la mauvaise santé et le chômage. Il avance que certaines mères seules sont incapables de sortir leurs enfants de la pauvreté parce qu'une mauvaise santé les empêche de trouver ou de conserver un emploi. C'est une question envisagée au vu de ce qui s'est écrit sur le sujet au niveau international, mais aussi au vu des résultats de notre projet en Nouvelle-Zélande, qui examine l'influence de l'état de santé de la mère tel qu'elle le perçoit elle-même sur

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l'aide sociale, sur son expérience comme bénéficiaire de prestations et sur son attitude à l'égard de l'obligation de chercher un travail rémunéré imposée par le gouvernement. Les mères seules en question n'ont pas été exemptées de devoir chercher du travail du fait de problèmes de santé ou de déficiences, mais leurs réponses à notre questionnaire indiquent que leur état de santé tel qu'elles le présentent est nettement inférieur à celui des Néo-zélandaises d'âge similaire. Elles sont environ un tiers à rapporter des problèmes de santé: les leurs ou ceux de leurs enfants. Des extraits de 120 entrevues qualitatives illustrent les obstacles que doivent surmonter bien des familles monoparentales pour parvenir à se passer de l'aide sociale.

Mots-clés: passage de l'aide sociale au travail, pauvreté des enfants, santé de la mère et emploi

Maureen Baker
Pobreza infantil, salud materna y beneficios sociales

Este escrito comienza con una discusión sobre la relación entre pobreza en la familia, salud decayente y empleo. El escrito argumenta que algunas madres solteras no pueden mantener sus hijos fuera de la pobreza debido a la interferencia de su salud decayente, con los intentos de buscar y mantener empleos. Estas situaciones son discutidas con referencia a la literatura internacional pero también con los resultados de nuestro proyecto de investigación en Nueva Zelanda, el cual examina el estado de salud reportado por las propias madres con beneficios sociales, sus experiencias como beneficiarias y sus opiniones sobre el requisito del gobierno de conseguir trabajo. Estas madres solteras no han sido excluidas del examen de trabajo por razones de salud o incapacidad pero los resultados de nuestro cuestionario indican que este reporte propio sobre el status de salud esta bien por debajo que el de las mujeres de Nueva Zelanda, de edades similares. Aproximadamente una tercera parte de las madres entrevistadas reportaron problemas de salud en sus hijos o problemas de salud propios. Estractos de las 120 entrevistas cualitativas muestran los retos que muchas familias con un solo padre encuentran cuando intentan salir del subsidio gubernamental para salud y empleo.

Palabras claves: pobreza del niño, salud y empleo maternales, subsidio gubernamental para empleo

Belinda Clayton
Rethinking Postmodern Maladies

This article is a reconsideration of the traditional understanding of health and disease. In view of the of psychosomatic 'syndromes' and 'disorders' that

characterize the postmodern experience, this article suggests that the illnesses of postmodernity reflect a shift in the way we conceptualize health and disease. By reassessing the basis of our understanding of ill health and health we subsequently undermine the nature/culture dichotomy that has supported the tradition of allopathic medicine. By examining the advances in genetics and modern biotechnology it is becoming increasingly difficult to pin down any essentialist notion of humanity. Without this backdrop on which to demarcate the 'other', Cartesian medical assumptions are open to question. These doubts are emphasized by the body's production of the 'syndrome' or 'disorder' where understanding health and disease in terms of mind/body dualism is becoming increasingly inadequate and instead reinforcing of the inseparability of the constructs of nature and culture.

Keywords: disease, disorder, nature/culture, postmodernism, syndrome

Belinda Clayton
Repenser les maladies postmodernes

Cet article est une reconsidération de la compréhension traditionnelle de la santé et de la maladie. En vue des 'syndromes' et des 'troubles' qui caractérisent l'expérience postmoderne, cet article suggère que les maux de la postmodernité reflètent un changement dans la façon dont nous conceptualisons la santé et la maladie. En revoyant le fondement de notre compréhension de la mauvaise santé et de la santé, nous ébranlons par la suite la dichotomie nature/culture qui a soutenu la tradition de la médecine allopathique. En examinant les progrès en sciences génétiques et en biotechnologie moderne, il devient de plus en plus difficile de cerner une notion essentialiste de l'humanité. Sans cette toile de fond sur laquelle démarquer l' 'autre', les suppositions médicales cartésiennes sont remises en question. Ces doutes sont renforcés par la production du 'syndrome' ou du 'trouble', par le corps, et la compréhension de la santé et de la maladie en terme du dualisme corps–esprit devient de plus en plus inadéquat et renforce au contraire l'inséparabilité des notions construites de nature et de culture.

Mots-clés: nature/culture, postmodernisme, syndrome, trouble

Belinda Clayton
Una reconsideración de algunas enfermedades posmodernas

En este estudio se reconsidera la interpretación tradicional de la salud y la enfermedad. A la luz de los 'síndromes' y 'afecciones' que caracterizan la experiencia posmoderna, se plantea que las enfermedades de la

posmodernidad reflejan un ajuste signifivativo en la manera en que se conceptualizan la salud y la enfermedad. Revalorizando la base de nuestra interpretación de la mala y la buena salud, llegamos a socavar la dicotomía naturaleza/cultura, la que ha sostenido la tradición de la medicina alopática. Analizando los avances en la genética y la biotecnología moderna, se está poniendo cada vez más difícil precisar cualquier noción esencialista de la humanidad. Sin la presencia de este telón de fondo contra el cual delimitar el 'otro', las suposiciones médicas cartesianas son cuestionables. Estas dudas se ven refortalecidas por la producción en el cuerpo del 'síndrome' o 'afección', en que interpretar la salud y la enfermedad en términos de la dualidad cuerpo/mente se hace cada vez más inadecuado y más bien tiende a reforzar la inseparabilidad de las construcciones de la naturaleza y la cultura.

Palabras claves: afección, naturaleza/cultura, posmodernismo, síndrome

Suhasini Bhatnagar and Suraksha Agrawal
Surname Endogamy among the *Brahmin* of India

Endogamy has been a strong influence on Hindu society over the centuries and most of the 75,000 subcastes or subgroups of India's complex social stratification system practise endogamy, while the further divisions within these subcastes, called *gotras*, are required to marry exogamously. The present study focuses on three socioculturally isolated, highly endogamous groups, to study the effect of endogamy on genetic microdifferentiation. The groups are all subdivisions or classes of the *Brahmin* or priest caste, namely *Bhargavas* and *Chaturvedis* and *Kanyakubja* and *Sanadhaya Brahmin*, and all groups practise patrilineal surname endogamy. Two-generation pedigrees were drawn up and microdifferentiation was estimated using parameters like mean concordance, i.e. within-*gotra* marriages in *Bhargavas* and *Chaturvedis*, F_{IT} (the inbreeding coefficient or inbreeding-like effect due to endogamy), F_{ST} (within-group a priori kinship) and R_{ST} (reduced variance of the mean value of within-group a priori kinship). Our results indicate that there is an increase in same-*gotra* marriage showing that these groups are in fact *not* following the strict rule of exogamy. This is highest among *Chaturvedis* (17.1 percent) as compared to *Bhargavas* (11.2 percent), *Kanykubja Brahmins* (13.4 percent) and *Sanadhaya Brahmin* (16.92 percent). The F_{ST} is almost the same in all the populations over two generations; however, it is slightly lower among *Bhargavas* and highest in *Brahmin* indicating that although these populations follow endogamy at surname level they are exogamous at *gotra/kuldevi* level. The same is indicated by F_{IS}, which shows that in spite of strict endogamy there is no inbreeding-like effect in these populations. R_{ST} measures variance among

populations and our results reveal that these populations are distinct from one another.

Keywords: Bhargava, Brahmins, caste, Chaturvedi, endogamy

Suhasini Bhatnagar et Suraksha Agrawal
Endogamie du nom de famille chez les brahmanes de l'Inde

La stratification de la société en Inde est unique: s'y superposent environ 2000 castes, que l'on peut diviser encore en unités endogames qualifiées de sous-castes, pour atteindre un total d'environ 75.000 ensembles. Les sous-castes se divisent elles-mêmes en *gotras,* lignées exogames. Environ 87 pour cent des sous-castes sont endogames et 5 pour cent permettent des mariages *anuloma* (hypergames: où la femme se marie au-dessus de son rang). Dans presque tous les cas, il s'agit d'une société patriarcale, la caste s'attachant au nom de famille du père. Il est possible de diviser grossièrement les castes en castes supérieures, castes moyennes et castes inférieures, selon leur statut social. La pratique de l'endogamie fait partie de l'histoire et de la tradition du pays. Elle influence la société hindoue. L'étude présente porte sur trois groupes socio-culturels isolés, de nature hautement endogames. En Inde, les brahmanes sont la classe des prêtres, chargés de performer les cérémonies religieuses. L'histoire veut que le groupe des brahmanes soit subdivisé en groupes plus petits, dont les *bhargavas* et les *chaturvedis.* On a utilisé pour mesurer la hiérarchie et la substructure de la population diverses mesures, comme F_{IT}, F_{ST} et R_{ST}. Après avoir dressé des arbres généalogiques sur deux générations, on a estimé la microdifférentiation, à l'aide de paramètres comme la concordance moyenne, par exemple dans les mariages *gotras* chez les *bhargavas* et les *chaturvedis,* dont: F_{IT} le coefficient de consanguinité ou l'effet similaire à la consanguinité dû à l'endogamie; F_{ST} le degré de parenté *a priori* au sein du groupe; R_{ST} la variance réduite de la valeur moyenne du degré de parenté *a priori* au sein du groupe. Nos résultats indiquent des mariages plus fréquents au sein d'une même *gotra,* ce qui montre que les groupes en question n'adhèrent pas strictement à une obligation d'exogamie. Le phénomène est particulièrement prévalent chez les *chaturvedis* (17,1 pour cent), contre 11,2 pour cent chez les *bhargavas,* 13,4 pour cent chez les brahmanes *kanykubja* et 16,92 pour cent chez les brahmanes *sanadhaya.* Sur deux générations, F_{ST} est similaire dans toutes les populations, bien qu'il soit légèrement plus faible chez les *bhargavas* et à son plus élevé chez les brahmanes, ce qui indique que les populations en question respectent l'endogamie au niveau du nom de famille, mais sont exogames au niveau *gotra/kulvedi.* C'est un point qu'indique aussi F_{IS}: malgré une stricte endogamie, il n'y a pas d'effet similaire à la consanguinité dans les populations en question. La valeur R_{ST} est la

variance entre les populations. Nos résultats montrent que les populations étudiées sont distinctes les unes des autres.

Mots-clés: Bhargava, Brahmin, caste, Chaturvedi, endogamie

Suhasini Bhatnagar y Suraksha Agrawal
Endogamía de apellido entre Brahmins de India

La estratificación social de la sociedad India es única, siendo dividida en alrededor 2000 castas, las cuales pueden ser divididas en unidades endógamas llamadas subcastas. El número total de éstas en India está estimado en 75000 unidades. Más aún estas subcastas estan divididas en linajes exógamos *gotra*. Alrededor del 87 por ciento de subcastas son endógamas y 5 por ciento permiten matrimonios 'anuloma' (hypergamos: mujeres que se casan socialmente por encima de su estatus social). En casi todos los casos, la sociedad es patriarcal y las castas mantienen el apellido paterno. Las castas pueden, a grandes rasgos, ser divididas en castas mayores, castas medias y castas menores, basadas en su estatus social. La práctica de endogamía forma parte de la historia y tradición del país y han influenciado la sociedad Indú. Estudios recientes se enfocan en tres grupos socioculturalmente asolados, los cuales son altamente endógamos por naturaleza. En India, Brahmins son la clase sacerdotal que hacen ceremonias religiosas. Historicamente este grupo está subdividido en grupos más pequeños: Bhargavas y Chaturvedis son subdivisiones de Brahmins. La población jerárquica y la población substructural han sido medidas usando varias medidas como: F_{IT}, F_{ST}, y R_{ST}. Por este propósito pedigrees de doble generación fueron escogidas y micro diferenciación fue estimada usando parametros como termino medio de concordancia, por ejemplo, entre matrimonios *gotra* en Bhargavas y Chaturvedis. F_{IT} ej. cruce híbrido (procreativo) coeficiente o cruce como efecto atribuido a la endogamía, F_{ST} entre otros grupos de parentesco ancestral, R_{ST} ej. variante reducida del valor medio dentro del grupo de parentesco ancestral. Nuestros resultados indican que hay un incremento de matrimonios entre individuos del mismo *gotra*, mostrando que estos grupos no están siguiendo las estrictas reglas de la exogamía. Esta es más alta entre Chaturveolis (17.1%), comparada con Bahargavas (11.2%), Kanykubja Brahmins (13.4%) y Sanadhaya Brahmins (16.92%). El F_{ST} ha sido casi el mismo en todas las poblaciones por dos generaciones, en todo caso, un poco más bajo entre Bhargavas y más alto entre Brahmins, indicando que aún cuando estas poblaciones siguen la endogamía al nivel de apellido, no son exógamos al nivel *gotra*/Kuldevi. Lo mismo es indicado por el F_{IS}, el cual muestra que a pesar de estricta endogamía, no hay efecto de cruce procreativo en estas poblaciones. El valor

R_{ST}, es la variante entre poblaciones. Nuestros resultados revelan que estas poblaciones se distinguen de una a otra.

Palabras claves: Bhargava, Brahmin, casta, endogamía

Göran Therborn
Back to Norms! On the Scope and Dynamics of Norms and Normative Action

Social norms and normativity are important parts of social change and social concern, as well as of social order. They are highly pertinent to a number of social disciplines. It is paradoxical that their theorizing and their study, at the core of neoclassical sociology, have been neglected for some time by sociologists, and major advances made from perspectives of rational choice. The marginalization of norms within recent sociology is critically discussed. An analytical field, and some tools for ploughing it, are laid out: of three basic kinds of norms, of normative and non-normative action, of different kinds of fundamental institutions, of bases of norm conformity, and of the dynamics and change of norms. The relevance of normative analysis to a range of areas, from globalization to families, is indicated.

Keywords: action, conformity, institution, norm, social dynamics

Göran Therborn
Revenons aux normes! Sur l'étendue et la dynamique des normes et de l'action normative

Les normes et la normativité sociales constituent un élément important du changement et des inquiétudes en matière de société, ainsi que de l'ordre social. Elles sont hautement pertinentes pour un certain nombre de disciplines sociales. Il est paradoxal que les sociologues négligent depuis un temps assez considérable l'étude et la théorie des normes, qui constituaient un fondement de la sociologie néoclassique, et que des percées majeures se soient effectuées dans la perspective du choix rationnel. Il est effectué une étude critique de la marginalisation des normes au sein de la sociologie actuelle. Il est présenté un champ d'analyse, avec certains outils pour le labourer: trois types de normes de base, l'action normative et l'action non normative, les différents types d'institutions fondamentales, les bases de la conformité à la norme et, enfin, la dynamique et l'évolution des normes. Il est indiqué


comment l'analyse normative peut s'appliquer à toute une gamme de domaines, de la mondialisation aux familles.

Mots-clés: action, conformité, dynamique sociale, institution, norme

Göran Therborn
En enfoque de dinámicas de normas y acciones normativas

Normas sociales y normatividad son partes importantes del cambio social y de interés social, al mismo tiempo que de orden social. Estos son altamente pertinentes para un número de disciplinas sociales. Es paradógico, que su teoría y estudio, esenciales de sociología neo-clásica, han sido olvidados hace bastante tiempo por los sociólogos, y mayores avances hechos desde perspectivas de decisión racional. La marginalización de normas dentro de la sociología reciente, ha sido discutida críticamente. Un campo analítico, y algunas herramientas para ararlo, de tres clases de normas básicas, de acciones normativas y no-normativas, de diferentes clases de instituciones fundamentales, de bases de forma de conformidad, y de dinámicas y cambios de normas son planteadas. La relevancia del análisis normativo en diferentes areas, desde globalización hasta familias, es indicada.

Palabras claves: acción, conformidad, dinámicas sociales, institución, norma



Thank you


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
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